Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume II

Paris Peace Conf. 184.01302/2

The Chief of the Special Mission in Germany ( Dresel ) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace ( Grew )

Paris , January 10, 1919.

Sir: I have the honor to submit herewith the following report of a journey to Germany, covering the period from December 27, 1918, to January 5, 1919.

I. Travelling Arrangements, Details and Objects of Expedition, etc.

In accordance with directions of the Commission, I left Paris on December 17th. I travelled by way of Switzerland, in order to make the necessary preliminary arrangements from there. I saw Professor Förster, the Bavarian Minister to Switzerland, and Count Montgelas, Counsellor of the German Legation, who gave their entire approval to my entering Germany and obtained the necessary authority from their governments. This consumed some days, and as it seemed impracticable to start immediately before Christmas, I did not leave Berne until the 27th.

My first stopping place was Munich, where I arrived the same evening. The Bavarian authorities provided a special car from Lindau to Munich, together with an escort from Lindau, and I was met at the station by a deputation, including the Burgomaster and several members of the government. This was due to a regrettable misunderstanding, but I took pains, both at that time, and afterwards, to emphasize that I had come in with no mission other than to obtain general information about the situation. To prevent any further misapprehension, I gave to the press a short and guarded statement to the effect that I had come in as an American citizen without any official status, and that my only aim was to obtain first hand details regarding the state of the country.

I stayed at Munich until Sunday evening, December 29th, after succeeding in obtaining interviews with many of the prominent men both inside and outside the Government.

On Sunday evening, December 29th, I proceeded to Berlin by night train, and arrived there at noon of the next day. I immediately put myself into communication with the German Foreign Office, and Dr. Rödiger, and later Dr. Ahrens, were assigned to make the necessary arrangements for interviews. Both these gentlemen made every effort to meet my wishes, and the result was that during the time which elapsed up to my departure, on January 5th, I was able to come in contact with a large number of representative men of all shades of opinion.

Owing to the extremely limited time which it seemed best to devote to the trip, I made no effort to visit places other than Munich and Berlin, as these two appeared to be the most important cities from which to study the situation.

I left Berlin on the evening of the 5th by the direct train to Spa, which, on account of the Armistice Commission there sitting, still maintains sleeping cars. A gentleman attached to the Berlin Military Department (Kommandantur), Dr. Burger, was sent with me as an escort, and I arrived at Spa on the afternoon of the sixth, and reported at once to General Barnum at the Headquarters of the American Mission. An automobile and escort were furnished me to Brussels, where I spent the night, reaching Paris on the evening of January 7th.

No serious difficulties of any kind were encountered on the trip, and both at Munich and Berlin army automobiles were put at my constant disposal, with the result that much time was saved. Hotel accommodations were still satisfactory, and though trains were crowded, it was possible to make proper reservations.

By arrangement with the American Legation at Berne, I took with me Mr. Franklin Day, a Special Assistant attached to the Legation, and Hunter D. Scott, a stenographer. Both these gentlemen returned to Berne by way of Munich in accordance with my directions.

II. General attitude of the German people

Taken as a whole, the Germans fully realize that they have lost the war and that the situation which faces them is of extreme difficulty. The general sentiment is of utter depression, and apathy and inertia are everywhere noticeable. At the same time, the old habits of order arid discipline have not been superseded, except in isolated instances, and the outward life of the people, as observed in the streets, theatres, restaurants, etc., is not changed. While crime is said to be on the increase, the mass of the people is well-behaved and orderly, and even on such occasions as New Year’s eve, no evidence of riotous behavior of any kind was observed.

Among the people at large, any return to military activity is looked upon with the utmost aversion, and the returning soldiers are almost all only anxious to go back to their families and to take up civil occupations.

The places of entertainment are all crowded and there is an evident desire to forget the war and its consequences as soon as possible. The effort is, however, hardly successful, and little real gaiety is seen anywhere. The streets are alive until late at night.

III. Analysis of present political situation

The following is a rough outline of the composition of the more important parties. These are, however, changing from day to day, and any analysis, to be correct, needs constant revision.

1. Majority Socialist Party. This is now in control of the Government, and maintains its hold through disposing of the best party organization and by its homogeneity. The leaders, though generally without experience in administering Government affairs, are practical common sense men of moderate ideas. While they have not abandoned their views of an ultimate social reorganization of the State, in accordance with the ideas of Karl Marx and other socialist writers, they see the necessity of postponing the full realization of these views until order has been entirely restored. They also appreciate the necessity of working together with the members of the new Democratic Party and other moderates in order to stabilize the government.

Besides the lack of governmental experience, the chief handicap of the party has hitherto been its great disinclination to extreme measures against the fanatical groups involving bloodshed. A deliberate attempt has been made to avoid a clash at any cost before the elections, but it now seems that this will have to be abandoned, and the appointment of a strong man, Noske, about a fortnight ago, to take charge of the military situation is a sign that a determined effort will be made to keep the anarchists under control.

The Cabinet now includes five Socialist members: Ebert, Scheidemann, Noske, Wissel and Landsberg.

Of these, Ebert, the head of the Government, is universally respected, and has a strong hold, both inside and outside his party. He makes an impression of great honesty and sincerity, but it may be questioned whether his ability is adequate to cope with the intensely difficult situation, and whether his forcefulness is sufficient to control the disorderly element outside of his Party. He is a self-made man, the son of a tailor, and was himself brought up to the saddlers trade. He has acquired considerable education, and expresses himself with clearness and even eloquence.

Scheidemann, also a man of humble origin, who began life as a printer’s apprentice, has more brilliant gifts than Ebert, but is less free from self-effacement, and unlimited political ambitions are attributed to him.

Noske is a man of little education, but has a very strong personality, and his chances of controlling the parties of disorder are good. His success at Kiel, which led to his present appointment, is evidence of his power and willingness to use an iron fist.

Wissel is Minister of Education, but neither he nor Landsberg, the remaining Socialist member of the Government, is especially prominent at present.

To sum up the strength and weakness of the Government, it may be affirmed with some certainty that it is gaining rather than losing. The resignation of the independent socialists has given it a freer hand. Its elements of strength are:

(a) Close touch with and control of the masses.

(b) A constructive programme and political initiative.

(c) Its moderation and willingness to cooperate with moderate men of other parties.

The elements of weakness are as follows:

(a) The inexperience of the leading party members in actual government, their previous activity having been confined to party and parliamentary work.

(b) The fact that the prominent members have now no time for public propaganda.

(c) The disinclination of the Government to shed blood, at least before the elections, if it can be possibly avoided.

(d) The lack of a real military organization at the present moment, and the necessity of creating a national army.

In addition, in Bavaria, the party is handicapped by an Independent Socialist, Eisner, being nominally in control as Prime Minister. Here the man best fitted to head the Government is undoubtedly Auer, a man of obscure origin, but who appears to be possessed of constructive ideas, and of energy to carry them out, and who has the respect of all moderate parties.

2. Independent or Minority Socialists. This party, at the present moment, is in a state of disorganization. While it is far more radical than the Majority Socialists in its insistence on the immediate institution of far-reaching socialist measures, it has for the most part shrunk from cooperating with the Spartacus adherents. The result is that it has been losing in influence, the right wing of the party joining the Majority Socialists, while some of the extremists have been won over to Liebknecht. The leaders of the party are Hoffman, Barth, Dittmann, Cohn and Ledebour.

3. Spartacus or Bolshevistic Groups. These comprise several different factions, such as the followers of Liebknecht, the anarchists, and the communists, who may properly be considered together, as the aims of all appear the same, and as they are all closely allied to Russian Bolshevism. The movement is led by radical fanatics, who are, with few exceptions, foreigners or Jews. It is composed of:

(a) Professional and theoretical agitators.

(b) Laborers who have hitherto received extravagant wages for their work in war industries (“schwerarbeiter”).

(c) Young uneducated soldiers.

(d) Fanatical women such as take part in all revolutions.

The strength of the party lies in:

(a) The serious food and economic situation, resulting in hunger, disease and unemployment.

(b) A nervous collapse, due in the first place to defeat, and in the second to under nutrition.

(c) The old agitation of labor against capital, strengthened by the collapse of the capitalistic regime.

(d) The entire freedom from scruples of any kind on the part of the leaders and their willingness to go to all extremes.

(e) The fact that the party has obtained, in a large measure, the control of arms and munitions, including especially machine guns.

(f) The fact that they are in control of large sums of money obtained principally from Russian sources.

(g) The fact that the leaders are not in the Government, and therefore free to agitate on the outside.

The weakness of the party appears to be due to the following considerations:

(a) The people whom they wish especially to control, i. e., the mass of the populace, are not particularly amenable to their influence. The German proletariat are far better educated, much less easily led and much more attached to order and discipline than the Russians.

(b) The widespread knowledge of the true state of affairs in Russia.

(c) The fact that the party has no well-defined and constructive programme, but is in its essence destructive.

(d) The lack of distinguished leaders.

4. German Democratic Party. This consists of a conglomeration of the liberal elements of several parties, and includes the former Progressive Party and the left wing of the National Liberal and Centre parties. Their aim is to establish a permanent republic on democratic lines, excluding however, the social reorganization to which the Majority Socialists are committed. Their ideal is a revival of the Republic of 1848, under the black, red and gold flag. Their tendency is antimilitaristic, and they derive their strength from the middle classes and from men of moderate incomes who wish an orderly and moderate government, without marked social changes. They will be willing to join the Majority Socialists in a coalition government, should the latter not have an absolute majority. The weakness of the party lies in the fact that it is composed of heterogeneous elements and includes among its prominent men a number of professors and other theorists. Among the leaders and founders of the party are Theodor Wolff, Naumann (known as the chief exponent of the Mittel-Europa scheme), Dr. Dernburg, Professor Delbrueck, Max Warburg, Prince Max of Baden, and others.

