Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, Supplement, The World War

File No. 763.72119/1861

The Chargé in Germany (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 4916

Berlin, December 21, 1916 .¹

Sir: I have the honor to make to the Department the following report on the development of the peace propaganda in Germany during the period in which I have been in charge of the Embassy.

On October 7, in my telegram No. 4439,² reporting the agreement which was said to have been reached between the Chancellor and his political opponents that the submarine issue should be dropped for the present, I informed the Department that this agreement appeared to be based upon the desire of the German Government to avoid embarrassing the President should he desire to act on the matter dealt with in the Ambassador’s highly confidential telegram No. 4375³ of September 25 and to take steps looking towards peace. This information was received from a source which I regarded as trustworthy and well informed, but I was not at that time able to confirm it.

On November 17, in my telegram No. 4614,⁴ I directed the Department’s attention to the importance of an interview with the Imperial Chancellor which Mr. William Bayard Hale, the Berlin correspondent of the Hearst newspapers, was about to cable to the New York American. There had been during the last few weeks in Berlin a marked increase of peace talk and sentiment, which, so far as I could observe, extended practically to all parties, and when I learned of the Hale interview and was informed that it was in the nature of an informal suggestion to the President, whose response was awaited with interest, there seemed every reason to attach weight to it, particularly as Mr. Hale’s relations with the German Government are closer than those of most of the other American correspondents, and as the Chancellor would not be likely to give an interview at this time without some particular purpose.

The Hale interview, however, was unexpectedly delayed after he had understood that it had been approved and passed, and had expected it to be published in New York on the morning of November 18 or 19. This I reported to the Department in my telegram No. 4626¹ of November 20.

In its telegram No. 3606¹ of November 22, the Department informed me that Count Bernstorff was trying to stop the publication of the interview in the United States and that it might now be held up by the German censor, and instructed me to endeavor to obtain the Chancellor’s statement to Hale and to cable it to the Department. No intimation was given me as to whether the Department itself considered the publication of the interview as inadvisable.

I replied in my telegram No. 4652² of November 25 that Hale had now informed me that the Chancellor, in view of recent developments such as the death of the Austrian Emperor, the changes in the Foreign Office, and the establishment of the Government auxiliary service, had now decided that it would be preferable to base the interview primarily on those developments and thus to avoid approaching the subject of peace directly, while bringing it into the interview incidentally. I had, however, obtained a copy of the original interview, and although it had now been withdrawn and could not be regarded as authorized by the Chancellor himself, I cabled various excerpts in order to indicate its general nature and the tendency of the Chancellor’s thoughts.

On November 28 Mr. Hale gave me a copy of the interview as finally approved and passed, after it had been revised five separate times, and in accordance with the Department’s instructions I cabled it in full in my telegram No. 4662.³ The great amount of padding in the interview and the fact that, so far as I was aware, it would be published in the United States, made me hesitate to cable it in full, but the Department had asked for the text and I feared that to omit any portion of it would be to confuse the relative importance of the subjects mentioned. The consensus of opinion of the Embassy staff was that it should be sent in full, which was accordingly done.

Meanwhile, on November 22, my first interview with the Chancellor regarding the Belgian deportations gave him an opportunity to turn to the subject of peace and to elaborate the theme at considerable length, knowing that what he said would be brought directly to the President’s attention. I am not aware as to what he had previously said to Mr. Gerard and to Colonel House, but he approached the matter very directly and definitely and left no doubt as to his intentions in bringing up the subject. As soon as the Belgian matter had been discussed, the Chancellor settled back in his chair and began to speak slowly and distinctly in German giving me the impression that he had carefully considered his words in advance. He said that these difficulties in Belgium would never have arisen if his suggestions that Germany desired peace, which he had expressed in the Reichstag last December, almost a year ago, and subsequently to Mr. Gerard and to Colonel House and in other speeches and interviews, had been acted upon abroad. England and France, he said, had replied that this was no time to talk of peace. It had been said in those countries that he had made conditions (Bedingungen); this was not true; he had made no conditions. If his intimations that Germany wanted peace should be continuously ignored, Germany would be forced in self-defense to adopt hard measures, but this would not be Germany’s fault. Germany’s readiness for peace absolved her from the guilt of this continued slaughter. It was utter craziness (Wahnsinn) to continue this useless and futile taking of human life. This he repeated several times in different words. “What do these difficulties in Belgium matter,” he said, “compared to the hecatomb of lives which have been lost on the Somme since last July?”

