File No. 195/126

The British Embassy to the Department of State

No. 356

Requirements of Tanker Tonnage for Oil Transport to United Kingdom

1.
The subject of the requirements and transport of oil fuel for the British Navy, and other petroleum products for naval, military and munitions service has been engaging the attention of the British [Page 628] Government, who desire that the situation shall be brought to the notice of the United States Government and discussed by British representatives with the representatives of the American Administration.
2.
So far as supplies of oil are concerned there appears to be no cause for anxiety so long as all existing sources of supply are maintained at their full producing capacity, but the problem of transport presents much greater difficulty.
3.
The United States Navy Department has made arrangements for the supply and transport of the oil required for the United States ships of war in European waters, including the replacement of supplies temporarily withdrawn by those vessels from the British stocks. At the present time the British Government owing to the loss of tank steamers as well as the necessity of meeting the large tonnage requirements of France and Italy, has not been able to maintain the reserves of oil necessary for safety and has been obliged to restrict the actual movements of British ships of war.
4.
The British Government is of opinion that it is desirable in the interest of all those associated with them in the war, to arrive at an improvement in this situation at the earliest possible moment in order that the British Fleet may resume the utmost activity of which it is capable in its many duties, including its large share in combating the submarine menace and in keeping the seas open for the transport of troops and supplies of its own Army and those of the Allies. With this in view, the representatives of the British Government have been in consultation with the chairman of the Petroleum Sub-Committee of the Council of National Defense to whom the British representatives are indebted for most cordial and valuable assistance.
5.
The situation in regard to available tonnage has been exhaustively examined together with full particulars of the disposition and utilisation of British tonnage and the conclusion has been reached that more comprehensive action has become necessary in order to deal with a situation of great urgency and vital importance.
6.
As the United States Government is aware, the British Government has taken control of the whole of the tonnage under the British flag and this control has been utilised to secure that every tank ship under the British flag is now being used either on the direct service of the armies, navies and munitions factories of the Allies, or upon other essential services, the supply of which is a matter of national importance to one or other of the countries associated with Great Britain in the war. No ship is allowed to be engaged upon any commercial trade which does not fall within those categories.
7.
Beyond this, to secure the utmost economy, severe restrictions have been placed upon the consumption of all petroleum products in the United Kingdom, which, so far as these products are concerned, has now been placed upon a famine basis. The use of fuel oil has been discontinued wherever any other fuel could replace it; the use of gas oil has been drastically curtailed; the use of kerosene, even in the poorest homes where it is often the only available illuminant and domestic cooking fuel, has been greatly diminished; whilst in regard to gasoline, the supply has been strictly regulated by a specially constituted Government department and, amongst other restrictions, the issue of gasoline for use of automobiles for private purposes has been altogether prohibited.
8.
The whole subject of the economical use and distribution of petroleum products in the Navy, Army and munitions services also receives the closest scrutiny from the Government departments concerned. Their demands for petroleum products are in turn scrutinised by a strong committee, constantly sitting and presided over by a British secretary of state who, having regard to the shortage of supplies, makes the necessary priority allocation in regard to those which have to be refused or greatly reduced for lack of tonnage to bring the supplies to the United Kingdom.
9.
Supplies to British dependencies have also been reduced as far as safety and other considerations may permit.
10.
The British Government is not proposing any relaxation of any of these restrictions although it realises of course the loss of efficiency involved, but it feels that a point has been reached at which no further reduction can take place and it is faced with an actual shortage of tonnage if it is to meet the necessities of the situation without withdrawing the tonnage which it has placed at the disposal of France and Italy at British requisitioned rates for the carriage of their petroleum requirements from America and elsewhere.
11.
The British tanker tonnage directly and wholly appropriated to France and Italy amounts to an aggregate carrying capacity of some 80,000 tons and in addition many British ships are utilised from time to time for the carriage of petroleum products for the supply of the naval and military forces in those countries.
12.
The British Government believes that its associates in the war will recognise the extreme undesirability of withdrawing from the service of France and Italy any of this tanker tonnage or any part of the large amount of other tonnage capable of conversion for oil transport and now engaged in supplying coal and other vitally necessary munitions to those countries.
13.
The losses of British tanker tonnage have been large, amounting to upwards of 300,000 tons and a considerable loss of oil cargoes [Page 630] has also taken place. But for these losses and the help in transport of all kinds rendered to the Allies, the British position as to tanker tonnage would have been secure without carrying restrictions of consumption to the extreme lengths referred to above. Further losses of tankers must be expected which, it is hoped however, may be met by vessels that are now being constructed to British orders in the United Kingdom and the United States.
14.
Apart from these definite losses there are of course many circumstances attendant upon a state of war which reduce the aggregate carrying capacity of the existing fleet of tankers within a given period. Amongst these may be mentioned the loss of time through waiting for convoys, sheltering in harbour from known submarine dangers and deviation from the normal to less dangerous routes. All these factors contributed to cause the critical situation which has arisen.
15.
As soon as the gravity of the position could be foreseen, the British Government was reluctantly obliged to give orders for fuel oil to be loaded in the double bottoms of ships proceeding to the United Kingdom from all ports at which fuel oil was obtainable. The general cargo-carrying capacity of the Allies as a result of submarine warfare had already been reduced to a totally inadequate figure and this further reduction of capacity for munitions and foodstuffs entails the most serious consequences, every ton of oil so carried shutting out a ton of munitions or wheat. This expedient can only be regarded as a temporary measure and should be terminated at the earliest possible moment.
16.
The following extract from a cable recently received from the British Government shows how urgent a matter it is to reduce the use of double bottoms for oil carrying:

