I wish respectfully to call your attention to the moral effect of this
landing in the city, and to express the belief that possibly such an act
may have had a deterrent effect on any contemplated riotous acts.
In my interview with President Palma (on the afternoon of the 13th) I
took occasion to allude to the many alarming rumors of an attack on the
capital by the combined rebel forces in the neighborhood to be made
simultaneously with an uprising in the city; which information had come
to me from the chief of the secret police. I asked him if the Government
of Cuba could afford the necessary protection to the lives and interests
of American citizens in case such an attack should be made. Mr. Palma
appeared exceedingly nervous and disinclined to talk, but finally stated
that while he had the greatest confidence that his troops could
successfully cope with the rebels in the field he did not feel sure that
they could do so in the city, because there were so many liberals and
other people here ready to take advantage of the situation to burn and
pillage, and that he would have to say no. I then told him that the
lives and property of Americans must be protected and that it was my
duty to so inform him. The President then remarked he thought it would
be a good idea, and that he would like to have, as a wise precaution, an
armed force landed to assist in the protection of American interests. In
accordance with the President’s request, therefore, in view of his
avowal that he was unable to guarantee protection to American lives and
[Page 483]
property, and considering
the immediate serious aspect of affairs, I decided to request Commander
Colwell to land an armed party of sailors from the Denver, it being expressly understood between us that they
were to be used solely for the protection of American lives and
property.
Subsequent to the landing of the aforesaid party of sailors, I received
your cable instructions of the 13th advising against the landing of any
armed force under any circumstances, and I immediately directed Captain
Colwell to withdraw his force to the ship, and thereupon advised
President Palma of my action, at which he expressed great regret, saying
to me, in the presence of Secretary of State O’Farrill that he would
cable President Roosevelt in the morning asking that they be allowed to
remain.
As I cabled yesterday, Congress met on the 14th, and after listening to
the President’s message and transacting some business adjourned.
A translation of the President’s message is inclosed herewith.
I confirm on the overleaf department telegram of the 14th instant,
transmitting a copy of a letter of the President to Señor Quesada,a and beg to advise you that a copy thereof has been
communicated to President Palma through the foreign office.
[Inclosure—Translation.]
message of president tomas estrada palma to the cuban congress.
Special session—September 14,
1906.
To Congress:
Since the inauguration of the Republic this is the first occasion for
the convocation of Congress in special session. It is to be
regretted that the cause should be the disturbance of public order,
as provided for in the constitution, rather than a matter of
material advantage to the welfare of the nation.
No one would have imagined that, after four years and some months of
our existence as an independent and sovereign government, an armed
insurrection would occur, thus placing in doubt the sincerity of our
institutions and universally disseminating a certain discredit in
our Republic and in our capacity for self-government, endangering
the independence of the Patria, for which the blood of thousands of
Cubans flowed during long years of cruel hardship. Who would have
thought that just when the country was most prosperous, peace and
prosperity reigning supreme, millions of surplus money in the
treasury—even after paying the army of liberation $18,663,049.13 and
spending $11,218,069.55 in innumerable public works—who, I repeat,
would have suspected that, in face of the flattering condition of
the country and the credit which we enjoy abroad, there should be
Cubans who would intend armed resistance against the constituted
government, substituting force and violence for law, anarchy for
order, war for peace? Such, however, is the situation, and it fills
our soul with shame and pain.
Since the beginning of the electoral campaign in June of last year a
tendency has been noted on the part of many members of the
opposition party in certain provices to win by any available means
of force. During the course of the campaign there were scenes of
perturbation and disorder and attempts at armed uprisings,
culminating in the hideous murder of several rural guards,
treacherously surprised at midnight in their quarters at
Guanabacoa.
It was to be hoped that once the elections were over and the new
constitutional period begun, all intent to upset the country should
have ceased, the adversaries of the government party reserving their
strength and activity for the
[Page 484]
purpose of organizing themselves pacifically
and disputing the power in the following elections. This is the
example of political parties which have succeeded in impressing upon
their followers a true love of country, so as not to sacrifice it to
the interests of cliques and personal ambitions; this is what
political parties do in countries accustomed to the exercise and
enjoyment of liberty.
