File No. 124.636/24
The Ambassador in Austria-Hungary (Penfield) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 6.]
Sir: On various occasions since the Government of the United States generously consented to “loan” the services of its diplomatic [Page 817] and consular officials for the exercise of good offices in behalf of the interests and subjects of various belligerent countries, rumors have reached me of dissatisfaction on the part of the latter with the results obtained.
In order that the reverse of the shield may in a measure be exposed, I venture to transmit herewith enclosed copies of memoranda of the notes addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at this capital in the interest of the British, French, and Italian Governments, to which replies are still awaited.1 The dates as well as the aggregate number are not eloquent of a disposition on the part of the Imperial and Royal authorities to give an example of celerity. In addition to such memoranda, which have been sent them as occasion demanded, frequent opportunity has been taken to urge verbally that the matters involved might be dealt with more expeditiously.
The various governments concerned, and that of Austria-Hungary as well, seem to have persuaded themselves into believing that American officials, instead of acting merely as channels of communication between themselves and the governments with which they are at war, have obligated themselves to employ “the full weight of their influence” towards the accomplishment of their desires. That the interests of the intermediary might possibly be prejudiced in the operation, not to speak of his duty as a neutral, does not seem to have entered the minds of these governments.
The fallacies of “representation” and “protection” seem to have taken root in every chancellery with a resulting irritation at the absence of enthusiastic partizanship of the agents of the “protecting” power. If in times of peace the resolution of ordinary questions required months when urged by the accredited representatives of the now enemy power, greater expedition can hardly be expected when the desires of that government are communicated by a neutral intermediary, itself having interests of vital importance to urge on the attention of the government addressed.
That the potency of the representatives of the United States in accomplishing ends purely American has been to a large degree impaired through the generous exercise of good offices in behalf of belligerents, is hardly to be questioned. Our Government assumed the burden gladly, and for my part I have experienced the liveliest satisfaction in whatever benefit I may have succeeded in accomplishing in behalf of the interests committed to this Embassy’s charge. The 19,000 communications received and sent by the Embassy in behalf of British, French, Italian, and Japanese interests during the first 17 months of the war, as well as the 21,000 communications dealt with during the same period in behalf of Austria-Hungary, in serving as a channel between this Government and the Embassies at London, Paris, Petrograd, and Tokyo, not to speak of an almost countless number of personal interviews, bear testimony to the diligence with which the interests of our fellowmen, regardless of nationality, have been cared for by this Embassy.
At the same time I must not forget that I am the accredited representative of the United States to the Government of Austria-Hungary. The care of my Government’s interests and those of its [Page 818] citizens must be my first concern, and any influence derogatory thereto must of necessity cause me the gravest concern.
It is in no spirit of complaint that I bring the foregoing to the Department’s attention, but simply that it may be advised of the conditions which exist here, and are to be found elsewhere, I assume.
Practically every note of importance received from the Austro-Hungarian Government relative to its interests in belligerent countries calls upon the Government of the United States to “urge”, “insist”, or “bring the full weight of its influence” to bear through its accredited representatives on the Government of the enemy power to insure the realization of Austria-Hungary’s demands, and does not hesitate to attribute any disappointment to the lack of energy or to actual unfriendliness on the part of the American mission especially concerned.
On the other hand, although I and all members of the Embassy staff entertain kindly sentiments towards Austria-Hungary, the almost daily communication of some desire of one or other of the enemy governments has slowly but surely caused the authorities throughout the Monarchy to come to regard us as “three-fourths enemy,” and do not fail to give expression to this opinion whenever occasion offers. Making all due allowance for the irritation which has developed as a result of the questions which have arisen between the United States and Austria-Hungary as a result of the present war, such as the ammunition protest, Ambassador Dumba’s recall, and the outcome of the Ancona incident, it is this additional handicap that we are called upon to face whenever questions purely American are to be dealt with.
The Embassy perceives this in nearly every transaction with the, local Government. But we conceal resentment of all petty shortcomings and go about our work in a manner giving no intimation of our being aware of the fact that there is a wide difference between the Government of Austria-Hungary in war time and in peace.
I have [etc.]
- Not printed.↩