While forecasts of the election are unreliable, it seems certain that the party will poll a large vote and will be a strong factor in framing a new constitution.

5. German People’s Party, or Christian People’s Party. This consists of the right wing of the former Centre Party and includes the Clerical Party, which is especially strong in Bavaria, and which is fighting the separation of church and state. The party is bourgeois, republican and not markedly reactionary, but is more opposed to all socialistic measures than the Democratic Party.

6. German National Popular Party. Comprises the former conservatives and the right wing of the national liberals. The leaders are Stresemann and Heydebrand. This party is also professedly republican, but its tendency is distinctly reactionary, and should the liberals be unable to form a stable government, it may be looked on to make an attempt to revive the monarchy in one form or another.

In some sections, especially in Bavaria, some of the old parties have maintained organizations and will put tickets into the field, but as far as can be ascertained, they will not form an important factor.

III. [sic] Attitude of Social Classes

1. The Junkers have retired entirely into the background, owing to the results of the war. The landowners, owing to their advocacy of the war to the last extremity and to their success in obtaining food supplies are the most unpopular class in the community and no serious attempts are being made by them to influence public opinion. They are under such obloquy that they will not be able to assert themselves, if at all, for a long time to come. The same thing may be said of the large manufacturers and of the war profiteers, as well as of the officers of the Ludendorff regime, who have been eager to fight to the last. Their voices are not heard, and their newspapers have had to change their tone.

2. The intellectuals, including professors and others, have to a large extent joined the Majority Socialist Party. Some are in the democratic ranks. They are not a strong influence at the present moment, due to their theoretic rather than practical views and their failure to agree on questions of policy.

3. The bankers and important merchants are extremely pessimistic and apathetic. They consider the financial condition of Germany almost beyond redemption and are afraid of losing all they have.

4. The minor officials, small employes and tradesmen are proletariatized, orderly and in favor of a liberal and stable government, but are politically quite untrained.

5. The laboring classes are mainly reasonable and inclined to support the Majority Socialists. A serious danger exists, however, that by hunger, cold and lack of employment, they will come under the control of the radical revolutionaries.

IV. Attitude towards the Allies and the United States

The most conspicuous feature of all conversations which I had with all classes was the somewhat over-friendly disposition towards America and Americans. This is undoubtedly partly due to self-interest, but is also largely owing to the former close ties with America, to social, economic and financial intercourse which existed before the war, and to the large population of German extraction in the United States; also to an appreciation of the fact that America has no selfish ends to serve and to the hope that she may be induced to plead the German cause with her allies. The result is that there is a strong wish to take up relations again with the United States at the same point where they were before the war, and the hope is cherished that the events of the war will be overlooked and condoned and that by the help of America, Germany will be enabled to rehabilitate herself. It is perhaps needless to add that I was careful to give no encouragement to this desire for a policy of forgiving and forgetting.

It was suggested to me that real advantages could be obtained for America if she consented to become the friend of the German people. One of the leading German financiers went so far as to explain that the nations predestined to bring order into Russia were evidently Germany and America; that America could not accomplish the task alone, and Germany had hitherto failed because of her lack of experience in dealing with the Russian people and her preoccupation with the war in other quarters, and that America would also fail if she acted alone because she would not understand the conditions in Russia, but Germany had now gained the necessary experience and together the two governments could organize the whole country and develop its resources.

An attempt will also be made on the part of the financiers to obtain a loan for Germany.

Anxiety is expressed as to whether, after the war, there will be a market for German goods in America, and I was asked on several occasions whether a boycott would be put in force for a considerable time after the war.

As regards the peace conditions, it is hoped in Germany that America will prevent the infliction of terms so severe as to cripple the economic and commercial life of the country, which is stated to be necessary for the existence of the German people. Bitter complaints are heard on all sides on account of the alleged harshness of the terms of the armistice, and the point most frequently brought up is that the forced giving up of rolling stock has practically stopped the transport of coal to many districts and has necessitated the closing of factories and unemployment of thousands of workmen. The occupation of the Ruhr district and the possible loss of the Silesian coal mines is also an especial source of anxiety. At Munich all factories were closed down for a period of ten days, up to January 1st, owing to the coal shortage.

A further cause of complaint was the alleged embargo against allowing passage of goods from the right to the left bank of the Rhine, in other words, from the occupied to the unoccupied district, and vice-versa. It was claimed that the consequence would be to prevent the important industries, such as textile concerns, from receiving supplies which would enable them to continue business.

Great emphasis was laid, by almost all persons with whom I talked on the necessity of obtaining an immediate supply of raw materials, and it was even claimed by one or two that the supply of raw materials was more important for the rehabilitation of Germany than the food supply.

The invariable argument used by all persons with whom I came in contact was that the Bolshevik danger was real and pressing, and was constantly fed by the lack of food and by the unemployment due to stoppage of raw materials; that Bolshevism would spread all over Germany and infallibly from thence to the neighboring countries, and would ultimately affect the whole world; that it was in the power of the Entente to check the movement by energetic relief measures and by giving the German people the chance to rehabilitate themselves; that this could only be done by affording them the necessary help and by failing to demand huge indemnities and crushing conditions with which it would be impossible to comply.

From many quarters it was insistently urged that the Entente should issue a formal and specific declaration substantially to the following effect: that it would under no circumstances conclude peace except with a responsible and stable government, elected by the will of the people, and that it would not be able to furnish food and other supplies to the people of Germany unless such a government, capable of providing the required guarantees, could be established. Such a declaration would in their opinion have the greatest possible strengthening effect on the forces of law and order.

I was asked repeatedly by persons connected with the government whether Count Bernstorff² would be an acceptable person to represent Germany at the peace negotiations. While I disclaimed giving anything but a personal opinion, I intimated that it would be, in my opinion, a great mistake, as in popular estimation, Count Bernstorff was held to have been the responsible head of the whole propaganda and espionage system in America and was emphatically an object of suspicion to the people at large. It seems probable that Count Brockdorff-Rantzau would be the principal delegate, if his health, which is said to be delicate, would permit. Dr. Solf was also mentioned, as was Dr. Rathenau. Mr. Warburg expects to be the financial representative of the German Government. Besides this, it is undoubtedly planned to bring over a number of experts. It is assumed that elaborate peace negotiations between Germany and the Entente will take place, in the course of which Germany will be allowed to explain her position at length, and it is hoped that her views regarding the fourteen points of the President and the League of Nations will be sustained.

V. Possible developments. Constructive plans

It is believed, that while in the extremely confused state of affairs an accurate forecast is difficult, the moderate element will ultimately remain in the ascendant. No doubt serious trouble with the anarchists is bound to take place, and very likely before the election at some time or other a serious clash is inevitable. It is, however, hardly possible that with the great majority of the German people opposed to them the anarchist people can do more than obtain momentary triumphs. The Government both in Prussia and Bavaria is adopting a more resolute attitude, and it is not conceived that the elections can be prevented. With the National Assembly behind them, the present Government, with or without the support of additional members of other parties, especially the German Democrats, should succeed in organizing a permanent government upon a Republican basis.

What form of organization will eventually be established is now the subject of discussion, and in Berlin a number of competent men are working at the task of framing a constitution. Of these, the most prominent is Professor Preuss, Minister of the Interior. The scheme favored by him is a confederation of states modelled on the American system with parliaments and a president or governor in each, and a central government with a president of strictly limited powers analogous to those of the French or Swiss President, together with a ministry responsible to a central parliament. Bodies akin to our senate and congress are proposed. Prussia would have its controlling influence weakened by being divided into four or five large states, and the capital would be removed from Berlin to some more central point, such as Weimar, Erfurt or Frankfort.

The South Germans appear to be in general accord with this plan, and at the instigation of Minister Auer, it was proposed to hold a convention for the purpose, before the elections, of determining on forms of constitutions for the whole of Germany. Two or three delegates from each state were to have been sent to this convention. The scheme did not go through, owing to the opposition of Eisner and the apparent lack of interest of the Government at Berlin in the proposal.

The danger of a monarchist reaction is, according to the consensus of opinion, remote. The general sentiment against the Hohenzollern dynasty is exceedingly strong, and there is a feeling that the latter has shown itself unworthy. In especial the former Emperor is an object even of contempt, due to the fact that in popular estimation his flight has branded him as a personal coward.

Whatever action may hereafter be taken in favor of a monarchy will therefore probably confine itself to an attempt to establish a constitutional form of government like England or Italy, under a non-Hohenzollern prince, possibly chosen from among the South Germans. Such elements as are likely to favor monarchism are, first, the agrarians, secondly, the Catholic Church. These are, however, only marking time at present. Against any such reaction is, in the first place, the growth of Socialism, which will foster closer relations with the proletariat in republican governments; second, the disorganization of the Army, which is exhausted by fighting and wishes to shed no blood in furtherance of a monarchical form of government.

It seems probable that no monarchical government will have any chance of success for many years to come, unless

(a) An undue extent of bona fide German territory or disputed territory is occupied by the allies or by subject nationalities.

(b) The terms of peace are so harsh as in substance to reduce the German people to a state of slavery.

(c) A violent and arbitrary separation of church and state lends fuel to the Catholic forces, which at present are in a state of inanition. This contingency applies in especial to Bavaria.

VI. Economic, Financial and Food Situation

In view of the fact that, as is understood, a commission will shortly visit Germany, including a number of specialists, in order to thoroughly investigate the economic and food situation, I made no especial effort to make a study of conditions of this nature. Some general impressions which I obtained in the course of conversation may be of use in order to furnish a rough outline.

