Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, Volume II

763.72119/1265½

The Representative of the Polish National Committee (Paderewski) to the Assistant to the Counselor for the Department of State (Auchincloss)

New York, January 25, 1918 .

My Dear Mr. Auchincloss: I beg to apologize for the delay in preparing the enclosed memorandum.

The problem of our army is a vital one and its speedy and favorable solution is the more urgently needed, as the French officers, interested in the affair, are getting rather impatient. I sincerely hope that after having so kindly taken charge of the Polish question, you will make of it a brilliant personal success.

Thanking you most warmly for the generous interest in the cause of our national revival, I beg to remain

Very sincerely yours,

I. J. Paderewski

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Representative of the Polish National Committee (Paderewski)

Recognizing the political and strategic necessity of a Polish national fighting force on the side of the Allies, on the Western front, the French Government issued a decree, dated June 5, 1917, signed by President Poincaré, calling to life an Autonomous Polish National Army in France. In August last, a special Franco-Polish Military Mission arrived in this country for the purpose of recruiting volunteers from among the Polish residents of the United States, and started at once an active propaganda. The Polish residents, however, though desirous of fighting for the independence of their State, as proclaimed by the President, the Polish residents, led by absolute loyalty to this Government, wanted to know, before enlisting, what would be the attitude of the Administration towards this scheme. A Polish Military Commission was appointed by the National Department in Chicago, the leading political Polish organization in America, and steps were taken in order to obtain official information about, and approval of the plan.

On October 6, 1917, the War Department authorized the following:

“It has been brought to the attention of the War Department that the Military Commission of the National Department of the Polish Central Relief Committee, located in Chicago, Illinois, intends to start, on October 7, 1917, an active campaign for recruiting for the Polish Army now engaged in fighting on the Western front in France.

The War Department has been advised that no individual of Polish nationality resident in the United States, who is in any way subject to the draft, will be accepted as a recruit by this Military Commission, and that special care will be taken not to recruit any man whose family would be left without means of support.

Having in mind the attitude of this Government toward a United and independent Poland the War Department is glad to announce that it is entirely in accord with the proposed plans of this Military Commission and that the Department trusts that this recruiting campaign, looking to the strengthening of the Polish army already fighting in association with the armies now in France, will be a success.”

On October 7, 1917, recruiting offices in various centers were opened—their number being now forty-one—and the enlistment had begun. Up to this moment 10,200 volunteers have joined the Polish army.

Considering the tenor of the statement of the War Department, which positively excludes from recruiting all the non-naturalized Poles subject to the draft, and recommends not to accept any man supporting his family, the results, so far obtained are truly remarkable. The French authorities, however, who have spent large sums of money for recruiting purposes, do not consider the number of enlisted men as satisfactory. If the restrictions mentioned in the statement of the War Department are not removed or modified, the recruiting will be undoubtedly discontinued. From the military point of view this would be regrettable, as the Poles are generally regarded as the best fighting material in the world. Indeed, the volunteers already enlisted, after only a fortnight of training, in their camp at Niagara-on-the-Lake, Canada, have been declared by the examining Canadian and French officers as “troupes d’élite”, comparable solely to the best French soldiers from the Department du Nord.

Furthermore the abandonment of the idea of a Polish National Army fighting for the Allies’ cause, which has already attracted so much attention and excited so much interest, would be exploited by the enemy as another failure of the Entente powers, and its effect upon the morale of the Polish people and soldiers still willing to fight on the Russian front would be most depressing.

According to recent reports there are at Bobruysk, Province of Minsk, over 80,000 Polish soldiers, perfectly disciplined, under the command of General Dowbor-Musnicki, thus forming the nucleus of a large Polish army whose possibilities should not be underestimated. General Rampon is supposed to be at Bobruysk as the representative of France at General Dowbor-Musnicki’s head-quarters.

Certain attention should be given to these important facts.

II

The idea of a Polish army in the United States as submitted to the Administration at the very beginning of America’s entrance into the war, was not due to the desire of creating a nationalistic movement in this country, but, to the firm belief that a large homogeneous and consequently efficient military force, could effectively assist the United States in winning her noble cause and, eventually, contribute to the re-establishment of an independent Polish State.

To win a war means efficiency. There cannot be absolute efficiency in an army where there is a lack of comprehension between soldiers and officers, or among the soldiers themselves.

Ever since the entrance of the United States into the war, volunteers have been flocking to the recruiting offices. The Polish boys who were so eager to show their loyalty to this noble country, as well as those, who, desirous of an immediate success, were equally eager to enlist them, did not realize that they were adding to the perplexity of the commanders and instructing officers.

The number of Polish boys who had arrived in this country shortly before the war, and who do not understand or know English well, is extremely large. Some cantonments contain from thirty to forty per cent of them. In a militaristic empire possessing numerous cadres, this would not much matter. Divided into small detachments, spread over some 400 or 500 regiments, these foreign-born soldiers would be quickly and automatically assimilated. But in this pacific Republic, whose regular army has so far consisted of about one twentieth of the number of Polish soldiers already wounded or killed on European battlefields, the presence of such a numerous linguistically foreign element in the training camps is certainly a drawback, retarding the speedy formation of a fighting force so urgently needed. It increases considerably the labor of the instructing officers; it makes them impatient and nervous, causing in some cases, inevitable severity, resulting always in humiliation. Besides, it creates something incompatible with lofty principles of this country, something utterly undemocratic, for it establishes two different classes of soldiers; a privileged one, made up of those who understand, and one, made up of those who do not understand. This is manifestly to the detriment of the spirit of unity among the fighters, especially as the Polish volunteers, assigned in many cases, to kitchen police and other menial duties are too frequently ridiculed by their fellow-soldiers.

Evidences of the facts above mentioned have been gathered not only from private informations and numerous complaints, but also frankly acknowledged by distinguished American officers and even confirmed by a high authority.

Considering:

A—That a separate Polish National Army is a recognized political and strategic necessity;

B—That the superior value of Polish fighting material is generally admitted;

C—That the Polish soldiers are imbued with a distinct ideal, as they know that the existence of their ancestral country; is at stake, while it is still extremely difficult to explain to an average American, why he has to risk his life for the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine or for the independence of Montenegro;

D—That at this grave moment everything causing embarrassment, obstructing speedy progress of preparedness, impeding efficiency of the army, should be removed without delay;

It seems indispensable that all the Poles not speaking English should be united into one body, protected by the United States Government. As to the definite solution of this problem it is respectfully suggested that:

(1) Either the Polish soldiers not knowing enough English, already in the American army, as well as those subject to the forthcoming draft, should be incorporated in the Polish army in France, provided that the French Government would establish a statute for that “Autonomous Army” and not apply to it the regulations of the foreign legion.

(2) Or all the Polish soldiers, non-speaking English should be put together as a separate unit and submitted to the exclusive control of the United States Government.

In both instances the bringing over here from Russia of 400 to 500 experienced Polish officers, as promised already by the Russian General Staff, would be imperatively needed.

The Poles fighting for the independence of their State will also fight for the American ideals and they believe to be entitled to ask this generous country for aid and protection.