Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, Volume I

763.72/1793a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

Washington, May 17, 1915.

My Dear Mr. President: As you will not return until Wednesday morning⁷⁰ I think I ought to let you know at once of a conversation which I had this morning with Ambassador Dumba, of Austria. I am therefore sending this by special messenger.

The Ambassador first expressed appreciation of your letter to the Czar⁷¹ and then asked me to say to you that he would be pleased to give you any assistance he could in the negotiations with Germany. He said he knew that Germany had no desire for war but, on the contrary, was anxious to maintain friendly relations with the United States and asked whether if assurances were given for the future it would not be possible to arbitrate the question so far as past transactions are concerned. I told him I would not feel authorized to discuss the subject without first getting your views, but suggested that he might say to the German Government that he felt sure there was no desire for war in this country and that we expected Germany to answer the note in the same spirit of friendship that prompted ours. He then suggested it might make it easier for Germany if she could, in her reply, say that she expected us to insist in the same spirit upon freedom of trade with neutrals. I pointed out to him that such an expression in the answer might embarrass us and also make it more difficult to deal with the Allies along that line and that I thought Germany ought to assume that we would live up to the position taken in our answer to the Orders in Council. He asked whether we could give any confidential assurances of that kind and I told him it ought not to be necessary and suggested to him that if Germany desired to justify, before her own people, her acceptance of the doctrine set forth in our note she could publish her views in a statement—not to us but to the German people, and say that she took it for granted that we would maintain the position taken in that statement and would insist upon our right to trade with neutrals. I told him if this statement was made to the German people instead of to us it would not require any answer from us and would not embarrass us, but if her answer contained any expression of opinion as to how we would deal with Great Britain it would seemingly link the two cases together and put us in the attitude of acting at Germany’s suggestion instead of acting upon our own initiative and for the protection of our own interests, and it might also be construed as a sort of trade, whereby we would settle an account with Germany by opening an account with the Allies.

He saw the force of the objection. I emphasized the two points—first that it was important that Germany should answer in the same spirit in which we had addressed her; and second, that there should be no attempted connection between our dealings with Germany and our dealings with Great Britain.

He asked whether we could not refuse clearance to ships that carried explosives and ammunition. He said that in Germany passenger trains were not allowed to carry explosives and that the regulation was made for the protection of the lives of passengers; he suggested we might, on the same ground, refuse to allow shipowners to carry explosives on passenger boats. I told him that Germany was, of course, at liberty to make any suggestions that she thought proper in her reply, but that we could not consider these suggestions in advance.

I think the call of the Ambassador was rather significant especially as I learned from Villard that he had received some of the same suggestions from von Bernstorff. I believe it would have a splendid effect if our note to Great Britain can go at once. It will give Germany an excuse and I think she is looking for something that will serve as an excuse. There is much discussion of the idea suggested by Dumba—in fact mentioned in the first explanation received from Germany, namely—that passengers and ammunition should not travel together. I have no doubt Germany would be willing to so change the rule in regard to submarines as to exempt from danger all passenger ships that did not carry munitions of war.

I am also enclosing a statement from Page.⁷² The closing sentence is interesting. Am glad to note that it will not take a generation to regain the respect with the loss of which we were threatened.⁷³

With assurances [etc.]

W. J. Bryan

P. S. The bearer of this letter—Mr. Yardley—will bring it to the Mayflower tonight and await instructions from you. If you have any answer to send back tonight he will return on the twelve-thirty train—if not, he will return early tomorrow afternoon. If you do not send an answer tonight but desire to send one tomorrow you can instruct him whether he is to call at the Mayflower for it or whether you can send it to the Holland House, Fifth Avenue near 28th street where he will stop.

70. President Wilson was in New York City.
71. Foreign Relations, 1915, supp., p. 1013.
72. Telegram No. 2104, May 16, 1915, from the Ambassador in Great Britain, Foreign Relations, 1915, supp., p. 397.
73. The reference is to Ambassador Page’s statement in his telegram of May 11, 1915, ibid., p. 391.