The financial burdens which Germany will have to bear were described by bankers and others with whom I talked as well nigh hopeless. The country is practically bankrupt, and unless commerce can be restored, will be unable to meet the interest on the war loans, in addition to severe indemnities which may be imposed. The well-to-do are gloomily anticipating being shorn of all they have. By the latest tax proposals, the war profiteers are to be taxed out of 80% of their war gains. The large estates are to be divided up. The bankers are expecting to become insolvent, as security for their loans has vanished, and merchants complain that they cannot collect debts.

War industries have come to a standstill, and owing to the lack of raw materials the factories cannot be retransformed so as to take up their pre-war activities. The seaports are centres of unrest on account of the large number of unemployed, and in Hamburg alone, it is estimated that 40,000 persons are out of work. At the same time, the rate of wages remains high and ordinary laborers are demanding and receiving 7200 marks a year, amounting at pre-war rates, to $1800 annually, and at the present value of German currency to about $900. In Bavaria and other places, the unemployed are being supported by the State, at a rate in some instances, of 20 marks a day.

The purchasing power of the mark has about been cut in two. As an example, the taxi-cab drivers are demanding and receiving twice the registered fare. At the same time, the salaries of petty officials, railroad employes, teachers, etc., have seldom been increased, and the result is that these classes are suffering severely.

I only had opportunity to judge of the food situation in Munich and Berlin. It is evident, however, that there is no danger of actual starvation for a number of months to come. The estimates vary from March 1 to June 15 as the period at which all stocks would be exhausted. It is probable that the last date is substantially correct. At the same time, the under-nutrition is everywhere evident. Especially in Berlin, but also in Munich, the people on the streets show marked signs of insufficient nutrition. The children have an anaemic and delicate appearance compared with two years ago, and the older people also show signs of emaciation and lack of strength.

I was informed by one of the food experts that while it had been possible during the war to furnish 1200 calories to each person, this now had to be reduced to 800 or 900. The normal allowance is, I am told, 3000. The most evident need is fats of all kinds, the butter and margarine ration being only 70 grammes per week. The bread is very poor and meat ration, ½ lb. per week, including bones, insufficient. The potato crop, according to personal statements which were made me, was much worse than has been admitted in the papers.

The system of food distribution has almost completely broken down and the result has been that the rich are often able to obtain sufficient supplies by paying exorbitant prices and by underhand methods of all kinds, which are now employed without hesitation. In some quarters of Berlin even money cannot buy adequate rations. In the country stocks which had been successfully concealed during the war are now being brought forth and sold at high prices. The incentive to this is partly the fear that a Bolshevist government may succeed in confiscating all food supplies and also to the expectation that when stocks are exhausted there will be help from outside.

The infant mortality is said to be terrible, and in general I was told that 800 more deaths occur daily throughout Germany than was the case before the war. Deaths were not directly due to starvation, but to wasting diseases caused by malnutrition. I was informed that cases of hunger oedema have been diagnosed by competent medical men as a result of living on full rations allowed by the Government.

VII. Recommendations

I venture to make the following suggestions:

(1) A commission of competent observers familiar with the German language should be organized and should proceed to Germany without delay, unless a condition of actual civil war arises within the next few days, in which case such a commission would probably attain no useful results. The members of this commission should be distributed throughout Germany. The points where it would seem advisable to place observers appear to be Berlin, which would naturally be the centre of the organization and where the strongest force should be maintained; Munich; Leipsic or Dresden, probably the former; Hamburg, Frankfort and Breslau. Such distribution should, however, be elastic and subject to change. The staff distributed outside of Berlin should report there by telegram or mail, and cipher communication, which will be allowed by the German Government, should be arranged from there to Paris. Great care should of course be taken that only persons of good judgment and considerable experience shall be sent in. Persistent endeavors will be made to convert observers to German views, and objectivity and impartiality are absolute pre-requisites. In this connection attention is called to the great undesirability of allowing the entry into Germany at present of American newspaper reporters, some of whom have already in several cases obtained interviews with German public men.

(2) A further commission to study the economic and food situation should also be sent immediately. Whether this could not be advantageously combined with the political commission is a question seriously to be considered. In this connection the question suggests itself whether preliminary arrangements for consignments of fats should not be undertaken at once.

(3) The coal situation should be made the subject of an immediate investigation, with the view of alleviating the very serious conditions which undoubtedly obtain in Bavaria and elsewhere at the present moment.

(4) I advise that an official statement of the kind above indicated relative to non-negotiation except with a stable government elected by the will of the people and non-supply of food stuffs and other commodities except to a government capable of giving the necessary guarantees, be issued at the earliest moment possible. In view of the coming elections, the present moment seems especially indicated for such a statement.

VIII. Memorandum as to annexed documents

The following papers are annexed hereto as part of this report:

1. Memoranda of interviews with the following persons:

1. Professor Brentano

2. Lieut.-Col. v. Sonnenburg

3. General Count Montgelas

4. Dr. A. Mueller

5. Prime Minister Eisner

6. Archbishop von Faulhaber

7. Minister Auer

8. Minister Frauendorfer

9. Assistant Commandant of Munich Station

10. Theodor Wolff

11. Dr. Solf

12. Dr. W. Rathenau

13. Minister Preuss

14. Minister Scheidemann

15. Dr. Salamonsohn

16. Dr. Solmssen

17. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau

18. K. Fürstenberg

19. Minister Ebert

20. M. Harden

21. Prof. Wurm

22. Max Warburg

23. Minister Noske

2. Memorandum furnished by Mr. Von Frauendorfer, Bavarian Minister of Transportation, in regard to the delivery of railroad material to the Entente.

In conclusion, I have to mention the efficient assistance which was given me by Mr. Franklin Day of the American Legation at Berne, who accompanied me on the journey and whose notes and participation in interviews have been exceedingly helpful in furnishing the material from which the above summary has been compiled.

I have [etc.]

Ellis Loring Dresel

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum of Interviews in Germany

1. Professor Lujo Brentano, of Munich

Professor Brentano stated that the first requisite of Germany was its economic rehabilitation, as the bad economic situation affected political developments adversely. He complained of the terms of the armistice, and stated that the delivery of the number of railway carriages and, locomotives provided for in the armistice was certain completely to cripple the German railways. The Bavarian industries had been ordered not to work during the week preceding January 1st in order to save coal, as all coal supplies from the Saar and Ruhr territories and from Bohemia had been cut off. The present Bavarian Government had effected an agreement with the Bohemian Government, according to which twenty five cars of coal would be furnished each day, which, however, had not been delivered. Coal and food, in his opinion, are the great necessities for attaining stable conditions. As to the food question, it was important to note that Germany was living on its reserve stock at present and that Bavaria was eating its March and April supplies. He thought that the stocks could not last longer than February, although optimists believed they would not be exhausted until March.

The Government had the masses under control, but could control them only so long as it could feed them, and the only reason for using the reserve stocks was to keep the people contented during the critical period.

He did not believe that the present Government would last much beyond January 12, the date of the elections to the Bavarian Diet. The further outcome of these elections he considered dubious, because of the unknown factor of woman suffrage.

Of Eisner, he said that he was a brilliant man, but a comedian and that he was not made to govern people. As far as counter revolutionary movements were concerned, he believed that the clerical party, which he said probably had the numerical superiority in Bavaria, would immediately attempt to make Bavaria a monarchy, and that this would be dangerous because the minority would never acquiesce, and bloodshed would take place. He also stated that if the Bavarian “National Constituent” were called and did not contain a Socialist majority, the Socialists would probably disperse it, or at least such action would be attempted by the Radical Socialist factions. Such an attempt, he added, would be useless, for the Diet would meet in some other town in Bavaria such as Nuremberg, take Munich by force, and then establish a firm government.

A great part of the people were anti-monarchical, and wanted order kept, although the very radical elements of the Independent Socialists were using funds copiously to corrupt the Soldiers who were returning from the front with their morals unimpaired.

As far as any separatist tendencies in Bavaria are concerned he believed that, while the Bavarian people were impatient of Prussian domination, they would be willing to form part of a federated Germany. Moreover, he pointed out that a separate Bavaria could not exist because it could not combat the economic pressure of its neighbors, as raw materials and coal came from other parts.

In conclusion Professor Brentano stated that he thought that it would be helpful if the Entente would designate some German party, and express its confidence in it by a declaration to the effect that it would conclude a peace with the government of that party. A policy of this kind would rally all elements to a moderate political program, and restore unity. Some such moral help he said was necessary to the German people who had physically and morally collapsed. He did not believe that the League of Nations would meet any obstacle from Germany and expressed his fervent hope for its creation.

Professor Brentano stated that he had been offered the Ministry of Commerce, and that for a number of days he had occupied himself with a study of the material collected at that office. He then came to the conclusion that only stringent reforms would be of any use in the reconstruction of the country’s commerce, and had resigned his post because he had no confidence that the present government possessed sufficient stability to assure his being able to carry out the measures he advocated with due consistency.

Munich, December 28, 1918.

2. Leeut.-Col. Fatner von Sonnenburg, of Munich

During the last four years, Lieut-Col. Von Sonnenburg has been the Chief of the Press Bureau of the Bavarian General Staff and thus has been the censor of the Bavarian press, an office which I am told he conducted with tact and liberality. I was informed by a number of people that, although not a party man, he was the best posted man in Munich on political affairs. In conversation he stated that he had protested against submarine war, as he had long been in America and knew the character of our people. Immediately before the order for unrestricted submarine warfare was issued, Bethmann-Holweg, then Chancellor, was ordered to report to the German Emperor on the subject. Upon his arrival at Headquarters however, he was informed that His Majesty had already made up his mind and that the matter should not be further mentioned. Bethmann-Holweg was then urged by friends, actuated perhaps by mistaken motives of patriotism, that it was his duty to remain in office unless the war became more and more ruthless, and unless further gross political errors be committed. Bethmann-Holweg therefore, instead of following the logical course of immediate resignation, remained Chancellor. Sonnenburg stated that this was a mistake, for thus the sore was only covered and was able to eat into the flesh further. He also informed us that he had argued with Ludendorff regarding submarine warfare without effect. Originally, he stated, the demolition of the Eastern French fortresses was the only demand which the Military Party was prepared to enforce upon a victorious peace. Then, the manifesto of the industrial societies appeared and the policy of conquest was adopted by the military extremists.