As I reported to the Department in my telegram No. 4636¹ of November 22, 10 p. m., the Chancellor gave an impression of great weariness and sadness and discouragement at the failure of his peace suggestions to bear fruit. His mood may to a certain extent have been influenced by the day, which was Busstag, the German day of penitence: he had lost his wife and son since the beginning of the war and his thoughts would naturally have turned to them on that particular day of the year. But, as I reported to the Department, the Chancellor, quite apart from any consideration of mood or manner, gave me the distinct impression, although not directly expressed, of his disappointment that the United States had not taken steps leading towards peace.

On December 1, in my telegram No. 4671,² I communicated to the Department my impressions of the general situation in Germany regarding the issue of peace. I stated that with the exception of a certain element in the Army and the Navy and certain politicians of the Reventlow type, Germany as a whole would appear ready to welcome steps looking towards peace, as there was a general weariness of war and as the food situation, while not critical, was becoming more and more difficult from day to day. As it was not generally believed, however, that peace could yet be brought about, owing to the growing doubt of the possibility of inducing Russia to conclude a separate peace and the attitude of England, the German Empire was gathering all of its potential resources with a view to meeting and if possible to exceeding the enemy’s output of trained soldiers, guns, and ammunition. Three principal steps were being taken in this significant and large-scale movement, namely, the organizing of the national auxiliary service, the impressment of laborers in Belgium, and the same or similar action in Poland. These steps would undoubtedly release a very large number of men to the front (it has been said a million and a half) and would effect a great increase in the number of available munition workers. It was hoped that by this method Germany would be in a position to conduct a successful offensive against Russia in the spring or sooner (probably a movement into Bessarabia and towards Odessa), and to check a similar offensive on the part of the Allies in the west. For this reason the Army leaders appeared to believe that they could secure more favorable terms after their spring offensive than now and were therefore probably averse to steps looking towards peace at the present moment. The attitude of the Navy was well known to the Department from my previous reports: the Navy would never feel that its trump card had been played until the ruthless and indiscriminate submarine warfare had been reopened and England starved out by the cutting off of all commerce approaching her shores.

The Chancellor, however, was to all appearances sincerely and heartily in favor of an early peace, and I believed these sentiments to be shared by Zimmermann, who, although a stronger and more determined man than Von Jagow, was in agreement with the Chancellor that the war could now only result in a draw, that the continued loss of life was and would be futile, and that, although Germany would be able to maintain her present position indefinitely, if not to advance, humanity called for an end.

It was not impossible that the Chancellor might encounter a certain amount of opposition from the German public should his repeated peace suggestions be acted upon, but so far as I was able to gauge the situation, any such opposition or criticism would be based upon the fear of a confession of weakness rather than upon any lack of desire for peace among the people, officials, and politicians of Germany as a whole.

The above telegram (here paraphrased) was sent only after repeated conferences with the various members of the Embassy staff, and it was altered until it met with the full approval of the military attaché and represented the consensus of opinion of the staff as a whole.

On November 29, in its telegram No. 3621,¹ the Department directed me to obtain as soon as possible a further interview with the Chancellor and after making a textual protest against the Belgian deportations on behalf of the Government of the United States, to represent to the Chancellor in confidence and with great earnestness the very serious unfavorable reaction which the Belgian deportations were exerting upon public opinion in the United States at a time when that opinion was more nearly approaching a balance of judgment as to the issues of the war than ever before. I was also, and more particularly, to point out the great embarrassment which the President had been caused by that reaction in regard to taking steps looking towards peace. I was authorized to say that the whole situation was being watched by the President with the utmost solicitude, as it was his wish and definite purpose to be of service at the earliest possible moment in that great aim and that it had repeatedly distressed him to find his hopes frustrated and his occasion destroyed by such unfortunate incidents as the Belgian deportations and the sinking of the Marina and the Arabia. Furthermore, authorization was given me to say that my report, in a recent despatch (telegram), of the evident distress and disappointment of the Chancellor that nothing had come of his intimations regarding peace, had been noted by the President with the deepest interest, and that what the President now earnestly desired was the creation of a favorable opportunity for some affirmative action by him in the interest of an early restoration of peace, this opportunity to be brought about through practical cooperation on the part of the German authorities. (Paraphrase.)

