Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, Volume I

763.72/1772½

The Counselor for the Department of State (Lansing) to President Wilson

[Washington,] May 17, 1915.

Dear Mr. President: In compliance with the request contained in your note of the 12th instant⁶⁶ to the Secretary of State asking for copies of the suggestions as to alternative courses of action made in my letter to the Secretary on the 10th,⁶⁷ it seemed to me better to repeat them in a more detailed form.

The suggestions apply to possible action in the event Germany refuses to comply with the demands made upon her.

First. Diplomatic relations could be severed by the withdrawal of our Ambassador. The natural course would be for the German Government to recall Count Bernstorff or at least to direct him to leave Washington and cease to communicate with this Government.

This action would not necessarily mean war. It might mean that this Government is unwilling to continue intercourse with the German Government because it has grievously offended against the principles of international law and humanity affecting American citizens and has refused to rectify the offense by making proper amends and giving proper assurances. It is an evidence of extreme displeasure but is not in itself a hostile act.

For this method of emphasizing a protest or demand there are several precedents, one of the most recent being the withdrawal of Baron Fava because of the failure of our Government to take steps to punish those persons guilty of lynching Italians at New Orleans and to pay a satisfactory indemnity.⁶⁸

The severance of diplomatic relations may, however, be interpreted as an evidence of hostile purpose. As the interpretation of the course of action in this case would lie largely with Germany, it is necessary in taking this step to consider the present temper of the German Government. My own belief is that it would be viewed by them as unfriendly, if not hostile, and that they might consider it to be a practical declaration of war.

Second. The alternative course of action would be to approach the other neutral powers particularly affected by the submarine war, namely, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, as to the sending of identic notes to both Germany and Great Britain protesting vigorously against the disregard shown of neutral rights on the high seas and asserting that, unless ample assurances were given that these rights would be respected, the neutral nations would consider what joint action they should take to protect their citizens on the high seas in the enjoyment of their rights.

If this course of action should be decided upon, I think that as a preliminary step an immediate representation should be made to Great Britain pointing out the failure of the British Government to act in accord with Sir Edward Grey’s assurances of consideration for neutral rights given in his note of March 15th.⁶⁹ By doing this the disregard of Germany for law and humanity and of Great Britain for law would form substantial grounds for joint protest and, if necessary, for joint action. It would furthermore indicate entire impartiality toward the belligerents and show that the neutrals sought to secure the freedom of the seas for their people, whichever belligerent invaded their rights.

A copy of this letter has been given to the Secretary of State.

I am [etc.]

Robert Lansing

66. See footnote 37, p. 389.
67. Ante, p. 391.
68. See Foreign Relations, 1891, pp. 675, 712.
69. Foreign Relations, 1915, supp., p. 143.