File No. 103.9502/15

The Commercial Adviser of the British Embassy ( Crawford) to the Counselor for the Department of State ( Polk)

No. 642

My Dear Mr. Polk: In our official note No. 563 of the 3d instant1 were given certain resolutions in regard to the control of tonnage, which had been drawn up in London and approved by the British War Cabinet. We have now received a cable from London stating that the following decisions on this question had been reached by the Inter-Allied Conference at Paris:

1.
The points numbered A4, B2, B3, and B4 in our note above referred to were accepted, and the following further decisions were arrived at.
2.
In order to carry out points A4 (tabulation of requirements, etc.), and B2 (bringing further tonnage into service), Allied bodies for the different main requirements for food, munitions and raw materials should be formed, on the model of the Wheat Executive, the United States authorities being associated with these bodies.
3.
For the purpose of carrying out the common policy above indicated the appropriate ministries in France, Italy and Great Britain, together with representatives of the United States, should take steps to secure the necessary exchange of information and coordination of policy and effort, establishing a permanent office and staff for the purpose.
4.
It was also decided that a statement should in the name of the Inter-Allied Conference be presented to the United States Government, showing the claims which the situation makes upon the United States so far as regards her participation in the solution of the tonnage problem. This statement was on the lines indicated in my letter of the 17th instant, No. 619, and embodied the following points:
(a)
That the United States should aim at building at the rate of 9,000,000 tons dead-weight per annum, instead of the present programme of 6,000,000 tons per annum;
(b)
That the United States should supplement the assistance given by Great Britain to France and Italy by providing at least 500,000 dead-weight in the immediate future, and by raising this figure to an average of at least 1,250,000 tons;
(c)
That, having regard to the projected military effort of the United States, the foregoing assistance can only be provided if the United States, first, takes all possible steps to bring into war service neutral and interned vessels now idle or out of war service; secondly, obtains the maximum assistance from Japan; and thirdly, reduces her own requirements for imports and requisitions drastically from her own trade;
(d)
That the United States should supply Great Britain with additional tanker tonnage to the extent of 100,000 tons dead-weight at once, and a further 200,000 tons as soon as possible.

I understand that Colonel House was to present to the United States Government a memorandum of the above decisions. We are however instructed to point out the importance to the Allied Governments of receiving at the earliest possible moment an official confirmation on the part of the United States of the decisions of the conference, in order that the requisite allocations of tonnage to the Allies may be made, and that United States representatives may be appointed in London for the purposes indicated in paragraph No. 3 above.

Believe me [etc.]

Richard Crawford

[For a statement by the Ambassador in Great Britain, with reference to the question of the disposal of tonnage to be obtained by agreement with the Netherlands, that, “as we have no authorized representatives of the United States Shipping Board here it is very difficult for me to conduct these discussions,” see his telegram No. 8039, December 21, 1917, Volume II, page 1157.]

  1. Ante, p. 641.