Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume XI

Paris Peace Conf. 184.00101/121

Minutes of Meeting of the Commissioners and Technical Experts of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, Hotel Crillon, Paris, Wednesday, July 23, 1919, 2 p.m.

Paris, July 23, 1919, 2 p.m.

• Present:
  • The Honorable Mr. White
  • General Bliss
  • Mr. Nielsen
  • Mr. Beer
  • Mr. Hoover
  • Dr. Buckler
  • Colonel Grant
  • Dr. Dresel
  • Dr. Scott
  • Lt. Burden
  • Capt. Chapin
  • Capt. Hornbeck
  • Major Johnson
  • Mr. J. F. Dulles
  • Admiral Knapp
  • Prof. Coolidge
  • Mr. A. W. Dulles
  • Mr. Leland Harrison

Mr. White called the meeting to order. Mr. White asked what the status of the Bulgarian Treaty was.

Dr. Scott: There remain several clauses to be passed upon by the Commission.

Mr. White: But they are not to be drafted?

Dr. Scott: No, sir.

Mr. J. F. Dulles: There is one point I might bring up, which is of possible interest to Mr. Hoover. The Supreme Economic Council is still functioning. The Financial Section and the Section on Germany are meeting, and they are putting all sorts of things on the agenda. I don’t know whether they are necessary or not. It is not necessary that we attend, and I am not sure but that we should definitely withdraw from all those bodies.

Mr. Hoover: I have tried on several occasions to wind that up. The British are particularly obsessed with the idea of continuing that body with all its ramifications, and any assault we make on any minor part of it they take as an assault on the whole.

Mr. White: What have you done?

Mr. Hoover: Various proposals have been taken up, which we have not agreed upon. As far as the Economic body is concerned, we have tried to transfer the questions on Germany over to the Reparations Commission, because if it has any function it is a purely international function, and we need to get rid of all those German relations. But they hope to build out of that thing an elaborate piece of international machinery for economic control, and I don’t think any American who has given it any study is at all prepared to launch into it; but they are very anxious to retain the machinery in its present form in order that it may mold the character of it. I have felt that we will all go away one of these days, and we would bid this thing good-bye.

Mr. White: Is there anything to prevent our doing it?

Mr. Hoover: No.

Mr. J. F. Dulles: When Mr. Davis went away he said there would be nothing more to come up; that these financial matters would all be closed, and we would not need a financial representative to attend the meetings. But things are constantly being placed on the agenda whose importance I do not know, and I have no time to go to these meetings, nor have I anyone to send. But they are doing things the importance of which I cannot judge.

Mr. White: To which we are a party.

Mr. J. F. Dulles: To which we are a party, nominally. And not taking an active part, I cannot protect our interests, in case they need protection. I don’t know just what to do about it, whether to formally notify them that we are off the financial section and do not consider ourselves bound by anything that occurs, or not. But that would do what Mr. Hoover hoped we could avoid—having an open break.

Mr. White: There is no middle course. You have to go on.

Mr. Hoover: I don’t know. I think they ought to send me the agenda, and if there is anything on it that is damaging to our interests, we ought to go over. In the meantime we have called a meeting of the Supreme Economic Council for next Friday, and I hope we can then finally wind up a lot of things.

Mr. White: You think we had better not break off then?

Mr. Hoover: Well, I will send to the sections and have them send around the agenda, and if there is anything damaging on it we will go. I haven’t time to run around to many more sections than I am going to now. But it is foolishness—a phantom in the air; it is the result of a situation where an official has an occupation and hates to let go of it.

General Bliss: Do you see any reason for letting go of it? It is better to wait for a while.

Mr. White: I thought we ought to pull out if we could. You would be in favor of waiting? (Addressing Mr. Hoover).

Mr. Hoover: I think so. Well, we are all going to go away some one of these days.

Mr. White: Major Johnson?

