893.00/3131
The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received June 19.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that on May 13th a deadlock occurred between the Northern and Southern delegates at the Shanghai peace conference. On this day the Southern delegation formulated its policy under eight articles as follows:49
. . . . . . .
Both delegations sent in their resignations to their respective principals.
The essential issue therefore is whether the old parliament is to be recalled. There are two strong influences arrayed against the old parliament. The Japanese at present desire to validate the various agreements which they made during the last few years … and would therefore do everything in their power to defeat the recall of a parliament which would not [sic] object to the sanction of these bargains. The Northern military clique, dependent on Japanese support, is entirely committed to the new parliament which it cost them a great deal of money to elect and which they seem to value in proportion. The President having been elected by the new parliament is by that fact estopped from taking any strong action against it; it would moreover not be practicable for him to assert himself strongly in this matter as against the leader of the Anfu [Page 351] Party (the term ANFU stands for “Anhwei,” the Province of the Militarists, and “Fukien,” the Province of the Navy, and designates a combination of the militarists with the pro-Japanese clique of Tsao Ju-lin).
The general principles set forth by the Southern delegation will receive the approval of all fair-minded men, namely, that China cannot be safely governed without the presence of a representative parliament with power to control the acts of officials and to prevent the national rights being bartered away by a narrow clique temporarily sustained by foreign support. It is however questionable whether the proposal to annul the mandate of June, 1917, and to recall the old parliament could receive the active support of the Chinese nation. From a strictly legal point of view the constitutional period of the old parliament having expired it is considered by legal experts to be no longer entitled to function. For this as well as for political reasons it would therefore be difficult to get general approval of the proposition that the time elapsed since the illegal dissolution should not be counted. It must be confessed that the old parliament has not entirely won the respect of the nation and that it enjoys little more credit than the new parliament existing at Peking. Impartial men seem to be agreed that both bodies should be dissolved immediately.
Before the present deadlock arose it was believed that a compromise would be arrived at after certain period of deadlock which was expected. The compromise would take the form of a recall of the old parliament for the purpose of accepting the new election law and of devolving its power to finish the constitution to a constitutional convention representing the provinces; and that therefore both parliaments would be dissolved and a new parliament forthwith elected under the new law. It was believed that a tacit understanding to this effect had been arrived at. But everything was upset by the Paris decision on the Shantung question, which greatly encouraged the military extremists of the North to make them unwilling to listen to any idea of compromise. When the Southern demands were received at Peking a meeting was held at the President’s palace at which the Anfu leaders expressed themselves in the most violent terms. They stated that the demands of the South were utterly unacceptable and that in view of such unreasonable attitude no course was open to the government but immediately to recall the Northern delegation and to issue an ultimatum to the Southern provinces demanding their return to allegiance in default of which military forces should be used against them. There is no question that the Anfu leaders are counting upon Japanese support; [Page 352] they may indeed be looked upon as the representatives of Japanese policy in China.
During the past weeks the efforts of the Northern party to make arrangements with individual military leaders in the South have been making progress. Hopes have been held out of sharing in the proceeds of the reorganization loan to be made. Negotiations with the generals at Canton seem to have been successful. They seem to be ready to arrive at an understanding with the Northern generals. The matter is complicated by the fact that it is not quite clear what General Lu Yung-ting’s status will be. The Canton generals are inclined to oppose him, but Lu Yung-ting is an intimate friend of Gen. Chang Hsun, the monarchist leader, and is on good terms with President Hsu, whose friendship with the Manchus is well known. It is not believed that the President is at present countenancing a monarchist movement but he is personally exercising his influence over Lu Yung-ting in favor of an understanding. The support of the old parliament on the part of Southern militarists is therefore weakening and it is possible that the Northern militarists may be able to win over a large part of the Southern generals by a promise of financial gain. This does not apparently include General Tang Chi-yao, the tuchun of Yunnan, who controls the Southern forces in Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechuan and who is an entirely independent viceroy within his realm.
Many suggestions have been made that the foreign powers should come to the rescue of China at this juncture, should suggest the solution and put their authority back of it. This suggestion has come particularly from the people in Central China although it will be most acceptable to all of China if a moderate program were to be put forward and supported in this way.
President Hsu has sent me word that he will not take any other immediate action but will allow people “to blow off steam” for a while in the hope that a feeling of compromise will be engendered and a feasible scheme evolved in discussion; he expressed the hope however that at the favorable time the friendly powers should support by formal advice a program of settlement. The Japanese Minister in conversation with me expressed the opinion that it might be possible for the Foreign Powers to give helpful advice but this should only be done when its acceptance could be made certain. The British Minister does not as yet see any opportunity for such action. The difficulty lies in the fact that the Japanese in view of the many deals they desire to validate will not be in favor of saying anything that will effectually discourage the desire of the Northern militarists to control the situation.
[Page 353]If the Foreign Powers could take action it would help to realize the immediate need of China of having a parliament recognized throughout the country and great service would be done to China and to the cause of representative government here.
I have [etc.]
- The eight articles contained in the Constitutional Government’s Bulletin No. 44 printed supra and a summary of that bulletin have been omitted.↩