Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress with the Annual Message of the President, December 2, 1872, Part II, Volume I

[309] *Part V: Wherein Great Britain failed to perform its duties as a neutral. The Insurgent cruisers.

[undated.]

“In the first place, I am sorry to observe that the unwarrantable practice of building ships in this country, to be used as vessels of war against a State with which Her Majesty is at peace, still continues. Her Majesty’s Government had hoped that this attempt to make the territorial waters of Great Britain the place of preparation for warlike armaments against the United States might he put an end to by prosecutions and by seizure of the vessels built in pursuance of contracts made with the Confederate agents. But facts which are unhappily too notorious, and correspondence which has been put into the hands of Her Majesty’s Government by the Minister of the Government of the United States, show that resort is had to evasion and subtlety in order to escape the penalties of the law; that a vessel is bought in one place, that her armament is prepared in another, and that both are sent to some distant port beyond Her Majesty’s jurisdiction, and that thus an armed steamship is fitted out to cruise against the commerce of a Power in amity with Her Majesty. A crew, composed partly of British subjects, is procured separately; wages are paid to them for an unknown service. They are dispatched, perhaps, to the coast of France, and there, or elsewhere, are engaged to serve in a Confederate man-of-war.

“Now, it is very possible that by such shifts and stratagems, the penalties of the existing law of this country, nay, of any law that could be enacted, may be evaded; but the offense thus offered to Her Majesty’s authority and dignity by the de facto rulers of the Confederate States, whom Her Majesty acknowledges as belligerents, and whose agents in the United Kingdom enjoy the benefit of our hospitality in quiet security, remains the same. It is a proceeding totally unjustifiable, and manifestly offensive to the British Crown.”—Earl Russell’s Letter to Messrs. Mason, Slidell, and Mann, February 13, 1865. Vol. I, page 630.

[310] Earl Russell de nounces the acts of which the United States complain as unwarranted and totally unjustifiable. The Tribunal of Arbitration will probably agree with Earl Russell in his statement to the insur*gent agents, that “the practice of building ships” in Great Britain “to be used as vessels of war” against the United States, and the “attempts to make the territorial waters of Great Britain the place of preparation for warlike armaments against the United States” “in pursuance of contracts made with the Confederate agents,” were “unwarrantable” and “totally unjustifiable.”

British territory the base of the naval operations of the insurgents. British territory was, during the whole struggle, the base of the naval operations of the insurgents. The first serious fight had scarcely taken place before the contracts were made in Great Britain for the Alabama and the Florida. The contest was nearly over when Waddell received his orders in Liverpool to sail thence in the Laurel in order to take command of the Shenandoah and to visit the Arctic Ocean on a hostile cruise.¹

Their aresual. [311] There also was the arsenal of the insurgents, from whence they drew their munitions of war, their arms, and their supplies. It is true that it has been said, and may again be said, that it was no infraction of the law of nations to furnish such supplies. But, while it is not maintained that belligerents may infringe upon the rights which neutrals have to manufacture and deal in such military supplies in the ordinary course of commerce, it is asserted with confidence that a neutral *ought not to permit a belligerent to use the neutral soil as the main if not the only base of its military supplies, during a long and bloody contest, as the soil of Great Britain was used by the insurgents.

The systematic operations of the insurgents a violation of the duties of a neutral. It may not always be easy to determine what is and what is not lawful commerce in arms and munitions of war; but the United States conceive that there can be no doubt on which side of the line to place the insurgent operations on British territory. If Huse had been removed from Liverpool, Heyliger from Nassau, and Walker from Bermuda; or if Fraser, Trenholm & Co. had ceased to sell insurgent cotton and to convert it into money for the use of Huse, Heyliger, and Walker, the armies of the insurgents must have succumbed. The systematic operations of these persons, carried on openly and under the avowed protection of the British Government, made of British territory the “arsenal” of which Mr. Fish complained in his note of September 25, 1869.¹ Such conduct was, to say the least, wanting in the essentials of good neighborhood and should be frowned upon by all who desire to so establish the principles of International Law, as to secure the peace of the world, while protecting the independence of nations.

