File No. 839.00/714.]
The American Minister and the Special Commissioners to the Secretary of State.
Bogotá, November 20, 1912.
[Telegram sent from Santo Domingo November 13 to Bogotá; transmitted from Bogotá November 20 by the American Chargé d’Affaires there; received at Washington November 22.—Paraphrase.]
The following telegram received today:
American Legation, Santo Domingo, November 13, 1912. The Commissioners returned from the north November 10, and desire to lay before the Department the following report, in which I concur:
[Page 374]In regard to the possibility of obtaining a peaceable settlement, the Commissioners are convinced that it is unfortunately most remote, owing to the fact that the Government, now thoroughly discredited and wholly unable longer to withstand the rebels unless materially assisted, desires to hold on to its present lucrative position as long as possible at any cost. On the other hand, the revolution, now stronger than ever and confident of ultimate success, is disinclined to make any terms with the Government.
The Department has already been informed of the financial embarrassment of the Dominican Republic. Upon the arrival of the Commissioners, Michelena had been making daily advances, and he consulted the Commissioners as to the advisability of making further advances. The Commissioners assumed the responsibility of saying to him that if he desired to continue assisting the Government during these negotiations, they would recommend that such sums in excess of the Government’s share of the customs receipts as he might advance be repaid to him upon final settlement, it being understood that previous advances were not included in the recommendation. But Michelena has now been notified that the Commissioners will not recommend any further advances. If he refuses to make any it is doubtful that the Government can obtain money elsewhere.
Subsequent to the note addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the first proposed solution was arrived at, which has been reported already to the Department. In exchange for the promise of this reform the Commissioners agreed to recommend the advances of money heretofore outlined, and had the reform been immediately and sincerely carried out the situation would probably have been cured. But the Government has not complied with its agreements nor, in the opinion of the Commissioners, even made any endeavor to do so, evidently satisfied that the announcement of the reforms, accompanied as they were by notorious public acts contradictory thereto, would be ineffective for producing peace. Therefore the President announced his willingness to resign and sent the Archbishop1 with full powers to negotiate with Vásquez; to his proposals Vásquez made counterproposals, which the Government rejected. The Commissioners were not parties to these negotiations.
On November 12 the President informed the Commissioners that he would not consent to complete removal of Alfredo from office and authority, and there is reason to believe that Alfredo wrote his friends that his removal was but temporary.
Rebels now have possession of Sánchez and Samaná, and points along the railway from Sánchez to Salcedo Crossing near La Vega; they now permit the operation of trains. Their forces are estimated from 700 to 1,500 and are better armed than elsewhere. Rebels in large numbers are reported gathered near La Vega, Santiago and San Francisco Macoris. Puerto Plata and Monte Cristi are besieged, water and market supplies cut off, and the Government restricted to the city limits. The Government, in fact, exercises no functions except within the towns and forts. In the south the rebels are daily attacking Barahona, so actively that the Government can not maintain a customs official there. At Samaná Bay the Government can not prevent contraband from vessels there, for the rebels [Page 375] are not only in control of the neighborhood but have possession of the revenue cutter, which increases the possibility of contraband. At Puerto Plata and Sánchez the merchandise consigned to the larger inland cities, now cut off, fills to overflowing the customs warehouses. Merchants at these inland cities can not send money to pay the duty, representing many thousands of dollars to the receivership.
The revolutionary leaders are of such a character that their entrance into power would not in the least benefit conditions. Should the revolution succeed, an attempt would immediately be made to reimburse the amounts spent by its promoters in New York, and to repay advances made by merchants at Sánchez and elsewhere.
The efforts of the President through the Legation and the Commission to bring about peace has started every intelligent Dominican to cooperate, except those profiting by the disturbed conditions. This work is often at cross purposes and not wholly disinterested, but may possibly bring results. And a solution by efforts of the people is much to be preferred to suggestions from the outside. The Archbishop, the members of Congress in the city (a small majority) and private persons are working for peace.
The Commissioners told the Dominican President that they much regretted to conclude that they were unable to assist in the restoration of order owing to what they believed to be the Government’s failure to keep its agreements. Whether the Government is absolutely faithless in its announced intention to resign (if paymasters require) should be certain by November 20th.
If the Government should resign and be succeeded, as it would be, apparently, by a good president, it is recommended:
- 1.
- That the Government be assisted to establish peace by placing it in possession of the customs houses in the hands of the rebels, and by preventing the rebels from operating within five miles of seaport customs houses;
- 2.
- That it should be assisted financially to the extent proffered to the present Government, money to be secured by a loan conditioned on approval of all disbursements by an auditor and a financial adviser designated by the United States;
- 3.
- That the rebels be formally notified that they will not be recognized if the Government is overturned by force.
It is believed that action would be necessary only under the second heading.
If on November 20 the present Government is still in power and the insurrection continues, it is recommended:
- First. That the Government be advised that in view of its misappropriation of approximately $400,000 of public works funds obtained under the Convention, and in view of its contracting obligations in violation of the Convention to such an extent as to make impossible of execution any arrangement on its part to replace misapplied funds, the United States will direct the General Receiver no longer to pay the Government any part of the customs house receipts.
- Second. That the Department of State announce that any money advanced the Government will be regarded as creating a condition of affairs in violation of the Convention.
- Third. That any money advanced to rebels will be regarded as gifts to them.
- Fourth. That rebels be formally notified that they will not be recognized if the Government is overturned by force.
On or before November 20 the Prairie, with the marines not transferred to other ships, should be withdrawn to Guantánamo, and at least three additional gunboats sent, so as to cover every seaport of entry.
The Commissioners believe that it is not worth while to reestablish the customs houses on the Haitien frontier until the restoration of peace, when it will be easy.
- Russell.
- McIntyre.
- Doyle.
- The Archbishop of Santo Domingo, Monseñor Adolfo Nouel↩