File No. 763.72/5815
The Special Agents (Morgenthau, Frankfurter) to the Secretary of State 1
[Received July 10, 9.25 a.m.]
Full report of Schmavonian2 and thorough canvass of the situation by the British and French developed that a feeling of greater confidence prevails in Constantinople because of Russian state of affairs, victory at Bagdad which was defeat for British greater than is known in United States and insecurity of British Army at Bagdad; therefore our opinion is very clear the time is not ripe to enter into negotiations. Foreign representatives vigorously urged that negotiations at the present moment would involve dangerous misinterpretation in Germany as well as in Turkey. It is useless therefore to proceed to Egypt; Philip’s stay there unnecessary. British and French reporting to their Governments the importance of greater interest in Eastern situation according to the following report:3 [Page 121]
The undersigned beg to report to their respective Governments as follows:
Our conferences began on the 4th of July, lasting two days; their scope was set forth in the following statement made by the American representatives:
President Wilson received intimations indicating Turkish dissatisfaction with the war, weariness of its continuance, and signs of readiness, once conditions became ripe, for releasing [herself] from the German domination. This, [it] was conveyed to the President, is not the prevalent feeling of the present Turkish rulers, but it does represent the feeling of some of the [leaders] in Turkey. The President is, of course, wholly alive to the difficulties of detaching Turkey. He realized that the chances of immediate success are distinctly unfavorable. But the [reports] which the President received were of such a character that he deemed that he could not leave the opportunity they suggested neglected, in view of the great [enhancement] to the Allied cause, felt by the Allies, if such detachment should come to pass. The President, therefore, sounded England and France, and found cordial support [for] sending a mission abroad to search the ground in an endeavor to see if an opening existed on the Turkish side. Contemporaneous concern in the United States about the Jews in Palestine furnished a ready instrument for the appointment of a mission and to dispatch it abroad.
As a result, the President, in the formal announcement of the Department of State, “in an effort to ameliorate the condition of the Jewish communities in Palestine has sent abroad former Ambassador Henry Morgenthau and Prof. Felix Frankfurter of the Harvard Law School, now serving as assistant to Secretary of War.” From this it will be evident that we are instructed to make soundings; we have no definite plan to propose for penetrating into the Turkish situation, much less any program of terms for dealing with the Turks. We have no instructions from the President as to the intentions of the United States regarding Turkey except this: that exclusive [control] over Constantinople by Turkey must cease and that the suppression of the [subject nationalities] of Turkey must cease. The terms and methods of a possible settlement will, of course, so far as the United States is concerned, have to be directed by the President.
It is with this object and in this spirit that we have been instructed to meet the representatives of the British Government and French Government to canvass the entire situation so far as it comes within the scope of our authority and to place all our information and ourselves at the disposal of our Allies.
The situation was fully canvassed in sessions lasting two days. The principal facts bearing upon the present Turkish situation which were discussed are as follows:
- (1)
- Now, more than ever, the Turkish Government is Talaat and Enver, with Talaat the dominant factor. Enver is whole-heartedly pro-German, and for the continuance of the war. Talaat is not pro-German, but pro-Turkey, distinctly suspicious of Germany, chafing under its control, distrustful of its designs in case of German victory, and alive to the consequences to Turkey of a possible German defeat. Largely through Talaat, Germany has been kept out of the civil administration of Turkey; Germany exercises its power through the German military in Turkey, in cooperation with Enver. Talaat’s (watchfulness?) against Germany is supported by Djavid Bey, the Minister of Finance, whose professed leanings are pro-Ally.
- (2)
- The anti-German feeling, and peace possibilities in Turkey were strongest at the time of the fall of Bagdad. Since then such feeling has been checked and the hope of victory has strongly come in the ascendant. The explanation, of course, is to be found in recent Allied [reverses] and the events in Russia. [Gaza], the interruption [Page 122] of the Russian offensive, the threatened insecurity at Bagdad, all combined for the time to strengthen Enver [and to] favor his ties with Germany.
- (3)
- These are the present [favorable] factors. The intrinsic condition of Turkey is distinctly bad, and its available resources are continually diminishing. A reliable estimate places all deaths since the beginning of the war at three million. The food situation in various districts is alarming. The finances rest solely on hopes in German success. The war debt is over [two] hundred fifty million pounds, guaranteed, according to the Turks, by Germany, with an income hardly sufficient to pay interest alone.
A consideration of the [facts] at our disposal leads us to the following conclusions:
- (1)
- The time is not now ripe to open channels of communication with Turkish leaders. Such a development must await a lessening of the [present] feeling of hopefulness at Constantinople. In other words, military success must precede any immediate attempts of diplomacy. Considerations presented at the conference made it clear that attempts at negotiations now would be construed as a sign of Allied weakness.
- (2)
- But in Turkey, probably [above all] the Central powers, elements are developing for a break in their ranks. The detachment of Turkey should, therefore, be made a distinct and conscious aim of Allied diplomacy.
- (3)
- The military is an indispensable instrument in the prosecution of such a diplomacy. We are, of course, not competent to suggest plans of appropriate attack. It is for us only to indicate the necessity of discrediting the military power of Enver and of encouraging the anti-German tendencies of Talaat.1
At the conference Weizmann announced that condition precedent in any negotiation with Turkey so far as Great Britain was concerned was the separation from Turkey of territory containing subject races, in effect Armenia and territory south of Taurus. The disposition of such [separated?] territory was a matter which he was not now competent to raise. Weyl expressed no views of policy. In any (future?) dealing with Turkey both English and French representatives strongly supported need of increased action in eastern theater but indicated difficulties as to available men and a favorable [opportunity?]. Weizmann raised [question of] possible participation of American force in eastern campaigns to which we deemed it appropriate to recall that America is not now at war with Turkey.
Communicate with us through Paris Embassy.
- Transmitted through the Ambassador in Spain, in telegram No. 670.↩
- Formerly special legal adviser to the Embassy at Constantinople.↩
- Corrections were made by comparison with the text later received by mail (File No. 763.72119/703½).↩
- No signatures included in telegram. Text received by mail bore the following signatures: Ch. Weizmann (for Great Britain); E. Weyl (for France); Henry Morgenthau, Felix Frankfurter (for United States).↩