[312] [313] It is in vain to say that both parties could have *done the same thing. The United States were under no such necessity. If they could not manufacture at home all the supplies they needed, they were enabled to make their purchases abroad openly, and to transport them in the ordinary course of commerce. It was the insurgents who, unable to manufacture at home, were driven to England for their entire military supplies, and who, finding it impossible to transport those supplies in the ordinary course of commerce, originated a commerce for the purpose, and covered it under the British flag to Bermuda and Nassau. Under the pressure of the naval power of the United States, their necessities compelled them to transport to England a part of the executive of their Government, and to carry on its operation in Great Britain. They were protected in doing this by Her Majesty’s Government, although its attention was called to the injustice thereof.² This conduct deprived the United States of the benefit of their superiority at sea, and to that extent British neutrality was partial and insincere. The United States confidently submit to the Tribunal of Arbitration that it is an abuse of a sound principle to extend to such combined transactions as those of Huse, Heyliger, Walker, and Fraser, Trenholm & Co., the well-settled right of a neutral to manufacture and *sell to either belligerent, during a war, arms, munitions, and military supplies. To sanction such an extension will be to lay the foundation for international misunderstanding and probable war, whenever a weaker party hereafter may draw upon the resources of a strong neutral, in its efforts to make its strength equal to that of its antagonist.

Continuing partiality for the insurgents. [314] From the Queen’s Proclamation of neutrality to the close of the struggle, Great Britain framed its rules, construed its laws and its instructions, and governed its conduct in the interest of the insurgents. What could tend more to inspirit them than the news that on the eve of Mr. Adams’s arrival in London, as if to show in the most public manner a purpose, to overlook him, and to disregard the views which he might have been instructed by his Government to present, it had been determined to recognize their right to display on the ocean a flag which had not then a ship to carry it? How they must have welcomed the parliamentary news,³ on the heels of this proclamation, that the effect of this recognition would be to employ British subjects in warring upon the commerce of the United States, with a protection against piracy promised in advance! How great must have been their joy, when they found British laws construed so as to confer upon them the right to use the workshops *anddock-yards of Liverpool, for building ships which, without violating the municipal law of England, might leave British ports in such warlike state that they could be fitted for battle in twenty-four hours! How they must have been cheered by the official legalization of the operations of those who had been sent to Liverpool in anticipation of the proclamation, to be in readiness to act! And if these welcome sights inspirited and cheered the insurgents, as was doubtless the case, how relatively depressing must have been their effect upon the loyal people arid upon the Government of the United States! The correspondence of Mr. Seward and of Mr. Adams, running through the whole of the volumes of evidence accompanying this case, bears testimony to the depth of this feeling.

When Great Britain carried into practice its theory of neutrality it was equally insincere and partial.

Recapitulation of hostile acts tolerated in British possessions. [315] Its municipal laws for enforcing its obligations as a neutral, under the law of nations, were confessedly inadequate, and, during the struggle, were stripped of all their force by executive and judicial construction. Yet Great Britain refused to take any steps for their amendment, although requested so to do.¹

The Queen’s Proclamation inhibited blockade-*running; yet the authorities encouraged it by enacting new laws or making new regulations which permitted the transshipment of goods contraband of war within the colonial ports; by officially informing the colonial officers that “British authorities ought not to take any steps adverse to merchant-vessels of the Confederate States, or to interfere with their free resort to British ports;”² by giving official notice to the United States that it would not do to examine too closely, on the high seas, British vessels with contraband of war;³ and by regulations which operated to deter the United States vessels of war from entering the British ports from which the illicit trade was carried on.

The Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819 forbade the employment of a British vessel as a transport; and yet vessels known to be owned by the insurgent authorities, and engaged in carrying munitions of war for them, were allowed to carry the British flag and were welcomed in British ports. Still further, the same vessel would appear one day as a blockade-runner, and another day as a man-of-war, receiving an equal welcome in each capacity.

