[Enclosure]
Memorandum Concerning the Saint Jean de
Maurienne Conference45
Versaille
, December 28, 1918.
The Saint Jean de Maurienne conference was held
on April 19th, 1917, in a railway carriage at Saint Jean
de Maurienne. There were present Lloyd George,
Ribot, Boselli, and
Sonnino, who were later
joined by Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, Raggi, Italian
Ambassador at Paris, Major General Sir G. M. W.
MacDonough, Lieut-Col. Sir Maurice
Hankey, Signor di Martino and
Count Aldrovandi.
The first subject discussed was that of Italian aspirations in Asia
Minor.
In order to understand clearly the purpose of this conference it
should be remembered that the so-called London Agreement of April
26th, 1915, between Italy, France, Great Britain and Russia,
promised to Italy an equitable share in the division of Turkey in
Asia. Italy was to receive territory in the neighborhood of Adalia,
where she had already acquired rights and interests under an
Anglo-Italian treaty. At the same time the Russian claims to
Constantinople had already been under discussion between France and
Great Britain and the conversations between the two governments had
resulted in the Sykes-Picot agreement of May 9th, 1916.46
[Page 468]
There had also been recent discussions between Balfour and the French and Italian
ambassadors with a view to delimiting the Italian sphere in Asia
Minor. These, however, had failed owing to the irreconcilable nature
of the French and Italian claims. Italy demanded inclusion within
her sphere of Mersina and Adana, but the French refused to renounce
their claims to either place. The British Foreign Office was not
disposed to include Smyrna in the Italian sphere and proposed,
instead, an arrangement giving Italy a sphere starting at the Gulf
of Scala Nova on the west, including Konia, and thence running east
and striking the French sphere near Ulukishla and thence coming down
to the Mediterranean coast near Anamur. The Italians, however,
refused to accept this scheme.
At the Saint Jean conference Lloyd
George, I have reason to believe, submitted a new
plan drawn up by the British General Staff, which gave Italy a
sphere including Smyrna and a second hinterland sphere bounded by a
line running from a point south of Adramyti, on the Gulf of the same
name, north to Balikesri and thence to Kutaya, thence south,
excluding the Bagdad Railway, to Eregli, excluding Konia, and thence
south to the coast to a point just west of Mersina. This arrangement
would give the Turkish state which was to have been allowed to exist
in a portion of Asia Minor, free access to the sea through the port
of Selefkeh and would have enabled the Italians to construct branch
lines from the Bagdad Railway to the coast.
Ribot had no objections to such an arrangement.
Sonnino, at first, seemed
satisfied with it, but after consulting experts made difficulties
and increased his demand. He claimed that if only one or two Allies
could realize their aspirations in Asia Minor at the end of the war
Italy should be given compensation elsewhere. His idea seems to have
been that although Great Britain, France and Russia might be able to
realize their aspirations in Mesopotamia, Syria and Armenia, Italy
was not likely to be so fortunate in Asia Minor.
Sonnino put forward the
following motion in French, the text of which I have seen and been
able hastily to translate:
“It is understood that if an agreement should be reached at
the Peace Conference such that the three powers are unable
to share equally in the total or partial possession of the
territories considered in the above convention, an
understanding shall be reached establishing the compensation
due to the power which may be obliged to content itself with
a sphere of influence only, to make up for the difference
between such a simple sphere of influence (to be recognized
by Turkey and the Allies or by the Allies alone) and actual
territorial possessions.”
Lloyd George, however,
objected to this. He pointed out that Italy was doing nothing to
help in the war against Turkey, whereas
[Page 469]
Great Britain had in Turkey 300,000 troops,
exclusive of Salonika operations. He felt that if Italy had
ambitions in Asia Minor she ought to contribute to their
realization. He offered to concentrate a greater portion of the
British forces in Palestine against Turkey and help Italy realize
her aspirations, provided that Italy would send infantry to Salonika
to replace the British infantry on the Macedonian front. Sonnino, however, refused and
declined even to submit the proposition to his government or to
Cadorna. Lloyd George, I am
told, then hinted that Sonnino was trying to obtain, by blackmail
elsewhere, what Italy was not making any effort to earn in Turkey.
He refused to consider the question of compensation elsewhere, for
Italy, but agreed that at the end of the war Italian claims would be
discussed. He then put forward a resolution, the English text of
which is as follows:
“It is understood that if at any time when peace is declared
the total or partial possession of the territory
contemplated in the agreement come to between France, Great
Britain, Italy and Russia, as to disposal of parts of the
Ottoman Empire, cannot be fully accorded to any one or more
of these powers then the interests of the powers concerned
will again be taken into equitable consideration.”
This resolution, after much discussion and amendments, which have
been included in the text, was accepted.
Sonnino, however, raised
another difficulty. He pointed out that the plan proposed by the
British General Staff did not include Konia, which, however, had
been included in Balfour’s
proposal.
Lloyd George replied, that
the General Staff scheme was an entirely new plan and was much more
generous to Italy, as it included Smyrna and the territory west of
Mersina in the sphere accorded Italy. Konia was excluded in order to
give it to Turkey as the new capital. Sonnino, however, insisted and finally Lloyd George agreed to consult the
British Cabinet, and to have further negotiations with Sonnino regarding the matter. He
also promised to send Sonnino
a map embodying the British General Staff’s plan.47
