763.72/9010½
The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 15.]
My Dear Mr. Lansing: In my letter of last week, in which I considered, first, the morale of the French Government and people as it affects their courage and determination to vigorously prosecute the war, and, second, their attitude toward the United States and its participation in the war, I took occasion to refer to these two factors as in their nature fundamental and little likely to become less favorable.
After writing you this, it occurred to me that I might very properly supplement that letter by the treating of a situation which has to do with the standing of the present Ministry, and certain conditions that have seemed of late to threaten its stability. Let me say, at the outset, however, that even the fall of the Clemenceau Ministry would by no means necessarily or with any degree of probability bring about a change which would seriously affect either the morale of France or her attitude toward us—most assuredly not the latter. Nevertheless, such a change just at this time might be unfortunate in giving encouragement to the enemy.
Since I took charge of this mission, late in the Fall of 1914, there have been five radical changes in French Ministries. Each new one succeeded the old one without any particular jar or weakening effect. However, it is undeniable that both in the Ribot and Painlevé Ministries, the seeds of their final overthrow—the last one remained in power but twenty days—were sown at the very inception of their institution when no member of any of the Socialist Groups, as had been the custom in the past, became a part thereof. This precedent was followed in the constitution of the present Ministry which has had to face, in addition, the bitter hostility of the Socialists on account of their long-time animosity toward Mr. Clemenceau himself. Only his strength with the army, and the confidence which the mass of the French people seem to place in his courage and integrity of purpose, have, thus far, been proof against both the secret and open opposition of those forces.
As stated in my last weekly telegraphic report N° 3210 of the 18th instant,73 certain complications other than what may be termed strictly political have come to exert no little influence upon public opinion. Their effect strengthen and at the same time weaken the present Government. [Page 106] I refer to the revelations growing out of the exposure of Bolo Pasha and Caillaux.
Undoubtedly the prosecution and conviction of Bolo Pasha, whose name for the past six months has stood as a synonym for corrupt intrigues and treason, has greatly popularized Clemenceau, and, for a time, the arrest of Caillaux, involving somewhat the same charges,—possibly devoid of financial corruption—added to his strength. But, apparently, reconstructing their lines of offensive, the friends of the latter, comprising substantially the whole of the Socialist Party, as well as certain other strong influences whose identity seems to remain in the background, are said to be at the present moment very active in their efforts to overthrow the Clemenceau Ministry.
Concerning the carrying out of such plans, as I intimated in my abovementioned telegram, one hears now very frequently of threatened labor troubles involving strikes in munition plants, predicted to begin in the near future. A very prominent member of the Chamber of Deputies, at the head of a great Paris newspaper, told me yesterday that such strikes were scheduled to take place on next Wednesday, the 27th. instant. You have doubtless been an interested reader of the proceedings of the Inter-Allied Labor Conferences now being held in London.
My informant told me also that a demand would be made upon the French and English Governments for passports for an International Socialist Conference—somewhat along the lines of that proposed last summer for Stockholm—; in the event of a refusal to issue passports to delegates of such a convention, the order for the strike would go forth at once. Facts are gradually coming to light of how within the past few weeks Clemenceau took most drastic steps in throttling a formidable strike in a munition factory at its very beginning. It is said that he issued an ultimatum that if the men quit work they would at once be marched to the front. Evidently they preferred the rear, for they did not strike.
The same Deputy above-quoted informed me that everybody was afraid of Clemenceau, and that his opponents in the Chamber, figuratively speaking, mentioned his name only in whispers. It would seem that the soubriquet given to him of “The Tiger” is not so inappropriate.
A humorous story was told by the same gentleman that even the President waved aside two envoys—Frenchmen—who came recently up from the Queen Mother of Spain—herself Austrian by descent but bitterly anti-German—to talk of a peace proposition. The President, with no little haste and embarrassment, referred these messengers to the Government. Later Clemenceau, hearing of the incident, had the men arrested and put under a watch near the Front.
[Page 107]As my informant is not a partisan of Clemenceau, it may be well appreciated that his comments were not intended to be those of praise.
However, the very courage and boldness of Clemenceau have attracted to him the support of the Army, and that fact alone will, in my opinion, operate as a very strong deterrent upon those who, if conditions were different, might seek to overthrow him. I have even heard it stated that the most prominent members of preceding Ministries are desirous of, if not active in bringing about the fall of his Ministry. Some of these are charged with no more serious offence than being altogether too lax in dealing with offenders like Bolo and Caillaux, after having knowledge of their intrigues. Undoubtedly, however, the resentment which they feel toward a Ministry that has brought their names into prominence in connection with such charges is very bitter.
My own observation has been that underlying the causes announced for the overthrow of all the past Ministries during my stay here may be found personal jealousies and animosities rather than differences in the governmental policies. It is indeed fortunate that the patriotism and good sense, so inherent in the mass of the French people,—as I pointed out in my previous letter—have been as a sheet anchor of strength against any harmful effects from such personal resentments of those in the various Ministries that have come and gone. Momentous consequences, even affecting the outcome of the war, might have otherwise followed.
In a later letter, pursuing the purpose to acquaint you with certain situations not liable to materially change from week to week, I shall take occasion to inform you as to some of the economic conditions existing in France—particularly in Paris—as they have to do with not only the everyday life but their effect on the prosecution of the war.
I am [etc.]
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