441.11 W 892/73
The Assistant Secretary of State (Olds) to the Secretary of
State
London,
September 23,
1926.
22
Dear Mr. Secretary: This letter which I am
dictating now in order to get it into the next pouch, is, of course,
only a preliminary report on the matters mentioned. I have been in
London less than
[Page 246]
two days and
shall, of course, have more precise information before I leave.
(1) Immediately upon my arrival I had a brief conference with the
Ambassador and Mr. Phenix and then went to the Foreign Office for a
conference with Sir William Tyrrell at his request. Enclosed is my
memorandum covering the conference at the Foreign Office. It is
understood that after I have gone into matters more fully with Mr.
Phenix, I shall have another talk with Sir William next week. Generally
speaking, I find that the problem of the adjustment of the claims is
surrounded by an atmosphere of optimism. Everybody here thinks that we
are on the right track and that these perplexing questions will be
speedily disposed of when the pending examination into the facts is
concluded. It is estimated that this examination will come to an end
about the third week in October. There may be some routine work after
that but by the first of November we ought to be in a position to wind
up the business. You will note that Mr. Vansittart, the head of the
American Section of the Foreign Office is to be in Washington at that
time and my understanding is that he will have authority to discuss the
matter in the light of facts as they may then appear. The main favorable
factor at this juncture is that the British Authorities are now fully
convinced that our method of going at it is the right one and that they
have perfect faith in our ability to reach a mutually satisfactory
result. As we have long supposed, and as you told the British Ambassador
in Washington, the so-called “war claims” in the aggregate will
eventually boil down to a residuum which ought to present few
difficulties. The brain storm phase is over and the British appear to be
just as anxious as we are to have a clean up. Naturally they have been
much relieved to find that our records and their own, when brought into
comparison show that the volume of claims which must form the subject of
real negotiation will be not at all what it had been assumed to be. Mr.
Phenix tells me that so far as they have gone the records disclose
settlements in one way or another of most of the claims which we had on
our list. I expect to go into the details so far as I can within the
next few days and make certain that we are not giving away any part of
our case and that nothing in the present procedure will operate to
embarrass us on any question of principle which may be involved. I am,
myself, becoming convinced that we can find an ultimate formula for
settlement which will not bring the two countries face to face on issues
which cannot be conceded by either of them. The trick will be, through
careful consideration of the individual cases left in dispute after the
examination of facts is concluded, to dispose of them on grounds which
will permit us to say that we have waived no question of principle, and
at the same time enable the British Government to avoid an
acknowledgment
[Page 247]
on the record
that the operations of the British Navy were necessarily invalid.
Probably, as part of the settlement, an exchange of Notes between the
two Governments can make all of this plain, and save the respective
positions of the two Governments. The important thing for us is to get
the record in such shape as to allow us to satisfy our own Congress that
no question of principle has been directly or impliedly sacrified by us.
I suppose it would be quite possible for our Government, if it wanted to
do so, to take some of these claims and crowd the British Government
into a most embarrassing and difficult position. As I have indicated in
my memorandum of the conversation with Sir William Tyrrell, the Foreign
Office recognizes that possibly we have this power, and it is stated
flatly that if we proceeded to exercise it serious complications would
ensue. Everybody I have talked with here agrees that the Baldwin
Government would in all likelihood fall if it attempted to make an
adjustment on any basis which would concede the invalidity of the
blockade. It goes without saying that the affair must be handled with
the utmost discretion, but I think that with the disposition which is
now evidenced on both sides, the problem admits of fairly prompt
solution. If we succeed it will be an exceedingly important and almost
unprecedented accomplishment. At the Foreign Office the matter is
apparently fully in the hands of Sir William Tyrrell who is following it
closely. Unless it later drifts into the bitter controversial and
political phase, probably Sir Austen Chamberlain and the rest of the
British Cabinet will not be concerned with it. I am satisfied that Sir
William is ready to go to great lengths to settle up everything on the
merits.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I think there is fully enough here to keep me busy for the next few days
until I sail on the 30th. The Ambassador has already talked over a great
many of his problems with me and I shall have much further information
to convey to you when we meet. We may go up to Scotland for the week-end
with the Ambassador and Mrs. Houghton. Our boat is scheduled to land us
in New York the morning of the 8th of October, and I should like to come
over to Washington immediately. If the usual Port courtesies can be
arranged, it will enable me to save some time and be certain of arriving
before night.
As ever [etc.]
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of
State (Olds) of a
Conversation With Sir William Tyrrell, of the British Foreign
Office, September 21, 1926
While I was in Paris I received a note from Sir William suggesting
that when I came to London he would be glad if I could arrange to
[Page 248]
have an informal talk
with him. I replied, stating that I would of course communicate with
him as soon as I arrived. Attached is the correspondence on that
subject.23
Within an hour or two after my arrival in London on October [September] 21st, a telephone call was
received at the Embassy from Sir William’s office, suggesting that,
if possible, we have an interview at 3:30 that afternoon. After a
brief talk with Ambassador Houghton I went to the Foreign Office.
