File No. 763.72/3036

The Chargé in Germany (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 4530

Sir: With reference to my confidential despatch No. 43221 of October 16, 1916, reporting on the political situation in Germany, particularly in its bearing on the question of a possible resumption of the relentless and indiscriminate form of submarine warfare, I have the honor to bring to the Department’s attention certain further information on this subject, which comes to me from a trustworthy, well-informed, and confidential source in direct touch with sentiment in naval circles at the naval ports.

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Much irritation has been caused in certain high naval quarters owing to the delay in an official announcement of a general submarine campaign against England, which is generally interpreted as a temporary victory for those opposed to the Von Tirpitz policy. An outspoken declaration for the indiscriminate destruction of enemy ships without warning would, it is said, have been made before this, could those in authority agree that the present was an opportune time to launch the campaign. While the entire Navy is in favor of it, they are divided into three separate groups on the question as to the time when it should begin. The first group, the great majority, hold that action should not be taken until after the presidential election in the United States. A second group believe that the early spring would be the opportune time, both on account of the weather conditions and because the submarine fleet would by that time be greatly augmented in tonnage. A third group, who are in the minority, have for the past two months been in favor of opening hostilities immediately.

The naval authorities are apparently much worried at the strength of the opposition to their plan. They realize that it would probably involve the United States in the war and they know that the Emperor is emphatically opposed to it, but they appear to believe that they can act independently of his wishes. They declare that he has always been opposed to the Zeppelin raids over London, but that the Admiralty has pursued that method of warfare regardless of his wishes or opinions and they pretend to believe that his opposition, as well as that of his close advisers, to the indiscriminate submarine warfare, can be overcome through a campaign of pressure from high military as well as high naval authorities. In any case, the idea that the submarines will eventually operate against all enemy ships without giving warning still dominates the wishes of the naval commanders, not only of the submarines but of all other grades in the Navy, and it is said that there is not one dissenting voice in the entire Navy against what they deem to be a necessary undertaking to avoid a long continuance of the war and an ultimate defeat.

The food situation must to a great extent be regarded as bound up with the submarine issue, for the greater the growth of dissatisfaction and unrest among the people owing to difficult conditions of living, the greater will be the pressure to meet these conditions with some strong, and what the Navy considers decisive, action.

It is an open secret that this food question is becoming alarming to those in a position to know the exact conditions. The authorities are becoming nervous over the growing dissatisfaction of the people in the decrease of the supply of foodstuffs and the difficulty of finding even the amounts which their food cards call for. Riotous demonstrations of the working people have occurred in Kiel and other places, which necessitated the calling out of the marines and soldiers to enforce order, and though nothing of this appears in the press, it is probable that the unrest is widespread.

In this connection the Consul General at Dresden writes me as follows under the date of November 4:

On Thursday afternoon some two thousand women made a pacific descent upon the city hall at Dresden and demanded not bread, but potatoes. They [Page 316] received the promise of a larger quantity and an exhortation not to disturb the peace. The women were of the lower classes and were very orderly in their behavior. Papers of Dresden have, of course, made no mention of the demonstration.

The normal quantity of potatoes allowed each person a day in Dresden is a pound, but for weeks many even of the well-to-do families have been unable to secure any. Through bad packing, I learn from an excellent source, two thousand tons stored in Dresden rotted. Eight thousand pounds of butter, also through faulty packing, had to be sold to soap factories. All this is known to the people and naturally creates certain hostility towards the local authorities who are held responsible.

There is virtually no meat, butter, eggs, or sugar to be had and very few vegetables and very little milk, and the little there is, is sold at least between a hundred and two hundred per cent above the prices before the war. Cards for every kind of food are in use with the exception of fish and vegetables, but unhappily the amounts they call for, although insignificant, are not to be had. For instance each adult person is supposed to receive an eighth of a pound of butter a week, but in fact he is very fortunate if he secures this quantity every 10 days or even 2 weeks. Butter costs $0.70 a pound, just twice what it was sold for before the war. One receives a pound and a half of sugar, half a pound of coffee, and a quarter pound of tea a month. Each inhabitant is allowed an egg a week which costs $0.12 and which in normal times could be had for $0.0125. We are supposed to receive 9 ounces of meat a week, but in fact we get about the half. If one is rich one can buy geese, costing from $7.50 to $10 each, ducks from $3.73 to $6.25 each, and hens at $2.50 each. In ante bellum times geese sold for $2 to $2.50 each, ducks for $0.75 to $1.25, and chickens for $0.50 to $0.75 each. The best meats, when obtainable, cost on the average $1 a pound, but before the war never more than $0.40 a pound.

The result of all this is that there is, if not actual starvation, at least woeful distress among the poor, want among the middle class, and a great deal of grumbling among the rich who can still live on geese, ducks, and game and who, it must be frankly stated, seem to be favored by the Government as no meat cards are required for these luxuries.

