File No. 817.00/2166.
The American Minister to the Secretary of State .
Managua , July 31, 1912 .
Sir: I have the honor to inform the Department of the details of the coup d’état attempted by the Nicaraguan Minister of War, General Luis Mena, on July 29, 1912, as heretofore briefly reported in my two telegrams of that date.1
It has been common talk on the streets for the last several weeks that a revolutionist movement was impending, and such of the local newspapers as are controlled by the Mena and Zelaya element have openly encouraged the Minister of War in his treasonable aspirations and have urged on him the ease of ousting from office the constitutional President of the Republic. Mena’s advisers, among whom are certain influential European subjects, believed that he, being in control of both the military and legislative departments of the Government, would be able to seize the presidency with the aid of the army, and give his title some color of legality by act of the subservient National Assembly.
In furtherance of this idea he had dictated the appointment in each district of a jefe político who would carry out his commands, and had ordered the gradual removal of all the munitions of war to Granada to the arsenal of San Francisco, a large commanding edifice, formerly an old Spanish church and school, now changed into a strong fortress under the comand of Col. Daniel Mena.
During all this time he was exerting his efforts in every way, such as by conniving at violations of the internal revenue laws, by deflecting the money intended for salaries of public employes into expenditures for the military establishment, and by certain abuses on the Atlantic coast, to embarrass and discredit the administration and to arouse public sentiment. Under his orders private houses were forcibly entered without warrant on the pretext of searching for arms, and enemies were illegally imprisoned, soldiers recruited, munitions purchased abroad without knowledge of the Government, and a feeling of general unrest created. The only obstacle that remained in the path of his success was the fortress of the Canipo de Marte and La Loma in Managua where, notwithstanding frequent changes in the personnel of the troops and of the officers, among whom was a brother of Mena, the majority of the forces continued to be loyal to the Government.
A few days ago President Díaz received positive information that General Mena was bringing 150 recruits from his home town of Nandaime to garrison Managua. When these men reached the capital on July 29 the President hurriedly called a consultation of his friends and advisers for the purpose of adopting means to oppose the attempt to overthrow the Government. It was agreed to take only defensive measures so as not to give any pretext for an open conflict. Therefore, the President decided that instead of removing his Minister of War he would merely curtail the authority of that office.
[Page 1028]In accordance with this arrangement President Díaz addressed to General Mena a note, the translation of which is as follows:
The Chief Executive in compliance with the duty of maintaining peace has resolved to take direct command of the fortresses of the Campo de Marte and San Francisco, and in that capacity has despatched orders to the respective chiefs, General Bartolemé Víquez, Colonel Roberto Hurtado and Colonel Daniel Mena, not to obey any military command which does not emanate directly from the Chief Executive.
For the purpose of avoiding useless bloodshed I appeal to your patriotism not to provoke a conflict.
General Víquez and Colonel Hurtado have replied informing me that they and all their officers will render obedience.
President Díaz also sent the following note to General Víquez, the comandante de armas who is the officer directly in command of the Campo de Marte:
Public tranquility being menaced, the Chief Executive heedful of its conservation has resolved to raise extraordinary forces, which you will please muster in immediately.
The Chief Executive has also resolved to place the army of the Republic under the immediate command of General Emiliano Chamorro, appointing him General-in-Chief of the armies of the Republic.
In accordance therewith please render him due obedience, recognizing him as such and so instructing all your subordinates.
At about three o’clock in the afternoon, which is the usual hour for the relief of the guard, General Mena sent 60 of his Nandaime soldiers to take possession of La Loma, a high fortified hill to the south of the Campo de Marte. The Government forces, consisting of about 35 men under Colonel Hurtado, refused to permit the newcomers to enter, and when the latter persisted in advancing on the fortress after being warned not to do so, fire was opened on them with machine guns until they broke and fled to the Mansión in the Campo where Mena has had his residence.
General Chamorro, who was on his way in a carriage to the Campo, heard the firing on the Loma and hastened to the comandante’s barracks, known as Las Limas, in the northeast corner of the Campo, and presenting his credentials to General Víquez took immediate command of the Government forces. Then informing Mena over the telephone of his compliance with the President’s orders, he expressed the hope that bloodshed might be avoided. Mena asked for a personal conference at the Mansión. Chamorro replied that he would be glad to see him at Las Limas.
