500.A15 a 1/469: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
112. Point 4, your 55, July 20 [19], 10 a.m. [4 p.m.] Memorandum quoted my 105,75a should not be construed as a Japanese suggestion. It represents points discussed by British and Japanese delegations and indicates a method the British hope may serve to reconcile differences between British and Japanese regarding total tonnage.
Following is in explanation of heading 2 respecting retention of an additional 25 percent over and above 500,000 tons of surface craft for the United States and Great Britain and approximately 300,000 tons for Japan. In executive committee meeting July 9th Viscount Ishii said that the Japanese delegation were prepared to consider favorably a suggestion made by Mr. Bridgeman that if a number of ships were allowed to be retained after they had reached their replacement age this would facilitate discussing the questions of total tonnage and total number of smaller cruisers. This idea of retaining over-age vessels has previously been incorporated in various proposals presented by the British (see my 83, July 12, 9 p.m.; 101, July 17 noon;76 also see comment thereon in my 105 and 106). The essence of the proposal is: [Page 128]
- First, neither the United States nor Great Britain shall maintain more than 500,000 tons of auxiliary surface craft including cruisers and destroyers which are under the age limits of 16 and 12 years;
- Second, the two powers may each maintain an additional 125,000 tons of ships which have passed the ages of 16 and 12 years;
- Third, as ships pass from the first to the second group they may be replaced in the former by completed new construction; but in the event that the tonnage of the second group had already been entirely taken up by over-age vessels an equivalent tonnage from the second group would have to be scrapped;
- Fourth, the total tonnage of the first group could be filled up to its limit by new construction and thereafter new construction could only proceed as vessels of the first group passed the age limit.
Insofar as our present situation is concerned such a proposal would not require immediate scrapping. In the allowed 500,000 tons of surface craft we could retain 10 Omahas, 60,000 tons, also approximately 50,000 tons of old cruisers and all our 307,000 tons of destroyers. In the over-age tonnage of 125,000 we could place our remaining 115,000 tons of very old cruisers or we could maintain such other subdivision of cruisers and destroyers as appeared desirable. As new cruisers are completed we could fill up the first group to the allowed 500,000 tons and thereafter transfer over-age vessels to the second group as required and scrap the oldest vessels when the 125,000-ton limitation is reached. (All figures in Washington standard tons.)
This proposal as advanced is of advantage to Great Britain in that the total tonnage figure is camouflaged and permits her to build up to a total of 500,000 tons of cruisers and destroyers below their proposed age limits of 16 years for cruisers and 12 years for destroyers. Great Britain is in a position to fill the supplementary group of 125,000 tons during the life of the treaty with efficient vessels which are now less than 16 years old (which we could not do) and gives them a clear advantage over the United States of all vessels placed in the second group. Before we could discuss such a plan we should have to devise modifications which would give us adequate compensation in second group.
The Japanese do not desire a total tonnage limitation which will lead to new construction on their part, as they have stated that their people would force them into building if the treaty permitted it. On the basis of approximately 300,000 tons of surface craft in first place they would not have any free tonnage available for construction other than that tonnage required for the completion of the 10,000-ton cruisers now building or projected by them. Further they would not have any considerable number of vessels which would [Page 129] pass into the second group thus making room for new construction. The vessels which the Japanese would be able to place in the second group are generally of low combatant value and it is judged from their previous propositions that they feel they would be as satisfactorily situated without these vessels as with them. The Japanese have apparently acquiesced in this proposal in an endeavor to facilitate solution of the British problem. The only features of this plan which might make it deserving of consideration with a view to modification to meet our situation are that it tends to restrict new construction on the part of the nations and brings the tonnage of cruisers in first group within figures Japanese are apparently prepared to discuss.
An unsatisfactory feature of this proposal as presented is that the cruisers we have available for placing in the second group are of low combatant value and it will be impossible for us to derive any considerable benefit as far as cruisers are concerned from the additional [125,000 tons] during the life of the treaty as compared with Great Britain unless some satisfactory modification can be found. The Japanese, like ourselves, secure no substantial benefit from second group but they seem more interested in restricting first group to approximately 300,000 so as to make further new construction unnecessary.
In unofficial conversations, members of the Japanese technical advisory group have stated that they do not favor the plan for themselves and further that they recognize the plan as being obviously unfair to the United States in its present form. Ishii and Saito on the other hand seem favorably disposed to the plan but probably would not oppose modifications which would make it more equitable for us if such modifications did not force them to demand changes for themselves which would require new construction.
We are giving careful attention to this scheme and to modifications necessary to make it even a possible basis for discussion as we object to its camouflage features. We are working on modifications which will fully guard our interests and limit tonnage in a straightforward manner.
With respect to further point raised in paragraph 4, your 55, we think that British and Japanese would agree to some arrangement satisfactory to the United States for retention by Great Britain of the four Hawkins. This question has not yet been discussed as its solution will depend on the establishment of two classes of cruisers.