[316] The instructions of January 31, 1862, forbade both belligerents alike to enter the port of Nassau except by permission of the governor, or in stress *of weather. That permission was lavishly given to every insurgent cruiser, but was granted churlishly, if at all, to the vessels of the United States.

The same instructions forbade the granting to a steam man-of-war of either belligerent in British ports a supply of coal in excess of what would be necessary to take the vessel to the nearest port of its own country or some nearer destination. This sale was enforced upon the vessels of the United States, but was utterly disregarded as to the vessels of the insurgents.

Those instructions also forbade the granting of any supply of coal to such a vessel if it had been coaled in a British port within three months. Yet in three notable instances this salutary rule was violated, that of the Nashville, at Bermuda, in February, 1862; the Florida, at Barbadoes, in February, 1863; and the Alabama, at Capetown, in March, 1864.

These facts throw suspicion upon the acts of British officials toward insurgent cruisers. [317] These admitted facts were repeatedly, and in detail, brought to the notice of the British Government, and as repeatedly the answer was given that there was no cause for interference. At length they were, as a system, brought to Lord Russell’s attention, by Mr. Adams, with the threads of evidence, which furnished him with the proof of their truth. Yet he declined to act, saying that “this correspondence does not appear *to Her Majesty’s Government to contain any sufficient evidence of a system of action in direct hostility to the United States;” that it furnished no proof as to the building of ironclads that “could form matter for a criminal prosecution;” and that the other acts complained of were “not contrary to law.”¹ In other words, he declared that the only international often se of which Her Majesty’s Government would take notice was the building of ironclads; and that no steps would be taken, even against persons guilty of that violation of neutrality, until the officials of the United States would act the part of detectives, and secure the proof which a British court could hold competent to convict the offender of a violation of a local law. It is important, in considering the evidence which is about to be referred to, to bear in mind these constant demonstrations of partiality for the insurgents. They show a persistent absence of real neutrality, which, to say the least, should throw suspicion upon the acts of the British officials as to those vessels, and should incline the Tribunal to closely scrutinize their conduct.

They show an abnegation of all diligence to prevent the acts complained of. [318] They throw upon Great’ Britain the burden of proof to show that the acts complained of could not have been prevented. The United States, however, go further than this. They insist that Her Majesty’s Government abandoned, in advance, the exercise of that due * diligence which the Treaty of Washington declares that a neutral is bound to observe. They say that the position of Her Majesty’s Government just cited, taken in connection with the construction put upon the Foreign Enlistment Act by the British courts in the Alexandra case, was a practical abandonment of all obligation to observe diligence in preventing the use of British territory by the insurgents, for purposes hostile to the United States. They aver that it was a notice to them that no complaints in this respect would be listened to, which were not accompanied by proof sufficient to convict the offender as a criminal under the Foreign Enlistment Act. To furnish such proof was simply impossible. The Tribunal will remember that it was judicially said in the case of the Alexandra, that what had been done in the matter of the Alabama was no violation of British law, and therefore constituted no offense to be punished.; Well might Earl Russell say that the Oreto and the Alabama were a scandal to English laws.

[319] The United States with great confidence assert that the facts which have been established justify them in asking the Tribunal of Arbitration, in the investigations now about to be made, to assume that in the violations of neutrality which will be shown to have taken place, the burden of proof *will be upon Great Britain to establish that they could not have been prevented. Her Majesty’s Government declined to investigate charges and to examine evidence submitted by Mr. Adams, as to repeated violations of British territory, which subsequent events show were true in every respect. It placed its refusal upon principles which must inevitably lead to like disregard in future—principles which Tendered nugatory thereafter any measure of diligence to discover violations of neutrality within Her Majesty’s dominions. Thereby Great Britain assumed and justified all similar acts which had been or might be committed, and relieved the United States from the necessity of showing that due diligence was not exercised to prevent them.

