Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XII

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/254

Captain Nicholas Roosevelt to the Commission to Negotiate Peace²

Paris, March 26, 1919.

The following summary of conditions in Hungary is presented by Captain Roosevelt who left Budapest about 8 P.M., March 22nd, thirty-six hours after the outbreak of the revolution. The information published in the papers since then throws no new significant light on the subject.

1. The revolution in Hungary was primarily nationalistic in character. The Hungarians who are united in their conviction that Hungary must not be dismembered, have made use of Bolshevism as a last desperate resort to preserve the integrity of their country, and have openly defied the Allies, and set a precedent for Germany to follow.

2. The revolution was precipitated by the presentation to the Hungarian government on the morning of March 20 of a decision of the Peace Conference concerning the demarcation line in Transylvania and the temporary creation of a neutral zone to be occupied by Interallied troops. This note was presented by Colonel Vix of the French Mission at the direction of General de Lobit, the French commander at Belgrade.³ The new line of demarcation follows closely the ethnic boundary between the Roumanians and Hungarians in Transylvania and was therefore taken by the Hungarian government to be the indication of the intention of the Peace Conference to give the whole of Transylvania to Roumania. Furthermore, the withdrawal of Hungarian troops to the westward of the neutral zone provided for in this decision meant that the Hungarians would have to abandon virtually half their territory to enemy occupation.

3. The revolution was accomplished with comparative quiet. During the night of the 21st there was a good deal of shooting in Budapest but only a few casualties and only a small amount of plundering. On the 22nd the government issued orders punishing with death any persons carrying arms, offering armed resistance to the new government, robbing, or plundering, and punishing with a 50,000 kronen fine the sale of alcoholic liquor. The effect of these measures was good. As far as the political aspect is concerned, the revolution was brought about apparently through a common understanding between the old government and the various elements which have constituted the new government. Baron Podmanicsky, who presented to Colonel Vix the answer of President Karolyi, informed me that it had first been decided to maintain Karolyi as President, but with an ultra radical cabinet and with an understanding with the Russian Soviet government. The members of the Communist party including Bela Kuhn favored this, but the members of the Laborers’ party insisted on a complete change and on the establishment of the rule of the proletariat. This was done. Karolyi accepted the resignation of his government and himself resigned, turning the government over to the proletariat, and appealing to the proletariat of the world to come to the rescue of Hungary. The new government, which is based on the Russian Soviet model, is a combination of the Communists and the left wing of the Socialists and includes Bela Kuhn and others who were previously arrested as Bolshevik agitators. In a manifesto the new government proclaimed its adherence to the Russian Soviet government.

4. There were also rumors which I was unable to substantiate but which it is my belief are true;—to the effect that there is some sort of an understanding with the Germans. Major Pentamalli, the Chief of the Italian Mission, informed me that he had been in close touch with Kunfi,⁴ one of the strongest men of the new cabinet, and that Kunfi while at the Berne Socialist Conference had come to an understanding with the Russians and Germans about this very matter. It is interesting to note that in my last interview with Karolyi on March 18 he showed keen interest in the question of the rate of return of American troops in France and asked what the attitude of the United States would be towards having American troops police Europe.

5. In this connection it is important to note that Major Pentamalli told me he had tried “to soften the blow” for Karolyi, and when I saw Prince Borghese, the rejected Italian Minister to Servia, who is in Budapest, (tho he states it is in no official capacity) Prince Borghese volunteered the opinion that the Allies would make a great mistake if they failed to give the new government a chance to make good, and he added that in his opinion it was advantageous that a “neutral person” should remain if the Allied Mission left, and keep in touch with the situation. He suggested that he might be such a “neutral person” and said if he remained he would of course keep his government informed of conditions. It is my opinion, tho here again I can adduce no definite proof, that the Italians were not altogether ignorant of this revolutionary movement. It appears from what Major Pentamalli said that the Italians would be willing to consider occupying Hungary. The only reason I can see for this is their policy of gaining power over a strengthened Hungary at the expense of Yugo Slavia.

6. The general opinion in Hungary as far as I was able to ascertain from newspapers, and from talking with persons of various classes, as well as from the reports of the Hungarian-American Lieutenant who was with me, is one of welcome for this revolutionary move. All classes seem to consider it as a step in the right direction, and as a probable successful method of preserving the integrity of their country. It is therefore essentially nationalistic, making use of Bolshevism for national ends—in this particular case against the Czechs and the Roumanians who have occupied parts of Hungary and for whom there is a bitter hatred. When it comes to a question of Hungarian integrity all parties are in accord.

7. The grave significance of this revolution is that this, the first important decision of the Peace Conference made known to one of the Central Powers, has been met by open defiance. Hungary has refused to comply, and is holding the club of Bolshevism over the Allies and asking “What are you going to do about it?” The precedent set by this action will offer an encouragement to the Germans which may be disastrous.

8. The immediate results to be expected are military activities against the Czechs and the Roumanians. The hatred is perhaps more bitter against the Czechs because they are stronger from a military point of view, but the bulk of the best troops are concentrated in the Transylvanian section. The American Military Attaché in Bucharest informed me on March 12th that according to his information the Hungarians were in a position to put about ten divisions into Transylvania at short notice. The greatest handicap to any military operations by the Hungarians is the lack of coal, which has crippled their transportation.

9. The following alternatives have been suggested as possible measures of relief:

(1) Ordering the Czechs and Roumanians to advance and occupy Hungary. Owing to the intenseness of hatred against these people such an action would only result in the worst kind of bloody war. Furthermore it is questionable whether the military organizations of these two countries are in a position to carry out such operations.

(2) Occupation by Allied troops. This was advocated by the Italian and British missions in Budapest, the last word of the Chief of the British Mission to me being that 10,000 troops would be sufficient. This number is probably too small and might suffice for Budapest alone. If, however, the feeling of the country continues to be of as strong a nationalistic character as it is at present, occupation by any troops will surely be met with resistance.

(3) If the Peace Conference desires to enforce its decision regarding the Transylvanian armistice line, a blockade is a practical weapon, but it would not prove really effective for about two months, when the food situation will become desperate, without imports.

10. The conclusion of the matter is that unless immediate and vigorous action is taken the Allies will be met with a disastrous state of affairs in Central Europe which it may take years to straighten out. Hungary has defied the Peace Conference and allied herself with the Bolsheviki. It is Germany’s turn next.

2. Substance of this report transmitted to President Wilson by Secretary Lansing under covering note dated March 27.
3. Provisional commander of the Allied armies in Hungary.
4. People’s Commissioner for Education.