Brest-Litovsk was the grossest blunder of the German Government, and the expeditions to the East in 1918 were only made for the purpose of proving that the military were right. A firm civilian government which [could?] control the Ludendorff adherents was then impracticable, as a highly organized pan-German movement was everywhere.

With reference to the present situation, Germany urgently required moral and material help, food and absence of further humiliation in order that the people might become self-respecting again. He stated that the German people had passed through an awful crisis, that of militarism, and that it was now a convalescent which needed nursing and strengthening.

He considered a monarchist reaction out of the question. That form of government was gone forever and the government of the future in Germany would certainly be Socialist. All parties would loyally lend their services to such a government as otherwise a Bolshevist supremacy over Germany would be assured. He was very firm in his conviction that there would be no pan-German or monarchist reaction in Germany, because the vast majority of the people were bitterly opposed to it.

He believed that as far as a separatist movement in Bavaria is concerned, it would only arise if things became insupportable in Berlin when Bavaria might join with the Tyrol and with Styria, and thus control large resources of electrical energy. Such a state would be able to endure. He believed, however that a federated, decentralized republic with its seat in a historic or geographic center outside of Berlin would be the outcome of a political readjustment. In conclusion he asked that America should place confidence in the German people who had been deluded and betrayed and who were anxious to follow a new road to a better political existence.

Munich, December 28, 1918.

3. General Count Montgelas, of Munich

He began with a general talk on the causes of the war, claiming that it was not as the Entente believed an aggressive war, but that Germany was forced to protect herself against her neighbors, especially those on her east. He acknowledged the wrong done to Belgium, and the fatal mistake of the extreme submarine warfare, against the last of which his brother as he said had made the strongest of protests. The transformation into an aggressive war had only taken place later on, when the Ludendorff regime came in, and the extreme measures were never supported by the masses of the people. The people should not in his view be punished for what the military authorities had wrongly decided, but it now seemed that the Entente were inclined to press matters to the utmost limit. As far as Bavaria was concerned, the coal situation was exceedingly serious, in fact even more so than the food situation at the present time. All factories have been closed until January 1st and there was no relief in sight. Whatever coal was obtained from the Ruhr was not sufficient and the transport difficulties from Silesia, even supposing that it would not be swallowed up by Poland, were extreme. The food on hand would last until March 1st. He could see no remedy except a specific declaration by the Entente that unless a stable government was formed at once no food would be furnished and no peace could be made.

Asked about the members of the present Government he did not think Eisner would last long; he considered him a visionary and an extremist. Auer was, he thought, the man most to be trusted and it was quite likely that he would come in after the coming elections. The clerical party was strong, especially among the peasants, but he was inclined to think a Majority Socialist Party, eliminating all independents, might be the solution in Bavaria.

Munich, December 28, 1918.

4. Dr. A. Mueller, Editor-in-Chief of the “Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten”

Doctor Mueller is a young man and appears very energetic, sound and intelligent. In his opinion there are two dangers in the present situation. (1) Bolshevism, considered from a political point of view, and (2) disorganization of labor and lack of work which again may influence political activity in favor of the support of Bolshevism. In his opinion the elections to the Constituent Assembly will not pass without opposition on the part of the Spartacus group, which is supported in its aggressive attitude by the revolutionary internationalists and by the Communists. These are led in large part by idealists, and even by persons from the best classes of society. All desire to destroy, but fail to take into account the necessary difficulties of reconstruction. Dr. Mueller expressed considerable pessimism and did not think that a stable government could be established in Bavaria without bloodshed, any more than in any other part of Germany. Bolshevism might even for the time become paramount. Dr. Mueller agreed with all other persons with whom interviews had been had, in stating that the most powerful factor for the stabilization of any government would lie in a statement by the Entente to the effect that no peace would be concluded, and no food furnished but to a firmly established government which expressed the popular will. It should be noted that Dr. Mueller’s pessimism is perhaps due to the bad experiences he has had with the more radical elements, which attempted to censor or suppress his newspaper.

Doctor Mueller was eloquent in his statements regarding the economic situation which he considered very bad indeed among the poor and those who lived on a fixed salary. He himself with an income of twenty thousand marks was only occasionally able to eat in the better restaurants where the food was not more than fair and it was practically impossible to bring young children through the period of the blockade without serious injury to their health. He believed that Bavaria might take a leading part in reestablishing order as soon as her economic difficulties arising from the coal situation, which created a lack of work, were settled. The present reasonably sufficient food was due to the fact that reserves were being used, and he expressed his fears for the potatoless time which was sure to come in March or April.

Dr. Mueller has been informed on the best authority that before the revolution Liebknecht had requested instructions from Joffe, and that he had received a large sum of money, about four million francs in gold, which was being copiously used to corrupt soldiers and induce them to join the Spartacus group, as members of which they were paid fifteen marks a day. These methods were highly dangerous as they attracted to the Spartacus faction all kinds of immoral and criminal elements which might be used for the purpose of a destructive Bolshevistic revolution.

Munich, December 29, 1918.

5. Minister President Eisner

Last night I had the opportunity of dining with Minister President Eisner, together with Professor Jaffe, Finance Minister, and Professor Bonn. Mr. Eisner presents the typical appearance of a radical journalist, with long hair, and although he is a Jew has few of their racial aspects. He had just arrived from Stuttgart where, he informed us, the States of Bavaria, Baden, Württemburg, and Hesse, had formed a coalition of the southern German States. Having returned by automobile he appeared tired and disinclined towards any serious political discussion, nor did he react to any political suggestions which were thrown out. Doctor Eisner made the impression of being both vain and flippant, and as lacking in any true realization of the bases of government. He talked “my revolution” and of his prison experiences, and showed no especial interest in the regeneration of Germany nor with its relations with the outside world.

Munich, December 29, 1918.

6. Archbishop von Faulhaber, of Munich

In conversation the Archbishop appeared very pessimistic indeed. The bourgeoisie was weak and lacked political experience, was easily terrorized and all possibility of arousing the non-governmental elements before the elections of the National Assembly was handicapped by the fact that the ordinary means of transport had broken down, and that conveyance such as motors was only in the hands of the supporters of socialistic and radical government. He seemed convinced that a further revolution was possible, and even probable, and that the bourgeoisie of the towns and the uninstructed peasants who, in spite of the non-existence of the great land holders were desirous of land, would not be able to stem the socialistic tide. He saw no strong man who could reorganize Bavaria, and eventually Germany. In his opinion the next ten days were vital in order to carry out an orderly electoral campaign, but he feared that obstacles would be put into the way of a real expression of the popular will. A certain harmony existed between Protestant and Catholic members of the new Bavarian Peoples’ Party, which was formerly the Center Party but which had abandoned its cut and dried attitude and was now a party of order as opposed to the parties of revolution.

The impression which the conversation left was that anything was possible today even in Munich, where the population was by nature less accessible to emotional political propaganda, but where the apathy of the bourgeoisie and its desire to let things go by the board rather than to allow their inertia to be disturbed might seriously cripple any agitation against what he considered the wholly destructive force of radical socialism. It is to be noted, however, that the Archbishop spoke in the highest terms of Auer, who, he said, possessed the confidence of many of the bourgeoisie.

Munich, December 29, 1918.

7. Minister of Interior E. Auer

Erhard Auer is a Majority Socialist who has consistently opposed militarism and Prussian influence, as can be seen from a speech of his before the revolution which he gave me. He is a self-made man in the widest interpretation of the word, having risen from obscurity and a farm laborer’s job to the post of Minister of Interior in the Republican Bavarian Government. He gives an impression of strength, honesty, directness and intelligence and courageously continues to fight against revolutionary radicalism in spite of the fact that his life has been threatened. He appeared both willing and able to carry his program to a successful conclusion, notwithstanding the quiet but determined obstruction of the visionary Eisner. He also informed me of a recent meeting of delegates from the Southern German States, including Hesse, at Stuttgart, where a permanent committee of these States would sit there to keep in touch with German affairs. Like all other members of the Government and politicians with whom I have spoken he emphatically urged a statement by the Entente that no peace would be made except with a stable government, a statement which, he said, would be of the greatest value in suppressing the radical revolutionary ardor due to the hysteria. He was optimistic and confident that the elections would go smoothly, by which I took him to mean that he and his party would win. It was his belief that the elements of order would get control in Berlin, and that Ebert would be able to hold his position and create a stable and non-radical government which by gradual socialization of appropriate industries would prepare the work of transition to a really Socialistic regime.

He also discussed the economic situation and strongly emphasized the danger arising from the unemployment, due to the lack of coal and raw materials, of the industrial population, thus causing disorder and endangering the morale of the proletariat. The above mentioned statement of the Entente he considered of particular importance and desired very much to obtain it officially in order to be enabled to pave the way to a constitutional and republican form of Government.

Munich, December 29, 1918.

8. Frauendorfer, Minister of Transportation

Herr von Frauendorfer expressed his belief in Auer as the man best able to carry a democratic, socialistic policy. He also agreed that the statement which has been mentioned in a former memorandum made by the Entente relative to order in Germany was highly necessary. He further enlarged upon the transport difficulties, a memorandum regarding which he gave me.³

Munich, December 29, 1918.

9. Memorandum of a conversation with a non-commissioned officer (vize-feldwebel) and assistant commandant of the railway station in Munich

This man, who accompanied us as far as Hof, was originally an employee in a large department store, and had gone in 1914 to the front, where he was made a vice first sergeant. He had fought in France, Rumania, and Russia, as well as a short time in Italy. He appeared to be an intelligent man of sober judgment and to represent the better type of the revolutionary masses. He expressed himself strongly in favor of order and discipline and told us of the measures which he and his comrades had taken to prevent Bolshevist agitations coming into Bavaria from Berlin.

