File No. 763.72111V76/10

The British Ambassador ( Spring Rice ) to the Secretary of State

No. 82

Sir: I did not fail to communicate to my Government copies of your notes of December 16 and December 22,1 in which exception was taken to certain proceedings of His Majesty’s ships off the United States coast. Referring particularly to the case of the Vinland, you reminded me that the United States Government had always regarded the practice of belligerent cruisers patrolling American coasts in close proximity to the territorial waters of the United States and making the neighbourhood a station for their observations as inconsistent with the treatment to be expected from the naval vessels of a friendly power in time of war, and has maintained that the consequent menace of such proceedings to the freedom of American commerce is vexatious and uncourteous to the United States.

My Government has carefully studied the contents of your notes. They are impressed by the fact that no suggestion seems to be made in either of them that British cruisers enter at all within the territorial waters of the United States, and they note that, on the contrary, the effect of the notes is to take exception to proceedings of these vessels when navigating admittedly on the high seas. The objection appears, indeed, to rest upon a claim to distinguish between different parts of the high seas, a claim which causes surprise to His Majesty’s Government, who are unaware of the existence of any rules or principles of international law which render belligerent operations which are legitimate in one part of the high seas, illegitimate in another. Under these circumstances it appears desirable that the position taken up by the United States Government should be more clearly defined. I am therefore instructed to have recourse to your courtesy in order to obtain fuller information as to the precise nature and grounds of the claims which are made by your Government, as well as their extent, since my Government are most anxious to recognise [Page 760] to the full any claims of this nature which are well founded in law, but are naturally unable to make a concession of what they regard as their belligerent rights.

The rights asserted in this respect by the United States Government in previous wars will no doubt be conceded by the United States Government as well founded when exercised by others. It will be in your recollection that my predecessor, Lord Lyons, complained that Rear Admiral Wilkes had ordered the vessels under his command to anchor in such a position as to control the movements of ships desiring to enter or to depart from the port of Bermuda, and that he maintained a system of cruising in the neutral waters of Bermuda in excess of his rights as a belligerent. The charge was thus of a far more serious nature than that which the United States Government now make against His Majesty’s ships. Admiral Wilkes in his reply, which was communicated officially by Mr. Secretary of State Seward to His Majesty’s Legation on January 15, 1863, asserted that his vessels “but maintained a system of cruising outside of the neutral waters of Bermuda in and under our rights as a belligerent.” It is clear, therefore, that this officer of the United States Navy, whose view was evidently endorsed by the United States Government, considered that his proceedings were fully justified so long as he could maintain that they had been restricted to the very practice of which the United States Government now complain, though resorted to in a far less aggravated form by His Majesty’s ships, and of which they appear actually to desire to impugn the legality.

I venture to enclose herewith extracts from the official records of the United States Navy in the War of the Rebellion which will illustrate the practice followed in that war by United States ships when conducting belligerent operations in the neighbourhood of neutral territory.

In this connection I may be permitted to point out that the number of enemy merchant ships now sheltering in harbours of the United States makes it necessary for His Majesty’s Government to maintain their cruisers in a position where they can have the best chance of capturing these ships if they should attempt to escape. Another urgent reason for a close and constant watch, which no doubt will be appreciated by the naval authorities, is the fact which I have brought to the notice of your Department and which has since formed the subject of judicial proceedings—that enemy ships received supplies of coal and provisions from neutral vessels leaving American ports. You stated in your reply to my representations that the United States Government could not go further, in any suspicious case brought to its notice, than conduct an investigation in order to determine in every possible way whether the transaction appeared to be bona fide. And in the cases of this nature which were brought before the courts the charge was not a breach of neutrality, but merely of making false manifests. Under these circumstances, as enemy cruisers were at sea and preying on the commerce of the Allies while they drew their supplies from American ports, it was incumbent on His Majesty’s cruisers to adopt such measures as were possible in order to cut off such supplies; and for this reason it is necessary that British cruisers should maintain such a position on the high seas [Page 761] as to enable them to intercept such supply ships before they have accomplished their purpose.

I have the honour to add in conclusion that in communicating the foregoing considerations I am instructed by Sir Edward Grey to state that while His Majesty’s Government can not abandon any of their rights, so far as they are in accordance with international law and the practice of the United States Government themselves, they will use their best endeavours in order that the exercise of such belligerent rights should be attended with as little inconvenience to neutrals as possible.

I have [etc.]

Cecil Spring Rice
[Enclosure]

Report of Commander Ridgely, United States Navy, commanding U. S. S. Santiago de Cuba, Key West, January 5, 1863:

I left the anchorage off Great Stirrup Cay to visit the Windward Anchorages. On the 8th we passed through the passage between Eleuthera and Cat Islands into Exuma Sound and anchored the same day off Fernandez Cay. On the 9th and 10th we passed close along San Salvador and Conception Islands and Rum Cay, and on the evening of the 10th anchored at the N. E. end of Long Island off Dove Cay.

