File No. 837.00/731.
The American Minister to the Secretary of State.
Habana, June 6, 1912.
Sir: Referring to previous correspondence in regard to the present negro uprising in Cuba, I have the honor to submit the following observations for such consideration as the Department may deem appropriate:
While the situation is very serious and rapidly tending toward a condition which will render intervention inevitable, it seems to me that there is still an opportunity for the adoption of a policy or line of action which might result in a better state of affairs.
It has been my understanding that you earnestly desired to avoid another intervention in Cuba, and I have, therefore, labored constantly to that end since I have been here, under the conviction that intervention, occupation, or annexation would be contrary to our traditional policy and to your expressed wishes and, therefore, to be avoided by all reasonable and honorable means.
There is no doubt in my mind that the present uprising in Oriente is extremely serious, far more serious than the Cuban Government appears to realize or, at any rate, than it is prepared to admit. If the present tactics are continued there is every reason to believe that the uprising will not be put down for months, or even years, without material assistance or intervention by the American Government.
The greatest burden now resting on the Cuban Government is the protection of foreign property. In order to afford anything approaching the protection demanded by foreign interests here it would require forces greatly in excess of those now at the despatch of the Cuban Government at a time when that Government should devote to active operations every soldier it can command. With the best will in the world, the Cuban Government can offer only relative protection, but most of the foreign interests in Oriente quite fail to make any distinction between the interest of the Cuban Government in protecting their property in order to avoid the subsequent claims for damages and their own absolute right to demand and obtain complete security in spite of the troubled conditions now existing.
Although the Cuban Government had not requested the landing of marines for the purpose of affording protection to foreign property, the President expressed his gratification on learning of the fact that a force of marines was landed at Guantánamo yesterday, and sent me word that as rapidly as American forces arrived for the protection of different foreign properties the Cuban troops stationed there would be promptly withdrawn and devoted to active operation against the rebels.
Aside from the fact that assistance of this sort coming from us would tend to hasten the reestablishment of normal conditions in Cuba, it would seem evident that we will be obliged to land further forces in the very near future. My British and Brazilian colleagues have already expressed surprise that forces landed have been devoted [Page 256] entirely to the protection of American property, and the former stated to me last night that, unless American or Cuban protection was forthcoming for his nationals in the Guantánamo district by this morning, he intended to cable the Foreign Office in London to urge that representations be made in Washington with a view to having forces of American troops assigned to various British properties in the disaffected districts. I fear that this is merely the beginning of a general demand that American protection be afforded to foreign interests in Oriente. If, either through our own determination thus to aid the Cuban Government to suppress the uprising or through compliance with foreign demands for protection, we eventually release the Cuban forces from police duty so that their entire efforts can be devoted to the prosecution of a campaign against the rebels, it may be confidently said that the chances of a successful outcome will be greatly increased.
As the prosecution of an active campaign on any considerable scale will of course require a large financial outlay, it seems highly probable that the Government will soon be obliged to seek a foreign loan. Under the existing conditions it would seem improbable that any responsible banking house would be prepared to make such a loan without substantial guaranties, and would probably demand them from our Government.
It seems to me that the floating of a new loan would offer us an extremely good opportunity to be of real assistance to the Cuban people by putting our own conditions upon the granting of the loan in order to make sure of its honest application. It would seem that this might readily be made to entail some more or less active fiscal control, which would protect the Cuban treasury against the wholesale looting to which it has hitherto been subjected. As is of course well known, Cuba is naturally so rich a country that an honest administration of her finances would in a short time place the Government in a very stable and prosperous position, and would enable an honest administration to accomplish much for the country which would be impossible if it were to take over the machinery of government and the burden of debt and disorder which now exists.
In closing, I desire to impress upon the Department the fact that my observations in this regard are based upon a desire to offer some possibly helpful suggestions toward the attainment of what I understand to be the desires of the Department in carrying out its policies with regard to Cuba.
I have [etc.]