Your perfect knowledge of the situation will, I hope, prove of decisive
use to the Department of State.
President Borno
to the High Commissioner in Haiti (Russell)
Memorandum
Considering that the time eventually set by the Constitution for
legislative elections is near at hand, the Haitian Government deems
it imperative to communicate to the Government of the United States
the considerations and opinion hereinbelow expressed, which in its
opinion, would if applied insure also in the Republic of Haiti the
order and stability needed for its general development and afford an
effective guarantee of the continuance of the remarkable results
already achieved for the progress and prosperity of the Republic
through the frank and loyal cooperation of the two Governments.
The Haitian Government has no hesitancy in declaring that it is
sincerely and absolutely convinced that if the legislative Chambers
were called at this time the happy state of things that has just
been referred to would be really threatened.
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Article D of the Haitian Constitution3 which
substituted a mere Legislative Council for the Chambers by
adjourning “sine die”, so to speak, any consultation of the people
concerning legislative elections, was certainly in the minds of the
two Governments to answer a dual objective:
On the one hand, not to entrust assemblies born of elections with the
law-making of the country until there was a certainty that the
political passions having wholly subsided there was no reason to
fear there would be in the Chambers elements of agitation and
disturbance apt to offer systematic opposition to the achievement of
political, administrative and economic ends concerning which a final
agreement had been reached by the two Governments through the
Convention of 1915.4
On the other hand, only to call upon the voters to exercise their
franchise for legislative elections so granted by the Constitution
conditionally, when the people would have been sufficiently educated
to make it possible to assert that there was a body of voters with a
sufficient knowledge of their duties and reasonably prepared for a
full unlimited enjoyment of their political rights.
In the opinion of the Haitian Government based on judicious
observation, it is proper to acknowledge that neither objective has
yet, generally speaking, been wholly attained thus far. On account
of the lack of means it has not yet been found possible to develop
the education of the people so as to put the great majority of the
citizens of cities, and particularly of the country, in possession
of the intellectual means required for a conscientious and
clear-sighted use or exercise of the franchise.
In this connection an idea may be formed from the city elections
which the Constitution of 1918 maintains with the very object of
forming an accurate estimate through repeated experiments every two
years of the problem of the voting attitude in the country.
These elections have always taken place up to date with a number of
voters decidedly below the least optimistic, statistical estimates
showing through the anomalous number of voters the slight interest
taken as a rule by the Haitian voter in the exercise of his
franchise. The voting quorum always was found quite low, so much so
that it would be hard to find therein a true expression of the will
of the majority of the people whose votes were sought.
The legislative elections, if they were to take place in 1926, would
coincide with the renewal of the Presidential term and would be
imperilled thereby, a feature of extreme unrest caused by the
probable excitement of the people. The opposition, whose only
platform
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it might be said
is the overthrow of the state of things created by the Convention of
1915, would surely display the greatest activity and bring into play
all its resources so as to win a majority in the legislative body
and thus bring about the victory of its Presidential candidate. It
would find quite an advantage in this undertaking in the
indifference of the bulk of the voters hereinabove noted and might
very well, thanks to this indifference, gain a privileged, if not
prominent situation, in the national Chamber.
The Haitian Government believes that this prospect, resting on a
plausible surmise, particularly if a policy of nonintervention in
the elections were adopted, must arrest the earnest attention of the
two Governments and unite them in the joint concern of warding off
the grave consequences which might follow from its being possibly
carried out.
Insofar as it is concerned, this Government maintains in this respect
the opinion it invariably professed heretofore, namely, that the
narrow bounds within which the Convention and the Constitution have
hemmed the exercise of legislative power, particularly in their
budget and financial clauses, will always make it difficult for
political assemblies in position to claim a free electoral
investiture and a full execution of the diplomatic instrument of
1915 to work harmoniously. This opinion is the result of the careful
examination made into the deep changes introduced in the traditional
relations between the executive and legislative powers by the
Convention and the Constitutional provisions which are the
unavoidable consequences thereof.
