893.51/2770: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)9

[Paraphrase]

388. Am repeating for your information cable to our Minister in China from our Embassy in Japan:10

“April 11, 6 p.m. For Lamont’s information:

Today Inouye11 and I had a long conversation in the course of which I told him that you and I were disappointed that the Imperial Foreign Office had decided to put in the note which it recently sent to the United States comprehensive provisions in regard to enterprises the consortium might undertake in the future, matters which ought to be left for the decision of the organizations of bankers. Inouye showed plainly that he was also disappointed. He seemed just as sure as he has been that in case the British Foreign Office and our State Department should insist upon leaving such issues to be decided by the bankers final consent would be obtained from the Imperial Government. The truth of the report to which you referred in the cable you sent from Shanghai March 31, noon,12 regarding an extra loan to the Chinese Government was completely denied by Inouye. The replies of Great Britain and the United States to the note which Japan had last sent were being awaited by him with impatience. He was hoping that they would be received early enough so that when you came back to Tokyo the making of the agreement could be finally concluded. This was merely a repetition of the situation when you were in Japan before, I told him. Inouye agreed that this was so but called my attention to the fact that as negotiations advanced the matter upon which there was disagreement was narrowing. Inouye thought it would eventually disappear. Although he appeared cheerful and assured, I thought he showed the strain of the week just passed during which semi-panic conditions prevailed on the Tokyo stock exchange. It was April 7 I am informed, before the Japanese Ambassador handed to our Government the note from Japan. The Ambassador has informed the Foreign Office here that Mr. Long and Mr. Lansing told him they were pleased that Japan had dropped its condition as to Mongolia and Manchuria and expressed their feeling that an acceptable solution would be found for the minor questions remaining.”

Lamont in a cable just received from Peking13 states that he believes as firmly as he always has that the only way to get a prompt settlement is for the United States and Great Britain, with the approval of France, jointly to take a firm position.

[Page 531]

Considering your 576, April 9, noon, and our 376, April 14, 9 p.m. and this information from Ambassador Morris and Mr. Lamont, you are instructed to inform the British Government orally that we feel that the proposed united effort should consist of an absolute refusal to agree to the additional restrictions which Japan has recently imposed and that the American, French, and British Governments should state that they will adhere to the understanding between the spokesman of the Japanese banking group and Mr. Lamont. The Department has a strong feeling that the issues brought up by Japan have already made a needless delay in negotiations, and that there is danger that by persisting in bringing up new issues every time an understanding has practically been reached Japan may continue the negotiations indefinitely. We propose for this reason that the united answer be so worded as to indicate that it is the final statement and as to clearly show Japan that the United States, Great Britain, and France are now expecting a clear answer to indicate whether Japan is to cooperate or not and whether or not the United States, Great Britain, and France will find it necessary to meet the condition brought on because Japan has declined to accept.

Inform our Embassy in France, repeating this as no. 783.

Colby
  1. See last paragraph for instructions to repeat to Paris as no. 783.
  2. This telegram was repeated to the Department as the Embassy’s no. 167, undated, received Apr. 14, 1920.
  3. Junnosuke Inouye, Governor of the Bank of Japan.
  4. Copy not found in Department files.
  5. See supra.