The Nandaime soldiers, who had not yet recovered from their confusion, were sent by Mena’s orders to the barracks in the northwest corner of the Campo, known as the Guardia de Honor, the headquarters for the uniformed guards who are always assembled at the official functions given by the President. Mena himself fled through a secret passageway constructed during Zelaya’s occupancy of the house, and escaped to the same barracks. Quickly collecting rifles and three machine guns, he directed from the tower an attack on the Government forces at Las Limas.
At about 4.30 p.m. President Díaz drove to the Legation, followed by Dr. Carlos Cuadra Pasos, member of the Nicaraguan Claims Commission. The former stated to me that after a short conflict the Government forces had successfully resisted the attack, and that it was only a question of time when Mena and his men would either [Page 1029] be captured or annihilated. The President seemed anxious to avoid unnecessary bloodshed and asked me if I would consent to get into communication with General Mena and try to stop the conflict by arranging a peaceful settlement. I inquired the terms, and he said the resignation of General Mena as Minister of War, the appointment of a civilian successor, and amnesty to the participants in the uprising. It was suggested that I telephone to Mena from the Legation, but believing that a personal interview would be more effective I decided to call at his headquarters.
A heavy rain was falling and it was difficult to see any great distance ahead, so when I reached the corner of the street in front of the Campo de Marte I waited for a few minutes in the hope that the combatants would cease firing to let me cross in safety. It occurred to me to turn back, but I felt sure that in case of Mena’s death his son Daniel, an irresponsible negroid Indian, would make reprisals in Granada where he had control of the Government’s military supplies.
During a lull in the firing I crossed the street and entered Mena’s barracks. There were about 150 men with rifles standing inside. As I walked through the gate Mena came forward to greet me. He was considerably excited and much more talkative than usual. I inquired the reason for the disturbance, and he stated that he had been badly treated by the Government and produced President Díaz’s letter, which I glanced over rapidly. Pie continued to complain that he was abused and had a right to feel resentful. I replied that I did not know the details or the merits of the difficulty, and of course could not discuss them; that my only interest was to try to bring about peace in the quickest and most practical way. After some talk of this kind he asked me what I proposed. I answered that I had nothing to propose but that President Díaz desired to propose through me that he, Mena, resign as Minister of War, deliver up his forces to a civilian, and in return be guaranteed his personal safety and that of his followers. He hesitated and then said that such a course on his part would be very humiliating. I replied that the terms were not mine but the President’s, and that if he did not wish to accede to them my mission was at an end and I would return to the Legation. He then stated that he would accept the arrangement as he realized that his life was in danger. He thanked me for having come to him and asked what protection I could offer. I said I could give him no physical protection because I had none even for myself, not having brought so much as a revolver with me, but that I was willing to assure him as American Minister that I would use every effort to secure the pledge of General Chamorro not to fire, or take the offensive or in any way whatsoever endanger his safety, and that if such pledge were given I felt sure it would be observed, and I added that of course he must likewise pledge himself to abstain from firing a single shot or taking any offensive step whatsoever. He said, “My word of honor on it and you may rely on me implicitly. Please arrange also for the safety of my wife and notify her friends.” I told him I thought his action in yielding was very praiseworthy. He replied that nevertheless his position was humiliating. I tried to pass the matter over lightly and offered to take his letter of resignation to the President. He hesitated and said, “Can’t you take my word of [Page 1030] honor?” I answered, “Yes, of course, but it will be better to put the matter in writing as I am only an intermediary.” He stated that it would be embarrassing to do so without knowing whether Chamorro would abide by the arrangement. I assured him that unless Chamorro would give me something in writing indicative of his willingness to turn over the command to the person designated by the President, I would bring back the letter of resignation. General Mena then called for pen and paper, and labored with them for a few minutes. He did not seem satisfied with his first attempt but the second was more successful and he thereupon delivered to me his written resignation, a copy and translation of which are enclosed herewith.1
After leaving the Guardia de Honor I walked down the line to the other barracks where the Government had about 600 armed men. I was shown to General Chamorro’s office and at once acquainted him with the purpose of my visit, the result of my interview with Mena and the arrangement by which both of them should retire in favor of a civilian. At first he demurred and insisted that he would not give up his command except on orders from the President. I explained to him that nothing else was requested or expected of him. He then wrote a letter, copy and translation enclosed,1 addressed to the President, reporting that he had taken command of the forces as instructed and that he was ready to deliver them to the person designated by the Chief Executive.
