763.72119/8218½b
The Secretary of State to President Wilson
My Dear Mr. President: In view of the insistence of Mr. Polk in the enclosed message (No. 5592),25 which was received in four sections, I feel that I should lay before you for immediate decision the question of dealing with the present critical situation in Paris as a result of the withdrawal of our Commissioners and the failure of the Germans to sign the protocol.
I have considered the subject with sympathetic appreciation of the French attitude toward our withdrawal and at the same time with a realization that to continue a representative on the Supreme Council in view of the Senate’s action would be to relieve that body of a responsibility which they ought to bear and which will become all the more evident if we do not proceed as if they had not rejected ratification.
[Page 695]To me the latter course seems much the more important and the European press as well as the American press is beginning to blame the Senate, as it should do, for the present situation. To Mr. Polk, on the other hand, the importunity and arguments of the French seem of first importance, and he suggests a means of meeting their wishes. While we thus differ as to the essential factor in deciding the problem, I am in a measure willing, if it meets your views, to go part way in relieving French anxiety, provided it can be done without removing the blame which today rests upon the Republican Senators for the present situation.
I suggest two possible methods of handling the problem:
- First: To direct Ambassador Wallace to sit in on the Supreme Council as an observer and not as a participant, and to instruct him to take no action and to express no opinion on any subject discussed; to report the proceedings to Washington and await instructions; and to issue to him full powers to sign the Hungarian and Roumanian (minority) treaties.
- Second: For me to ask a hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee or interview with Senator Lodge, lay the whole situation before them, and say to them frankly that the Senate’s action has placed us in this dilemma and that, therefore, they should decide whether or not we should continue to co-operate with the Allies in having even a silent representative on the Supreme Council.
Personally I do not favor either suggestion, but, if either is to be adopted, the first seems to be the better because I do not like the idea of even indirectly giving the impression that the Senate has the right to control in any way our foreign affairs except as to its constitutional power in relation to treaties. I think that the principle outweighs the expediency of forcing the Republican majority to express an opinion as to the wisdom of retaining an inactive member on the Supreme Council. It would of course seriously embarrass them; but, on the other hand, if they favor such representation, they would be relieved in part at least from the tide of public complaint and criticism which is constantly growing higher as the consequences of their failure to ratify the treaty become more apparent to everybody.
As our Commissioners leave Paris Tuesday night, I think this matter should be settled immediately; otherwise it will be too late to communicate with Mr. Polk before his departure, and he ought to be able, before leaving, to tell the French what we intend to do.
I would like also to have your decision as to whether our troops in the Rhineland should take part in the reported operations instituted by Foch to force Germany to sign the protocol. As the protocol has to do in fact with the deposit of ratifications, should we permit our men to participate in the present coercive measures? And yet, since it may be claimed that the sinking of the German ships at Scapa Flow was a violation of the armistice and the protocol was drawn [Page 696] to recompense the Allies for the loss due to the violation, the failure to permit our troops to be used might be open to criticism. I never liked the terms of the protocol, but as it was agreed to by the Supreme Council I do not see how we can reopen the case on the merits. I confess that I do not blame the German Government for doing so. The only thing is how far ought we to go in allowing our armed forces to be used in compelling the Germans to submit.
Viewed strategically the longer the protocol remains unsigned by Germany so much the more blame will be put on the Senate and so much the more pressure will be put on that body to ratify the Treaty.
As the newspapers are announcing, on what authority or information I do not know, that our troops are participating in Foch’s movement across the Rhine, I think that a decision in this matter ought to be reached without delay.
Faithfully yours,
- Supra.↩