Paris Peace Conf. 184/246: Telegram

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

5592. Strictly confidential and personal from Polk for the Secretary of State only. To be delivered to the Secretary’s residence at once.

Your telegram No. 3975 of December 5. In a later telegram I will let you know about the Rhine Commission, the Teschen Committee, and the matter of funds for Bandholtz. I know how very busy you are and how many trying and irritating questions are now before you and I therefore hesitate to add another worry, but I hope at the same time that you will forgive me if I urge upon you again the necessity of having someone finish the work before the Supreme Council which will still be pending on the day of our departure. We will be in the position of carrying on our work up to an arbitrary day and then abruptly taking our departure, thus leaving the other four powers to continue with no representative of the United States on the work which we have been engaged in preparing.

You already have my views with regard to Germany and also in regard to the minorities treaty, the Austrian treaty, and the Hungarian treaty. But I must again ask you to consider the position we are placing ourselves in by not bringing to a conclusion our uncompleted task. Inasmuch as we have been largely instrumental in the framing of the Hungarian treaty and in making it possible for the Hungarians to form a Government, I am unable to see how the Senate or anyone could have an objection to our being present when the treaty is presented, provided the decision of the Senate is not to be considered as final. The same is true of the Roumanian minorities treaty. The powers have given Roumania an ultimatum and it appears to me that there could be no criticism of our standing by until the Roumanian minorities treaty is signed, particularly as minorities treaties were imposed on the Poles, Serbs, and Greeks. Neither the Roumanian treaty nor the Hungarian treaty would require Ambassador Wallace to exercise any discretion as all the details have been completed.

Regarding the German protocol, personally I think Germany will sign, but nothing can convince the French that we have not deserted them in an emergency if we leave while the negotiations are still going on. In this matter also it seems to me that the Senate could have no objection to our sitting in the conference, for, in the event that the Germans refuse to sign, it would be only fair that the other powers should know what position, if any, we intend to take under the terms of the Armistice. I believe it is thoroughly understood by the powers that it is only the Supreme Council as such that can function in connection [Page 694] with these matters and that it would be quite easy to impress on them that the Ambassadors would have to refer to their governments for instructions.

We are leaving Tuesday evening at 8 o’clock and M. Clemenceau is still hoping that something can be done to avoid the appearance of our leaving arbitrarily. I believe that he is disturbed not only because of the possible effect of our departure on Germany, but he also sees that our withdrawal practically throws the European situation into the hands of Great Britain which would be the only power strong enough to assume leadership.

Permit me to apologize again for being so persistent, but from every side, from the French, British and Americans I get the impression that this is one of the critical moments in American diplomatic history and on your decision, to a great extent, rests the prestige of the United States. People like Grasty24 are urging that I present this point of view to you for they cannot see what our position will be like on Wednesday when business will have to be done and no one will be here to represent us although we have been represented on the previous day. The question is why should we alter our position by leaving on Tuesday night, especially as the business we would have been discussing on Tuesday morning would still be unfinished.

I apologize again for bothering you, but we are in an embarrassing position. Polk.

Am[erican] Mission
  1. C. H. Grasty, representative of the New York Times.