Returning to the Legation I delivered the two letters to President Díaz who thanked me and stated that he would at once name Dr. Camilo Barberena, a prominent lawyer and civilian, as the new Minister of War. I telephoned this information to Mena, and he expressed himself as thoroughly satisfied with the appointment, adding that Dr. Barberena was friendly to all elements and would be in himself a guaranty that the rights of everybody would be respected. General Mena then asked me to send word to Dr. Graham to bring Mrs. Mena away from the Mansión in the Campo de Marte. Up to this time I thought she was in his private house in the city, and I had no idea she had been left by him in such a dangerous position. While we were talking he suddenly interrupted me for a few seconds and then resumed the conversation by saying that Dr. Graham had just entered his headquarters and wished to speak to me. This surprised me a bit as I did not know the gentleman even by sight, but of course I consented to hear what he had to say. At first Dr. Graham spoke in Spanish in order perhaps that Mena might understand the conversation. He said that General Mena wished to ask a great favor of me and would feel very grateful if I would conduct his wife to a place of safety. I replied that I would be glad to do so, but I inquired why he as a close friend of the family could not attend to the matter. He answered that it would be dangerous. I told him that there was no risk as I had already gone once to the Campo and that I intended to return there with Dr. Barberena to be present when he accepted the delivery of the forces. However, to avoid delay I said I would arrange to have Mrs. Mena safely escorted to the Hotel Lupone or to any other place he might designate. With this understanding I called up General Chamorro by telephone and [Page 1031] urged on him the extreme importance of sending one or two thoroughly reliable staff officers to take Mrs. Mena to a place of safety. General Chamorro of course consented and the lady was accordingly brought to the house of her friends.
Having ended this affair, I sent a messenger for Don Miguel Cárdenas, the Minister of Government, whose countersignature was necessary to validate the decree appointing the new Minister of War. After this formality was complied with I learned for the first time that Dr. Barberana was in Granada, and I at once despatched a note requesting him to come to the capital without delay. In order however not to lose further time in taking over Mena’s forces it was decided to appoint a subsecretary to accept the delivery.
While this matter was being discussed, Mr. Peña, the manager of the electric light company, which is an American corporation, called at the Legation to ask my advice about a letter he had just received from the Chief of Police ordering the lights to be turned off that night at seven o’clock. I told Mr. Peña that his plant should be kept going by all means. I also addressed letters to the Chief of Police and to the Jefe Político of Managua, both friends of Mena, informing them that the latter had assured me of his desire to make a satisfactory settlement of the difficulty, and requesting them to cooperate in preventing disturbances during the night. The Jefe Político sent me a reply which at the time I thought was written in good faith.
It was already dark when I was called to the telephone by General Chamorro who informed me that his troops down in the city were being menaced by the police under Noguera, Mena’s control, and that there was great danger of a conflict between the two forces. I advised him to observe the strict letter of the agreement not to make any offensive move, and that the police had the right in the first instance to continue to patrol the streets for the protection of property. General Chamorro consented to order his troops to the barracks even though he would thereby be putting himself at a great disadvantage in case the peace arrangement fell through.
President Díaz and Dr. Cuadra Pasos, who had been discussing the appointment of the subsecretary, decided to name Dr. J. A. Urtecho, and messengers were sent out to find him, but he had gone to Rivas; so Benjamin Cuadra was finally designated. It being now after seven o’clock I invited the President and Dr. Cuadra Pasos to take dinner at the Legation, so as not to delay matters after the new appointee should have arrived. While we were at table the electric lights suddenly went out, and in about half an hour I was again called to the telephone by General Chamorro who informed me that Mena had just left the city under cover of darkness taking the police with him. When I repeated this news to the President he seemed much disappointed at Mena’s action in breaking his pledge but he said there was some consolation that Mena would at least exercise a restraining influence over his son Daniel who was very much feared in Granada.
At my request the acting Minister of Fomento, Señor Pallais, came to the Legation and arranged for the immediate organization of a provisional police force, with the understanding that if enough civilians could not be promptly had for the purpose General Chamorro [Page 1032] would select a few of his soldiers to fill out. As a result the streets were better policed than usual, but the firing by the troops continued in desultory, manner throughout the night and the city, while outwardly calm, was secretly apprehensive of what might happen in the morning.
I have [etc.]