File No. 763.72/2355½
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 26, 7.30 a. m.]
3648. Sir Edward Grey sent for me this afternoon to talk about the Administration’s proposals about submarine warfare and about forbidding any merchantman from carrying a gun astern for defensive use. I was obliged to tell him that I knew nothing about such proposals. He seemed disappointed [and] he showed me a telegram on the subject from Spring Rice, not omitting Sir Edward’s telegram of to-day in reply.
I have only once before seen Sir Edward so grave and disappointed, and that was when he informed me that the British had sent the German Government an ultimatum. After he discovered that I had not been informed of the subject he seemed disposed to say little. He did say, however, that he indulged the hope that the Department had not foreseen the results of the proposal which was wholly in favor of the Germans theoretically and practically [and] wholly against the Allies. Then he asked me for House’s address because, as I gathered, he had talked with him at my table so frankly and freely about the relations of our two Governments that he thought he ought to inform House that he [did not] then know that this proposal would come. He spoke as one speaks of a great calamity. He said that he would not mention the subject in his speech in the House of Commons to-morrow because the announcement that such a proposal had been made by the United States would cause a storm that would drive every other subject out of the mind of the House and of the country. He is the best friend that we have in the Government and his surprise and dismay are overwhelming.
Sir Edward is too courteous to expose himself, but the Government and British opinion will regard this change by us of an accepted practice made while the war is in progress as a complete German [Page 152] victory over us in the submarine controversy. [The] engendered bitterness against us will be intense in the Allied countries and such influence as we might have had with the Allied Governments will be lost. If this proposal be persisted in, the Administration will forfeit the confidence [and] good will of England and France. Can we gain enormously by it to offset this loss? [Hope you] will reread my confidential telegram of the 22d instant.1
It has been rumored here in well-informed circles for several weeks, and I believe it is true, that the British Government have been constructing extra munition works in England and Canada which can on short notice be manned and used to make as many munitions as the United States now supplies. The reason given for this expensive preparation is the fear of Bernstorff’s success in his efforts to cause the Administration to embarrass the Allies. If necessary, orders placed in the United States could now be stopped within a month without diminishing the total supply. If no merchantman may carry a defensive gun into an American port, [this] change may precipitate a cutting off of American orders, not from any wish to cut them off, but from fear that other embarrassing acts by us may follow.
- Not located in the files of the Department.↩