893.51/2451: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)72
6073. Your 3161, October 2, noon.
In view of your reference to the intimation by the British Foreign Office that Japan might invoke the Lansing-Ishii exchange of notes in support of the claim to the exclusion of Manchuria and Mongolia from the operation of the consortium, I have to advise you that this Government does not consider that in that agreement it obligated itself to the recognition of any such position on the part of Japan as would warrant that claim. Any claim that the recognition of special interests was intended to imply a monopoly or a priority of economic or industrial rights is negatived by the concluding paragraphs of the agreement which explicitly and without limitation preserve the principle of equality of commercial and industrial opportunity. That this reassertion of the Open Door was understood to import no restriction in the particular case of Manchuria is made plain by the fact that that agreement assumed the existence of earlier treaty arrangements on the subject, one of the most concrete of which is the Portsmouth Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia by which the contracting parties declared that they had not in Manchuria “any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity,” and engaged “not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries, which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.” In connection with the formation of the old consortium for the Currency Loan in 1912 the Japanese and Russian Groups having made reservations regarding non-application of restrictions upon their independent action in northern China, Manchuria and Mongolia maintained the right to withdraw from participation in any such business which their respective Governments might consider “contrary to the interests of Russia or Japan.”73 Even the position sought to be established at that time by [Page 494] the Japanese and Russian groups did not contemplate any such exclusive right as is now claimed but confined itself to a right of protest against undertakings deemed positively harmful to the national interests of the two countries. In May, 1915, furthermore, during the negotiations between Japan and China which led to the so-called agreements of May 25th involving certain special political and economic advantages in favor of Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia, this Government found it necessary to advise both interested Governments that “it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the Open Door Policy.”74 The reservation thus made in behalf of this Government has never been withdrawn and must be regarded as a part of the res gestae to be considered in construing the position of the United States in reference to the question now at issue.
This Government therefore reluctantly finds itself unable to concur in the suggestion of the British Foreign Office that a solution of the difficulty might be found in accepting the Japanese reservation regarding South Manchuria as now defined by the Japanese Ambassador.
This Government can only regard the reservation in the form proposed as an attempt to inject exclusive political pretensions into a project which all the other interested Governments and groups have treated in a liberal and self-denying spirit and with the purpose of eliminating so far as possible such disturbing and complicating political motives; and it considers that from the viewpoint, either of the legitimate national feeling of China or of the interests of the Powers in China, it would be a calamity if the adoption of the consortium were to carry with it the recognition of a doctrine of spheres of interest more advanced and far-reaching than was ever applied to Chinese territory even in the period when the break-up of the Empire appeared imminent.
It can only be assumed that in taking its present position the Japanese Government has misapprehended the purposes of the consortium and assumed that it is the intention of the other Governments to encroach upon the existing vested Japanese interests in the region indicated. That such is not the intention may be seen from the wording of the inter-group agreement of May 11th [12th]75 which in article 1 [2] specifies that only those industrial undertakings are to be pooled upon which substantial progress has not been [Page 495] made. This wording plainly excludes those enterprises which are already developed and thus constitute vested proprietary interests (such as the South Manchuria and Ssupingkai-Chengchiatun Railways, the Fushun colliery, et cetera) and may fairly be interpreted to exclude likewise the existing options for the extension of railways already in operation (for instance the proposed continuation to Taonan of the Ssupingkai-Chengchiatun Railway and to Hueining (Hoiryong) of the Kirin-Changchun Railway). If Japan’s reservation is urged with a view solely to the protection of existing rights and interests, it would seem that all legitimate interests would be conserved if only it were made indisputably clear that there is no intention on the part of the consortium to encroach on established industrial enterprises or to compel the pooling of existing Japanese options for the continuation thereof: and this Government feels that the Japanese Government should be amply content with the understanding that certain specific enterprises are exempt. It will not accept a geographical reservation which could not but lend itself to implications which are foreign to the purposes of the consortium. In view of the fundamental identity of purposes and methods which has characterized the cooperation of the United States and Great Britain in both China and Siberia, this Government looks confidently to Great Britain to exert a reassuring influence upon its ally and to convince the Japanese Government that it may find it possible to authorize its banking group to enter the proposed consortium with full assurance that no legitimate Japanese rights or interests would thereby be jeopardized.
Upon such a basis this Government would be happy to cooperate in arranging for an immediate advance to China for the purposes and upon substantially the conditions suggested in your telegram.
Should such an adjustment of the difficulty appear impracticable in the near future this Government would, through great reluctance, find itself compelled to forego the hope of Japanese cooperation and to proceed with entire freedom of action although of course with the most earnest hope that the British and French Governments would find it possible to cooperate with it in the carrying out of the plans which they and their respective banking groups have already approved in principle and loyally endeavored to further.
This Government feels that it has adequate grounds for the belief that especially if supported by Great Britain and France such plans for the relief of the critical situation now existing in China might be hopefully undertaken; and that, so far from stimulating independent and rival action by Japan as apprehended by the British Government, such action would tend strongly to impress upon the Japanese Government that it is neither practical nor politic from the viewpoint [Page 496] of Japanese interests to compel its group to hold aloof from cooperation with the interests of the other powers concerned. The attitude hitherto taken by the Japanese bankers seems clearly to indicate their appreciation of the impracticability of separate action; and it is to be seriously doubted whether the Japanese Government would find it feasible to persist in its present pretensions or to maintain a policy of financial rivalry if confronted with the alternative of cooperation or competition with those whose desire is to relieve the Chinese situation without taking advantage of it to seek special benefits. It is desired that you read this telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and urge upon him the particular importance which this Government attaches to this question and its earnest hope that the influence of the British Government will be exerted to the utmost towards the attainment of an entirely harmonious cooperation among the four most interested powers in a policy which shall be wholly helpful and wholly free from any implication of self-seeking at the expense of China or of the general interests of the powers in relation to China.
In the meanwhile, as a matter of immediate concern, this Government confidently relies upon Great Britain to cause to be definitely declined the proposal for an immediate advance by the old consortium inasmuch as it would under present circumstances create a situation in which it would be difficult for Great Britain and France to withhold acquiescence in Japan’s new pretensions in South Manchuria. We consider this of the utmost importance.
In this general connection the following telegram from the Legation at Peking is repeated for your information:
“October 3, 5 p.m. The Japanese Minister called today to express his apprehension that there would be general disorder throughout North China unless financial assistance is soon given to the Peking Government. He alluded to the suggestion made to the old consortium by the Japanese Government, that the old consortium arrange for a loan. He said that no reply had been received from London to the request of the consortium bankers for instructions. As the Japanese would be the principal sufferers if disorders break out, it would be necessary for Japan to act independently in financing the Peking Government if it can not be done through the consortium. He expressed the hope that American financiers would cooperate in a loan, part of which might be allotted to the Southern Government.”
This matter is being taken up here with the British Ambassador in the same sense in connection with discussions with him regarding the situation in Siberia.
Repeat to Paris for the information and guidance of the Embassy and Marshall.
- See last paragraph for instruction to repeat to Paris.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 140.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 146.↩
- Ante, p. 439.↩