Major Johnson: I think there is nothing of particular importance. There are several minor frontier rectifications that are being considered by the Rumanian and Yugo-Slav Committee, which will be reported to the Supreme Council in a few days—none of them of considerable importance. The matter in reference to the Bulgarian frontier you are already acquainted with.

Mr. White: Yes. I understand that Mr. Venizelos sent a telegram direct to the President.

General Bliss: Have you seen a copy?

Mr. White: No, I have not. Have you?

General Bliss: Yes. I have one here.

Mr. White: He feels very strongly on the matter. Captain Hornbeck?

Captain Hornbeck: I have nothing, sir.

Lt. Burden: I have nothing.

Colonel Grant: There is one little point that is up before the Council of Foreign Ministers. We were asked by the military advisers at Versailles to assist them with a report they were working on for the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak troops, the question was whether it was to be decided as policy that the allied troops should be taken out of the north Russian ports before winter. The council has never paid any attention to that inquiry, as far as I know. It has never been put on the agenda. I don’t know whether that is really going to be necessary to answer or not.

General Bliss: I doubt it. Was that communication sent to London? We returned the paper to the Supreme Council asking them to find out from the British government officially whether that expedition would remain or leave.

Colonel Grant: Yes, sir. That was sent to the Secretary-General of the Conference, and it was also sent by General Sackville-West to England. I have never heard any reply from either.

General Bliss: Well, all that makes it impossible to carry out the plan, because we said at the time that if we began at once it would be almost impossible then to execute it.

Mr. White: Nothing can be done about that then.

General Bliss: Besides that, we have official word from Omsk that the Czecho-Slovaks would not attempt that movement via Archangel.

General [Colonel] Grant: That was, of course, a more or less roundabout report. I think that came from the Czecho-Slovak government.

General Bliss: It came from their diplomatic representative.

Mr. Hoover: There is one incidental piece of news: in the preliminary round between the Rumanians and Bela Kun, Bela Kun got the best of it. That the Rumanians are in retreat.

We have a whole lot of ragged edges hanging around here. One is that same question of Archangel. When the proposition was first taken up by the War Trade Board, our Board participated in the feeding of the civilian population at Archangel; when the troops were withdrawn, our interest in that subject ceased. The British have put a little food in there, but they say now that they will not put any more in there, and if they withdraw their troops, that population will starve during the coming winter, and I understand the British intend to withdraw before the winter, and they are asking us, I understand, to stock up that place with food and do it at once. It is going to cost ten to fifteen millions to do it, and we have no available funds for anything of that kind.

And another ragged edge is this question of German and Austrian prisoners in Siberia. The Austrians and the Hungarians both have been asked to contribute something towards their repatriation. The Germans have refused to put up anything for some reason or another, and in any event nobody is looking after it. And it is a question in my mind as to whether or not it would not be well for the Council to appoint a Commission, comprised of military people probably, and this commission to say to Germany, Austria and Hungary that we will undertake the repatriation of those prisoners for them provided they find the money, and that the various governments should co-operate to get them some shipment. But I don’t see that it ought necessarily to fall on us to provide this, because to move 200,000 men from Vladivostok to Germany would be a very large undertaking.

Mr. White: Are there many Germans?

Mr. Hoover: Half Germans and half Austrians. And they are dying like flies because the people of Siberia won’t feed them. They joined the Bolshevists up there one time, and of course Koltchak hasn’t any use for them.

Dr. Dresel: I thought there was one German to five Austrians.

Mr. Hoover: I don’t know the proportion. I was told 200,000 Germans and Austrians. But I thought that if we put up a commission and said to the governments: “Here is the commission that will carry out the repatriation of these prisoners”, and have the governments co-operate in finding means of transportation, this matter could be taken care of properly.

Mr. White: I think that would be good.