Unfortunately, this has not happened in Cuba. Those who during the
past elections adopted the iniquitous system of threat and violence
in order to rise to power at any cost, divested of all sentiment of
pity for Cuba, organized a dark plan of conspiracy, in which,
without scruple of conscience, entered as legal means of attack,
murder, treason, and sedition among the armed forces of the
Republic, and everything else, however criminal, conducive to the
ends of their dastardly ambitions.
The Government, through sources worthy of credence, knew what was
going on, and could have squelched the plot by promptly adopting
measures of prevention; but, in obedience to the principles of
democracy which it professes, and unwilling to overstep the precepts
of our fundamental code, it waited day after day until the occasion
should arise for proceeding in accordance with the laws of the
Republic and in a manner amply justified. On the other hand, it
could not imagine how, in view of the prosperous condition of the
island, there should be anyone, with the exception of a few
adventurers, that would lend aid to the leaders of the
conspiracy.
The armed movement broke out in Pinar del Rio on the 16th of August,
with Faustino Guerra, a member of the House of Representatives and
of the liberal party, as leader. He was followed in the province of
Habana by Ernesto Asbert, a provincial councilman, and in Santa
Clara by Eduardo Guzman, both belonging to the same party. These
groups were gradually increased in force in the three provinces
mentioned, the movement thus acquiring serious importance.
The detective bureau being in possession of sufficient information to
denounce to the court those whom public opinion pointed out as the
principal instigators of the rebellion and under word to place
themselves at the head of the rebel forces, those persons were
arrested in Habana, Santiago de Cuba, and Santa Clara. Others,
though beyond doubt equally guilty, were not arrested, because, more
skillful in their methods, they had left up to that time but meager
evidence of their complicity.
The Government from the first moment faced the situation with what
little forces it could dispose of. It should be borne in mind,
however, that the 3,000 rural guards are scattered throughout the
island, and it would be imprudent to leave ungarrisoned provinces
which were apparently tranquil. It was also inadvisable to take away
from Habana a part of the artillery corps, except, as was done to
fortify Pinar del Rio, in case of absolute necessity.
Living as we had been in peace, and I being solicitous since my
inauguration in May, 1902, only of the economic development and
intellectual progress of our country, no thought was ever given to
preparing the nation for war, but, on the contrary, the constant
endeavor had been to spend the moneys of the national treasury in
works of public utility and in the creation of the greatest possible
number of schools in order to extensively sow the seed of education
among all classes of our society. Hence the revolutionary movement
took us by surprise, without a reserve stock of arms, without
ammunition, and without horses, etc. It was necessary to take
immediately such steps as were possible under the circumstances, and
to order by cable the necessary war material. But while waiting for
this material and while organizing a volunteer militia several days
must needs pass, of which the leaders of the insurrection took
advantage by extending it throughout the provinces in which they had
sympathizers, and the natural consequence of the delay in
determinedly combating the rebels was a growing feeling of impunity
and increase in the numbers of their forces.
The extension of the rebellion renders it impossible for the regular
forces at our disposition to prevent the rebel parties, scattered
throughout a wide range of territory, from entering towns and
villages, uprooting railway tracks, blowing up culverts and bridges,
and causing other damage. Indeed, bands of “plateados”a have appeared in
some places, committing violence and pillage.
[Page 485]
The rural guard, as also the artillery, have shown wondrous bravery
every time they have had an encounter with the rebels, particularly
in the desperate right sustained by both organizations in
Consolacion del Sur with a numerous force under Guerra. The police
of Habana, under Gen. Armando Sanchez Agramonte, and the detective
bureau, under the orders of its chief, Señor Jose Jerez Varona, have
shown great activity and zeal in the fulfillment of their
duties.
The assistance of the militia has not been as effective as could be
wished, inasmuch as its organization is yet incomplete and there are
insufficient rifles to equip the men.
The Government has and continues to make extraordinary efforts to
control and put down the insurrection, and it now devolves upon
Congress to adopt such measures as it may deem of moment, and, if it
sees fit, to approve the presidential decrees that have been
issued.
Presidential
Palace, Habana,
September 14,
1906.
