763.72119/1265½a
The Secretary of State to President Wilson
My Dear Mr. President: I presume you have read the telegrams from Rome indicating a measure of dissatisfaction or at least of disappointment on the part of the Italian Government and people with the statement in your address of January 8th61 relative to Italy and presumably the statement in regard to Austria-Hungary. The point which the Italians seem to make is that if their frontiers are to be rectified only on the basis of nationality, they will be as vulnerable to attack from Austria-Hungary as they have been in the past. That is, the Adriatic Question will remain unsettled and will compel the nation to continue its present policy of defense.
[Page 90]There is no doubt but that Italy’s position in the Adriatic is more or less precarious and that it is one which the Italian Government seeks to make more stable in the final peace. The Italian coast is low-lying and without harbors. It offers no opportunities for naval bases from which to operate. On the other hand, the opposite coast is indented with numerous inlets and ports. As a consequence the Italian shores are difficult of defense and control of the Adriatic lies to a very considerable degree with the power possessing the eastern shores of the sea.
Manifestly an adjustment of the Italian frontiers along lines of nationality will in no way cure this situation or make Italy’s position more secure than it is at present. I think that this is the ground for Italian dissatisfaction, and it is not entirely without justification.
While, as you know, I am strongly inclined to nationality as the basis for territorial limits I believe that it cannot be invariably adopted, but that in certain cases physical boundaries and strategic boundaries must be considered and modify boundaries based on nationality. These will constitute exceptions to the general rule but will be very few in number.
I mention this at the present time because I fear that if Italy gains the impression that she is not to strengthen her position in the Adriatic, the Italian people will become discouraged and feel that the war has no actual interest for them, that they will be disposed to make peace provided the Germans and Austrians retire from Italian territory, and that they will consider themselves to have been abandoned by this country and the Allies. With the present political situation in Italy and the depression following their military reverses such an impression would be most unfortunate and might be disastrous.
Do you not think that something could be done to restore Italian confidence that a satisfactory settlement of the Adriatic Question will be made at the peace conference? If anything can be done it seems to me it ought to be done without delay.
Faithfully yours,