893.00/3135

The Consul General at Shanghai ( Sammons ) to the Minister in China ( Reinsch )48

No. 3107

Sir: As possibly concluding the formal reports connected with the Internal Peace Conference, I have the honor to place before the Legation and the Department Bulletin No. 44 of the Intelligence Bureau of the Constitutional Government of China, under today’s date. This reviews the ultimatum of the Southern Delegation, and their explanation of the various clauses.

It now remains to give a summary of the Northern Delegation, with reference to the ultimatum of the Southern Delegation, regarding which I have very reliable first-hand information, as follows:

On No. 1, the Shantung question, the two delegations practically agree.

In regard to the 2nd, about the secret treaties, the position of the Northern Delegation is that as soon as peace in Europe is signed, the Sino-Japanese military pact will automatically expire according to the arrangements made between Peking and Japan on February 5 (?) and March 1 (?), 1919, (not sure of the dates.)

In regard to the third, the disbandment of the war participation army, the national defense army, and the frontier defense army, the position of the Northern Delegation is that as soon as the general disbandment is agreed upon, these armies will be disposed of under that plan.

In regard to number four, the removal of military governors and provincial governors, who are unpopular and obnoxious to the people, the position of the Northern Delegation is that it is the business of the United Government. The Peace Conference should not meddle with administrative matters.

In regard to the fifth question, the restoration of the old Parliament, the Northern Delegation think that this is a demand of an extreme or uncompromising character, and that no one can restrict its freedom of action once the Parliament is restored. This was the unfortunate fact in 1916, when it was restored by Tuan Chi-jui.

In regard to number six, position not known.

In regard to number seven, the questions that have been discussed by the Conference have been practically agreed upon. The only one over which there is some conflict of views is the local self-government question.

[Page 346]

In regard to number eight, the recognition of President Hsu by the South as Provisional President of China, the Northern Delegation feel they cannot agree, because the President has been recognized by the Powers long ago. Any such action undertaken by the Parliament would shake the foundation of the Government, which is detrimental to the interests of the country.

I have [etc.]

Thomas Sammons
[Enclosure]

Bulletin No. 44 of the Intelligence Bureau of the Constitutional Government of China

Since the resumption of the Peace Conference sessions on the 7th April last, both Delegations have been working assiduously and harmoniously together in discussing the various subjects submitted to the Conference.

Much progress have been made and many of the problems disposed of or a solution for them found and agreed to in the rough by the special committees or formally by the Conference.

The memorandum submitted by the Southern Delegation in writing to the Northern Delegation two days in advance and brought up at the formal session of the Conference on the 13th Inst, consisted mostly of subjects which had been either discussed informally or partially or had been held in reserve for discussion at a more opportune time.

To counteract the false impression which incomplete or inaccurate reports of the last session of the Conference may have caused, a circular telegram has been sent out by the Southern Delegation, giving a true statement of the facts and justifying the action they have taken in resigning.

The following is a translation of the telegram:

“To all the Provincial Assemblies, Educational Associations, Chambers of Commerce and the Press of the country:—

It is several months since the undersigned were commissioned by the Constitutional Government (at Canton) to act on the Delegation to the Internal Peace Conference. When the preliminary questions, such as the Shensi military situation and the disbandment of the War-Participation Army etc., were brought up, the behaviour of the Peking Government with relation thereto was such as to cause a deadlock for more than a month, the circumstances of which have been made the subject of a previous statement by us to the public. In the natural course of events, the resumption of Peace negotiations would depend upon the removal of the cause of the deadlock. But out of consideration for the wishes of the people and the rapid moving of international events, the undersigned in a spirit of conciliation [Page 347] agreed to renew negotiations which have been conducted now for more than a month.

In the meanwhile, an offensive campaign was being carried on (in Shensi) principally against Chien-hsien while Peace negotiations were going on in Shanghai. Besides, a large consignment of arms and ammunition was being imported by the North. Even now, there is no positive evidence of the sincerity of the North in their desire for Peace.