Of what use was it to exercise diligence to show the purpose for which the Florida, the Alabama, or the Georgia was constructed, or the Shenandoah was purchased, if the constructing, fitting out, or equipping, or the purchase for such objects was lawful, and could not be interfered with? What diligence could have prevented the excessive supplies of coal and other hospitalities to the insurgent cruisers, or the protection of transports, all of which made these ports bases of operations, if such acts were no violation of the duties of a neutral, of which the United States might justly complain?

[320] List of the insurgent cruisers. *The cruisers for whose acts the United States ask this Tribunal to hold Great Britain responsible are (stating them in the order in which their cruises began) the Sumter; the Nashville; the Florida and her tenders, the Clarence, the Tacony, and the Archer; the Alabama and her tender, the Tuscaloosa; the Retribution; the Georgia; the Tallahassee; the Chickamauga; and the Shenandoah. The attention of the Tribunal of Arbitration is now invited to an account of each of these vessels.

The Sumter.

The Sumter. [321] The Sumter escaped from the passes of the Mississippi on the 30th of June, 1861, and on the 30th of the following July arrived at the British port of Trinidad. She remained there six days, taking in a supply of coal.¹ Complaint being made of this act as a “violation of Her Majesty’s Proclamation of Neutrality,”² Lord Russell replied, that “the conduct of the Governor was in conformity to Her Majesty’s Proclamation;” that “Captain Hillyar, of Her Majesty’s Ship Cadmus, having sent a boat to ascertain her nationality, the commanding officer showed a commission signed by Mr. Jefferson Davis, calling himself the President of the so-styled Confederate States.”³ Her Majesty’s Government thus held this vessel to be a man-of-war as early as the 30th of July, 1861.

Having got a full supply of coal and other necessary outfit, the Sumter sailed on the 5th of August, 1861, and, after a cruise in which she destroyed six vessels carrying the flag of the United States, she arrived in Gibraltar on the 18th of the following January. Before she could again be supplied with coal and leave that port, she was shut in by the arrival of the Tuscarora, a vessel of war of the United States, which “anchored off Akeeiras.”⁴ The Tuscarora was soon followed by the Kearsarge, both under the instructions of the Government of the United States.

[322] Finding it impossible to escape, an attempt was made to sell the Sumter, with her armament, for £4,000.⁵ The consul of the United States at Gibraltar, by direction of Mr. Adams, protested against this sale.¹ The sale was finally made “by public auction” on the 10th of December, 1862.² Mr. Adams notified Earl Russell that the sale would not be recognized by the United States, and called upon Great Britain not to regard it, as it had been made in violation of principles of law that had been *adopted by British courts and publicists.³ He maintained that “Her Majesty’s Government, in furnishing shelter for so long a period to the Sumter in the harbor of Gibraltar, as a ship of war of a belligerent, had determined the character of the vessel;”⁴ and that “the purchase of ships of war belonging to enemies is held in the British courts to be invalid.”⁵

[323] After reflecting upon this simple proposition for more than five weeks, Earl Russell denied it. He said, “The British Government, when neutral, is not bound to refuse to a British subject the right to acquire by purchase a vessel which a belligerent owner may desire to part with, but it would not deny the right of the adverse belligerent to ascertain, if such vessel were captured by its cruisers, whether the vessel had rightfully, according to the law of nations, come into the possession of the neutral.”⁶ Mr. Adams also maintained that the sale was fictitious,⁷ to which Earl Russell replied that he “could not assume that the Sumter had not been legally and bona fide sold to a British owner for commercial and peaceful purposes.”⁸ Mr. Adams insisted (and the result proved that he *was correct) that the sale of the Sumter was fictitious, and that the purchaser was an agent of Fraser, Trenholm & Co., the treasury agents and depositaries, &c., for the insurgent authorities at Richmond.⁹ His representations were disregarded, and the vessel was taken to Liverpool and thoroughly repaired. She then took on board a cargo of arms and munitions of war, and, under the the name of the Gibraltar, fortified with a British register, became an insurgent transport.¹⁰

