File No. 763.72/13493
Memorandum of the Ambassador in Great Britain ( Page ) of a conversation with the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ( Grey ), July 27, 1916
[Received August (17?), 1916.]
(1) Sir Edward reminded me that in most of the controversies with the United States his Government and the French Government now act in concert. He implied (rather than said) that he feared [Page 41] there was a tendency at Washington to regard the British Government as taking actions and pursuing policies alone, although the French Government shared these actions and policies. He remarked, in parenthesis and with a smile, that the French Government often outran his Government in vigor of construction and in earnestness of action. What he clearly had in view was that he wished me to remind the President and the Department of the Anglo-French joint action and joint responsibility, and he expressed the hope that the American public as well as the American Government would bear this joint action in mind.
(2) He expressed sympathy with the President because the political campaign inevitably causes more frequent and more severe criticism abroad of every action taken by him in his foreign policy. He did not know how it was in America, but he presumed that the rule held there as in England (indeed in all countries where public opinion is free) that more people would say, during a political campaign than at any other time, “Oh, the President wrote that or did that for political effect at home.” He regretted to notice this tendency in England. He suggested that this sort of criticism might, to an extent at least, be forestalled in England if all notes from the State Department made it clear to the man who runs that the aim of the notes was to contend for this or that international law or custom, citing even, when possible, chapter and verse of such law or custom. This was said in the friendliest spirit, out of sympathy for the President, on account of the peculiar tendency that men have, at such a time as this, to ascribe partisan motives for everything that they do not approve of. The British Government, including Sir Edward personally, receives such volumes of criticism of this sort that kindred sorrows make him sympathetic—that was his motive, as well as what I think I may call his genuine appreciation of the President and of his difficulties.
(3) Then he went on to say quite frankly that two thoughts expressed in a speech by the President some months ago had had a very serious influence on British opinion. One thought was that the causes or objects of the war were of no concern to him, and the other was his (at least implied) endorsement of the “freedom of the seas,” which the President did not define.
Concerning the first thought, he understood of course that a neutral president could not say that he favored one side or the other: everybody understood that and nobody expected him to take sides. But when the President said that the objects of the war did not concern him, that was taken by British public opinion as meaning a condemnation of the British cause, and it produced deep feeling.
Concerning the “freedom of the seas,” he believed that the first use of the phrase was made by Colonel House (on his return from one of his visits to Berlin), but the public now regarded it as a German invention, and it meant to the British mind a policy which would render British supremacy at sea of little value in time of war; and public opinion resented this. He knew perfectly well that at a convenient time new rules must be made governing the conduct of war at sea and on the land, too. But the German idea of the freedom of the seas (“freedom” was needed on land also) is repulsive to the British mind.
[Page 42]He mentioned these things because they had produced in many minds an unwillingness, he feared, to use the good offices of the President whenever any mediatorial service might be done by a neutral. The tendency of these remarks was certainly in that direction. Yet Sir Edward carefully abstained from expressing such an unwillingness on his own part; and the inference from his tone and manner, as well as from his habitual attitude, is that he feels no unwillingness to use the President’s good offices, if occasion should arise.
I asked what he meant by “mediatorial”—the President’s offering his services or good offices on his own initiative? He said—No, not that. But the Germans might express to the President their willingness, or even their definite wish to have an armistice, on certain terms, to discuss conditions of peace, coupled with an intimation that he might sound the Allies. He did not expect the President to act on his own initiative, but at the request, or at least at the suggestion of the German Government, he might conceivably sound the Allies—especially, he added, “since I am informed that the notion is widespread in America that the war will end inconclusively—as a draw.” He smiled and remarked, as an aside, that he didn’t think that this notion was held by any considerable group of people in any other country—certainly not in Great Britain.
In further talk on this subject he said that none of the Allies could mention peace or discuss peace till France should express such a wish; for it is the very vitals of France that have received and are receiving the shock of such an assault as was never before launched against any nation. Unless France was ready to quit, none of France’s allies could mention peace, and France showed no mood to quit. Least of all could the English make or receive any such suggestion, at least till her new great army had done its best; for until lately the severest fighting had not been done by the British, whose army had practically been held in reserve. There had for a long time been a perfect understanding between Joffre and Haig—that the English would wait to begin their offensive till the moment arrived when it best suited the French.
The impression that I got from this part of the conversation was that Sir Edward hoped that I might convey to the President (as, of course, he could not) Sir Edward’s idea of the effect of these parts of the President’s speech on feeling in England towards him. Nowhere in the conversation did he make any request of me. Anyone, overhearing it, might have supposed it to be a conversation between two men, with no object beyond expressing their views. But, of course, he hoped and meant that I should, in my own way, make known to the President what he said. He did not say that the President’s good offices, when the time should come, would be unwelcome to him or to his Government; and he meant, I am sure, to convey only the fear that by these assertions the President had planted an objection to his good offices in a large section of British opinion.
(4) Among the conditions of peace that Sir Edward himself personally would like to see imposed (he had not yet discussed the subject with any of his colleagues in the Government) was this—that the German Government should agree to submit to an impartial (neutral) commission or court the question, Who began the war and [Page 43] who is responsible for it? The German Chancellor and other high German officials have put it about and continue to put it about that England is responsible, and doubtless the German people at least believe it. All the governments concerned must (this is his idea) submit to the tribunal all their documents and other evidence bearing on the subject; and of course the finding of the tribunal must be published.
(5) Then he talked a good deal about the idea that lies behind the League for Enforcing Peace—in a sympathetic mood. He went on to point out how such a league, with force behind it, would at any one of three stages have prevented this war: (1) When England proposed a conference to France, Germany, Italy, and Russia, all agreed to it but Germany. Germany alone prevented a discussion. If the League to Enforce Peace had included England, France, Italy, and Russia, there would have been no war, for Germany would have seen at once that they would all be against her. (2) Later, when the Czar sent the Kaiser a personal telegram proposing to submit their differences to some tribunal, a League to Enforce Peace would have prevented a war. (3) When the question of the invasion of Belgium came up, every signatory to treaty guaranteeing Belgium’s integrity gave assurance of keeping the treaty but Germany, and Germany gave an evasive answer. A League would again have prevented a war, or put all the military force of all its members against Germany.
Throughout the conversation, which lasted about an hour, Sir Edward said more than once, as he has often said to me, that he hoped we should be able to keep the friction between our Governments at the minimum. He would regard it as the greatest calamity if the ill feeling that various events have stirred up in sections of public opinion on each side should increase or should become permanent. His constant wish and effort were to lessen and, if possible, to remove all misunderstandings.