Mr. Beer: The question was brought up a month or so ago about drawing up a convention concerning the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, but no one seems to know what the procedure is to be after the conventions are drawn up. That the conventions should be signed here the same time as the Austrian Treaty; but no decision has been taken. All we know is that we have been instructed to draw up these conventions and report to the Council of Five. But I think the matter of what ought to be done after they are drawn up should be considered.

Mr. White: The Council of Five should say.

Mr. Beer: Yes. The final articles about ratifications, and so on, should be taken up.

Mr. White: They could not take it up until they get the report.

Mr. Beer: Until they get the conventions themselves.

Mr. White: Yes.

Mr. Beer: No, I think they could discuss it in advance, whether it should be signed later.

Mr. White: Would you like that brought up?

Mr. Beer: Yes, I think it would be of great advantage to have it brought up and settled; otherwise it would take years and years to get the parties to agree to these things.

Mr. Harrison: I think Mr. Lansing’s desire was that as soon as Mr. Beer completed that work, to send it to the State Department, and he will advise you.

Mr. Beer: I did not know what the plans were.

General Bliss: Then it means that that is not to be ratified at the time of the signing of the Austrian Treaty.

Mr. Beer: Of course there is a big disadvantage in waiting.

Mr. Harrison: Why could not a clause be inserted like the one in the aeronautical convention, namely that certain people should sign, and there should be provision for others to sign later.

Mr. Beer: I presume that could be done.

Mr. White: I presume that could be done. Do you see any immediate objection?

Mr. Beer: No, I see no immediate objection. Of course if every party acts that way it will cause very great delay, because as soon as a conference like this stops—

Mr. White: Can we Americans take action without our government’s approval? Can we agree to a ratification of the same kind?

Mr. Beer: Of course those conventions would all be subject to ratification. It is merely to what extent the signature would bind them. It would have to be ratified now.

Mr. White: What is your recommendation?

Mr. Beer: I should like to talk that over with Mr. Harrison, and find what Mr. Lansing’s desires are in the matter.

Mr. Harrison: In the first place you would have to have special full powers.

Mr. White: What?

Mr. Harrison: You would have to have special full powers; the Department would have to give you special full powers to sign—or to Mr. White to sign, because his full powers, as in the case of the aeronautic convention, would not give him full powers to sign.

Mr. White: Perhaps it would be well for you and Mr. Beer to talk it over.

Mr. Harrison: Yes.

Mr. Nielsen: There are one or two things out of the ordinary, one of which I presume I should have some instructions about, and that is an agreement with regard to the disposition of Spitzbergen to Norway. At Mr. Lansing’s request, we have a representative on the Commission, which consists of representatives from Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States. The idea was to settle, if possible, that old question of Spitzbergen.

Mr. White: Norway wants it?

Mr. Nielsen: Norway wants it, and it was Mr. Lansing’s view that to concede sovereignty to Norway would be a good disposal. I was delegated to a conference in 1914. We then tried to frame an international administration, and that was, of course, a very fantastic thing. The conference broke up when the war began.

All the delegates seem to favor this idea of conceding sovereignty in Norway. For some reason the governments not represented here have been asked for their views, and owing, perhaps, at least in a measure to the delay in the mails, we have not received all the replies. The Norwegian minister here made the proposal that the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers should conclude a treaty with Norway, that is, the Five Powers on the one hand and Norway on the other hand, conceding sovereignty in Norway, on certain conditions, of course, with regard to guarantees of private rights.

In 1914 our people had very material industrial concerns up there, which have been since sold, so we really have no property up there, and we have always disclaimed having any political interests, but I think, in view of the part we took in trying to solve this rather disagreeable question in the past, and in view of Mr. Lansing’s participation here, in going so far as to state that he thought Norway should have sovereignty, perhaps we ought to continue to take part.

The question is raised then again: if this idea of the treaty between the Five Powers and Norway goes through, I ought to know how far I might go in participating in the proceedings leading up to it. Again, the question might come up as to whether our plenipotentiaries here would have power to sign such a treaty—which I presume they have not—and we should have instructions from our government as to whether they favor such a solution.

