500.A15 a 1/475: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 23—1:50 p.m.]
115. Reference is made to my telegram No. 82, of July 12, 8 p.m., and to the next to the last paragraph of my telegram No. 108 of July 19, 5 p.m. The draft which follows is submitted with the hope that you will let us have your comments as to whether you consider objectionable a political clause similar to the one contained therein. The American delegation is conscious that a treaty without such a clause would be preferred and will suggest such a clause only should it prove to be the sole way of harmonizing our positive stand concerning freedom of action on armament with the British insistence that they will be compelled to ask for some rearrangement of the total tonnage limitation for cruisers if the United States persists in maintaining its right to build cruisers which will carry 8-inch guns.
As a practical thing, I do not believe the British would ever wish to make use of such an article or that our construction program would ever cause them any actual uneasiness and this was the only reason I suggested the possibility of such a clause. However, it is quite possible that an article of this nature might assist materially in obtaining [Page 132] British ratification of any treaty which might be negotiated between the three powers at Geneva.
It should be understood, of course, that the draft given below is only a rough form of what such an article might include and an expression of your views in the premises would be appreciated:78
“In event that prior to December 31, 1936, any one of the contracting powers shall consider that the tonnage allocation in the cruiser class has been utilized by any other of the contracting powers in a manner to call for an adjustment of the total tonnage allocation of that class, such high contracting party may at any time, subsequent to January 31, 1931, convoke a meeting of the Powers parties to the present treaty, with a view to ascertaining whether such an adjustment can be made by mutual agreement. In the event that no agreement is reached at such a conference, any of the high contracting parties may give notice of the desire to terminate the present convention and this notification shall be effective within one year after the receipt thereof by the other parties to the treaty. In such an event, the treaty shall terminate with respect to all of the parties thereto.”
When this matter was discussed in the American delegation, the opinion was expressed that while it was improbable, from a practical standpoint, that a conference would be convened by reason of any program of American naval construction, nevertheless, such a clause might give rise to the objection that a pretext is given to bring diplomatic pressure designed to hamper legitimate construction.
This objectionable feature might be overcome by an article in which more general phraseology was used, similar to the rough draft given below:78
“If, during the term of the present treaty, circumstances should arise which, in the opinion of any contracting power, materially threaten its national interests, the contracting powers will at the request of such power, meet in conference with a view to the reconsideration of the provisions of the present treaty and its amendment or abrogation by mutual agreement, provided that such request be made not less than 6 months prior to the time of meeting and the reasons for the request are fully set forth.”