In all these proceedings on the part of British officials the United States find a partiality toward the insurgents, which is inconsistent with the duties of a neutral:

1. [324] The Sumter was permitted to receive at Trinidad a full supply of coal. The United States, however, were forbidden by Great Britain even to deposit coal in the British West Indies for their own use, under such regulations as might be prescribed by Her Majesty’s Government. What took place at Nassau in December, 1861, has already been told. In Bermuda, on the 19th of February, 1862, their consul was officially informed that “the Government of Her Britannic Majesty *had determined not to allow the formation in any British colony of a coal-depot for the use of their vessels of war, either by the Government of the United States or of the so-styled Confederate States.”¹¹ Before this Case is finished it will be seen how thoroughly this determination was disregarded as to the “so-styled Confederate States.”

[325] If it should be thought that the habitually insincere neutrality of Great Britain, as already detailed, did not constitute such a violation of the duties of a neutral as would entail responsibility for the acts of all the insurgent cruisers, (which the United States, with confidence, maintain that it did,) it is clear that the Sumter was furnished with an excessive supply of coal at Trinidad, which supply enabled her to inflict the subsequent injuries on the commerce of the United States. It is not contended that at that time there were any precedents which settled absolutely the quantity of coal which might be furnished to a belligerent steam man-of-war by a neutral. When the proclamation of neutrality was issued, it seemed to be the opinion of leading members of the House of Lords, (Lords Brougham and Kingsdown, for instance,) that coal for the use of vessels of war *might be regarded as contraband of war.¹ The instructions issued by Her Majesty’s Government a few months later permitted this article to be furnished, provided the supply should be measured by the capacity of the vessel to consume it, and should be limited to what might be necessary to take it to the nearest port of its own country, or to some nearer destination. This rule, as subsequently modified by the United States,² appears to be a just medium between the excessive supply furnished to the Sumter in Trinidad and the absolute refusal to permit the United States to supply itself. Under this rule the Sumter would have been entitled to receive only what would be necessary to take her to New Orleans or to Galveston.

2. [326] The Sumter was in the port of Gibraltar when the instructions of January 16, 1862, (Vol. IV, p. 175,) were published there,³ on the 11th February. By their terms they were to go into effect six days after that date. Under those instructions the Sumter, having been recognized as a man-of-war, ought to have been required to *leave the port of Gibraltar within twenty-four hours, or, if without coal, within twenty-four hours after getting a supply of coal. Instead of that she was allowed to remain there for twelve months, while Lord Russell’s instructions were rigidly enforced against the vessels of the United States. The reason for this partiality may be easily gathered from the correspondence of the United States Consul at Gibraltar.⁴ The vessels of war of the United States were on her track, and had the instructions of Earl Russell been complied with, the well-laid schemes of the United States officers for her destruction would have been successful. But the Tribunal will observe that the instructions, which were so offensively enforced against the United States vessels Connecticut and Honduras, were ignored as to the insurgent vessel Sumter.

3. [327] The sale of the Sumter was palpably an evasion. She went into the hands of Fraser, Trenholm & Co.; and, knowing the connection between that firm and the insurgents, it is not too much to ask the Tribunal to assume as a probability that there was never any change of ownership. But if it should be thought that the transaction was made bona fide, then there is an equal proabability that the money found its way to the * credit of the insurgents in their Liverpool transactions.

By reason of these repeated acts of insincere neutrality, or of actual disregard of the duties of a neutral, the United States were great sufferers. Before arriving at Trinidad the Sumter captured eleven American vessels.¹ After leaving that port, and before arriving at Gibraltar, she captured six other vessels belonging to citizens of the United States. The injury did not stop there. The United States made diligent efforts to capture this vessel which was destroying their commerce. For this purpose they dispatched across the Atlantic two of their men-of-war, the Kearsarge and the Tuscarora. These vessels followed on the track of the Sumter, and the plans of the United States would have been successful had Earl Russell’s instructions of January 31, 1862, been carried out toward the Sumter in the port of Gibraltar, as they were carried out toward the vessels of the United States in all the colonial ports of Great Britain.