Mr. White: There is no doubt they favor it. You have no objection, Admiral, to Norway getting such sovereignty?

Admiral Knapp: Not at all.

Mr. Nielsen: The only question I should say, is whether in trying to facilitate a solution in the matter, which we now have not much more than a sentimental interest in, we would be willing to enter into a treaty to do it.

Mr. White: Do you see any objection?

Mr. Nielsen: No.

Mr. White: Do you see any objection? (Addressing Dr. Scott)

Dr. Scott: On the contrary, I would say it would be a very good thing.

Mr. Nielsen: On the other side: whether that is a proper kind of a treaty. Norway thinks she can bring in line these five powers, and France, in an unofficial way, so far, has said that after this treaty is concluded she will invite the acquiescence of the other governments. In other words, in getting the five powers to concede sovereignty it would have a great influence in getting the others in line.

Mr. White: How about the small countries?

Mr. Nielsen: Sweden has not replied. There has been some foolish bitterness between Sweden and Norway. Russia—that part which calls itself the Russian government here—seems to be falling in line. I do not think that either the Netherlands or Sweden will object, and that being the case, the coast will be clear for an agreement.

Dr. Scott: I presume that we would have to ask for instructions from the Department.

Mr. White: For signing it, yes.

Dr. Scott: Of course you would participate in the making of the treaty, but for signing you have to have full powers.

Mr. White: Would you ask, however, for power to participate?

Dr. Scott: No, I would not, because that has already been directed

Mr. White: Authority in regard to asking sovereignty for Norway would not be necessary. It has not assumed the formal treaty form yet. They are just discussing it.

Mr. Nielsen: I feel a little disagreeable in working along with that plan, if, in the last moment, we should be instructed not to take part.

Dr. Scott: Perhaps you might obtain it by cabling and suggesting full powers in the event of a treaty; that would bring the thing to a head.

Mr. White: Yes.

Mr. Nielsen: In his talk, Mr. Beer brought up the question of Russia. Russian nationals have gone in there and have overlapped some of the American claims. I don’t see how we can negotiate with any better people than those who are here representing the Russian government. They sent in a very remarkable document; not only is it remarkable because of the historical facts it recites, but from a legal standpoint. These people either have access to those archives up there, or they are in communication with men who are very well versed in the situation. I don’t see how we can postpone the thing until we find out what is the Russian government; I don’t think that is an absolute obstacle. I can see how they can make trouble, but that is a thing that will have to be met later.

Mr. White: I think we will have to send a telegram. Have you any suggestions? (Addressing Admiral Knapp)

Admiral Knapp: No. This is the first time I have heard of this proposal that the Five Powers recognize the claim of Norway. I will say that a doubt has arisen in my mind as to the advisability of going into that. But it is a perfectly new thing to me.

Mr. White: You mean the treaty of the Five Great Powers?

Admiral Knapp: Yes.

Mr. White: What objection occurs to you?

Admiral Knapp: It seems to me that our interests are very much more remote than are those of some neutral powers that are closer to Spitzbergen,—and for the Five Great Powers to set out to regulate the world—that is the idea in my mind. I am speaking very crudely now.

Dr. Scott: They are doing it. They are not setting out to do it; they have been doing it all the time.

Mr. White: You think that the assumption of power outside the Peace Treaty would be a burden.

General Bliss: I think you can take it up in a telegram to Washington and that would take it out of our hands.

Mr. Nielsen: I think, Mr. White, we could insist that the treaty be so framed that it is merely a recognition on the part of the five powers of the sovereignty, so we would say that as far as we are concerned we recognize the sovereignty.

Mr. White: Will you draft a telegram, you and Dr. Scott? Any further remarks?

