File No. 763.72112/6419
The Secretary of the Navy ( Daniels) to the Secretary of State
Sir: Referring to your letter of November 10, 1917, in regard to the conventions entered into by Great Britain, France, Russia, and [Page 923] Italy concerning prizes captured during the present European War, and requesting an expression of my views as to whether or not it would be desirable for this Government to enter into a separate agreement of this nature with Great Britain or with any of the other Allied European Powers, I have the honor to reply as follows:
Because of the great distances of the maritime war zones in Europe from United States ports, in the event of capture of enemy vessels by our Navy it would be undoubtedly a great convenience to have at hand in the ports of our allies the necessary Admiralty Court machinery promptly to adjudicate in the matter of such prizes. Because, however, of the character of this war, the absence of enemy merchant vessels from the high seas and the small percentage of war vessels which may be captured and not sunk, it is not anticipated that serious complications will arise. In any event, there is ample authority and precedent for such vessels as are captured being taken into a port of our allies and there held for convoy to a United States port; or, if circumstances are imperative, the vessel may be there sold, and the proceeds sent into a United States Admiralty Court for adjudication. (Rev. Stat., sec. 4615; Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 Howard 498; Moore, vol. 7, p. 590).
Accession to this convention in its entirety by the United States may give rise to complications in the following regards:
Japan is not yet reported to have become a party to the convention. Accession to the convention, therefore, on the part of the United States may result in different rules of procedure in the Atlantic and Pacific.
Complications may arise from the fact that the prize court systems of the Allies are dissimilar.
In some respects the convention of November 9, 1914, would supersede the treaty of 1871 between the United States and Italy.
It is doubtful whether the United States would be able to fulfil existing treaty obligations toward certain neutral states, e. g., Sweden, 1783, articles 10, 25, if bound by this convention.
More important than all might be a seeming approval of certain practices and principles against which the United States has already protested, as in the note from the Secretary of State to Ambassador W. H. Page, dated October 21, 1915.1
The Navy Department is therefore inclined to the opinion that accession to this convention at this time is inadvisable, especially as it involves acceptance of certain practices and principles against which the United States has protested. If the character of the war should change so as to involve many captures by the United States and one or more Allied Powers, and if complications should arise as to the disposition of such captures, the United States may then [Page 924] accede to the convention, articles 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, take action to make article 1 operative and reserve article 2.
There is appended hereto for your information a memorandum treating in more detail the articles of the convention and the complications which may arise should the United States at this time become a party thereto.1
Sincerely yours,
- Foreign Relations, 1915, Supplement, pp. 578 et seq. ↩
- Not printed.↩