File No. 893.00/2442
Minister Reinsch to the Secretary of State
Peking, May 31, 1916.
Sir: The Nanking conference adjourned on May 27 without producing any decisive result. The conference at first passed a formal vote calling upon President Yuan to remain in office until a parliament could be assembled. In subsequent discussions, however, differences of opinion appeared and it was resolved to invite the seceded provinces to send delegates to Nanking. Upon this invitation being forwarded to them, the leaders of the revolutionaries stated that they could undertake negotiations only upon the absolute condition of the immediate resignation of Yuan Shih-kai. After some discussion of the financial and military situations, which did not reveal a great readiness or ability on the part of the provinces to come to the assistance of the Central Government, the conference adjourned. It failed to produce a definite statement of policy and added to the uncertainty of the situation.
The disorganization of the Government was further aggravated by the declaration of independence of Szechuan and Hunan; the Province of Shantung while not declaring its independence is also a great source of difficulty to the Central Government on account of the peculiar situation there.
While the Central Government has thus been losing ground, there is no indication that the secessionists are getting nearer to a unified policy of action; so that it is generally believed that should the authority of the Central Government crumble entirely there would be nothing to take its place. The constitutional action on the part of the President of resigning in favor of Vice President Li Yuan-hung would have the advantage of implying deference to constitutional forms, but it is almost certain that unless Li Yuan-hung could count on immediate and ample financial support from without, the forces of dissolution would so strongly assert themselves that the division of China could not be avoided.
As reported in former telegrams and despatches of the Legation, there has been from the beginning a constant participation of Japanese in the revolutionary movement; formally disavowed but according to all reports actively shielded by the authorities. It is not, however, clear whether the Japanese Government has already conceived a definite policy as to what to evolve out of the general disorganization and confusion which has been brought about. The only absolutely definite principle of policy seems to be that Yuan Shih-kai must be ousted at any cost. Should this be accomplished it may be taken for granted by the aggressive party in Japan that the prestige of Japan would be greatly increased and whatever successor might be selected would necessarily feel his dependence on the Japanese Government. But many of the observers of affairs here believe that it would suit the policy of Japan better still to have China divided into three or four parts; a Manchu principality comprising [Page 84] Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia under the practical suzerainty of Japan; a southern and a northern with the possible addition of a central, Chinese Republic, in which the local contrasts in China could be more fully developed. While it is at present impossible to know which of these alternatives is preferred by the Japanese and whether they have in fact formulated a definite plan with respect to the extremely complicated and difficult situation, the action which they have allowed their nationals to take in China, as well as the attitude of the banking institutions controlled by the Japanese Government in aggravating the financial embarrassment of the Chinese, indicate that an attempt will be made to utilize the confusion and helplessness of China so as to make its dependence upon Japan plain to all.
I have [etc.]