Prof. Coolidge: With regard to Teschen: the delay originally granted the Poles and the Czechs expires day after tomorrow, and the French government has received a request, through its minister in Warsaw, for a prolongation of the delay. That was considered this morning. The American delegates, not knowing the question would come up, took the position that they would oppose the delay unless they had some very good assurance that if it were granted the two parties could get together. This question has been delayed and delayed, and Mr. Hoover knows through reports from that part of the world, that it is interrupting the transportation of coal very much in the district of Teschen.

Mr. White: In that connection, Mr. Paderewski came to see me the day he left and said that he had received notice from the Conference that the time given within which he and Mr. Mazaryk were to come to an agreement, would expire on the 25th. He said that when he went to Prague, on his way back to Paris, he had had a talk with him, but they had not been able to come to an agreement. They had thereupon each appointed nine men to form a council of eighteen to discuss this matter, and he had reason to believe that they had already met at Warsaw. I asked him as a friend, and entirely confidentially, whether he considered that those eighteen gentlemen would arrive at a conclusion by the 25th or anywheres near it, and he was quite frank in saying that he did not. He therefore did not wish to make any objection to the powers taking the matter up—to the Council taking the matter up on the 25th, only he must beg that a plebiscite be accorded to Teschen just as it had been to the rest of Silesia and on the same conditions, and that everybody who had anything to do with it should get out, and he said that the Allies and their numerous troops which they had at their disposal, should come in. And there is where the matter rests. I forget whether I reported that to the Council. I am not sure that I did.

Mr. Hoover: Under an agreement we constituted a commission up there with, I think, a German representative, and I think a Czech and a Pole, with an American chairman. We got production up to a good point, but now, since the Treaty has been signed, it is going to pieces. Colonel Goodyear is coming down day after tomorrow, and I wish you would discuss the matter with him.

Mr. White: Yes.

Mr. Hoover: He has got some ideas on the subject, having conducted the coal mines for several months.

Mr. White: He has had success?

Mr. Hoover: Some success.

Prof. Coolidge: Do you approve of hastening this, after consultation with Colonel Goodyear, rather than having postponements?

Mr. White: I see no reason for delay, because if the nine Poles elect any more representatives, and the Czechs do the same I don’t think they will get anywhere. That Council of 18 really looked to me like a Council of Chaos.

Mr. Hoover: One question in that regard, as well as Silesia. The coal production is on the ebb now. There will be an economic collapse if something isn’t done about the coal situation. As far as the boundaries are concerned, that ought to be settled now. There are social, racial and religious questions which are beyond the ability of any human soul to settle, but the boundaries should be settled.

Dr. Dresel: Isn’t it necessary that we appoint an expert who could handle all these questions?

Mr. Hoover: It is a terrible problem; Europe needs at the present moment a total of 600,000,000 tons per annum, which is its normal production. The total production is now down to 350,000,000 tons, or something of that kind. And if we had a complete dictatorship of the whole European coal production the production of Europe might be increased up to say 500,000,000 tons, but even then I think they would have an economic collapse. But I would hesitate about going into it, because I don’t see any solution other than the whole thing reaching the bottom and going up again. But outside of these social questions is the restriction of effort we have got everywhere, and that is a thing I don’t believe anybody could solve. I don’t see any daylight at all in the coal situation in Europe anywhere. So that I feel if we monkey with this thing too long in an informal way, we are likely to call down upon ourselves a good deal of blame, because we are taking responsibility without any authority, and I don’t know that any authority could be constituted that would remedy it. If someone possessed all the food resources in the world and cold-bloodedly exchanged bread for coal with each and every miner individually, I think he might solve the situation, but I don’t see any other way of doing it.

Dr. Scott: May I ask a question about Bulgaria. I understand there is an intention on the part of the commission to ascertain formally if there is any doubt whether the American Commissioners should sign the treaty with Bulgaria. Is there any information on that subject?

Mr. White: We made inquiry about that and we received a communication yesterday which sounded rather cryptic: that we would not be responsible for the treaties with Bulgaria and Turkey.

Major Johnson: He¹⁶ said: we regard ourselves as bound by it.

