File No. 761.94/110
Ambassador Guthrie to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, July 18, 1916.
In compliance with the Department’s telegraphic instruction of July 13, 6 p.m., and supplementing my No. 562 of the 17th instant, I have the honor to state that the new Russo-Japanese convention as published in the Official Gazette, is but little, if anything, more than a reaffirmation of the Convention of July 4, 1910. It may afford moral support to Japan as showing Russia’s continued determination to adhere to that convention, but as officially published it does not appear to change present conditions (on the assumption that the former convention was still in force) or injuriously to affect America or American interests in the Far East.
My cable of July 16, 3 p.m. shows that the British Ambassador does not consider that British trade interests are affected.
This opinion is strengthened by the reported declaration of the Prime Minister, Marquis Okuma, that there is no intention to depart from the policy of the open door, which he made in connection with the publication of the terms of the treaty as signed.
The convention appears to contain only two clauses, in the first of which the two parties agree that neither will become a party to any “political arrangement or combination” directed against the other; and in the second they agree that in case the “territorial rights or special interests in the Far East” of one party, recognized by the other, be menaced, they will “consult” as to the measures to be taken “with a view to mutual support.”
When these articles were given out here it was rumored that Russia had agreed in principle to the transfer to Japan of about 75 miles of its railroad between Changchun and the second Sungari station, of fishing rights on the Siberian coast, and of certain rights of navigation on the Sungari River (rights granted to Russia by China), but the exact terms and conditions of the transfer had not yet been arranged and particulars were therefore withheld for the present.
We now have confidential information that these matters have been finally agreed to and the conventions signed, subject, however, to some settlement with China as to navigation rights on the Sungari River.
[Page 441]It was understood that the convention was complete in itself and that there were no secret clauses unless the additional provisions are to be so regarded; and this is now accepted as true by the Japanese press, although at first it was disposed to suggest that there were some provisions which gave Japan greater and more specific assurances of support.
Of course, there is the possibility that there was some agreed definition of what “territorial rights and special interests” were “recognized” by both parties, which might be objectionable to the United States, but I cannot get any evidence of it.
As already stated, however, the public impression is that there are no secret provisions; and it is to be observed that the convention of July 4, 1910, differs only in that it refers to the status quo as the object to be maintained, while the present one refers to rights and interests “recognized” by the two parties.
In this connection it is significant that when the articles agreed on were first given out by the Foreign Office they were numbered respectively 17 and 18, indicating that they were copied from a document containing at least eighteen paragraphs. This would seem to indicate that something more had been sought, or at least discussed, but had not been agreed to.
An agreement to “consult in regard to the measures to be taken with a view to mutual support” in case of menace to the “territorial rights or special interests” of one party “recognized” by the other, leaving both the rights to be supported and the measures to be adopted for that purpose to be determined when the menace should arise, would not seem to justify any great reliance.
The agreement is, of course, open to the interpretation that the word “recognized” refers to the treaties previously made, but if so, the first clause of the new treaty is but little more than a declaration that the parties are still satisfied with them and willing to abide by them.
Or it may be that a new convention was considered necessary in order to bring under its protection “rights and special interests” acquired since the making of the old one, especially the rights then being granted.
The Department of Agriculture and Commerce has stated that—
the section of the railroad to be transferred to Japan passes through a district devoted to the cultivation of the soya bean; that by freight discrimination the product of this district had been carried to Vladivostok, but that when Japan obtains control of the line, this will be corrected, and the traffic diverted to the South Manchuria Railway, which will be much benefited thereby.
There have been great public demonstrations here of gratification over the signing of the treaty. Some of this has, I think, been worked up for political purposes; but there is unquestionably much sincere gratification among the people.
This, I think is due to several reasons.
There has always been in the public mind an idea that, sooner or later, Russia would return to the old policy of seeking an open port on the Pacific, and of increasing its sphere of influence in North China.
There has also been a feeling that after the war Germany might seek to reestablish herself in the Far East, and a conviction that she would certainly do so, unless she were completely crushed in the war.
[Page 442]While Germany’s attempt would be dangerous to Japan standing alone, Japan and Russia united would be almost, if not entirely, impregnable.
And, finally, the imperative necessity of the British alliance to Japan’s safety in the face of these dangers was not popular.
While, in my opinion, the recent newspaper agitation against the British alliance was to some extent promoted for ulterior purposes; it must be admitted that it represents the feelings and opinions of quite an important section of the public.
From what I hear, there is no good will between the British and Japanese in China; and that feeling finds a reflex here, and is aggravated by the position of the British colonies in regard to Japanese immigration.
So long, however, as there existed any possibility of danger from both Russia and Germany, the Japanese Government felt the necessity of the alliance and loyally stood by it.
On the other hand, there was practically no commercial friction between Russia and Japan, and nothing in the relations between the peoples themselves to cause ill will.
I have [etc.]