Chargé Sleeper to
the Secretary of State.
American Legation,
Habana, August 30,
1906.
No. 165.]Sir: I have the honor to advise the department
that the general aspect of the insurrection has not materially changed.
The so-called amnesty order, on the subject of which please note
inclosure 1, has not yet had the anticipated effect. It has indeed
caused a few men to give themselves up, but the small bands roving
through the country districts and seizing horses and supplies, keep the
spirit of revolt alive and active.
At present Guerra seems to be awaiting for the Government to make the
first move; a move which the latter is not yet prepared to make on
account of lack of men and arms. It is rumored, nevertheless, that
Colonel Avalos with 500 men has been sent by sea to attack the Guerra
command some place near the Bay of Cortes, south of San Juan y Martinez,
and there establish a base of operations, thus opening a waterway for
the Government, in case traffic over the Western Railroad should be
interrupted.
In this connection be it noted that Guerra has again notified the general
manager of this railroad that he will dynamite his bridges if the
transportation of government troops continues.
In the province of Habana, the rebel leader, Asbert, whose interview I
cabled on the 29th, continues to harass the Government, but avoids a
fight.
From Matanzas and Santa Clara provinces come many conflicting reports.
The situation in Matanzas I do not consider threatening, but the state
of affairs in Santa Clara is generally considered to be far more
serious. I expect to receive reports from our consular officers in these
provinces next week, and hope to then be able to more definitely advise
the department. Although there are some disquieting rumors from the
eastern portion of the island, I have received no official report as to
any trouble there.
I have, etc.,
Jacob Sleeper,
Chargé d’ Affaires ad
interim.
[Inclosure 1.]
DECREE, WAR MEASURE, OR WHAT?
(From the Daily Telegraph, August 29, 1906.)
Much misconception has been awakened by an incompetent translation
published in a bilingual paper of this city, of the order sent by
Secretary Montalvo on Monday, directing the chief of the forces in
operation to send instructions to the commanders in the provinces of
Pinar del Rio, Habana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara, “recommending”
them to permit those abandoning the arms they have taken up against
the Government peacefully to return to their homes.
The paper referred to translates the opening paragraphs of the order
as follows:
General: At the order of the President of the Republic of Cuba I make
the following decree:
Give instructions to all the chiefs who are operating in the
provinces of Pinar del Rio, Habana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara:
First. Allow all insurrectionists who present themselves and are
repentant for what they have done to return quietly to their
homes.
In the correct translation of the order, the text of which, printed
by us yesterday, will be found reproduced on another page of this
morning’s issue of the telegraph, there is no use of the word
“decree,” which would be obviously out of place, and there is the
important word “recommending.”
This in passing: the most serious question awakened by the order,
reading it as it was really worded, is, however, one of its
constitutionality.
So far as we know, martial law has not been declared, nor any
suspension of the constitution. That the Government does not
recognize the existence of a state of war is well exemplified by the
fact that the rebels placed under arrest are at once handed over to
the instructional judges, who represent the judicial branch of the
Government. This being the case, on what ground does the President
assume jurisdiction and promise immunity from penalties which it is
the prerogative of the judicial branch of the Government to impose,
for crimes which it is the court’s prerogative and duty to punish?
His pardoning power is, of course, unquestionable, but can it be
exercised before conviction by the courts? And, moreover, there is a
wide difference between the pardoning power and the granting of
immunity from prosecution. The executive, the judicial, and the
legislative functions are clearly differentiated by the
constitution, and each is strictly limited within its own sphere.
The cases in which the Executive may supply the shortcomings of the
legislature are carefully specified in article 68 of the
constitution, but nowhere, except in case he shall suspend by
executive decree the constitutional guarantees, is there any
provision in the constitution for his infringing upon the judicial
prerogative.
Paragraph 17 of article 68 says in its last paragraph:
Whenever there may be danger of invasion, or when any rebellion may
gravely menace the public safety, the Congress not being assembled,
the President shall convoke it without delay, that it may adopt such
measures as the occasion may demand.
Inasmuch as the President has not convoked the Congress, as required
in the case of rebellion seriously menacing the country, it is to be
adduced that there exists no such serious menace, and therefore the
constitution is in full force.
As the wording shows, the order is not a presidential decree, and, as
a state of war has not been declared to exist, it can not be a war
measure. Therefore we would ask what it is, and if it has any legal
force. We do not do this with intention captiously to criticize the
administration, but in the belief that, with the best intentions in
the world, a blunder has been committed.
[Inclosure 2.]
cuba’s dilemma—intervention or economic
ruin.
(From the Daily Telegraph, August 30, 1906.)
The attention of our readers is invited to the editorial from the
Diario de la Marina, printed on another page under the caption “On
Horns of a Dilemma.”
Therein is forcibly set forth the fatal consequences inevitably to be
entailed upon Cuba by a continuance of the rebellion, but our
colleague seems to feel
[Page 463]
a
delicacy about proposing a way to bring it to an end, saying: “That
is something which it is not our duty, nor perhaps our right, to
say.”
The Diario declares that the revolution must, if not quickly ended,
bring about one of two results, both equally deplorable, namely,
American intervention or the discrediting of the Piatt
amendment.
One of these will entail the loss of Cuba’s independence, the other
the ruin of her credit.
That this is true there is not the slightest room for doubting, and
it being true it is certainly incumbent upon all having Cuba’s
welfare at heart to make every effort to end the struggle. How can
it be done? We do not know, but we venture to suggest a way which
seems to us at least worthy of a trial before confessing that Cuba’s
attempt at independent self-government is a failure.
Unless American intervention is to come, Cubans must settle the
conflict themselves, and settle it quickly. There has been some talk
of the leading business men of the country getting together and
proposing a basis of arbitration. This, we think, would be
impracticable, for the reason that most of the leading business men
are foreigners, for the most part Spaniards, with a sprinkling of
American citizens. Cuba’s independence is presumably dearest and
should be safest in the keeping of the best of those who fought for
and suffered for and won it. Among these there are a number of
general officers who, having performed a patriot’s duty and achieved
as a patriot’s reward their country’s independence, have since held
aloof from the warping influences of politics, and are capable of
acting impartially, impelled by no impulse but their love of
country.
If, as many now declare, the Government is powerless to quell at once
the insurrection which so fast is hurrying it to either political or
economic ruin, would it not be well for it to call to its assistance
a few such men as we have suggested—not to go against the rebels
with arms in their hands, but to approach them with an offer to
arbitrate the difference between them and the Government? Whatever
justification or lack thereof may exist for the armed protest of
those arrayed against the administration, Cuba is threatened with
ruin, and to avert that should absorb the thoughts of all Cubans to
the exclusion of every other consideration.