Mr. White: He didn’t say whether we would be bound by it or not. We can inquire about Bulgaria.

Dr. Scott: I asked because there is some uncertainty over at the Quai d’Orsay, and there is something of a feeling that those who will not sign, who are not going to sign, should not participate in the proceedings.

Mr. White: Well, we have participated thus far on the assumption that we were going to sign, because I heard the President say in this very room to the Press on the day that he went away, that we are to sign the treaties with Bulgaria and Turkey.

Dr. Scott: He said it?

Mr. White: He said it to the Press, and they were on their word. But I don’t know whether he wants us to hold out as a minority or not against all the others. As you know, England, France and Japan support Greece; Italy goes with us. And I have asked my Japanese colleague whether he had very strong feelings on the subject; I have sounded him and he said he was bound to admit that he had not, except he felt that the Bulgarians were the enemy and the Greeks friends, and therefore, if it was a question at all it was reasonable that he should support his friend, his ally, and not his enemy. But he admitted frankly that he had no feeling on the subject. That discussion is coming up tomorrow.

Prof. Coolidge: Do you know whether the President’s health is likely to delay the answer?

Mr. White: I am glad to say he is better. I notice that he was up yesterday.

Mr. Hoover: Do you know whether anything has been done about defining the eastern frontier for Poland?

Mr. White: No, and that is likely to remain indefinite on account of Russia.

Mr. Hoover: It materially affects this whole European situation.

Mr. White: Yes. I am informed that the Rumanians are about to hold an election in Bessarabia for members to the Rumanian parliament. The representative of Bessarabia says that is a most infamous proceeding.

Prof. Coolidge: Did you see under what conditions they were to vote?

Mr. White: No.

Prof. Coolidge: No one under forty is to have the suffrage in the new Rumanian territories. We got word of that the night before last, and we submitted it to the meeting of the Committee on the Protection of Minorities yesterday, but there was no action.

Mr. White: Is that a matter that you would suggest I should bring before the Council of Five, or not?

Prof. Coolidge: I don’t think it is quite ready for that.

Mr. White: Because the first of August is near.

Prof. Coolidge: No, this election is in October.

Mr. White: I received a note about it.

Prof. Coolidge: In considering these matters we have thought of religions and different nationalities, but we had not thought of the matter of age. We received this communication from Mr. Schoenfeld,¹⁷ in Bucharest.

Mr. White: No, mine is from a Russian.

Prof. Coolidge: Mr. Schoenfeld sent us a message night before last which said there was to be an election in all the Rumanian territories, including Bessarabia and Transylvania, but in the new territories no one had a right to vote until he was forty years of age, which seemed to be an ingenious way of giving a majority to the people in the older territories.

Mr. White: There is no urgency about it.

Prof. Coolidge: It is not urgent, and it might wait until the Committee on Minorities discussed it. It comes at a moment when they were to hand in a note on the protection of minorities in Rumania.

Mr. Dulles: The question of election in Bessarabia—I don’t see how that is a question of protection of minorities. I think the point is whether they have a right to vote at all.

Mr. White: That is the point, because nothing was to be done in any of the territories that formed part of Russia, as I understood from Mr. Lansing.

Prof. Coolidge: Was that ruling formally adopted?

Mr. White: Was that adopted? (Addressing Mr. Harrison)

Mr. Harrison: Mr. Lansing opposed any decision until Russia could take part.

Mr. White: And his decision was acquiesced in?

Mr. Harrison: The Council heard the Russian ambassador, and then they heard Bratiano, and then Mr. Bratiano left immediately after the meeting, if you remember, sir, and since then nothing more has been done.¹⁸

Major Johnson: My recollection of the same meeting was that there was certainly no definite acquiescence.

Mr. White: I want to say that the Rumanian minister came to see me a day or two ago, and he said that it [was] high time to settle the annexation of Bessarabia to his country. He hoped that we would co-operate in that arrangement. I repeated to him what Mr. Lansing said, and I told him that I should certainly adhere to that principle.