On the 12th we anchored off the S. End of Eleuthera.

I left Stirrup Cay for the cruising ground to the Northward of Abaco hoping to intercept vessels bound from Nassau to Charleston.

The Octorara is watching the Providence Channels.

All the places with the exception of Stirrup Cay are British. Commander Ridgely seems to have cruised in British waters and to have stopped at British ports for belligerent purposes.

Report of Lieutenant Baldwin, U. S. S. Vanderbilt, off St. Thomas February 25, 1863:

I came off St. Thomas with the intention of sending in a boat for information, when I received an order from Admiral Wilkes, who was in the harbour, to search the Peterhoff, which vessel had just sailed. I boarded her some five miles off the harbour.

Report from Lieutenant Baldwin, Barbados, March 7, 1862:

I sailed to join the U. S. S. Alabama at St. Pierre, Martinique. The Alabama having just arrived off the harbour, Commander Nichols communicated with our Consul, I remaining outside. . . . The Alabama then examined the island of Dominica while I went to Pointe a Pitre, Guadeloupe. I left next morning, meeting as agreed the Alabama off Basse Terre, on the western side of that island. After consulting with Captain Nichols, I proceeded to Isle de Aves, arranging that the Alabama should go to Sombrero and the Anegada passage and toward the N. side of Puerto Rico and the anchorage of the Virgin passage. I found nothing at the Isle of Aves, and after looking among the islands in the Virgin passage went off St. Thomas, intending to send a boat in for information. As I got off the harbour the English steamer Peterhoff was coming out; and at the same time I received an order from Admiral Wilkes, who was at anchor in the harbour, to search her, and come in and anchor.

Admiral Wilkes, March 18, 1863:

For a single vessel to blockade these roadsteads it is almost impossible. I have resorted to the plan of having two—one to be anchored at Fort de France and the other at St. Pierre, only some eight miles distant.

Admiral Wilkes, March 20, 1863:

On the subject of the squadron lying at St. Thomas, apparently watching the contrabands, I had some conversation with the Governor. . . . I put it to him that there were vessels in the harbour preparing to run the [Page 762] blockade, and we were in these waters to prevent them if possible; that so far as the neutrality of the harbours and waters of these islands was concerned we should take care to observe it most strictly. . . . I should not complain of these vessels coaling and refitting, but when they reached the high seas we should act the part of a belligerent and overhaul them. . . . Therefore whether we lay at anchor or cruised off the port was of no consequence. . . .

Admiral Wilkes, April 5, 1863:

You will get your command in condition to cruise off the harbour and island of St. Thomas for the purpose of intercepting contraband runners. After you leave the inner harbour of St. Thomas you will anchor at times in the outer roads to procure information. . . . Bear in mind, however, that if a capture after examination proves necessary the neutrality limits must not be infringed upon.

(See the correspondence between the Governor of St. Thomas and Admiral Wilkes of April, 1863.)

The Admiral states in his letter to the Governor of May 13 that “The idea of our using your harbour to make preparations or of infringing upon your neutral territory has never been conceived. It will not appear that we have in any case done so, but, on the contrary, have avoided making captures when it was ascertained that we were within the limits of His Danish Majesty’s territory.” He then proceeds to describe the circumstances of the capture of the Peterhoff, the attempt to capture the Neptune, the capture of the Dolphin, and the boarding of the Intrinsic. All these ships were pursued after leaving the port by ships of the United States stationed for that purpose in or near the port.

Report of Admiral Wilkes May 13 of his conversation with the Governor of Martinique:

We had looked closely along the shores for any vessels that might be secreted and felt we had a right to remain outside the neutral limit.

Instructions of Admiral Wilkes May 13 to Commander Bryson:

You will proceed to cruise off the North East Channel or Abaco, where you will arrive about the dark of the moon, the time the blockade runners depart.

(See Report of Commander Clary, U.S.S. Tioga, May 20, 1863.)

Cruising from Bernini. . . . Matanilla Reef to along north end of Eleuthera to Cat Island and Exuma Sound, returning to South Cays, Abaco Bahama, the Elbow, and Eastward.

Admiral Wilkes in his letter to the Secretary of the Navy of January 2 stated that “we but maintained a system of cruising outside of the neutral waters of Bermuda in and under our rights as a belligerent.”

The United States ship Iroquois in November 1861, hearing that the Confederate ship Sumter was in the port of St. Pierre, Martinique, stationed herself in the offing just beyond the marine league and kept up while there communication by boats, with the shore and got the movements of the Sumter to be signaled to her. (See Reports of Captain Palmer of November 17, November 23, and November 25, 1861.)