He told us that the morale of the German Army began to break when America had entered the war, for they knew then that they could not win. Neither Ludendorff, nor Tirpitz would have dared to show themselves at the front, even as early as 1916, for none of the soldiers believed in the success of extreme submarine warfare.

The war had lasted too long and a revolution was bound to follow, although nothing would have happened had the war stopped two years earlier. He expressed himself as glad that the war had ended In the defeat of Germany, as, though they had lost the war they had won their liberty. He was in favor of a government headed by Auer, but was not ready to break up a Constituent Assembly, should it have a Catholic majority. He expressed himself as apprehensive as regards the results of granting woman suffrage, because women were not yet accustomed to exercising political rights. I was much impressed with his sobriety, as well as by the spirit of discipline which men like he might be able to enforce. He did not think that the Spartacus people would be able to wield any permanent influence or exercise real terrorism, and expressed his contempt because they all ran away when he ordered his men on one occasion to fire on them.

The spirit of men of his stamp is shown by the fact that he is on duty twenty-four hours successively every other day, and when asked whether he did not find this very hard he said that this was a time when every one must do his best to restore the country to order. He expressed great personal hatred of the Prussians, who, he said, had robbed Bavaria, a statement which was repeated by a comrade of his at a further railway station with whom we discussed the political situation, and who was entirely on the side of my informant. Bavaria, in the opinion of the first man, should have entered the war of 1870 on the French side. He did not believe that Bavaria could stand alone, but he was for the exclusion of Prussia from a federation of South German States.

Berlin, December 30, 1918.

10. Theodor Wolff, Chief editor of the “Berliner Tageblatt’”

Herr Wolff began by explaining the position of the German Democratic Party, which he had founded. This party, he said, was created to form a bourgeois organization with which the Social Democrats could cooperate, although it did not pursue as radical economic aims as the Socialists. He stated that no one was admitted to the Democratic Party who had either (A) supported the U-Boat war, (B) who had favored a policy of annexations and indemnities (C) who had opposed electoral reform in Prussia. The purpose of this restriction, he stated, was to keep the Party’s hands clean. This Party, carrying black, red and yellow flags, last Sunday demonstrated in favor of a stable government, this being the first instance of a bourgeois street parade, and one hundred thousand people took part. At the same time the Majority Socialists demonstrated with a similar aim and mustered four hundred thousand representatives. The Spartacus Group also had a parade of about thirty thousand men only.

The German Popular Party, of which Stresemann is the head, is reactionary and represents a blend of moderate conservatives and of the right wing of the National Liberals.

Of the Spartacus Group, he said that it was small in number but determined and well armed, possessing many machine guns, and including especially laborers from the steel industries. It is largely composed of young soldiers, many sailors and visionaries, and of criminal elements. He stated that the first care of the new government, which has no doubt been strengthened by the fact that the Independent Socialists had left it, must be to create a new army.

With reference to the events in Poland, he said that the German people would not now suffer the Poles to occupy German territory, although if the Peace Conference based on Wilson’s principles decides that this territory should belong to Poland this view will be accepted. Under no conditions, however, will the German people suffer the Poles to rob them of the eastern provinces. Germany is not dead and sooner or later the German people will awaken if the Entente insists on a policy of force. The great dangers to Germany arising from the political situation are (1) Bolshevism, which may follow impoverishment and (2) a nationalism which, although it may not be monarchical, may lead the nation again into militarism through the channel of a republican national uprising. It is, therefore, unwise to humble Germany too much or to ruin her completely. As far as Bolshevism is concerned he stated that the labor unions had lost in power, and that thus an element of discipline was lost to the State. Of Walther Rathenau, he said that he had lost his influence and his credit. First he issued a manifesto calling for a defense to the last ditch after the armistice negotiations had begun, and then he said that he would not outlive the ruin of his country, which no one believes.

With reference to the National Assembly he said that the Majority Socialists would poll a huge vote, that the Independent Socialists would fail to gain many seats, and that the Centre Party would regain much of its lost influence on the voters because of the untimely separation between Church and State which had irritated the Catholic masses.

Wolff was thoroughly optimistic, and thought that, even should Germany pass through a period of Bolshevism, she would be able to overcome it and would be able to renew her strength.

In conclusion he said that Radek’s presence was a great danger, as he was unscrupulous and immoral. He was no better than a thief, and had been expelled from both Polish and German Party organizations.

Berlin, December 31, 1918.

11. Dr. W. Solf, former Colonial Minister

Dr. Solf explained that he had left the Foreign Office because of the telegram which Joffe sent to the effect that Haase, then a member of the Government, had accepted Bolshevik money for the purpose of a social revolution. Upon the publication of this, Dr. Solf refused to shake hands with Haase and ensuing difficulties led to his resignation.

With reference to the present situation Solf was very pessimistic, and could not see that the Government would be able to hold itself against the onslaught of the Spartacus group. He estimated the strength of the armed men at the disposal of the Spartacus people at thirty thousand, and stated that the Government had no such number of loyal troops to oppose them. He said that the sailors who had originally come to preserve order as well as the soldiers had to a large extent gone over to the Spartacus faction. Another great danger lay in the fact that the Police President of Berlin was one of Germany’s most prominent Bolshevists, and not only prevented the collection of arms from the Spartacus party, but in fact furnished them. He believed that the present government would have to attempt to disarm the Bolshevist elements but he would not be surprised if in another week the Spartacus people would one fine day go and simply imprison the Government. It was his belief that the whole Bolshevist movement, as well as the apathy of the bourgeois classes was in a large measure due to the under-feeding which had made brain cells abnormal. Bolshevism, once it were rampant in Germany, would affect all Europe and might even infect England and America.

The present government, suffered not only from its weakness in not having troops, but also from the fact that it was opposed to the use of force in principle and was, therefore, at the mercy of its radical and active opponents. Its members were honest men from the lower middle classes who were good party politicians, but who entirely lacked courage, or the character necessary to rule. Noske he thought the most energetic man, and he believed that he might be able to re-organize the army. Solf himself had hoped that a coalition government of democrats and socialists would obtain power, but he thought this impossible at present.

He agreed with all other informants that a monarchical reaction was impossible, and that no one was willing to reinstate the Emperor. The Emperor, he said, had behaved very badly and had utterly misunderstood the true situation, for when Solf had asked him to abdicate, the Emperor claimed to have the people and the army behind him, and could not be persuaded that this was not the fact. The Emperor’s greatest mistake, Solf said, was his flight to Headquarters, as it gave circulation to rumors that he would continue to fight with his army in spite of the armistice and that he would cause the navy to attack England. He said that he himself had been convinced that Germany would break down in the spring, but he never believed that such Russian conditions as existed in Berlin today would come about. It was his belief that there would be bloody fighting before the elections to the National Assembly were carried out. Finally he repeated what, as he said he had impressed on all Americans who had spoken to him, that the greater the food supply, the less danger of Bolshevism, and the less food, the more danger.

Solf also considered the presence of Radek in Berlin as most dangerous.

Solf made a most depressed impression. He did not think that the present Government could solve the problems before it. Ebert and Scheidemann were both estimable in his opinion, Scheidemann the more able man, but they could not see that forcible measures were necessary to save Germany. At any time the Spartacus Group could seize the reins of power. They had already at times prevented his entering his own office, and one day he found three sailors at his door who barred the entrance. The real leaders of men were only to be found among extremists, the Junker class among them, but these latter had, of course, made themselves impossible.

Of the Spartacus Group, Rosa Luxemburg was the most dangerous and plausible. Liebknecht has been said to be mentally unbalanced, but when it was attempted to send him to a sanitorium instead of a prison he defended himself with such cleverness that a medical certificate of mental trouble was impossible.

Ludendorff had been the evil genius of Germany. He had had matters all his own way and had been able to prevent Kuhlmann from making a decent peace at Brest-Litovsk. Ludendorff had no political sense, but tremendous will power, and his entourage was also most pernicious.

Solf warmly favored a declaration by the Entente that no peace would be concluded unless with a stable government. If the parties of disorder got into power sooner or later the Entente would have, in his opinion, to intervene.

Berlin, January 1, 1919.

12. Dr. Walther Rathenau

Dr. Rathenau stated that when he last saw Colonel House he had arranged to let him know when the moment was ripe for American intervention with a view to concluding peace. He said that the time had not come up to autumn of 1917, but he then wrote two identical letters to Colonel House, one over Holland and one over Spain, which he forwarded through the Foreign Office and the Legation and Embassy. He had not had an answer, and supposed they had never reached [sic]. Asked how it could have been expected that America at that moment would enter on discussions for a separate peace, he said that was not contemplated, but that she should take action with her allies.

Passing to general conversation, he stated that at the time of the majority resolution in July 1917, he had done all he could to make peace possible. He had even gone so far as to approach Ludendorff, though unwillingly. He reproached Ludendorff for having surrounded himself with Pan-Germans, but this was denied by Ludendorff, who said that he had only one or two, and these only temporarily. However, Rathenau said that he convicted him by naming several to him. One, the most virulent, was Colonel Bauer, who was a liaison with great producers (“Schwerindustrie”). Ludendorff had told Rathenau after a long conversation that he agreed with his views in all respects except that the submarine war could not be stopped. Ludendorff said that it was a matter of instinct with him to continue it. Rathenau pointed out the technical reasons why the continuation was ruinous and quite ineffective, but was unable to convince Ludendorff.

Dr. Rathenau then made a plea for moderation in the peace negotiations, stating that the country was already three-fourths ruined, and that cold-blooded discussions at the Council Table would lead only to the destruction of all that was left in Germany. Poland was the only land in history which had been divided by negotiations between the dominant powers, and even in that case the results had been that the Poles were assured of good treatment under stable governments.

