War Department Files: WCD 9971–C–4

Paraphrase of the Report of a Confidential Conference between Marshal Joffre and General Scott, Chief of Staff, at the Army War College, April 27, 1917

Marshal Joffre (Lieutenant Colonel Cosby assisted by Lieutenant Tassan interpreting) said, in substance, as follows:

Now that America was at war the problem of cooperation between the French and American Army was the manner of making our enormous resources available. He would not at this time take up the economic or financial questions, nor that of naval cooperation but confine himself to military cooperation which was most important.

This military cooperation must take several forms. The American Army cannot now take part in the battle front, but if we wait until the American Army is at full power, time will be lost. It is better to act now with such elements as are ready.

The best thing to be done is to form a unit of one division only so as not to weaken the American Army unduly. Such a division with staff and auxiliary service could be sent to the front in a very short time. It would be first sent behind the line for four to six weeks’ training, after which it would be a good fighting unit. It would be sent first to a relatively quiet sector of the front and then advanced to more active portions.

Such a division would probably lack many essential things, grenades, machine guns, trench mortars, infantry cannon, etc. The French could make up everything which such a division would lack.

This is the first phase of cooperation.

Real cooperation would follow later by the sending of a large force which should be organized and trained at once in a manner to [Page 41] be left largely to our own Government. It will need new officers and staffs. Officers and noncommissioned officers should be trained for it immediately.

As soon as this large army is formed it is only a question of how fast it can be sent to reinforce the division first dispatched, this depending upon the means of transportation available. The units of this large force would be sent behind the line at first and gradually the entire army would become fit for fighting.

The next thing for discussion with France is the lines of communication with all that this implies. The lines of communication will require various services calling for a large number of men. Of the various services required many need only be sent as our large army arrives; others, such as railroad troops, automobiles, etc., can be sent as fast as formed to serve the French until our own troops arrive.

The three things to be done to secure military cooperation are these:

(a)
The prompt dispatch of one division;
(b)
Commencing simultaneously the organization and training of a large army;
(c)
Formation and dispatching promptly special services (railroad troops, automobiles, etc).

What the Marshal has discussed is the theoretical plan. The question now is how to put it in practical execution. The Marshal suggested that the various officers brought with him work out the plans with our officers. The thing to be done now is to take up these studies in detail so as to get down to practical cooperation. The sooner we begin the sooner will we succeed in attaining what both sides desire. The very first thing is to send a division at once. No matter how small the transport facilities, the sooner we get troops fighting alongside France the quicker we will get results.

The Marshal then stated he would present details of his ideas in a paper. (Handed to General Kuhn, April 28, translation attached.1 Note: This is essentially one of the plans tentatively worked out by the French General Staff and forwarded to the War College by Major Logan and submitted to the Chief of Staff in W.C.D. 6609–262, April 27, 1917.)

The Marshal then discussed some phases of organization stating that French experience had shown divisions of nine or twelve battalions (three or four regiments) to be best. The actual application of the French experience to our Army must be left to our General [Page 42] Staff, keeping in mind the psychology of our people. Studies had been made in Paris by the French General Staff in cooperation with our military mission and our organization must be along some of these lines.

What the Marshal had proposed he believed to be the best way for the American Army to cooperate, to secure final victory and to shorten the war. He recognizes our difficulties in forming a large army due to want of officers and cadres. In order to assist he thinks it would be useful to get help of French officers in our training camps and schools. For this it is necessary to have instructed officers thoroughly versed in front methods.

The Marshal then discussed the present infantry methods in comparison to those of three years ago to illustrate the change that the war has wrought. At the beginning of the war the infantry had but one weapon, the rifle. Now it has, in addition, hand grenades, rifle grenades, 37-mm. cannon, machine guns and automatic rifles. There are numerous barrage fires, the rifle grenade barrage being better than an artillery barrage. On the offensive the infantry employed voltigeurs, armed with dagger and rifle, to clear enemy’s trenches. He mentions these things to show what modern war is. The French had to learn these things by bitter experience. The employment of voltigews was necessary to secure the rear of troops who had advanced beyond the lines of captured trenches. He referred to the experience of the English on the Somme on July 1, who were fired on in their rear and had to retreat.

While he had spoken only of infantry changes there were equally important changes in the other arms. Liaison with the artillery is very important and difficult. It was necessary for the artillery to be connected with the aeroplanes and with the advancing troops. The means of liaison were light balls, optical, wireless and telephones. All these things were explained in detail in the printed French Regulations which he had brought. All these things are so complicated that he thinks we should have French officers to explain them, both as instructors and advisers.

General Scott then asked about a port of debarkation to which the Marshal replied that this Had been already considered by the French Director of Rear Service and that the port of Pallice (near La Rochelle) had been proposed. This port has landing quays, a water supply, but additional storage buildings would probably be needed. The facilities were ample for one divison but doubtful about sufficiency for our army of 400,000 to 500,000 men.

General Scott then asked, the division being landed, what would happen next? The Marshal replied that their experience with the Russians would guide them. The first regiment landed would be [Page 43] sent at once to one of several camps about 30 kilometers behind the front so as to place it in the military atmosphere where instructions would begin at once with schools for bombers, machine guns, etc. The first element to be landed would be the commanding general and his staff, who would see that all necessary arrangements, and installations were provided. The American general could then attach himself to a French Army corps to see how things were done. As soon as the first American regiment is ready it can be put into the front under command of the American general, the French commander selecting the point where the American regiment would go.

General Scott then inquired about the need for railroad rolling stock. The Marshal stated that France needed railway equipment, theirs being worn, but could not state whether our rolling stock would operate on French tracks.

General Scott then inquired as to the relations that would obtain between the French and American commanders. The Marshal replied that this was a matter to be determined but thought the latter should first be under a French Army commander. The Marshal’s own ideas were that the first American division would be under a French Army commander until we have an army of our own. Army commander would receive only very general directions from the French supreme command.

Asked whether the American Army should be kept together, the Marshal stated emphatically it should, that it was bad to divide an army.

General Bliss then inquired as to how the first division should be maintained at strength. The Marshal replied that, in a general way, this required front depot battalions, behind this in France regimental depots and in the United States still others. Asked as to the number of front depot battalions, the Marshal answered this was a question for study. Suggested French system of regimental depots with some convalescent officers supplying reinforcements of both men and officers as needed. Recruits on landing would remain at the base for a few days and then proceed to front depot battalions.

General Scott inquired as to distance from proposed base and the use of the railroads. The distance was given by Colonel Fabry as 450 kilometers. All French railroads under one director who controlled train movements.

Several questions were asked relative to machine shops for repairing ordnance material and the heavy artillery required. As to the latter the Marshal promised to furnish tables.

Asked as to the matter of introducing our rifle in the French front, the Marshal asked if the rifle was a good one. Being told it was of the best, he replied, “Keep it.”

The interview lasted approximately two hours.

  1. The memorandum attached is the same as that transmitted to the Assistant Secretary of State, post, p. 44.