I think that it is now generally admitted that the trouble lies with the Government which seems not to be able to adapt itself to changed conditions. It makes regulations which do not work and apparently has not the capacity to enact new ones. The trouble is that, although an Imperial food director has been appointed, there is no single governmental control of its distribution due largely to the independent Kingdoms of Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, and Württemberg declining to surrender their surplus supplies to their less fortunate neighbors. Saxony is a manufacturing country and not an agricultural one, and it is, therefore, almost wholly dependent upon the other German states for its food. Even the local Saxon municipalities retain for possible lean months the products they do not actually need instead of turning them into a single distributing center. Dresden, for instance, grants nominally an eighth of a pound of butter a week, but Blasewitz, a suburb of the city, but with its own municipal government, permits the purchase of a quarter pound a week. Hundreds of pounds of fish, meats, butter, and potatoes have been allowed to spoil, due either to indecision or lack of adaptability on the part of the officials.

Wholesale dealers and hotels could purchase tons of meats, sausages, and supplies of all kinds from the Scandinavian countries, but are not permitted to do so, as the Government is unable to devise a plan for the supervision of their distribution.

These conditions, which obtain in a greater or less degree throughout the entire country, must be met, and met in a way that will prevent the growth of ill-feeling and riotous manifestations, just as the successful operations of the enemy on the Somme and elsewhere and the consequent discouragement of the people were met with the campaign against Roumania. To offset the dissatisfaction over the lack of food, the people’s minds must be turned to something that appeals to their imagination and which holds out a prospect of an early peace with victory. The submarine campaign is the solution chosen by the Navy and probably by a great number of the high [Page 317] military officers in the field. They fully realize, however, that their present stumbling block is the Emperor and his immediate advisers, including Von Hindenburg, upon whom the decision of the question of plunging into a general submarine warfare will probably ultimately rest.

The return of the submarines U–53 and U–69 from the Atlantic coast of the United States is the cause of much elation in the Navy. They pretend to see in this a demonstration that they can carry on a successful submarine warfare along the full ocean highway, even to the gateways to American waters, and they regard it as a successful test and an experience to be availed of in case the much-desired submarine campaign should ultimately be launched.

For the past three weeks it is said that from four to five new submarines a week have been put into commission. This rapid increase is believed to be but temporary and due to the completion of submarines of all types which were under construction when the new type, now in use, was agreed upon. Almost the whole strength of the naval constructive force, however, is diverted to the rapid building of submarines and little attention is now being given to the building of the larger or dreadnought type of ships. Those under construction are of the ersatz or replacing order and are of the small cruiser class only.

There are at present believed to be nearly 100 qualified submarine commanders awaiting assignments, which are being made as rapidly as the boats are put into commission. The men for 100 more boats are awaiting places on these boats. Even with this qualified force on hand, as many more are undergoing training for the service and the school ships are busy with this work.

It is said that the Zeppelin raids over London will probably be discontinued and that airship activity will be directed to places in the British Isles outside of that city. The recent death of Kapitänleutnant Mathey and the destruction of his Zeppelin have had a depressing effect on the air division, for he was the oldest and most capable Zeppelin commander in the fleet and his ship was the latest and best equipped model. Mathey always operated at an altitude of 4,000 meters and considered himself safe at that height. His only danger was in case an aeroplane could get above him, and he reasoned that it required so much time for a machine to do that after getting notice that he was within the zone of operations that he would have dropped his bombs and returned out of danger. It now develops that before they started, the British agents in Germany communicated with their people and the British aeroplanes had arisen to a height of 5,000 meters before the Zeppelins arrived and therefore had no trouble in dropping inflammable bombs on the high airship. Kapitänleutnant Koch, who was under Mathey at an altitude of 2,500 meters, saw his machine fall and he himself with his machine had a narrow escape, two inflammable bombs hurled at him passing his Zeppelin at a distance of less than 10 meters.

Heretofore it has been considered by the Zeppelin authorities that in case a ship was struck, it would ignite and those in it would be incinerated before having time to even hurl themselves from the boats. In view of the fact that Mathey and his companions were not burned nor was their clothing even scorched, they now realize [Page 318] that had the Zeppelin been supplied with parachutes they could probably have been saved. The Zeppelins are now to be given this contrivance for future use.

I have indications from various sources that since Von Hindenburg became Chief of Staff there has been a great increase in the number of men called to the ranks who were previously passed as unfit or excused from service for one reason or another. A great number of Jews are being reexamined and forced into service. My reports are that since Von Hindenburg’s appointment approximately 100,000 new men in Berlin, 60,000 in Hamburg and similar quotas in other cities have been taken.

In connection with the general political situation and the submarine campaign, I would respectfully refer to my confidential telegrams Nos. 4503, 4553, 4558, and 4569, of October 20, November 3, 4, and 7, respectively,1 sent since my despatch of October 16,2 as well as to the press summaries cabled daily.

I have [etc.]

J. C. Grew
  1. Ante, p. 300.
  2. Not Printed.
  3. Ante, p. 300.