Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, Supplement, The World War

File No. 763.72111D48/26

The Third Assistant Secretary (Phillips) to the Acting Secretary of State

July 19, 1916 .

Dear Mr. Polk: The British Ambassador handed me this telegram to-day, not as a protest at the Department’s decision regarding the character of the Deutschland, but merely to point out the dangers which the decision occasioned. He dwelt particularly on the fact that in future there could be no coast protection for any country; that through submarines customs could be evaded, and that henceforth espionage was made very simple, in that a submarine could land on the coast of the United States and carry on espionage work. He mentioned as a fact that the Deutschland was a naval vessel, and left a photograph which appeared in the San Francisco Call and Post of July 12, taken at Bremen, showing the Deutschland flying the German naval flag and her officers and men wearing the German naval uniform. He said that the United States decision increased the difficulties of the German blockade in that the Scandinavian countries, which have formerly refused to allow the submarines in their waters, would naturally follow the decision of the United States as to submarine merchant ships. He mentioned the embarrassment to which the United States might be subjected in the event of a war with some other power, when it found itself in a position of being unable to maintain a blockade through its own submarine decision.

Sincerely,

W. Phillips

[Enclosure—Telegram]

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Grey) to the British Ambassador at Washington (Spring Rice)

London, July 18, 1916 .

From point of view of sea power so much depends both now and in the future upon the way in which submarines are to be treated in international law that it seems impossible to leave the controversy at the stage where the United States Government are disposed to let it rest.

The first point to be established is that international law ought not to transfer without modification to submarines, rules and regulations which work fairly well as regards surface vessels. If this be once conceded we may hope to have an international code drawn up which might meet conditions of naval warfare.

It is argued that German commercial submarine carries cargo but no armament and that it should therefore be treated exactly like any other ship which carries cargo but not armament.

On this it must be observed that most formidable part of submarine, namely, its submersibility, is one of its inseparable attributes. Whatever else it carries and for whatever purpose it may nominally have been designed, it cannot divest itself of its most dangerous characteristic. If a belligerent were to use for mercantile purposes a vessel which in every respect was designed and armoured as a battle cruiser, but which carried no guns, everybody would say: “This is only colourably a merchant ship; nine-tenths of work required to convert her into a completely equipped ship of war of most formidable type has already been put into her and cannot be removed. Clearly it is as ship of war that she should be treated.”

So it is with the submarine. It is not torpedoes and torpedo tubes which make her what she is. These are weapons which may equally be possessed by a trawler. What really puts her in a class apart and makes it necessary to treat her under special rules is the indefeasible quality which she possesses of travelling under water. She bears no real resemblance to a liner which in time of war may have a few guns put into her and be turned into an auxiliary cruiser but can never be made a powerful fighting unit. The submersible cargo boat, for all her peaceful appearance, possesses and must always possess qualities which would enable her at very short notice to be converted into a fighting vessel of most formidable kind; her case is therefore exceptional and calls for exceptional treatment.

If this be denied it would seem to follow that unarmed submarines might be constructed in any number in neutral countries and then be armed by belligerent purchaser with necessary torpedo tubes. To take an example, Great Britain would then, if Germany and the United States were at war, be compelled to supply Germany with submarines to be subsequently used in destroying Anglo-American trade.