The interview lasted a little less than one hour. Sir William
received me with the utmost cordiality and talked with great freedom
and frankness, not only on the subject of the pending claims between
the two countries, but about other matters. He launched into a
rather extensive dissertation on the relations between the United
States and Great Britain and a good deal of what he said was
virtually an ad hoc adaptation of the “hands
across the sea” theme with which we are all so familiar. He touched
upon a great variety of subjects in this connection, discussing what
he designated as our Monroe policy, the fundamental causes for
Britain’s and our own entry into the World War, and so forth. He
made no mention, however, of the Debt Question. Of course, he
emphasized the importance at all times of having a complete
understanding between the two Governments, and to that end of
eliminating every conceivable cause of friction. In his view there
would never be anything like a formal alliance between England and
the United States. The English, he said, were no more enamoured of
alliances than we are. The best sort of alliance, using the term in
its broadest sense, was an understanding which would enable the two
countries to stand together in any great international emergency. It
went without saying, he asserted, that the peace of the world could
be effectually preserved whenever England and America agreed to
insist that it be kept.
Passing to the matter of the claims, Sir William stated that there
was always much difficulty in getting such questions in shape to
permit their discussion on the merits. There was always danger that
controversies of this nature might, for one reason or another, be
embarrassed and to some extent decided on extraneous issues. It
seemed to him in the highest degree important that these claims be
treated in such a way as to prevent political considerations from
entering into the negotiations. He spoke about the difficulty which
the Foreign Office had in explaining the situation fully to
Parliament and I naturally interjected that we also had Congress to
consider.
He then expressed the deepest satisfaction with the present stage of
the proceedings. He said that the method now being employed, was in
his judgment, perfectly sound and had every prospect of
[Page 249]
bringing about a complete
adjustment. It was obviously necessary to ascertain all the facts so
that both Governments might know exactly where they stood. His
Government intended to cooperate to the limit for that purpose. I
stated that I was informed by Mr. Phenix that he had met with
nothing but the most whole-hearted co-operation and that the work of
assembling all the data was proceeding without the slightest hitch.
Sir William indicated that he had been following the operation very
closely. He considered that this controversy was one of the most
important ones which had ever arisen between the two countries
because if the claims were not handled with the utmost discretion
the two Government’s might be brought face to face on certain issues
which were vital: on the one hand there was our undoubted interest
in maintaining neutral rights and on the other, England was bound to
protect its position as a great maritime power. He made it clear
that if the issue of the validity of the British blockade should be
brought to the surface and presented in any definite way, the whole
controversy would at once enter a political phase and the relations
between the two countries would necessarily become difficult.
He believed, however, firmly, that when the pending examination is
concluded it will be perfectly feasible for us to dispose of the
residuum of claims which our Government might feel obliged to press
without much trouble. He thought we ought to treat the whole matter
as one of more or less routine business. While it was impossible,
for the moment, to write a formula for the ultimate disposition of
such claims, with the information now before him, he considered that
it would be feasible to dispose of the claims on grounds which would
not raise vital issues and which would at the same time permit both
Governments to reserve their respective positions. He would not
expect our Government to waive anything in principle nor did he
think that we had any occasion to try to indict the British
Government for violation of the principles of international law. He
hoped that a way could be found to handle the situation practically
as a bookkeeping operation. It was entirely possible considering the
way in which the facts are developing that offsets could be made
allowing an adjustment without putting the Foreign Office in the
position of going to Parliament for a large sum to pay claims of the
United States arising out of the War. He said flatly that if his
Government had to go to Parliament to pay blockade claims as such,
the present Government, in all probability would be thrown out and
he did not see how any British Government could survive the attacks
which would be made upon it in that contingency.
On the whole, we agreed that the outlook was most favorable and that
we had no reason for taking anything but an optimistic point of
view.
[Page 250]
At the end of the conversation Sir William called in Mr. Vansittart,
the head of the American Section in the Foreign Office and stated
that Mr. Vansittart was sailing for the United States and would be
in Washington when the “Phenix-Broderick” report is made. Both Sir
William and Mr. Vansittart assured me that, at that time, they would
be ready to work out a final formula for the disposition of the
whole subject.
I gained the impression that Sir William and his associates have been
greatly relieved by finding that the United States claims are not at
all what they had at first feared and that the amounts involved are
not going to be considerable in any event. When the subject was at
first broached, they were naturally in the dark and there were
rumors that our demands would run into huge sums. The demonstration
now being made completely dissipates this anxiety and the general
attitude of the Foreign Office is one of optimism and a disposition
to go the limit in wiping the slate clean. Sir William agreed that
under all of the circumstances the time had arrived to get rid of
these claims, once and for all, and that it would be unfortunate to
allow them to remain unsettled any longer.
I told him that we felt very strongly that it would be a great
mistake for both Governments to delay matters and Sir William again
emphasized the danger of permitting the situation to drift into the
political phase.
R. E. O[lds]
London, September 22,
1926.