Mr. Harrison: There is this in the Koltchak correspondence. Koltchak agreed to accept the decision of the Council.

Mr. White: Koltchak did?

Mr. Harrison: Yes.

Mr. White: But Mr. Lansing’s position was that nothing formerly belonging to Russia should be dealt with until Russia should become a power again.

Prof. Coolidge: But Koltchak was asked if he would consent to it.

Mr. Harrison: He said he would.

Mr. White: But he isn’t all of Russia.

Mr. Harrison: No, sir, but the Allied Powers in their note to Russia took the ground that Koltchak had the right to decide the Bessarabian question, and laid down as one of the conditions that Koltchak acquiesce in what the Bessarabians should decide.

Mr. Dulles: I thought all those conditions were to be accepted by the Russian government if recognized.

Prof. Coolidge: Mr. Lansing inquired of Bratiano if he were willing to take a plebiscite in Bessarabia, but Bratiano replied that a plebiscite would not be possible under the circumstances, because it would be a plebiscite on the question of Bolshevism.

Mr. White: You would not go so far as to say that the principle had been adopted in the Council?

Mr. Harrison: Certainly not.

Mr. White: But that was our principle.

Mr. Harrison: That was our principle.

Mr. White: And I told the Rumanians that I would entirely concur.

Major Johnson: Mr. Lansing said something to this effect: “I don’t think I have authority to deal with such an act”, and I remember Mr. Balfour said to him that he hoped he would get instructions giving him the authority, because he thought it was a matter that ought to be settled. The matter was left without any decision, indefinitely, as I recall it.

Mr. White: I must find out whether that date was not mentioned: August 5th, as to the election in Bessarabia. I thought they were going to steal a march on us, as far as Bessarabia was concerned, by a special election there.

Mr. Nielsen: I think another question might come up as to still another treaty. The Italian delegation presented a large batch of so-called political clauses to a special committee on which I represented Mr. Lansing, at his request. They wanted those clauses that related to Italy and the new states, as well as Poland and those states that received new territory, imposed on these new states. That I objected to on the ground that these clauses related to purely local matters; that while the Allied and Associated Powers were interested in broad questions growing out of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, they were not concerned with such things as coastwise trade and provincial duties and railroad rates; that those matters should be settled between the interested states, and certainly should not be settled without the interested states being given a hearing. The British concurred in that view. And then the question was considered of putting these clauses into the Austrian Treaty. Fortunately that Treaty was closed for the insertion of other clauses. Then the assertion was made that the Allied and Associated Powers conclude a treaty between the Allied Powers on the one hand, and the new states on the other hand; and then there was the suggestion that these clauses be considered generally as to their merits as clauses that might go into some kind of a treaty, and we have gone over them, and that consideration I took a part in. Now I made it very clear at the end that the American delegation participated, but that it neither approved these articles in form nor in substance, but it merely considered the question whether these questions were proper articles to be laid before the new states as a basis for negotiation. There was a good deal of effort made to make it appear that we had done more than that; that in a sense we were committed to these. But I presume that matter will come before you later, as to just what shall be done with these articles, and I thought I would call your attention to a little of the history of these matters. Certainly it would not be fair to put in such clauses as these relating to the new states, into a treaty, without the new states being heard—which seems to be the intention.

Mr. White: Any remarks to make on this? It seems reasonable that the new states should be heard.

Mr. Nielsen: I think this committee will just make its report to the Supreme Council, and they will know the facts.

General Bliss: I would like to ask Dr. Scott a question about a matter that came to my attention today, and the decision of which, I think, would have a bearing on the attitude that the American delegation would be apt to take. The report which you showed me this morning, Dr. Johnson, was a divided report on the question of the Bulgarian southern boundary, and the attitude of the American and Italian delegations was that the boundary should remain as in 1915, isn’t that right?

