[Enclosure]
The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have sent by this
pouch a long letter to the President, but there were a number of
matters which I did not discuss with him, or discuss at least as
fully as they require.
The expressions in the President’s message66 and
Lloyd George’s speeches relating to Italian war-aims fell so far
short of what Italy desires and what her Government and Press have
led her people to expect that there has been a tremendous stir here
about Italy’s aims and claims, at least on the part of the people
who write and talk about such things. This has resulted in strong
currents of critical feeling about America and England, and the
propaganda which has been going on for months against England is, I
learn, now sufficiently broadened to include America also. I believe
that this is a part of the almost universal German propaganda which
covers the world, but undoubtedly a good many Italians are being
drawn in to take part in it. Happily for us, a great many Italians
have been equally aroused to resist this propaganda. These last,
however, are continually bringing to our attention the importance of
our taking some steps ourselves to countervail this anti-American,
anti-Democratic propaganda. And I agree with them fully in thinking
that it is a matter of great importance that we should set ourselves
seriously to this work. I have on a number of occasions sent
telegrams about this matter, more or less urgent, but so far I have
apparently had little success in impressing my views on whoever the
matter has been referred to at home. I suggested making an
appropriation of funds, reasonable enough one would think; for in
the beginning I suggested something like $2,500. Later I suggested
the great effect that it would have to send a Military Mission, or a
Mission of Military Observers to the Italian Front. The response was
a suggestion of sending a distinguished newspaper or war
correspondent just made into a Reserve Captain to represent America
where all the other Allies were represented by trained military men
in Commissions of
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from six
to a dozen members each with Generals, or at least Colonels at their
head. This was far worse than nothing, and would undoubtedly have
been considered by the people here as a slight and possibly an
intentional slight. The absence of a Mission of Military Observers
here is often commented on, though naturally not to me, by Italians
who say they have enrolled a greater number of men to their
population than France has done; that they have lost over a million
men; that they have until just recently borne a greater weight
thrown against them per kilometer of front without any assistance
whatever than any other of the Allies; that they have suffered more
than any of the Western Allies in privation, and as much in battle
losses.
A great part of this is true. The Italian people have suffered and
are suffering tremendously. Moreover, another claim which they put
forward insistently is well-founded: that Italy’s front is as
important to the Allied cause as the French front; that if Italy’s
front should be broken and Italy forced to make peace France would
be lost as definitely as if the French front were forced. Now the
security of Italy’s front rests upon first her troops at the front,
and secondly the endurance of her people, and it is this endurance
which the propaganda to which I have alluded above is addressed on
the part of the Germans and of those Italians who allow themselves
to be used in this German propaganda. The military situation appears
for the present to be very good, although I understand the
propaganda is again working to some extent even in the trenches. The
dangerous point is the failure to meet the economic situation in
Italy with sufficient food supplies, coal supplies and other
supplies of the necessaries of life.
I have sent you by this mail a letter written by David Lubin,67 the
American Representative at the International Institute of
Agriculture, giving the views of a number of important Italian
public men on this point, and I commend those views to serious
consideration. The number of men at present under arms in Italy, is
I believe somewhat exaggerated, though I learn that Italy has
enrolled about 4,300,000 men of which she has lost about a million,
one half of them, about, being prisoners in Austria. But the main
facts stated by these men is the importance of saving Italy to the
Allied cause. And whatever may be said of certain elements who are
against Democracy and who are at heart more friendly to Germany, if
reports are to be believed, than they are to America, the Italians
at large beginning with the King and concluding with the great body
of the plain
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people are
believers in Liberty. And it is to stand by them and to overthrow
those who are carrying on the German propaganda that we should take
effective steps, the most effective in our power.
The declaration of war against Austria was a tremendous stimulus
here. There was an element undoubtedly which was far from wishing us
to take this step and which has resented our doing so, but the
Italian people and many of their best leaders know what it has done
for Italy, however the press may be engaged at present in fomenting
criticism of us because the President did not go further in his
message, and announced that Italy ought to have all her Government
has claimed. The sending of troops here would be the greatest
propaganda that could be started. Even a small number of troops with
the flag would count for much. But undoubtedly there would be
expectations that that small number would ultimately be increased. I
could not tell you how many men have said to me personally what I
have heard several say in public speeches: If America would only
send her flag—her starry flag it would be a symbol not only to Italy
but to the world that America recognizes that Italy is fighting for
freedom, for Liberty and has the same ideals that America has.
Believe me, Mr. Secretary, it would have an immense moral effect. It
would have an immense effect not only for the present and while the
war lasts,—but for years to come.
I know the difficulties that stand in the way of sending troops here,
but it is well worth all the trouble. It will bind Italy to America
in a way that nothing else on earth will.
Meantime, I ought to have the means placed in my hands to carry on a
reasonable propaganda here in Italy to show the Italians what
America and Americans are doing for Italy. We are doing it and it is
now [not] known as it should be known. The
other Allies are engaged in pressing upon the attention of the
Italians what they are doing for them. We have no means here of
showing what we are doing, and about all they know is that we are
lending them money, selling them supplies by no means as much as
they need, or think their due proportion, and helping the other
Allies with everything including armies.
I urge you to have this matter given the most serious consideration.
No money could be spent which would bring so rich a return. There
are many more things which I would like to write you about, but for
the present I forbear.
Believe me [etc.]
