Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/254

Captain Nicholas Roosevelt to Professor A. C. Coolidge 98

No. 123

Subject: Presentation to President Karolyi of Peace Conference decision regarding evacuation of Transylvania.

1.
At Colonel Vix’s request, I called on him this morning at a quarter before nine, to attend a meeting of the Allied representatives in Budapest. I arrived there early purposely so as to explain to him again that I was not empowered to take any action of a diplomatic or military nature. He stated that the question for consideration was the presentation to President Karolyi of a decision taken by the Peace Conference in Paris about the new demarcation line for Transylvania, and the creation of a neutral zone to be occupied by allied troops.99 He said that he realized that I had no military or diplomatic standing here, but that inasmuch as this was merely the presentation of a decision already taken by the Peace Conference, and inasmuch as I was connected with the Peace Conference, he could see no reason why it would in any way prejudice the position of the actions of the American Mission if I accompanied the other missions in presenting this note to the president. He said that all he wished was the support of the Allied Missions in a decision already taken by their superiors in the Peace Conference at Paris, and that he wished particularly that the Hungarian government might have the ocular proof in the persons of the representatives of the French, British, Italian and American governments; that this decision had been taken by the Allied Powers in Paris. I at once tried to get into telephone communication with you to get your approval on this matter, but could not get Vienna before it was time for us to go to the president. Inasmuch as Colonel Baker, the British representative, and Major Pentamalli, the Italian representative, both expressed their views that it would not look well for the United States not to be represented if the English and Italians were there, and inasmuch as it struck me that this point of view was correct, I went with them and we were received by the President a few minutes after ten o’clock.
2.
The memorandum, a copy of which I hope to be able to send you, stated in brief what I had already been informed in Roumania, namely; that the Peace Conference had decided upon a new line of demarcation, running roughly speaking, from Arad to Nagy-Varad and Szatmar, following pretty closely the ethnic line as set down in the German map of Justus Perthos. The Hungarians are to withdraw to a line almost coincident with the original demarcation line promised Roumania by the Allies in 1916. This runs in a general way from Szegedin to Debreczen, and thence onwards towards the Ruthenian country. I enclose herewith a map1 drawn from memory, showing these lines. The intermediary zone is to be neutral and policed by interallied troops, consisting mainly of officers. The memorandum explains that the method to be followed will be first the evacuation of the Hungarian troops and withdrawal to the new line from Debreczen to Szegedin; second, the occupation of the neutral zone by interallied troops; lastly, the advance of the Roumanian troops to their new line of demarcation.
3.
Colonel Vix opened the meeting at which at first President Karolyi alone was present, by stating briefly that he had come to present to him a decision of the Peace Conference in Paris. He handed Karolyi a copy of the paper, and the president sat down and read it about half through. He then got up and said that before going any further, he must send for the Minister of War, Böhm. Vix suggested the Prime Minister also, so the President left the room for a minute and gave directions that they be summoned at once. When he returned he finished the reading of the paper. In the meantime, Colonel Vix had laid on his desk a map showing the proposed neutral zone. Minister Berinkey then came in, and the president handed him the note. As Berinkey was reading it, Böhm came in. The president first said he would have to protest, but nothing further, and then he turned to Böhm and had a brief conversation in Hungarian with him, during which Böhm, who had been examining the map, sat back and shook his head continuously. The president then turned to Colonel Vix and told him that it was impossible, that in the first place he could not see why no line of demarcation had been drawn to the north (in the Ruthenian country) and that this clearly showed that Hungary was to be dismembered. It could only mean that the Peace Conference had decided to allow Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania to share the Ruthenian country, and to have a common boundary. Otherwise it was impossible to imagine that such a neutral zone and such a line of demarcation will be drawn. One did not draw a demarcation line just simply in space. It had to run from some fixed point to some other fixed point. Berinkey then put in the remark that this open space was left so that [Page 415] the Roumanians might attack the Hungarians. Vix