This telegram was not received at the Embassy until December 2. I immediately applied formally through the Foreign Office for an interview with the Chancellor and was received by him on the morning of December 5 after he had made two previous appointments with me for the day before and had been obliged to break them both, one on account of the funeral service for the Austrian Emperor and the other owing to an extended sitting with some committee. After making the formal representations with regard to the Belgian deportations and leaving a copy with the Chancellor in writing, I turned to the delivery of the President’s communication.

The matter was one of some delicacy, owing to the fact, as I had reported to the Department, that the Chancellor had not directly expressed disappointment that the United States had taken no steps looking towards peace, but had given me that impression only by intimation. There was no question whatever as to his intention in having spoken to me as he did at my first interview, which was clearly indicated by his words, his manner, and his allusion to what he had previously said to Mr. Gerard and to Colonel House, but I could not run the possible risk of first delivering the President’s communication and then of having the Chancellor, owing to some alteration of circumstances in the meantime, say that I had not clearly understood him. Accordingly I began by repeating carefully word for word, so far as it was possible to remember it, the Chancellor’s remarks to me at the previous interview and then inquired if I had understood him clearly. On his reply that I had made no mistake, I proceeded to make the representations stated above. The Chancellor listened with full respect to the President’s communication, but made no comment and said that he would send for me in a few days after he had talked the matter over with Zimmermann.

In an informal talk with Zimmermann on December 6, he expressed satisfaction at the President’s communication and said that the Chancellor’s reply would be “favorable and friendly.” He also remarked that it was the desire of the German Government to smooth the President’s way as much as possible in any steps which he might take looking towards peace.

On the following evening, December 7, the Chancellor sent for me and said that while the answer of the German Government to our representations regarding the Belgian deportations would be communicated to me in due course by Zimmermann, he wished to reply immediately himself, before leaving for General Headquarters that night, to the statement regarding the President’s attitude towards the question of taking steps looking towards peace, and he proceeded to make to me the following confidential oral communication:

The German Government, desirous of maintaining amicable relations with the United States, has given proof of its willingness to settle incidents arising between the two nations in a friendly spirit by the replies recently transmitted to the American Government in the Marina and Arabia cases. It is with great satisfaction that I have noted that the President of the United States so earnestly tries to be of service in the restoration of peace. Also my offers to open pourparlers for peace negotiations have so far not met with a favorable response from the other side. I hope the time will come when Germany’s enemies will be more willing to lend an ear to the voice of reason. I am extremely grateful to see from the message you were good enough to deliver to me that in this event I can count on the practical cooperation of the President in the restoration of peace as much as the President can count on the practical cooperation of the German authorities.

This statement and an account of my conversation with the Chancellor were cabled to the Department in my No. 4700¹ of December 7.

The following day, to my surprise, Mr. Conger, the Associated Press correspondent in Berlin, showed me a telegram which he was about to send to the United States containing a more or less complete account of my interview with the Chancellor, both on the subject of the Belgian deportations and on peace. The information, he said, had been given out to him by a certain official in the Foreign Office with full permission to use it as news.

Endeavoring to look at the matter from every point of view, I could not see that the publication of this interview, so far as it related to peace, could do otherwise than embarrass the President. We did not know at that time that either the Chancellor or the President would shortly come out with a public communication on the subject, and it was my opinion, although no intimation of the Department’s attitude had been given me, that if the President were contemplating taking action, his way would be rendered more difficult by the unfavorable reaction which the publication of my confidential interview with the Chancellor would have on public opinion in the countries of the Entente. Furthermore, if the President had no objection to the publication of the interview, the Department would presumably not have characterized the communication to the Chancellor as confidential, which was done in the Department’s telegram No. 3621. It did not therefore lie with me to determine the advantages or disadvantages of its publication, and it was undoubtedly my duty to call the attention of the Foreign Office to the fact that my communication to the Chancellor had been confidential and that I had so stated when delivering it. This I did without delay. The Foreign Office averred that a mistake had been made, although I am now aware that the information had been given to Mr. Conger with the approval of a high official, and stated that they would suppress the telegram at the censor’s office. This was done, for Mr. Conger came to me on the following day and said that, to his surprise, his telegram had been badly cut up by the censor, all allus on to peace having been eliminated. I reported this incident to the Department in my telegram No. 4707² of December 8.

