File No. 437.00/27.
In case the Department desires me to comply with Sr. Sanguily’s request
for cooperation, I venture to urge that I be given specific instructions
as to the character and extent of the action to be taken by me, and
particularly as to how far I should go in advising this
[Page 278]
Government in regard to the essential
questions now being considered: whether or not it shall accede to the
demand of the three powers that the claims be submitted to
arbitration.
I may add that the representatives of the three interested powers are
insistently pressing for an early decision and that their notes on the
subject are couched in peremptory and impatient terms.
[Inclosure 1.—Translation.—Extract.]
Personal letter from the Cuban
Secretary of State to the American
Minister.
Habana,
February 9, 1912.
My dear Mr. Minister: Only because
reluctant to detain you I did not draw your attention this morning
to a matter of great importance to this country; but now I have
decided to consult you in the hope that, if there is no objection,
you will assist me either with your valued counsel or in any other
way, for I am confident that in any event your cooperation will be
very effective, not to say decisive.
You will no doubt have heard through the noisy press of Habana * * *
about the commotion among men of influence and nearly the entire
Congress, brought about by the-well-known matter of the claims of
France, England and Germany against Cuba on behalf of subjects of
those nations for damages which they allege to have suffered during
the war of 1895–98. As far back as 1903 the representatives of these
nations began steps to procure from Cuba money indemnities on the
strength of those claims, which implied that in their judgment Cuba
was under obligation to pay them. Various notes upon this point were
exchanged between the respective representatives and the Department
of State in which reasons were adduced on both sides. The
controversy remained in suspense throughout the period of the second
intervention of the United States, but it was renewed in 1910, and
since then as before we have, naturally, invariably maintained both
orally and in writing the illegality and impropriety of the
demands.
In this connection it is to be noted that now, as from the beginning,
the situation is an anomalous one in that the aliens who claim to
have suffered damages did not apply to the Cuban authorities to
enforce their supposed rights, but from the beginning leaned upon
their respective Governments and, disregarding such means and
recourses as might be open to them through our laws and courts, have
intrenched themselves in the diplomacy of powerful nations, while
Cubans who, like those aliens, suffered damages in the war have not
been indemnified and, even if they had filed claims therefor, would
lack the enormous advantage which those aliens have procured through
their appeal to diplomacy.
Prior to the “August Revolution” (1906) the official representatives
of the three powers acted—although in mutual accord, as was natural
in view of their identity of purpose—severally; but from 1910 on they have been acting jointly. On April 19, 1910, the diplomatic
representatives of Germany, England and France came in a body to the
Department, the French representative acting as spokesman. He told
me that they had already waited too long for the decision of the
Cuban Government in respect of the claims filed as far back as 1903,
and that if those claims should not receive proper attention they
would be compelled to follow instructions which the three had
received of identical tenor, which would surely result greatly to
the prejudice of the Republic. Wherefore, confident that they would
be heard and heeded, they had agreed to suspend the execution of
those instructions, principally “out of personal consideration for
the Secretary of State”, because they expected that through him the
matter would be settled without great delay and in conformity with
what they considered to be justice, that is (I suppose) in
conformity with the demands of claimants. The representative of
Germany added emphatically that the powers which the three ministers
represented would no longer tolerate Cuban opposition to their
demands with “un fin de non recevoir”.
[Page 279]
As the situation had become clouded and aggravated for my country,
and as I continued, like my predecessors in this Department, to
regard the claims as unfounded and illegal, I endeavored to protract
the matter in spite of their more or less veiled threats.
Fortunately, in November, 1910, the President of the Republic honored
me, together with General Monteagudo, with a commission to pay his
respects to the President of the United States upon his arrival at
Guantánamo Bay. And here, my dear Mr. Minister, I must be perfectly
frank and explicit with you, for from that visit has been derived
everything that happened later in connection with the foreign
claims, and the little that then transpired is in my judgment the
explanation and also, as I contend, the justification of my attitude
and of the course which from that time on the negotiations took.