In answer to a question, he said that he considered that the chances of ultimately establishing an orderly, strong government were very good. The German nation were naturally orderly and docile and he did not question but that the proper spirit would assert itself. It was quite to be expected that the Bolshevists would be able to gain power for a time, but this would be merely temporary, and could last from only three to six weeks at the most. Everything would be in order before the Entente would have time to step in. Their views would be so divergent that it would be long before they could come to an agreement between themselves.

In Dr. Rathenau’s opinion the American influence with the Entente was decreasing rapidly. Now that their army was no longer necessary, the French would make every effort to push matters to extremes, and America’s prestige has been injured by coming to Europe to negotiate.

In diplomacy American methods were direct, but Europe has to rely on machinations and intrigues, and with the best will in the world America could not use direct methods. He feared that the President would be drawn into the net; that his broad lines of policy would be ignored and evaded, and that the peace would eventually be made by France, not even by England. No doubt the President had a hold on the people at large in the different countries, but it would take a long time for such forces to get into play, and in the mean time peace will have been concluded on narrow, selfish lines.

The only thing to do was for America to assert itself strongly, and bang on the table, and insist that Germany should not be utterly destroyed.

Going into details, he stated that the whole national wealth of France was about 250 billions. 8 per cent of French territory had been occupied, and possibly a fourth of the wealth in this was destroyed. This would amount to 5 billion francs, but even if the loss is put at 15 billions, this is small compared with the 65 billions demanded. This last figure can only be accounted for by France figuring in the expenses of the war.

He feared that there would be no real negotiation of peace, but mere dictation analogous to that of the Armistice. He thought that the Germans should never have proposed an armistice, but should have directly started negotiations of peace with America. Asked how this would have stopped the fighting, he said that it would have been simple, after negotiations had once begun, to conclude a temporary peace in two or three weeks.

He feared that the German delegates to the Peace Conference would be badly treated. Erzberger would undoubtedly be one of the delegates. Perhaps Bernstorff would be another delegate, but he himself favored Solf, and had told him so.

Rathenau expressed his astonishment that the French and British should have allowed the present mission to come through without interference, but he exceedingly welcomed the opportunity to state his views and trusted that further occasions would be given. It was in the interest of America that there should be a strong Central Europe whose economic basis was satisfactory and, therefore, it was entirely in the interest of America to furnish raw materials and facilitate trade in every way. He said he believed in the future Germany was the only country on whose friendship America could rely. England would undoubtedly remain a friend for a time, but amicable relations with France would certainly not be permanent.

The greatest difficulty with the present situation was that old-fashioned diplomatic methods would hold the stage for a “short run”, as he expressed it, but permanent ideas founded on justice and liberality could only establish themselves in the long run. The only way to avoid this tendency was to have America strongly assert itself at the present moment.

Dr. Rathenau touched on the food situation and said there was enough food to last until about March 1st. The infant mortality was terrible.

He insisted that the German people were at heart perfectly sound. They understood nothing about politics, but they have been taught to obey from their earliest youth. Atrocities of all kinds were abominable to them, but nothing could go above the direct orders of their military superiors. The people who had really done harm to Germany were infinitesimal in number, but they have been able to swing the masses of the people who trusted and believed them implicitly. Asked how it was then that there had been such a distinctly unfriendly feeling among the whole German people towards America before we came into the war, he stated that the people had been deceived by lies, and taught that America was throwing her influence on the side of the Entente by deliveries of munitions and encouragement of the blockade. He himself had tried to controvert this but had not been listened to. Rathenau described himself as very pessimistic about the home situation, but it was evident that his fear was on account of the rigorous conditions which he thought would be imposed, rather than because of the internal situation. He made the impression of being very nervous, and not entirely well-balanced. He was inclined to talk a good deal about what he had done and written.

Berlin, January 1, 1919.

13. Prof. G. F. Preuss, Minister of Interior

Preuss was formerly a professor, and was considered the most radical member of the bourgeois parties. He was respected but obscure, and had no preferment until the new popular administration entered upon office. He was then offered the position of Minister of the Interior in the Government, following an article entitled: “Obrigkeitstaat und Volksstaat” (“Government by bureaucrats versus popular government”). When he entered the cabinet he informed the present Government of his exact attitude in political matters, and was told that he was chosen because he was an independent thinker and because of his technical knowledge, although he was not a Socialist.

Of the bourgeois parties, he said that they were torpid and that politically they were not of very much use. The revolution so far, he said, had been political rather than social, and the Independent Socialists complained of this. He stated that the more the revolution could be kept political the less likelihood of disturbances, but it was difficult at the present time to create purely political revolutions as social questions in an industrial country like Germany were of overwhelming importance. The danger for the present Government for the time being is from the Left, but he thinks that the demoralization of the army may be overcome. As far as the Spartacus Group and Liebknecht are concerned, he said that Liebknecht was not bloodthirsty, and that Rosa Luxemburg was the cleverest woman as far as politics were concerned in Germany today. To him the greater danger appeared to be from the Right, not for the present but in the long run, for he believed the reaction which was not showing its head now would emerge sooner or later and would emphasize any lack of success in any field. If conditions of misery exist, they will be pointed [to?] in order to persuade the people that the revolution had not brought what [had] been expected, and that the old regime had safeguarded property and [life].

The people were so used to the Hohenzollerns and to militarism that it would at best be a difficult matter to destroy the sentiment entirely. In this respect Dr. Preuss expressed a different opinion from other informants. Like very one else Dr. Preuss emphasized the danger of the coal and food situation, of which he said that they were ready instruments to bring about Bolshevism, which has no political standing but whose determined adherents, only a few hundreds in number, used the economic situation for their own purposes. Liebknecht, he said, had attended his courses, and had been an intelligent pupil.

In discussing the new German constitution which he was drafting, he stated that it had always been his opinion that the American Constitution should in a large sense be used as a model in organizing any possible German confederation of states, and that his present draft was being made with this in view. He proposes that the executive power of the government should be in the hands of a president with extended powers, but that unlike our system a cabinet of ministers responsible to parliament should be constituted. He also proposes that the chief legislative body of the new federated Germany should have a House of Representatives and a body akin to our Senate, with the exception that the representatives to the Upper House would not in numbers be equal for each state, but would be proportional to the inhabitants. For this purpose he stated Germany would have to be broken into federated states between numbers of the population, of which there was so great discrepancy. The scheme which [would be?] adopted for the suppression of Prussian hegemony, would require the breaking up of Prussia, and granting to the smaller states a limitrophe province of former Prussia. The difficulty, he said, with political development in Germany was that Germany had never had a revolution and that therefore it lacked the leaven necessary for active political development. The present revolution, he also said, was too bloodless and had not been energetic enough, nor had it affected a sufficient number of the people.

Dr. Preuss gave the impression of a sincere man of exceptional intellect and acquirements. He is of Jewish origin.

Berlin, January 2, 1919.

14. Minister Phillip Scheidemann

Scheidemann stated that the numbers of Spartacus Group were small, but that they were determined and energetic. The Government, he stated, appreciated the necessity of taking a firm stand against them, but was naturally unwilling to bring on a struggle before the elections as this would enable opponents to say that the blood of fellow workmen had been shed. He was very confident that a strong government could be formed which would have permanence, and he expressed his willingness to cooperate in any moderate government which was established by the will of the people. The National Assembly would determine the constitution, and the present Government considers itself purely provisional and would acquiesce in the wishes of the people, as expressed by a freely elected parliament.

He also stated that the constitution would be modeled on that of America, and that Germany would have a President and a number of federated States.

He discussed the food situation, and stated that it was worse than the Government dared to admit, and that the coal situation was dangerous. These two economic difficulties, once having been overcome, he was certain that a stable government could be created, and that the political situation could be controlled from within. The early frosts had ruined the potato crop, and in the north and east of Berlin conditions were exceedingly bad. He thought that there would be no Bolshevism unless the food situation became desperate, but in that case the masses would free themselves from the control of the government.

Berlin, January 2, 1919.

15. Dr. Salamonsohn, head of the Deutsche Kreditanstalt

Dr. Salamonsohn stated that the situation today was as bad as it could be, and that Germany was on the road to ruin. The Government was not strong enough to enforce order, and he feared that Bolshevism would become rampant if the food and coal situation were not remedied. At present the workmen were demanding such high wages that any profitable working of industries was out of the question, because no margin of profit was left, and because the workmen who received higher pay did less work. Hard work which was of a disagreeable nature, such as stoking, was not done by anyone, and other labor was too inadequate to be usefully employed either in production or in reconstruction. He said it was a fact that wealth produced high wages and that high wages produced high prices. The reduction of prices to precede a reduction of wages was impossible, as wages had to be reduced first to lower prices. When this process begins to set in he feared difficulties, and he believes that the present Government would not be able to quell them.

Once the National Assembly were called he said a coalition government or even a Majority Socialist government could be formed which would have the support of all classes which loved order. He feared, however, that this Assembly would never sit, as the Independent Socialists and the Spartacus people together might do their best to prevent it, since their aim was to establish their own regime during the interregnum, and to ruin the country.

The people were demoralized, and the army, the workmen, and the bourgeoisie all had lost their energy and their sense of responsibility. If food and coal could be provided the chances of the re-establishment of order would improve, otherwise he saw nothing but Bolshevism.

The financial situation, he said, was bad, and the amount of gold to cover the note issue was about thirteen percent. The currency which had been issued by certain municipalities was only temporary, due to wearing out of the machinery for printing bank notes, and therefore printed city notes were put in circulation. The coupons of the war loan also had been used as currency, but they had now been redeemed and the municipal currency would also soon be called in. This measure, therefore, did not appreciably affect the financial situation. This latter depended largely on an orderly government, and an orderly government could be brought about by economic assistance from outside. Germany, he believed, would soon have to adopt the American trust system in order that production could be concentrated where it was cheapest, and that wasteful distribution could be done away with.