Major Johnson: That is right.

General Bliss: Reserving to the Allied and Associated Powers the right to attach any part of this disputed territory to the International State of Constantinople. The British, French and Japanese stood for a cession by Bulgaria of this territory to the Allied and Associated Powers. Now, as I understand it, in the first case the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to attach any part of this to the International State extends over an indefinite time in the future—either ten, fifteen or twenty years, or longer.

Dr. Scott: In none of the clauses is there a limitation. They say sometime, if there is a plebiscite. It may be in a certain time, but there is no limitation as to when it is to be held.

General Bliss: Well, it designates cessions made deliberately to the Allied and Associated Powers, I suppose with the idea that they would themselves dispose of it very soon, but there is nothing to indicate it.

Dr. Scott: Not at all.

General Bliss: What would be the probable attitude of the United States, or the United States Senate towards a treaty which binds the United States in a continued association? We are an associated power during the war against the Germans. How about our remaining associated for an indefinite term to come? And for what purposes?

Dr. Scott: I think Mr. White’s reply covers it. There are a number of provisions in the treaties already negotiated to which the United States is to be a party, in which we are associated with the four other powers for the final disposition of this territory or territories, and there is no limitation of any kind. It is a question of policy whether we should undertake such an obligation, and that question of policy having been settled, there would seem to be no limit.

General Bliss: I don’t think it has been thought of.

Dr. Scott: The United States has taken cessions of that kind in conjunction with the four other powers, and the cession is: that Germany or Austria renounces its sovereignty or rights or title over such and such territory, and agrees to recognize any disposition which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall make of such territory. There is no limitation as to time. The United States has agreed, apparently, to become a trustee, with these other powers, of this territory, and in co-operation with them to determine the question of ownership. This clause would not differ from other clauses which are already in the treaty.

Mr. White: I was told that Western Thrace would not be given to Bulgaria, and also not be given to Greece, but to be held subject to the decision of the Powers, in view of a possible mandate for Turkey.

Dr. Scott. That is a question of policy, Mr. White. Dr. Johnson could tell us something about that.

Major Johnson: I should think it would be of a very distinct advantage should it not be left with Bulgaria. Certainly from the general political and economic point of view it would be very much better for Bulgaria if it were under international control than in the hands of Turkey. The Bulgarians would doubtless so regard it. In both cases—both in the American-Italian proposition and in the French-British-Japanese proposition—the power of control of that territory rests in the Allied and Associated Powers, but there is a very distinct difference in the wording. According to the proposal of the British, French and Japanese that the Bulgarians cede the territory to the Allied and Associated Powers, that prejudges the disposition of that territory to this extent: you would not ask the Bulgarians to cede it if you were going to turn around and give it to them. The Americans insisted that the frontiers of Bulgaria should remain as they were in 1915, with the exception of any portions of territory which the Allied and Associated Powers deem wise to attach to the International State.

Mr. White: That takes it away from Greece at the same time.

Major Johnson: That takes it away from Greece, and restricts the future attribution of the territory to the International State if it does not go to Bulgaria.

Prof. Coolidge: Owing to the previous recommendation of the Greek Committee, if the Allied and Associated Powers were not to keep it, according to the English and French view, then it would go to Greece.

Major Johnson: To the proposition that we might simply draw the southern frontier of Bulgaria and leave the territory north of it indefinitely, we replied that it would prejudge it, but would be glad to have the statement whether, in view of the French and British it would not prejudge the disposition, and the chairman was not willing to say that it would not prejudge the disposition of the territory. For that reason we were unable to accept that wording. We believe, and they admit that it does prejudge the case, because we would not ask Bulgaria to cede it if we intended to give it back to her. It would imply that it would go to someone else.

Thereupon, at 3:15 P.M. the meeting adjourned.

16. i. e., President Wilson.
17. H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, Chargé In Roumania.
18. See FM–29 [IC–201], vol. vii, p. 8.