It seemed to me both expedient and necessary to inform the President
of the United States that there were European claims pending against
Cuba, and I even believed it to be my duty to warn him as discreetly
as I knew how that the new phase in which these claims were brought
to our consideration was disquieting for Cuba on account of certain
threats which the three ministers had conveyed, as above stated.
I gathered the impression that the President of the United States
thought that in this matter right was not on the side of the
claimants. The President told me that he would take up the matter
with Secretary Knox, and I even think that I understood him to say
that the result of his conference with. Secretary Knox would be made
known to me through the Minister of the United States at Habana.
After some time had elapsed without my receiving any word from
Washington, I orally requested Mr. Jackson to ask that I be made
acquainted with the all-important views of the American Government.
Mr. Jackson promised me to convey my request by the means at his
disposal; but time flew on and I was at a loss to find an effective
and decorous means of protracting the business. To this end I had a
few interviews with the European ministers, at times jointly and at
other times individually; I offered to commit the examination of the
claims, from the point of view discussed by both parties, to some
competent jurist; and I went so far as to indicate to them the
probability that pursuant of the First Transient Provision of our
Constitution1 I should recommend to the
President of the Republic that he place the matter in the hands of
the Congress for examination and final action.
But, as the summer drew on and the foreign ministers began to leave
the country, it seemed to me profitable and prudent to consult
certain influential persons competent to deal with the question by
reason of their knowledge and experience in public life; and while
conferring with them on the 9th of June last year I was told that
the Minister of the United States had arrived and was awaiting me in
the next room. I interrupted the interview immediately, begging the
gentlemen present to wait for me a little while, because I wished to
receive the minister at once. The minister had in his hand and
showed me a paper containing the substance of a telegram which he
had just received from his Government.2 In that telegram
he was informed that the Ambassadors of France, England and Germany,
having complained to the American Government of the tardiness of
Cuba in respect of the claims which had on behalf of their subjects
been filed since 1903, the Secretary of State, or perhaps the
President himself (I do not now recall the exact terms of the
instruction which Mr. Jackson allowed me to read), had begged them not to bring pressure to bear
upon this Republic, in view of the possible effect upon Cuban
finances; but at the same time he advised us to endeavor to settle
the pending conflict by arbitration, not only for our own
convenience but because that method was in harmony with the ideas
and policy of the United States. I cannot after so many months vouch
for the accuracy of my memory in respect of the ideas expressed in
that instruction, which I read but once in the memorandum; for
although I asked him to leave the memorandum with me Mr. Jackson
[Page 280]
declined (courteously, as
always) to do so, on the ground that I had dealt with him thus far
only orally and he could consequently go no further than to allow me
to read his instructions; but he nevertheless authorized me to
communicate them to the gentlemen in the next room.
I did so, and the general agreement was that we should not now
hesitate to accept arbitration; and it is noteworthy that on July 3
the Legations of France, Germany and England should have presented
to this Department a note verbale proposing “the institution of a
tribunal of arbitration or a special international commission” to
examine the claims of their subjects and pass upon their
admissibility and amount.
In view of the foregoing—the impression which I gathered from the
President of the United States that it was his belief that Cuba was
not under obligation to answer for damages suffered by foreigners
during the war of independence; the recommendation contained in Mr.
Jackson’s memorandum; and the almost unanimous opinion expressed in
consequence thereof by the gentlemen assembled in this Department on
June 9, 1911—I became persuaded that if I resorted to arbitration no
one could offer better guaranties for Cuba than the President of the
United States himself. And accordingly, on the same day on which I
received the note of the powers proposing the institution of a
tribunal or commission, I sent cable instructions to our Minister at
Washington to inquire whether President Taft would consent to act as
arbitrator1; and the Minister replied July 6 that the
President would consent if the claimant Governments should jointly
with that of Cuba submit the question to his arbitrament.2 As I did not even suspect that the powers
would refuse this solution, I addressed them a note on July 10
accepting in principle the proposition of arbitration, but
requesting them at the same time to accept the idea of appointing as
arbitrator the Honorable William H. Taft, President of the United
States. Contrary to what I had anticipated, on August 9 they handed
me a collective note stating that the Republic would be notified
later of the proposals of the powers regarding the organization of
the arbitration; and at the same time they told me orally that the
Governments in interest, “by reason of the importance of the
decision”, thought that “arbitration should be confided to a
commission in which the powers were represented “and that therefore
they “could not think of committing the question to a single
arbitrator however great his high authority”.
