File No. 868.00/131
The Minister in Greece (Droppers) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 19.]
Sir: With reference to my telegram No. 350 dated June 11,1 I have the honor to report as follows:
On Friday, June 8, the British Minister, Sir Francis E. H. Elliot, called at this Legation and informed me confidentially that to avoid further divisions of counsel among the Entente powers in the affairs of Greece, the three protecting powers, France, Great Britain and Russia, had decided to appoint a High Commissioner for Greece in the person of Monsieur Jonnart, a senator, who at the funeral of King George of Greece had been chief of the French mission. Sir Francis further informed me that the protecting powers had authorized Monsieur Jonnart to demand the abdication of King Constantine in favor of one of his sons excluding the Crown Prince.
[Page 132]M. Jonnart, who had reached the harbor of Piraeus the day before, had proceeded immediately to Salonica where he was to convey his instructions to General Sarrail and Mr. Venizelos. He was expected to be back on Sunday June 10.
On Sunday it was rumored that he had returned and had had an interview in the afternoon with Mr. Zaimis, the Prime Minister. At about half past 11 o’clock at night, I had a telephone message from Mr. Streit, former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Venizelos cabinet when war was declared in August 1914 but now a bitter enemy of Mr. Venizelos, stating that he wished to see me on important business. I replied that I was at his disposition. A few minutes later he arrived in a state of agitation and informed me that M. Jonnart had seen Mr. Zaimis in the afternoon and informed him that certain measures would have to be taken with respect to the status of the King. This, Mr. Streit thought, meant abdication. He urged me to telegraph my Government and to request the intervention of the President. I replied that I would have to see M. Jonnart first, but that in any case I could see no solution but one that looked to a united Greece. I stated that the division of Greece into two hostile parties was to my mind the source of most of the evils from which Greece was suffering. His reply was that the King would, he thought, be ready for any sacrifice even to calling back Venizelos to the Ministry in Athens.
The next morning I intended to call on M. Jonnart but before going I wished to see Mr. Streit once more in order to get positive assurances with regard to the King’s attitude. I had difficulty in finding him, but at 11.30 a.m. he called at the Legation only to inform me that M. Jonnart had already demanded the abdication of King Constantine in a note handed to Mr. Zaimis. I then informed Mr. Streit that he had come too late. It was quite useless for me to see Mr. Jonnart, or to make any appeal to my Government. I may add, at this point, that I knew that over a month ago the King was solemnly warned to make an effort to unite Greece and to recall Mr. Venizelos, but he was unwilling then to do so. It was now too late.
Very soon after this, at about 1 o’clock, the news of the ultimatum became public and caused great commotion in the streets. Crowds began moving toward the Palace, some from curiosity, some from self-interest and some from sympathy for the King. Even among Venizelists there are many who believe that the King is a victim of a cunningly devised pro-German camarilla. These people rather pity than dislike him.
At 2 o’clock, the Diplomatic Corps met by invitation at the British Legation. Sir Francis Elliot had first received a visit from Mr. Zaimis, [Page 133] President of the Council, and from Mr. Michelopoulos, Director of Public Security. The former informed him that he had personally advised the King to accept abdication. The latter informed Sir Francis that measures had been taken to insure public order. He requested Sir Francis to make known to all the Diplomatic Body that there was no danger whatever for them in Athens. It was known that M. Jonnart had informed Mr. Zaimis that in case the King refused to abdicate the protecting powers would take summary measures to enforce their demand. Hence the fear of a possible uprising and rioting in the city.
About 3 o’clock a meeting of the Crown Council was held at the Palace at which the King announced his determination to accept the ultimatum of M. Jonnart. He abdicated in favor of his second son Alexander, a young man of twenty-three. The Crown Prince was excluded from the succession in the ultimatum on the ground that he was too much under the same influence as the father. At about 5 o’clock the King issued a proclamation (translation enclosed1) in which he announced his decision. This proclamation was distributed to the public by the police.
During the night the crowds continued to surround the Palace crying “Do not abdicate!” and making it impossible for the King and his suite to leave the Palace. The following day the same state of things prevailed until late in the afternoon when a passage was made from the Palace to the Royal Gardens opposite. The King, his suite and baggage went in automobiles to Tatoi, his summer residence, about 15 miles northeast of Athens. On the same day Alexander took the customary oath, as prescribed by the Constitution, issued a proclamation (translation enclosed1) to the Greek people.
The following day, owing to various difficulties, Constantine remained at Tatoi accompanied by a large number of officers and friends. The next day he left for Oropos, opposite Euboea, where he and his suite embarked in two small Greek steamers, the Sphakteria and Amphitrite. It is said that he will proceed by way of Corfu to Italy and thence to St. Moritz, Switzerland.
The demand of the protecting powers for the abdication of King Constantine springs from the ultimatum of December 31 signed by Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia. In that note certain measures were imposed on Greece, mainly two; (1) that all the arms and the remainder of the army should be transported to the Peloponnesus; (2) that the League of Epistrates (Reservists) should be dissolved and disarmed. A mixed military commission consisting of [Page 134] a British, French, Italian and Russian officer was dispatched to Greece to insure the proper administration of these measures.
Ware these demands executed in good faith? On this point there is some division of opinion. The British and Italian officers maintain that the arms, officers and soldiers of the Greek Army were transferred to the Peloponnesus on a scale that absolutely precluded the Greek Army from injuring General Sarrail at Salonica. Technically, the Greek Government, I believe, has complied with the terms of the ultimatum in this respect. On the other hand the French officer, General Cauboue, continued to point out that arms were hidden in various places in the vicinity of Athens. Only the week before June 10, several quantities of arms were found in places of concealment and in one instance on or about June 9 when General Cauboue demanded delivery of certain arms that were concealed near the outskirts of Athens about three hundred “Epistrates” refused to let him enter the house. He departed without securing the arms. Besides, although the League of Epistrates was officially ordered dissolved, it was well known that it remained thoroughly organized. Vague threats were disseminated that at the next crisis the Venizelists would not be treated leniently as they were in the uprising of December 1, but would be exterminated and their houses razed to the ground. But more important than these threats was the attitude of the higher military circles. These were thoroughly Germanophile. When the news came that America had officially entered the war, a Colonel Metaxas, of the General Staff, wrote an article over his own signature to the effect that our joining the Allies could have no influence whatever, that from a military point of view America was a negligible quantity. … The so-called Royalist press in Athens circulated the most absurd canards. They reported again and again that German soldiers were in northern Greece ready to bring succor to the oppressed Greeks. They steady minimized German defeats and magnified those of France and Great Britain.
Therefore, although the terms of the ultimatum of December 31 may be said to have been technically carried out, in spirit the situation remained much as before. The French cut the Gordian knot by demanding and securing the abdication of the King and however much I may sympathize with him, personally I am bound to confess that the measure was justified. He had many likable qualities and under other circumstances might have been a successful ruler, but surrounded as he was by sinister influences, he was rapidly leading his country to ruin.
The following message of sympathy is reported to have been sent to the King after his abdication by the Kaiser. I do not vouch for [Page 135] it, but if authentic it affords additional evidence of a spiritual sympathy between the two rulers:
It is with just indignation that I learn of the cowardly insult given to you and to your dynasty by our common enemies. I give you the assurance that your absence shall be only temporary. The mailed fist of Germany with the added help of Almighty God will restore you upon your throne which no man can have the right to take from you.
The armies of Germany and those of her allies shall reap vengeance upon all those who dared with such insolence to place their guilty hands upon you.
We hope to receive you in Germany with the first opportunity. A thousand heartfelt greetings!
I have [etc.]