Regarding double bottoms, it is vitally necessary United States Government should understand very serious loss to the carrying power of the Allies entailed thereby. We regard it as essential that every suitable ship should be fitted to carry fuel oil but actual conveyance by this method limited to sudden emergencies where tankers absolutely unobtainable. Cargo tonnage demands on Shipping Controller for winter notably for Italian coal are so grave as to make it imperative obtain every possible steamer for this purpose. Rely on you therefore to impress on United States Government urgent necessity for increasing in every possible way the tanker tonnage at disposal of Allies and so reducing double bottoms shipments.

17.
A further step has been taken which, viewed broadly, can not accurately be described as an economy in tonnage; it consists in moving petroleum products from Gulf ports to North Atlantic ports [Page 631] by American tankers and transporting them by the shorter route across the Atlantic from Northern ports by British tankers. To the extent that this shorter route is applied to products manufactured at refineries situated at the Northern ports it constitutes an economical use of tonnage, but when applied to products transported coastwise and trans-shipped, it involves a large loss of time by double handling and some deviation and is very uneconomical if the combined suitable tanker tonnage employed be considered as one whole. In this connection it should be borne in mind that the great bulk of the fuel oil supply originates in the Gulf States, the quantity at Northern refineries being relatively unimportant. American tanker owners have naturally been reluctant to charter their ships on voyages into the danger zone, although they have lately rendered some valuable assistance to the Allies in transatlantic transportation. If however the shortage of transatlantic tanker tonnage is to be overcome, it is apparent that Great Britain having come to the limit of her resources, a larger quantity of American tonnage must be employed in this essential work, and it is hoped that the United States Government may see the necessity of so directing American tonnage that it will assume a much larger share of the carriage of American oil from the United States to Europe.
18.
In order to meet the tanker tonnage requirements of the British forces without withdrawing British ships from the Italian and French services on which they are engaged, it is estimated that it will be necessary to bring into Atlantic service approximately 100,000 tons gross of additional tanker tonnage. In addition to the above, a further quantity is most urgently required to transport the oil fuel at present carried in the double bottoms of cargo steamers referred to in clauses 15 and 16. This quantity is approximately 100,000 tons of oil per month.
19.
In view of the consideration to which attention has been drawn in this memorandum, the United States Government will appreciate the grave anxiety felt by the British Government that the matter should be dealt with at the earliest possible moment, and it is hoped that the United States Government will see its way to meet the situation by requiring the necessary tonnage to be placed at its disposal with the least possible delay.
The United States Government will recognize the importance of placing the matter on such a footing that the Allied Governments may be relieved of their anxiety that the necessary activities and operations of their naval and military forces would be restricted for lack of vitally important supplies of petroleum products.