To that note, as also to the oral statement, I replied on August 12
that as the powers had indicated that they would propose the
organization of the arbitration when I in my note had reserved the
determination of the points to be arbitrated, and as the powers had
likewise rejected my other proposal to commit the matter to a single
arbitrator, I regarded it as my duty to say that the Government of
the Republic considered itself free from the obligation which they
attributed to it and which might have been based upon its acceptance
in principle of the proposal for arbitration. But as the French
Chargé d’Affaires asked me to await, before making public this
statement, the amplification which they would make in regard to this
question, in order to please him I waited until I received some time
later3 a
memorandum in which the powers jointly submitted to the
consideration of the Cuban Government detailed proposals for
proceeding by arbitration to the settlement of the pending
claims.
In the meantime I learned that the President of the United States
declined the office of arbitrator which had been proffered him.4 I do not now exactly recall through what
channel this information reached me, but I am sure that it was
alleged that the reason for the declination was the fear of the
President of the United States to arbitrate a case in which he might
have to act in the dual capacity of judge and party, because among
the claimants for damages suffered during the Cuban revolution some
American citizens might appear. And here I wish to say that if I
greatly regretted that the President of the United States should, in
our then very serious situation, excuse himself, it caused me far
greater surprise to learn that the reason invoked was the
possibility that American citizens might, like the Europeans, bring
claims against Cuba for damages suffered during the war of 1895,
when it is clear and conclusive that, without reference to the cause
of damages—as shown by the protocols of the Paris conferences5—the United States undertook and bound itself to
[Page 281]
answer for the claims of
American citizens and to pay such as should be proved just and
proper.
Following the receipt of the collective memorandum to which I have
just referred, I had several conferences with capable and learned
men both in my office and in the Senate; and as the number of the
conferees was small and all of them did not concur in submitting the
question to arbitration, I proposed to the President of the Republic
that he should convene in the Palace a larger number, chosen from
among the various committees of Congress and lawyers and politicians
of repute. This conference, attended by over fifty men so chosen,
took place on the 30th of last month, although unfortunately without
any practical outcome whatever. * * * Notwithstanding the danger and
delicacy of our situation opinion is divided; some think that we
should resolutely embrace arbitration while others oppose this
procedure. * * * On the one hand difficulties appear and dangers
arise; on the other hand the First Transient Provision of the
Constitution, if not debarring aliens from pressing their claims,
prevents the Cuban Government from taking any attitude contrary to
its precepts; for which reasons I would not even venture to advise
the President of the Republic to take any action that, with the
dissent of the people, might be productive of far-reaching
liabilities.
In a situation which I can well say is embarrassing, I appeal to you,
for I am sure that if at any time the United States can, in
protection of justice, mediate between strong nations and a weak
people which is its grateful and loyal friend, now is the time when
it would be most appropriate and necessary. I believe that if the
Platt Amendment and the treaty in which it was embodied give the
United States the right to intervene in our country in certain
circumstances, those instruments likewise particularly impose upon
it the obligation to defend us when those who are stronger than us
menace us for reasons that are opinionable and debatable. Will you
permit me to remark that inasmuch as the moral authority of the
United States in respect of Cuba—which is so great in the eyes of
every country in the world—can be exercised in cases that heap
humiliation on us, it should in just compensation be exercised above
all when, as now, the occasion offers to do it to our benefit and
for our guaranty?
I have [etc.]