On December 10, in my telegram No. 4712,³ I cabled the Department that the Reichstag had suddenly and unexpectedly been called to meet on December 12 and that it was generally believed that the subject of peace would be openly broached, possibly with a general statement of terms. During those few days Berlin was full of the wildest remorse [rumors] as to the meaning of the convocation of the Reichstag, and it was not easy to sift the well-founded rumors from mere gossip, so I telegraphed the Department with considerable reserve.

On the morning of December 12 I was unexpectedly called to the Chancellor at 11.30, the Spanish Ambassador having been received at 11 and the Swiss Minister at 11.15. The Swiss Minister was coming out as I entered and whispered to me as he left: “An offer of peace,” which was the first intimation I had had as to the reason for the Chancellor’s summons. The Spanish Ambassador had been equally in the dark, and calling on me afterwards, he stated that when invited to the Chancellor, he thought it not unlikely that the latter was about to announce a resumption of the indiscriminate submarine warfare. This I reported in my telegram No. 4724¹ of December 12, 6 p. m. I therefore unfortunately had no opportunity of informing the Department in advance as to the proposed step of the German Government.

The Chancellor lost no time in preliminaries, but seating me beside him at a small table, he immediately told me in a few words the reason why he had sent for me and then proceeded to read a statement, a close paraphrase of which was cabled to the Department in my telegram No. 4725² of December 12 and a copy of which was transmitted in my despatch No. 4820³ of the same date. He then delivered to me the note containing the German Government’s offer of peace, the signed original being in the German language and accompanied by an official French translation. An English translation of the note was cabled to the Department at the earliest possible moment in my No. 4722,⁴ the French version following shortly afterwards en clair in my No. 4726.⁵ As the translating and encoding of the note occupied but a few hours, it did not seem to me possible that a preliminary telegram, such as was apparently received from Vienna, according to the Department’s telegram No. 3670 of December 13, 4 p. m.,³ could reach Washington sooner than the note itself. I am aware that the Legation at Copenhagen remains open until 11 p. m. daily for the transmission of telegrams, and as our telegram containing the text of the note itself was dispatched on the afternoon of the 12th, it seemed to me that it must reach the Department early on the morning of the 13th. I now learn from the press that it did not arrive until the night of the 13th, and fear that it must have been delayed by the congestion in the telegraph offices on that day. As stated in my telegram No. 4738 of December 15,³ however, it could not have been more urgently expedited by the Embassy. I fully realized the great importance of haste.

Immediately after the Chancellor had received me, I left the note at the Embassy to be translated and encoded and proceeded at once to the Reichstag, where the Chancellor spoke at 1.45 immediately after the meeting had been called to order. His remarks were cabled to the Department in my No. 4723² of December 12. His speech, which was quietly delivered, called forth no great enthusiasm, although his remarks were frequently punctuated by “Bravos” from the house. Afterwards the leaders of the Central, Conservative, and Socialist Parties spoke, but at no great length. The representative of the Center Party moved to adjourn, leaving it in the discretion of the President to fix the day of the next meeting. Herr Bassermann of the National Liberal Party took the position that a measure of such moment as the peace proposal required dignified discussion by the Reichstag and moved that such discussion be entered upon immediately. Count Westarp, of the Conservatives, and Herr Ledebour of the Socialist Labor wing supported Herr Bassermann’s motion for open discussion by the Reichstag. Upon vote being taken the motion to adjourn was passed by a large majority.

On December 13 I cabled to the Department, in my Nos. 4728¹ and 4729,² full comment and excerpts from the press.

In an informal conversation with me on December 19, Zimmermann mentioned the subject of peace and said that while the Chancellor in his note of December 12 had clearly indicated that Germany, with her sincere desire for peace, would adopt no basis which it would be impossible for the Entente to accept, the German Government had particularly avoided giving any intimation as to what this basis would be, as this, among other reasons, might have demoralized the troops in the field who would have believed that there was no further purpose in fighting. This conversation was reported in my telegram No. 4753³ of December 19 and was the first occasion on which the subject of peace had been commented upon at the Foreign Office since the Chancellor handed me his note on December 12.