The last paragraph of article 55 and article 112 of the Constitution,
together with certain provisions of the Convention, particularly
those contained in article 9 of the last-named instrument, have as a
matter of fact stripped the legislative Chambers of all autonomy in
budget and fiscal matters. The initiative in lawmaking, which is
granted them by the second paragraph of article 55, is noticeably
lessened by the last paragraph under which the initiative as to laws
concerning public expenditures is reserved for the executive power,
the reason being that laws that do not call for any expenditure are
exceedingly rare.
Legislative Chambers won to the spirit of opposition will not
patiently put up with the passive attitude forced upon them by these
restrictions and it is to be presumed that they will constantly be
inclined to seek a compensation in an excessive use of the few
prerogatives and powers left them going as far as resorting to
obstruction should the case arise. The executive power, defenseless
and powerless, would be placed in a situation so created with no
other alternative than to abdicate or resort to unlawful means.
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The first solution which without question would strengthen the
despotic tendencies of the Chambers would sanction in advance, so to
speak, anything they might undertake to do hereafter as they might
see fit against the President’s prerogatives under the cover of the
unrest and agitation borne of the Government’s unstable
conditions.
It may furthermore be safely asserted that if resort were had to
violence it would constitute an attempt on legality which would in
any event, cause, in Haitian opinion, a disturbance that would be
fatal to the real interests of the country.
Upon an impartial examination of the threats that a call of the
legislative body at this time would offer to the condition of things
created by the Convention, and the friendly cooperation of the two
Governments, the Haitian Government is also led to give equal
consideration to the advantages and resources that the quorum
relative to the deliberations of the two Houses of that body, as
provided in the Constitution, would not fail to bring to the
opponents of the Presidential regime.
It appears from article 59 of the Constitution that a majority (one
more than one-half) for the Chamber is 19 and 9 for the Senate in
the very rare cases when the two Houses would sit with all the
members present. Taking into account the unavoidable absences and
consequently the corresponding lowering of the figure for the
majority, it must be granted that there being in the two Houses
minorities including from 14 to 17 members in the Chamber of
Deputies and 5 to 7 in the Senate would be enough to place the
executive power in the most embarrassing situation, stand in the way
of all its recommendations and so paralyze the law-making
operations.
The Haitian Government in brief believes that all the foregoing
considerations are such as to discountenance the recourse to
legislative elections because of the certainty of their being
attended with disappointment. Taking the best possible aspect of
things, in case of legislative actions, it seems to the Government
that it would be very difficult even if there was a marked success
to secure in the Parliament the majority needed for an effective
action against active minorities animated with the spirit of
intrigue and ambition.
In the face of all these considerations just set forth by it, the
Haitian Government is of the firm opinion that upon sober
consideration of the present situation of the Republic of Haiti, it
is the part of wisdom and prudence for the two Governments firmly to
adhere to the policy that has brought forth so many happy results
and which the two Governments have thus far applied.
The Government means by this a condition of things signalized by the
preponderant existence of a strong executive power animated by
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the most benevolent
disposition towards a frank and cordial cooperation which must
subsist between the two Governments and which alone may meet the
necessities daily created by the operation of the Convention and to
insure the successful cooperation of that Convention in the
achievement of its eminent ends.
By the side of that power, it is important to maintain the
Legislative Council consisting of specialists, above the sterile
call of politics, bound to the executive power in close cooperation,
a council, which has unquestionably stood the test, and of which one
may expect in adding up the remarkable results already achieved much
more in the future for the happiness and prosperity of Haiti.
We must not forget, moreover, that an experiment of legislative
elections under the Convention was made in 1917 and that it
culminated through the hasty and biased attitude of the two Chambers
into a violent dissolution which was acknowledged by both
Governments to be necessary.