With reference to guaranteeing payment for food to be sent in, he stated that this could only be done by a dollar loan which could be secured by a pledge of German railway mining securities which are yet free from liens.

Berlin, January 3, 1919.

16. Dr. Solmssen

Dr. Solmssen has just come from Cologne, and gave the following information relative to the economic situation on the left bank of the Rhine. The country on the left of the Rhine was industrially entirely interlocked with that on the right bank, many industries have their furnaces on one side and their coal mines and ore deposits on the other. Railway statistics of 1913, which could not have been made with any ulterior purpose, show that the railway traffic on each side was equal. The left bank was as industrially important as the right bank, for materials were worked into semi-finished goods, especially textiles, which were later sent off for completion. For this reason, he said, the present restrictions on intercourse were ruinous to the economic situation, not only on the left bank of the Rhine but also in other parts of Germany which depended on goods half finished on the left bank. Once industries came to a stop, he feared the worst and believed that a sudden uprising would take place which even the Entente could not suppress. He was pessimistic and requested information as to what central authority he could address himself in order to explain the situation, naturally not appreciated by the military authorities.

Berlin, January 3, 1919.

17. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Count Rantzau began the conversation by stating his aims. He said that his policy would be to sign any peace on the basis of the fourteen points of President Wilson, but that he would not accept conditions which made Germany the slave of the Entente. He said that he had accepted his office with reluctance. The German people could not be destroyed, and he would not let it be destroyed, nor would he sign any peace whatever but a peace which would grant Germany the possibility of continuing a decent existence.

He stated that he had always stood for President Wilson, and that at the time the offer for an armistice went to the President it was he who had particularly urged it, and he had thus taken upon himself a great responsibility before the people. He said that he had great faith in the President’s honesty, and had great admiration for him. He said he appreciated the difficulties under which the President worked in Paris, and that he could understand the French and Belgian attitude. He said that he would not whine or beg, but that the coal situation and the situation relative to food was exceedingly serious, so serious indeed that it might result in Bolshevism. Once this Bolshevism became rampant in Germany he knew that it would immediately spread to Scandinavia and that it would [not?] fail to affect France and Italy. Germany and America, he believed, has [had] similar interests and were akin to one another, and could for the future of the world cooperate profitably.

In discussing the Peace Conference, he mentioned the question of Bernstorff being sent there, and expressed his doubts whether he would be acceptable.

Count Rantzau stated that he was optimistic for Germany, because he had not lost his faith in the German people, which had been deceived and misled, and which had followed a phantom to the edge of an abyss. Optimism, he believed, was the only possible basis for a constructive program, and he intended to draw a sharp line at the foot of the happenings of the war and to proceed to reconstruct.

Count Rantzau stated emphatically that a reaction was out of the question.

Berlin, January 3, 1919.

18. Herr K. Furstenberg, President of the Berlin Handels Gesellschaft

Furstenberg is a prominent private banker and discussed the financial situation. Germany, he said, could not pay the war debt as a lump sum, but could pay the interest on it, if it were given help in the form of an international loan. Such an international loan, he said, could be secured by German stocks which represented the German industrial assets. He had, as a patriot, hoped for victory, but had run his bank in the expectation of defeat, and consequently it was still sound. He had never been consulted, and considered the Government experts incapable and ignorant. He was very optimistic, and was sure that Germany, after a hundred years of paying off her debts would again be financially reestablished. Herr Furstenberg is a man of original and interesting ideas, and appears to be universally respected.

Berlin, January 3, 1919.

19. Minister F. Ebert

Herr Ebert received us at the Chancellor’s palace, which he is occupying. The son of a tailor, he became a saddler’s apprentice, and in the Social Democratic movement rose to the second place in the party. He is everywhere spoken of as the logical President for the new German Republic. Ebert stated that the Bolshevist danger was serious only because of the food and coal situation, and that a stringent shortage of food or coal would make it difficult to control the masses, because they would fall into utter despair. The armistice conditions were such as to be very burdensome to Germany, but he had given orders that everything should be done to comply with them, although traffic would thereby be seriously hampered. He was confident that a firm government would soon be established, and he expected no serious difficulties from the Spartacus Group. This could be suppressed by force of arms, but he was not willing to use force until the opponents had first employed it. He said that Noske was very energetic, and was working out a plan for a national army which would soon be created. He gave the impression of an honest and simple man with the best of intentions to build up the nation.

In discussing the question of the German constitution, Ebert said that it would be modelled largely on the American Constitution, with slight modifications. Ebert said that he considered a reaction out of the question.

Berlin, January 3, 1919.

20. M. Harden

M. Harden stated that he was not pessimistic in regard to the situation but that the Bolshevist danger was very real. The present Government meant well, but had not the force necessary to solve the difficult problems which confronted it. A strong coalition government was, in his opinion, necessary, and might well be established after the elections. The new Constitution should follow that of the United States. He thought there could be a nominal head of each state, but the chief power should be in the hands of a prime minister. A strong central executive was necessary. Prussia would have to be divided into several states.

The whole German people were relying on President Wilson to see that justice was done, and that such indemnities should not be demanded as would absolutely cripple Germany.

He strongly favored an official statement by the Entente to the effect that peace would only be negotiated with a strong, stable government which had eradicated Bolshevism, and that no food supplies or raw materials would be forthcoming unless such a stable government was formed.

He thought that there was no possible danger of a reaction for a long time to come. The Hohenzollerns have made themselves utterly impossible, and the former Emperor was universally condemned because of his flight to Holland. He had always been a coward. Bismarck once told Harden that everybody should feel relieved that the Emperor was, in fact, a coward because if mobilization was ever discussed he would not be able to make up his mind to order it. At the beginning of the present war they had arranged to mobilize without the Emperor taking any part in the decision.

Harden is an interesting talker, but had no original constructive ideas of value to impart.

Berlin, January 4, 1919.

21. Prof. Wurm, former Food Controller

The mortality is terrible. The figures have been hitherto strictly kept secret. Every day eight hundred more people die than was the case before the war. Since the armistice was concluded, and leaving out the grippe cases, 36,000 more people have died than in the corresponding period before the war. The mortality has been especially great among older people and children. The under-nourishment of mothers has had a disastrous influence on babies.

The normal amount of calories is 3000, and in America it has been the custom to consider 4000 the proper ration. The ration in Germany during the war has generally been about 1200, which is quite insufficient, but now the amount is only 800 to 900 calories.

The present supplies of cereals will last up to the 15th of June at the very latest; after that everything will be empty unless new supplies come in. The under-nourishment, however, is so terrible that help is needed at once.

There is a marked hunger psychosis which is firstly of a purely nervous nature, causing all kinds of nervous disturbances; secondly, a state of mind is induced bordering on desperation, a conviction that it is impossible to endure hardships longer. The combination of these two is having a disastrous effect on the political situation in Germany.

During the war Prof. Wurm had occasion to see well defined cases of hunger oedema caused among persons who had had the full war rations.

Prof. Wurm gave me two photographs [graphs?] indicating the mortality in Berlin from 1915 to 1918 and the consumption of the most necessary foodstuffs for the years 1912 to 1913 and 1917 to 1918.

Berlin, January 4, 1919.

22. M. Warburg, a banker of Hamburg

The German people, he stated, were suffering more from the demoralization of the war than from having lost it. People are indifferent as to whether they die or not, and thus are not able to gather the necessary strength to fight dangerous revolutionary movements. Not only had militarism been overcome, but discipline has been lost. If some strength is left her, Germany will find her way through the woods, though she will never again be a great power. To help her on the right path is in the interest of the Entente, as Germany can keep order in Europe, and as she must not become a source of infection for all the world. In order that she may become sane again, she must be enabled to live her economic life. She must not lose northern Silesia, nor the opportunities to obtain iron ore from Lorraine. The Silesian coal production was 30 million tons per year, of which Poland received 1, Austria 9, and Germany the remainder. This is indicative of the importance of these coal mines to the existence of Germany. But as much as she needs economic help, she needs moral help so as not to lose confidence in herself as a self-respecting nation. For this reason Alsace-Lorraine should not be returned to France except on the basis of a plebiscite. The German people can console themselves for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, but only if taken legally on a fair basis, such as the fourteen points. It is especially necessary also to remove the blockade, which has particularly affected the Baltic. Today 900,000 tons of shipping are lying idle in Baltic harbors and in all German harbors ships of the total capacity of 1,900,000 tons would be ready to go out but for the continuation of the right of seizure. The result of this is that the most unruly elements, the sailors, are out of work, and that 38,000 men in Hamburg alone are unemployed. The menace of this to order and quiet is obvious.

Mr. Warburg stated that peace should not be signed in Paris, although he thought that the preliminary peace might be signed there in order to give France the triumph she desired. He considered that France was an unsuitable place for the final peace conference because of the pressure public opinion might exercise there on the negotiations, and that from there the German members of the peace commission would be cut off from their home Foreign Office and their people. Therefore, a neutral country should be chosen for the final negotiations.

The fact that the German prisoners had not yet been returned is not understood in Germany, and is causing considerable indignation. Never, he said, would Germany consent to the use of these men as slaves to rebuild France, although Germany would be willing to enter upon contracts to furnish labor and pay it for the rebuilding of the destroyed territories of France and Belgium.

A war indemnity such as has been talked of was impossible. Figures are now being collected which can be verified, showing the state of the German national finance and what Germany can pay, but it cannot collect the enormous sums demanded. Moreover, he said, if territories like Alsace-Lorraine and Poland are sundered from Germany, such districts would have to take over proportionally the burden of the pre-war loans made for their development and would also have to continue to bear their share in the war loans.

