763.72119/3307
The Chargé in Siam ( White ) to the Secretary of State 1
[Received December 31.]
Sir: I have the honor to comply herewith with your telegraphic instructions of November 5th, 4:00 p.m.2 to report to you personally on the probable programme of Siam at the Peace Conference as also in regard to the reasonableness of the same.
Already three months ago I made enquiries as to the war aims of Siam and elicited the information that none had been formulated. Thus the American Adviser to the Foreign Office told me that he knew of no official desiderata and considered that the Government ought in its own interest to proclaim its views. He confided to me that Mr. Pitkin had made a written enquiry to this Government but without eliciting any response. The British Minister, who is very influential here, expressed his ignorance likewise and did not consider that the views of the Siamese Government had crystallized as yet in this respect. He expressed the opinion that the Siamese had acted on high grounds, and with a view to the rights of small nations.
In contrast with the silence of official spokesmen are emphatic statements in the press (of which I have forwarded to the Department sundry examples) that at the end of the war, the Allies of Siam will, almost as a matter of course, abrogate their extra-territorial rights in this country. I think there is no doubt that such is indeed the hope of the Siamese Government. How actively the goal is to be sought, I do not know; and most probably no plans have yet been formed.
As to the desirability of abolishing extra-territorial rights in Siam, I think that there is abundant data already available in the Department, so, unless you instruct me to make another detailed study of the question, I will content myself with the following observations.
From the point of view of rewarding an Ally. The sacrifices incurred by Siam as a result of her entry into the war have been slight (see enclosure for Revenue and Expenditure figures2). The contribution of Siam has consisted in an expeditionary force numbering [Page 490] less than 2000 men and which recently reached France. More important than this military aid, Siam has broken up German business relations in this country. The British, Danes and Japanese have been the principal gainers by this policy. One American to my knowledge has also gained. The abrogation of extra-territorial rights was not held up as an inducement to Siam to become a belligerent.
The French intend to modify their remaining extra-territorial privileges in favor of Siamese pretensions. The negotiations may well become active with the advent of the new French Minister next month. The reasons prompting French policy in this respect are, I think, primarily those of enhancing their influence, which is by no means equal to that of Great Britain, coupled with a desire to act correctly towards an Ally. I anticipate that they will endeavor to obtain, either as a direct quid pro quo or by creating a favorable atmosphere, additional Advisers to the Siamese Government, and the right to establish better communications by rail or road with Indo-China. I gather that no attempt will be made to secure tin concessions in Southern Siam, as that would be considered trespassing on British preserves.
(N. B.—In connection with railroad communications between Siam and Indo-China. I am informed that the Colonial Government gives precedence to the completion of a railroad northwards from Saigon to Tongking, over Westerly construction. American capital has, I hear, been considering the construction of the latter route. The Colonial road system is almost complete to the Siamese frontier, near Battambong. Thence to Bangkok there is no construction and much swamp. I gather that the deficiency of communications with Indo-China inspires confidence in those Siamese officials who still remember the aggressive attitude of France in the nineties of the last century.)
A canvass of my colleagues representing nations having extra-territorial rights in Siam, revealed no enthusiasm among them for the surrender of these privileges. In fact quite the reverse.
Otherwise than as a war measure, I apprehend that the United States might forego their extraterritorial rights either for a quid pro quo or on the intrinsic merits of the question at the present time, I have heard of no adequate quid pro quo. The privileges of a political nature which we might acquire would not compensate for those we should surrender; and economic gains could only be realized when American capital is ready to invest in a specific proposition. Personally I adhere to the opinion of those who do not consider that either the administration of justice in Siam or its general level of progress call for a modification of the present treaty rights. Such also is the private opinion of those Americans in Siam with whom I have discussed the matter.
It has occurred to me that we might (1) forego our right to maintain a 3% import duty—against adequate guarantees. (2) Agree to [Page 491] administer Siamese instead of American Law in the Consular Court when Codes or subsequent legislation had been completed and approved by us; (3) promise to abolish the Consular Court itself, whenever other nations dispense with the services of their legal advisers. Such a modification however would be rather consistent with the well known generosity of American policy towards small nations than with the legal theory of capitulations. Moreover I doubt whether the Siamese in their present temper would accept any such half way measures. The detriment of American extraterritorial rights is rather to Siamese pride, where it exists, than to anything concrete.
I have heard the opinion expressed that capitulations, being eventually doomed to disappear, those who first part with their rights will reap the greater advantages. If we accept the premises, I would suggest that rather than suffer our rights to lapse with time, or bargain them away for less than they are worth, provision should be made for the merging of extraterritorial privileges in a super national judicial structure of the League of Nations.
I have [etc.]