File No. 763.72/8014
The Ambassador in France ( Sharp ) to the Secretary of State
[Received in sections, December 8, 1.15 a.m. and 8.10 p.m.]
2830. Supplementing my No. 2855 of December 5.2 Joint telegram transmitted from Jassy by Ministers of Great Britain, United States, France and Italy:
Jassy, December 5.
The situation which is rapidly becoming more serious may require immediate decisions in view of which we request our Governments urgently to send us instructions. What should our attitude be in the following hypotheses:
- 1.
- In the event that contrary to the expectations of General Shcherbachev the negotiations for an armistice either did not prevent the dismemberment of the Russian troops or resulted in the conclusion of a separate peace, are we to admit that the Roumanian Government should associate itself therewith or to induce it to attempt to leave the country which would involve the constitution of a government by the enemy hostile to the Entente?
- 2.
- In the event of General Shcherbachev being replaced by a Maximalist commander are we to avoid all intercourse with the latter? It is expedient to observe that such an event would expose the Royal Family and the Government to an even graver danger. Their departure would thereupon become imperative and could only be organized with the cooperation of the de facto Russian authorities.
In order to provide our Governments with all missions’ appreciation we may point out that the Russian High Command has received a communication according to which the Government of Ukrainia desires peace at any price. On the other hand, according to the press telegrams General Kaledin observes an expectant [neutrality?] which is confirmed by the inertia of the Cossacks on the Roumanian front.
Finally it is the opinion of the chiefs of the British, French military missions as well as of the Roumanian General Staff that the anarchy which reigns in southern Russia as well as the absence of all organization render the evacuation of the Roumanian Army to Bessarabia at present impossible.
It is self-evident that if events allowed an improvement of the situation in southern Russia to the extent of making it possible to evacuate the Roumanian Army there we would bring all our influence to bear in that direction.
A Russian newspaper publishes a note inspired by the Russian commander saying that General Shcherbachev has proposed an armistice to the enemy with the consent of the Roumanians and “after having so informed the Allied Governments.” As shown by our telegram of the 3d of this month,1 in the new situation which has arisen in regard to which the initiative of General Shcherbachev was represented as the sole means of avoiding an immediate peace, we did not deem it possible to take upon ourselves the responsibility of protesting against the proposal of which Mr. Bratiano has informed us in the name of the Russian commander.
The Allied representatives being thus publicly brought into question it behooves their Governments to determine whether they should or not be directed to protest officially on their behalf against all dealings with the enemy. It may be noted that in the present circumstances such a protestation might from local point of view have serious consequences.
“Third telegram undated.” Strictly private telegram addressed to the Minister of France to the effect the Entente is opposed to any armistice and the Roumanian Army should retreat at any cost, we have so informed the President of the Council. Regarding the question of armistice Mr. Bratiano has reiterated to us that by reason of the Russian treason the Army is placed in a position of force majeure. He added that according to his previous statement the Council assembled this morning under the presidency of the King; has given instructions to the Roumanian parliamentaries to remain upon the strictly military ground of the armistice. As regards the evacuation of the Roumanian Army to Russia, Mr. Bratiano repeated that this is not feasible at present owing to the impossibility through want of credit to be prepared (one group wrong) to organize a depot of provisions on the line of retreat. The Minister of France having been directed to inform the King of the opening of unlimited credits for the rationing of the Roumanian Army we have insisted that everything should be attempted in view of this (one group wrong) if the events allow and sufficient respite to make this possible. In order to allow the immediate utilization of these credits it is indispensable to inform the banks at Odessa and Kief that same have [Page 461] been opened. Finally Mr. Bratiano has requested us to examine the contingency of the departure of the Royal Family and the Government through Russia. We confirm that this departure can only be effected with the cooperation of various de facto authorities of Russia. Events may be precipitated and it is urgent to request without delay the Allied representatives [in Russia] to approach the said authorities on the subject informally and discreetly.