In regard to the colonies, he said that Germany must not be left without them, because the people must be left the hope and possibility of expansion and must not be deprived of every chance of recovering their economical strength, else, he said, Bolshevism or general disintegration might take place and Germany would, to the harm of the world, vanish as a nation. Reconstruction he believed to be possible if help from the outside were given.

Berlin, January 4, 1919.

23. Minister Noske

Herr Noske stated that he believed that the German people would get through this crisis, and that the Government was becoming firmer. The Bolshevik movement in Germany was no such great menace and that the workmen as a whole were orderly, and very desirous of keeping order. The danger in the situation, in his opinion, lay in the fact that in the industrial sections raw materials were lacking and that workmen were therefore out of employment and demoralized. The first necessity for Germany was to receive raw materials so that industries could be revived. The Government was now preparing everything so that it could strike a blow when necessary, but he was not willing to try experiments which he was not sure of bringing to a successful conclusion.

He said that it was of importance to the Entente to prevent the demoralization of Germany as this might easily spread to other European countries. A reaction, he stated, was out of the question, and there was not a soul who favored it. This had been his experience when he was Military Governor in Kiel. Once the borders were open and raw materials were allowed to come in, Germany would soon recover and become again orderly. He complained that the French were not complying with the Armistice conditions, and were abusing them to crush Germany. Noske was energetic and plainspoken, and it seems that he has sufficient strength to be able to suppress rioting or trouble which may occur, and which he fully expects. Should this come, he said that the Government would show itself firm and would be able to carry out its policy, as it had received information from soldiers in all parts of Germany that they would loyally support it.

Berlin, January 5, 1919.

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum Furnished by the Bavarian Minister of Transportation (Von Frauendorfer)

The fulfilment of the armistice treaty and the manner in which the Entente is interpreting and executing it exposes the economical and industrial existence of Germany to the greatest danger.

What do the conditions of the armistice mean to the German railway system?

We are to deliver up 5000 locomotives and 150,000 wagons. It is true the German state railways possess about 32,000 locomotives and about 820,000 passenger carriages, luggage vans and goods-trucks. At the first glance the delivering up of the sixth part of our locomotives and something more than a fifth part of our wagons as wagons demanded from us may appear heavy but not impossible. Unfortunately conditions are much more unfavorable, for

1. We were obliged to leave the whole of the rolling stock of the Alsace-Lorraine railway-net in that country and we must, according to the conditions imposed anew by the Interallied Commission conditions, which are daily becoming more complicated, considerably increase this rolling material, having to deliver 700 wagons besides to Strassburg daily, altogether about 15000 wagons.

2. The whole rolling-stock necessary for the maintenance of the railway traffic in the German railway districts on the left bank of the Rhine had to be left there.

We do not know in Bavaria how great the number of the conveyances is which have to remain in Alsace-Lorraine and in the other districts on the left side of the Rhine. But we assume that it is a matter of altogether more than 3000 locomotives; the number of the wagons we cannot even approximately estimate here in Munich.

Moreover only a very small part of the enormous quantity of rolling-stock, which Germany has had to supply for the traffic in the occupied districts in the East as far as Bagdad has been returned till now. We reckon here that there are probably more than 3000 locomotives in the East; but the exact figures are not at hand here at Munich.

Today only 60%, that is, about 15000 of these 26000 locomotives which remain to us in the most favourable case are in a fit condition, because unfortunately the number of the repairs cannot be decreased more than 40% for a long time on account of want of material; so, supposing we have to deliver up 5000 locomotives we should have to give up a third of our whole serviceable locomotive material.

Besides there is to be taken into consideration that the conditions of the armistice are interpreted by the Interallied Commission that, practically only locomotives of the heaviest construction will be accepted. For the Bavarian States Railway which possesses only few heavy locomotives, this means, according to the present standing of the negotiations, that we must give up far more than 200 heavy locomotives.

Therefore Bavaria would have to deliver up two-thirds of its total sum of the serviceable heavy goods-trains engines to the Entente.

Besides these deliveries must be executed hurriedly by the 16th of January, that means exactly at the time when tremendous demands are being made on our railways by the demobilization of the front troops and the transporting home of the prisoners of war.

The condition of the German and especially of the Bavarian railway was already nearly hopeless till now.

Our present passenger-trains time-table only amounts to about 40% of the time-table in time of peace, resulting in the dangerous overcrowding of the trains so that the passengers who want to alight at an intermediate station very often have to be lifted out of the windows.

For weeks the goods-service has only been able to be maintained in quite an insufficient manner. Traffic prohibitions exclude all goods not absolutely necessary for the nourishment of the people and the supplying of fuel to the population. By the want of locomotives more and more wagons, which cannot be forwarded any further, accumulate in the railway-stations and obstruct them. Double lines must be obstructed to a great extent with wagons so that the management of the traffic is made extremely difficult. By this the circulation of the wagons is stagnating, the empty coal-trucks do not return to the coal-mines to be reloaded. Added to this the railway lines on the Rhine are occupied by the enemy and the lines, still at our disposal for the transport of coal are entirely overburdened, because the railway-lines on the left bank of the Rhine are completely cut off.

Bavaria on the right side of the Rhine in time of peace has imported 17000 t. of coal on an average, daily. We reckon that, maintaining our present economy we can just manage with an importation of 10,000 t. Practically we have received nearly 8000 t. in November, 7000 in the first half of December, but in the second half of December only 1100–2000 t. daily. Now already important industries in Bavaria have come to a standstill, others have been obliged to greatly reduce their activity. The demobilization commissioner has ordered a ten days closing down of all industrial works employing more than 10 workers; beginning on December the 23rd, on account of want of coal. The consumption of gas and light has already been reduced to the utmost. Further severe encroachments are to be expected. The want of coal must, if not entirely, so still for a great part, be traced to the difficulties of transport.

The outlook in the future is however still more gloomy.

It may be that at least the masses of the Western Armies will be transported back to their home garrisons by the end of January.

If even then for months a considerable amount of military transport will remain to the Railway-Direction for the distribution of the soldiers, to be discharged from their garrison regiments, home or to their new place of employment; for the bringing back of the Eastern-Army and for the distribution of the army stores, yet the reduction of military traffic will effectively relieve the railways. But opposed to this relief there is the huge lessening of our capability, caused by the delivering up of rolling material.

The situation of the Bavarian Railways is made worse by the fact that the 65 locomotives, hired from the Swiss Confederal Railways, must be returned from the middle of January.

Nevertheless we shall make every effort to fulfil the conditions of the armistice. Unbounded difficulties will still have to be overcome in order to take out from the running-stock the necessary engines and wagons—fit for acceptance—and we are looking forward with great anxiety to the moment when we shall have accomplished it.

We shall then be placed before the possibility of a breakdown of our economical existence.

If the imminent danger of anarchy and bolshevism is to be prevented, it is absolutely necessary to take care that the masses of returning soldiers find work and positions to earn money. This will only be possible if coal, raw-material and food can be distributed all over the country. Instead of this by that time many factories will have used up their very last reserves and numerous industries and perhaps even gas and electricity works and flour-mills will have to close down; the passenger traffic will have to be so greatly reduced that even the economical requirements will not be able to be carried out.

Moreover the Entente themselves do not only not keep to the conditions of the armistice, but render the fulfillment of them more difficult for us in every possible manner.

Contrary to the spirit of the armistice-treaty, the communication between the left and the right bank of the Rhine has been completely cut off, although our industries—especially the locomotive industry and the repairing of locomotives entirely depend on the supply of material from the West and our gas-works are specially fitted up for the use of coal from the Saar-mines.

Recently they have even closed the shunting stations on the bridgeheads to the right of the Rhine, so that now even the coal for the Bavarian railway service (unloading-station Gustavsburg) has not arrived from the Ruhr mines for ten days.

But the Entente for their part, demand a daily delivery of Ruhr coal and coke for the country on the left bank of the Rhine; they even require our supplying coal for a stretch of 200 km with every locomotive delivered up.

The sharper blockade at sea—contradictory to the conditions of the armistice and the stopping of the whole of the Baltic shipping not only increases our need of raw material and food but also overburdens the railways because large transports, which till now have been forwarded by water, are now thrown upon the railway.

Quite exaggerated demands are made by the French Commission at the taking over of the rolling-stock. No consideration is taken of Germany having had to makeshift with substitute materials to a great extent for the construction and the maintenance of rolling stock during the war, (manufacture of the fire-boxes of the locomotives out of iron instead of copper, the using of inferior material for the bearings, of inferior train oil, etc.) and that therefore the number of serviceable rolling-stock has sunk extraordinarily. Now the Receiving Commission also refuses a great number of the serviceable engines and wagons on account of very small faults (e. g. passenger carriages with broken window panes, locomotives with small defects in the bearings, etc.)

Moreover all goods trucks that have not been examined for three years, are refused without further ado. The time for the examination of goods trucks having been fixed at five years during the war in Germany; this new demand of the Entente will exclude from the very beginning two-fifths of the whole of our rolling stock from acceptance.

Germany has [had] at one time captured numerous Belgian and French locomotives and wagons. This rolling material must be returned, but is to be credited to the number of wagons we are obliged to deliver up. The Receiving Commission makes the greatest difficulties at the acceptance of this material. They object if German substitute parts (German buffers and German pistons) have been used for the repairs; on the other hand we have nothing but German material for restoring these wagons.

The delivery of the locomotives and wagons and the returning of the rolling stock refused in great number by the Receiving Commission is complicated by the fact that important crossings and lines of communication over the Rhine are blocked by the Entente besides many other unnecessary annoyances in the service being made.

So there is the danger that the Entente themselves make it impossible for us to meet the conditions of the armistice treaty properly.

2. Former German Ambassador in the United States.
3. Enclosure 2, infra.