On the morning of December 21 I received the Department’s circular telegram of December 18, containing the President’s communication for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, which I read to Zimmermann at about 5 p. m., after the telegram had been decoded, the note prepared, and an appointment made at the Foreign Office. I presented the matter with the utmost earnestness and clearly conveyed the impression, as directed, that it would be very hard for the Government of the United States to understand a negative reply. Zimmermann listened to the reading of the communication, a copy of which I left with him, with earnest attention and expressed great satisfaction at and appreciation of the President’s “wise and high-minded action.” He said he would have to discuss the matter with the Emperor and the Chancellor before replying, and that in any case he did not think that an answer could be given or action taken until the Entente powers had replied to the Chancellor’s note of December 12. He said he was quite sure that Germany’s peace terms were more moderate than those of the Entente, but that Germany could not be the first to divulge them, first, because one party to a negotiation could not give its hand away at the start, and second, because of the unfavorable effect which this would have on the German public, part of whom would undoubtedly be dissatisfied with the terms offered by Germany. I remarked that if Germany could not be the first to divulge her terms and if, as was probable, the Entente powers would be similarly reticent, the process of elimination would leave a mutual and simultaneous statement of terms as the only alternative, which he said might be considered.

The word “soundings,” he said, struck him as peculiarly appropriate and he believed that in any case the action of the President was a step nearer towards peace and that favorable results might possibly be expected.

I informed the Department of the receipt of the President’s communication in my telegram No. 4760 of December 21, 10 a. m.,¹ reporting at the same time that section 2 of the Department’s circular for Vienna and Sofia had been sent to Berlin by an error of the telegraph authorities and that I had forwarded it immediately. My conversation with Zimmermann was reported in the Embassy’s telegram No. 4764² of December 21, 6 p. m. I would add that in leaving with Zimmermann the President’s communication in writing, I adopted the form of a note as had been done by the Ambassador in previous cases under identical instructions (vide the various Lusitania notes from the Embassy to the Foreign Office).

The Ambassador returned to Berlin at 10.30 p. m. on December 21.

In summing up, I venture to remark that in my opinion this peace propaganda is a direct outcome of the food situation in Germany, which is steadily becoming more difficult. The German masses are suffering from undernourishment, which is already affecting adults, but particularly young children, and there will probably be several months to come, before the next crops are ripe, when the supply of food available for rationing human beings and animals will be sensibly less than at present. If it becomes necessary to go through this period in a state of war, it may be expected that it can be done, though with great and widespread hardship. The fighting could then be prolonged for a considerable period, but under these circumstances, even if victorious in a military sense, Germany would probably be so far exhausted as to render a victory barren of results. It is, therefore, necessary for Germany to make great sacrifices at the present time in order to try to secure a peace. The attempts to detach Russia from the Alliance having proved abortive, the sacrifices to be offered appear at present to be directed towards France and England.

As a basis for discussion, something of the following nature is talked about among well-informed Germans: Belgium and northern France to be given up; France to be compensated with a part of Alsace and Lorraine; England to be compensated with certain colonial possessions. On the other hand, Germany to be allowed to follow her development of the Bagdad Road and Mesopotamia; to have an influential position in the Balkans; and the independent Kingdom of Poland to be continued as a buffer state. It is significant that in 1915 it would not have been possible to find a German voice to speak of the ceding of a square foot of Alsace-Lorraine.

The morale of the masses is low. The successes in Roumania and the peace propaganda have given them new spirit for the moment and the Chancellor’s action on December 12 was received with unconcealed joy; but this frame of mind cannot be expected to last if the peace offer fails.

The year 1916 has seen a definite step in the growth of liberal ideas in Germany. The ideas so freely expressed by the ruling classes at the beginning of the war and throughout 1915, that Germany by virtue of her leadership in the arts of civilization and the moral superiority of her people must spread her power and methods throughout the world, are now generally relegated to obscurity.

Nevertheless the full regeneration of the country can only come from within. When it is brought home to the people that the building up of vast armaments for conquest and expansion and the fostering of that spirit of force which is militarism has led them to failure and suffering, the time will be ripe for new forms of government in Germany and for a stable condition in Europe.

It would appear from the statements made in the countries at war with Germany that they recognize this condition and are not prepared to accept terms unless they impose upon Germany definite losses and hardships which will bring home to her people the futility of future wars of expansion.

I have [etc.]

J. C. Grew

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