Recently, realizing the critical state of our international relations and the increasing desire of the people for peace, and basing our action upon the sentiments of the whole nation, at the same time, noting what has transpired at the Conference and gauging how far both parties may be able to keep together oil common ground, the undersigned presented a memorandum containing eight proposals as follows:—

1. To declare China’s resolve not to agree to the proposed settlement of the Shantung questions decided upon by the European Conference.

(Explanation) In the case of diplomatic questions, the Government should always express its resolute attitude in some appropriate manner to the nations of the world in the form of a mandate or communique or official note. The present Shantung question is an issue which is of vital importance to the existence of our nation. If we fail to lodge a strong and appropriate protest now aside from merely instructing our delegates not to sign the Peace Treaty, we would not be in a position to remedy the matter in the time to come.

2. To declare the invalidity of all covenants, pacts and the like secretly entered into between China and Japan and to severely punish all those directly engaged in or responsible for the consummation of them.

(Explanation) The secret treaties entered into between China and Japan are extremely detrimental to the nation in that they encroach upon our sovereign right and bring utter humiliation to our country. They have never received parliamentary approval. Their consummation has been brought about by treasonable individuals who conspired in the admission of privileged alien influences for their private gain and to the detriment of the nation. Therefore, it is only right to cancel these agreements and severely punish those responsible for its [sic] contraction in order to appease the nation.

3. To effect the immediate disbandment of the War Participation Army, the National Defence Army and the Frontier Defense Army.

(Explanation) These special military organisations referred to above are the outcome of the Sino-Japanese Military Pact,49 having for their bulwark the special influence of a certain foreign nation and they are bound to cause endless trouble in the future; hence, the necessity of their disbandment.

[Page 348]

4. To remove the Tuchuns and Provincial Governors who by their specially notorious maladministration proved themselves unpopular and obnoxious to the people.

(Explanation) Those officials whose actions have brought detriment and misery to the people should have been removed by the Government without repeated requests from the Peace Conference and appeals from the people.

5. That the Peace Conference should issue an announcement that the mandate issued by the former President Li Yuan-Hung, on the 13th of the 6th month of the 6th year of the Republic (1917)50 was illegally issued and therefore invalid.

(Explanation) There being no provision in the Provisional Constitution for the dissolution of Parliament, a Mandate not based upon the laws of the nation is unconstitutional and ultra vires and therefore, should have no effect. Moreover, President Li Yuan-Hung issued the said mandate under compulsion and he himself has subsequently publicly avowed its illegality. Even Gen. Chiang Chao-Chung, the Commander of the Peking Gendarmes who signed the said mandate in the capacity of Acting Premier telegraphed and confessed before the entire nation that the procedure was unconstitutional. It naturally follows that the said mandate should be declared null and void. Furthermore, our diplomatic failures in the recent years have been brought about since the dissolution of Parliament. Following the first dissolution by Yuan Shih-Kai (in the 2nd year of the Republic or 1913), the famous (or infamous) Twenty-one demands and a secret treaty between China and Japan were signed. Following the second dissolution of Parliament by Li Yuan-Hung (6th year of the Republic or 1917) a number of other Sino-Japanese secret agreements were consummated. None of these documents signing away national rights could have been passed by Parliament but for its unfortunate dissolution. Foreigners would not have dared even to make an attempt at what they have now actually succeeded in accomplishing. Under these circumstances, the people were inevitably taught a lesson—to be firmly convinced that the restoration of a Constitutional Parliament is the most urgent necessity in our national salvation. However, the Conference has refrained from taking up this subject at the beginning for reasons of expediency, in view of the European Conference being in session. It would have been extremely disadvantageous to China as a whole, if our Internal Peace Conference should come to deadlock then on this parliamentary issue. The necessity of this expediency has now passed. We are already undeniably defeated at the world conference in all our aims and hopes. Realizing at the same time that the root of the failure lies in the absence of a Parliament, we, therefore, insist upon its restoration. Because in this measure alone lies the only thread of hope within reach of ourselves for the annulment of all the iniquitous covenants on the logical ground that they never received the approval of the Parliament. The restoration of the Parliament, therefore, [Page 349] should not be indefinitely deferred for reasons of external as well as internal policy.