added that this was ridiculous; that it was no question of such an action, and that furthermore the Allies were prepared to guarantee that there should be no such attempt. Berinkey shrugged his shoulders and said that Hungary had already had experience with Roumania in the Belgrade treaty. Karolyi interposed that the country and the people would never tolerate such an action. Vix said that as far as public opinion was concerned, and whether or not the people would tolerate such an action, this could easily be regulated by the government; that it depended upon the newspapers, and that if the people were shown the thing in the proper light through the papers, there would be no trouble; whereas, if on the other hand, the papers made a sensation about it, public opinion could be strongly aroused against it. He added that it was not a question of politics, that it was merely a question of acting upon a decision already taken in Paris. The president replied that it was a matter of politics, inasmuch as it not only deprived Hungary of a large portion of territory, but it practically gave Roumania the whole territory which she claimed, and to this extent it was a matter of the gravest internal political importance to Hungary. Böhm, who in the meantime had continued to shake his head, made a remark to the president in Hungarian, which the president translated to the effect that if this was done, the Communist Party would jump in a day from a few thousand to 200,000 or more. Whereupon Colonel Vix leaned forward and said in German to Böhm: “Das ist mir ganz egal”. Böhm shrugged his shoulders and said: “Mir auch”. Vix came back again to the fact that it was not a question of politics, and that even so, it was not our business to discuss them with him, and said that he must ask for an answer before six o’clock tomorrow on the question as to whether the government would guarantee that the interallied troops of occupation in the neutral zone would be unmolested by the Hungarians. At this point, Berinkey asked if there was any provision to prevent the Hungarians advancing through this neutral zone against the Roumanians. At first I thought he had mistaken a grammatical phrase in French, but he later came back to the same proposition, and wished to know what opposition would be made by the Allied troops if the Hungarians decided to enter this neutral zone, and to advance on the Roumanians. Karolyi then asked how many troops the Allies expected to put in the zone, and Vix said that he could not say, but that they would be chiefly officers. The president kept insisting that the question of the neural zone was minor from his point of view—that the whole thing hung on the fact that the Roumanians are to advance 100 kilometers into Hungarian territory, and the Hungarians are to withdraw 200 kilometers. Berinkey here remarked that the government had already had experience with [Page 416] an armistice, and they knew how far they could rely on the promise that the Roumanians would not advance beyond a specific line. Karolyi seized this opportunity to cast reflections on the way in which the Belgrade armistice had been carried out, and Vix answered that it was true that there had been unfortunate violations on both sides, but that it was not now a question of the Belgrade armistice, but of a decision by the Peace Conference in Paris, and he repeated what he had previously said that the Allies could guarantee that Roumania would not overstep the line. Karolyi then said that the political consequences of this could only be revolution. Any government that signed such an agreement would not last a day, and even if the present government fell (Karolyi here said in a low tone of voice “As far as I am concerned, I should be glad to be rid of it”) he did not think that any other government could be found which would consent to sign such an agreement. Under the circumstances it would be just as well to occupy all of Hungary—“To make it a French colony, or a Roumanian colony, or a Czecho-Slovak colony” (These were the words he used in English turning to Colonel Baker, the British representative) Colonel Vix replied that he felt certain that after they had considered the matter in a dispassionate manner, that they would see that the wisest thing to do was to acquiesce in this decision of the Peace Conference in Paris. He said that he hoped the president would think somewhat also of the future and not of the present alone. Karolyi asked Vix what he would do if the Hungarians refused to acquiesce in this agreement. Vix shrugged his shoulders and said that in the same way he had come, he was prepared to leave. He then said that he judged it best to leave the president to discuss the question with his ministers, and that he must insist upon an answer not later than 6 P.M., tomorrow, March 21.
Nicholas Roosevelt
  1. Transmitted to the Commission by Professor Coolidge under covering letter No. 169, March 23; received March 26.
  2. See BC–40, minute 3, vol. iv, p. 145 and Annexure A, p. 157.
  3. Not attached to file copy of this document.