File No. 817.00/1786.
The American Minister to the Secretary of State.
Managua, June 20, 1912.
Sir: I have the honor to report that on the 5th instant the National Constituent Assembly chose General Luis Correa to be its Speaker by a vote of 14 to 13 against Fernando Guzman, and it also elected General Correa and Don Marcos Mairena to be, respectively, First and Second Designados to the Presidency, to which latter office they will succeed in the order named, if and when there is a vacancy.
General Correa, who is an admirer of Emiliano Chamorro and not unfriendly to General Mena, was elected by a combination of the Díaz and Chamorro votes over the Mena candidate, the name of the latter being withdrawn when it was seen that he would be defeated.
The anti-Mena factions now claim that they control the Assembly on some questions but this is very doubtful, especially as under the practice observed here each seat in the Assembly may be filled by either the regular incumbent or by the alternate in his absence thus permitting a practically new alignment at every session in which there is a close contest.
The result reached in the present case is due probably to the greater personal popularity of Correa over Guzmán.
In this connection I have to report that on May 30 I was informed that the Minister of War, who is said to control the Army and the National Assembly, would within several days of that time have Guzman elected First Designado and thereafter attempt a coup d’état by deposing Díaz and substituting Guzman as President. If the plan succeeded, Guzmán would give way to his chief, but if it failed on account of opposition by the United States or for other reason then Mena would disclaim all responsibility. It was said that he had assured his followers that the American program in Nicaragua had been repudiated by the Senate and by the people of the United States, and that therefore the subversive movement might safely be attempted.
Although coming to me from a reliable source I did not attach enough importance to the information to telegraph it to the Department. I considered it as an effort to ascertain whether the United States would recognize the new government as fait accompli, or on the other hand would lend active support to the present administration in the suppression of the movement.
The Legation not being willing to anticipate any such act of bad faith declined to express any opinion in advance as to what course it would adopt in the event that the plan was attempted, other than to say that it would know how to deal “with the matter when the occasion arose. It has seemed best from the start to refuse to make any commitments on Nicaraguan politics, and to confine efforts to an adjustment of the numerous and difficult financial and economic problems with the hope of thereby being able to insure the continuance of peace and order, such as they are.
The situation then, as now, seemed to be quiet and not to justify any serious apprehension, and I was, and am, inclined to believe that the moral influence in favor of constituted authority exerted by the [Page 1026] United States, which has heretofore since my arrival been the strongest if not the sole factor in the preservation of peace and order, will continue to be effective to that end for the present.
In order not to give an erroneous impression I ought to add that the conditions are far from satisfactory. There is little or no police protection, the administration of justice is extremely lax, there is no punishment of any criminal offender who has the slightest political influence of the right kind, houses are searched and individuals arrested without warrant, and there is almost as much military activity as if the country were preparing for war.
This situation is due to divided responsibility and confusion which result from the opposing aims of the President and his Minister of War, but the conditions, bad as they may be, are a decided improvement as contrasted with those under the Zelaya régime and give promise of something better in the future. I think therefore that it is the wiser course for President Díaz to refrain from reorganizing his Cabinet until after the financial situation is improved, and at least until he can pay the back salaries of the public employees, many of whom are in direct want and therefore not over-enthusiastic in their support of the Government. It is also desirable, other things being equal, to postpone the settlement of the presidential succession, if the settlement is to be definite and effective, until only a comparatively short time will intervene between that event and the beginning of the term of the successful aspirant to the presidency.
I have [etc.]