6. That a special Administrative Council be formed of men of national distinction, selected and recommended by the Conference for the purpose of superintending the enforcement of the decisions of the Conference. The formation of the Cabinet of the unified Government shall be subject to the approval of this Council, which shall be dissolved immediately upon convening of the Parliament.

(Explanation) Before the Convening of the National Assembly, a formal cabinet can not be organised; hence, the necessity of this transitional organ proposed here to tide over the period.

7. All questions whether already passed upon by the Conference or referred to special committees for investigation and other questions to be brought up before the Conference shall be separately dealt with and definitely settled.

(Explanation) This is the natural procedure for settling all unfinished matters.

8. That the Conference officially recognise Mr. Hsu Shih-Chang as the Provisional President of the Republic for discharging the functions of that office until the formal election by the Parliament of a permanent successor. (This article will be given no effect until or unless the previous seven are agreed to).

(Explanation) This momentous sacrifice on the part of the South-west is prompted by the spirit of mutual concession and by the earnest desire for immediate unification of the country. It is understood that Mr. Hsu Shih-Chang holds his position contrary to the Constitution in not having been legally elected.

The fore-going Articles together with the explanations have been duly submitted by the undersigned at a Formal session of the Internal Peace Conference on the 13th Inst., together with the declaration that these proposals represented the ultimate views (limit of concession) on the part of the South-west. But the Northern Delegation could not agree with any of them with the exception of the first article, and was opposed particularly to the fifth article, saying that it was impossible for the North to accept this for discussion and that if this could not be amended to their satisfaction, the Northern Delegation would refuse to discuss any of the rest. As a counterproposal, it was suggested that the North would request the five Provinces of the South-west to elect members to join the new Parliament now sitting in Peking.

Thus, the North has revealed definitely its extreme opposition to the Southern view point, in spite of our willingness to concede to the very limit of our possibility in order to realise an early peace. The 8 articles enumerated above indicate unmistakably this conciliatory attitude on the part of the Constitutional Government and the Provinces of the South-west as devoid of any consideration of private interest and sectional privileges. The Peking Government, on the other side, has not shown the least inclination to change its policy since the beginning of the Peace Conference. The War-Participation Loan continues to be drawn upon and squandered; the organisation of the War-Participation Army, the National Defense [Page 350] Army and the Frontier Defense Army are being pushed forward every day with the intention of over-awing the South-west by military prowess as well as alien influence; while the people remain down trodden by a few military despots. To this very day, the Northern Delegates treat our proposals for political reform and for constitutional solution of the problems with utter disregard. Under such circumstances, how can the Peace Conference proceed? We are, thus, at the end of our wits. Realizing our incapability of carrying on this important work any longer, we have tendered our resignation to the Constitutional Government at Canton on the 14th Inst. Our resignation, however, is based purely on personal reasons (as we deem ourselves responsible for our failure in effecting a settlement), and the Peace Conference itself is not to be disturbed by our actions. The Constitutional Government will decide as to the future policy and as to the appointment of our successors. We respectfully submit the fore-going report for your information, (signed) Tong Shao-yi, Chang Shih-chao, Hu Han-ming, Miao Chia-shou, Tseng Yen, Kuo Chun-shen, Liu Kwang-lieh, Wang Po-chun, Peng Yun-yi, Yao Ming-Luen, Li Shih-ying.”

  1. Copy forwarded to the Department by the Consul General under covering letter of same date; received June 21.
  2. Foreign Relations, 1918, p. 224.
  3. Foreign Relations, 1917, pp. 6768.