893.51/3200
Memorandum by the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long)
Memorandum of conversation with the Japanese Ambassador.
The Japanese Ambassador spoke of the Consortium and of the note which we sent him yesterday which he said he was glad to receive. He said that he was surprised to see that we had taken exception to their requests to have the two particular railroads and their rights in connection therewith recognized in the agreement.
I told him that both cases were covered by the general underlying agreement. He said that for that reason the Japanese Government felt that there should be no dispute about them but that they should [Page 539] be accepted simply as the application of those principles to these two instances. I told him that things of that nature had no place in the underlying agreement, and that it would be wrong to include such particular enterprises in an agreement which aimed to lay down general principles of cooperation.
He spoke of the use of the word “veto,” and asked whether it was proposed by the use of it that Japan should not have the right to prevent those activities which might be aimed at her national interest. I explained to him that it was not; the desire to prevent that, and that in practical operation it would work out to the satisfaction of Japan in this; that England, France and the United States wanted to proceed with the railroad and it had some direct bearing upon the national interest of Japan, and if Japan should refuse to proceed that the bankers in England, France and the United States would find it practically impossible to sell their bonds.
I then alluded to Cochin China, and asked him whether he thought it would be right to give France the power to veto a railroad construction connecting southern China with Canton, on the theory that it would jeopardize the economic existence of Cochin China, when as a matter of fact such railroad would make accessible to Japan and other countries the products of a region which could not be obtained otherwise. He agreed that it would not be right to give France such a power. I then told him that the whole underlying theory of it was to substitute for a spirit of rivalry and competition one of coordination and cooperation for the good of the four Powers, and for the benefit of China. He left the impression that he was quite satisfied and would recommend to his Government the acceptance of the last note.