File No. 893.00/2371
Minister Reinsch to the Secretary of State
Peking, March 21, 1916.
Sir: In connection with my telegram of March 18, 8 p.m., I have the honor to enclose, for your information, copies of despatches from various consular offices in China, dealing with political conditions.1
There are also enclosed newspaper clippings of discussions on the monarchial question from the Peking Gazette of the 18th instant, on the independence of Kwangsi from the Gazette of March 18 and 20.2
The cardinal factor in the present immediate situation is that the officials of Kwangsi have sided with the revolutionists, and that the military governor of Kwangtung cannot be absolutely counted upon by the Central Government. The shrewd manner in which the Kwangsi military governor induced the Central Government to supply him with funds and ammunition before he declared himself as allied with the revolutionaries is ominous and places the Central Government in a serious dilemma. It must either, by acceding to the demands for funds and war materials on the part of the military governors, take the serious risk of supplying the revolution with means of action, or it will, through refusal to furnish such assistance, cause an immediate defection of high officials, who may be suspected of sympathies with the revolutionists. The military governor of Kwangtung, who has advised the Central Government to come to a settlement with Kwangsi, is evidently not to be relied upon with assurance by the Central Government. The situation in the Province of Hunan is also very uncertain. The current popular [Page 66] sentiment there seems to favor the revolutionists, and while the northern troops have been thus far able to hold in check the invading forces from Kweichow, there is no certainty as to how long the officials could withstand the republican movement should there be any reverses or should Kwangtung, as well as Kwangsi, join the revolutionary cause.
Just before, the announcement of the attitude of Kwangsi, the Peking Government, in view of the success of its military operations in Szechuan, was inclined to make overtures to the Yunnanese leaders, promising them participation in the Government, a liberal constitution and a cabinet, in return for submission to the Government of His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai. It is believed that there was readiness to modify the monarchical scheme to the effect of having His Excellency Yuan assume the position of emperor for life, or life-president. The action of Kwangsi cut short this attempt at a solution of the difficulties. As there are now not only the few leaders around Tsai Ao to deal with, but those of the two southernmost provinces as well, the solution at first suggested has entirely to be abandoned. There would now seem to be only one possible solution: namely, mediation on the part of the military governors of central China, especially their excellencies Feng Kuo-chang and Chu Jui, acting in conjunction with men of the standing and influence of his excellency Tuan Chi-jui, former Minister of War, and his excellency Chang Chien. Promises of liberal constitutional arrangements, even the total cancellation of the monarchical movement, probably would not save His Excellency Yuan at the present time, unless these men were to form a combination which would, on the one hand, prevail upon the southern leaders to submit, and, on the other, guarantee such promises as would be demanded from the President.
As the Chinese in all parts of the country realize the danger of foreign intervention and a civil war threatening permanent division of the country, it is probable that an intermediation such as the above would be effective. So strong, however, is the hostility toward H. E. Yuan that it will be difficult to counteract the demand for his total elimination, except upon an adequate guaranty against the resumption by him of purely personal authority.
It is generally believed that as to forms of government the population of China remains largely indifferent, and that any preference existing on the part of the upper and middle classes rather favors the monarchy; the present movement is generally understood to derive its energy from personal hostility against President Yuan.
I have [etc.]
- Not printed.↩