[328] Under these circumstances, the United States ask the Tribunal to find and certify as to the Sumter that Great Britain, by the acts or omissions hereinbefore recited or referred to, failed to fulfill the duties set forth in the three rules in Article *VI of the Treaty of Washington, or recognized by the principles of International Law not inconsistent with such rules. Should the Tribunal exercise the power conferred upon it by Article VII of the Treaty, to award a sum in gross to be paid to the United States, they will ask that, in considering the amount so to be awarded, the losses of individuals in the destruction of their vessels and cargoes by the Sumter, and also the expense to which the United States were put in the pursuit of that vessel, may be taken into account.

The Nashville.

The Nashville. [329] The Nashville, a large paddle-wheel steamer, formerly engaged on the New York and Charleston line, lightened to diminish her draught, armed with two guns, and commanded by an officer who had been in the Navy of the United States, ran out from Charleston on the night of the 26th of October, 1861.² She arrived at the British port of St. George, Bermuda, on the afternoon of the 30th³ of the same month, having been about three and a half days making the passage. She took on board there, by the permission of the Governor, six hundred tons of coal,⁴ and this act was approved by Her Ma*jesty’s principal Secretary of State for the Colonies.⁵ This approval seems to have been elicited by the complaints which had been made to the Governor by the Consul of the United States at that port,⁶ It may also be that Her Majesty’s Government preferred to have the question settled, before it could be made the subject of diplomatic representation on the part of the United States.

[330] In view of the rule as to supplies of coal which was soon after adopted by Her Majesty’s Government, the United States insist, as they have already insisted in regard to the Sumter, that a supply of six hundred tons was greatly in excess of the needs of the Nashville. There are no means of knowing whether she had any coal on board at the time she arrived in the port of St. George. Assuming that she had none, the utmost she should have received was enough to take her back to Charleston, from which port she had just come in three days and a half. Instead of that, she received more than a supply for a voyage to Southampton. She left Bermuda on the afternoon of the 5th of November,¹ and anchored in Southampton waters on the morning of the 21st of the same month,² *having destroyed at sea the United States merchant-ship Harvey Birch³ on the passage.*

A correspondence ensued between Earl Russell and Mr. Adams as to the character of this vessel, in which Lord Russell said,” The Nashville appears to be a Confederate vessel of war.”⁴ She was received as such, was “taken into dock for calking and other repairs,” and “received one hundred and fifty tons of coal” on the 10th of January. On the 25th “Captain Patey, of Her Majesty’s Navy, reported the Nashville coaled, and necessary repairs completed.”⁵

[331] On the 4th of the following February the Nashville left Southampton and proceeded to Bermuda, where she arrived on the evening of the 20th. On the day previous to that (the 19th) the Consul had received from the Governor the official notice already alluded to, that the Government of Her Britannic Majesty had determined not to allow the formation, in any British Colony, of a coal depot for the use of the vessels of war of the United States.⁶ The Government of the United States was, therefore, not a little astonished to learn from the Consul at Bermuda that the Nashville had taken on board one hundred *and fifty tons of coal at that place, and that she left “under the escort of Her Majesty’s steamer Spiteful.”⁷

These circumstances, in accordance with the principles hereinbefore stated, justify the United States in asking the Tribunal of Arbitration as to this vessel, to find and certify that Great Britain, by the acts or omissions hereinbefore recited or referred to, failed to fulfill the duties set forth in the three rules in Article VI of the Treaty of Washington or recognized by the principles of International Law not inconsistent with such rules. Should the Tribunal exercise the power conferred upon it by Article YII of the Treaty, to award a sum in gross to be paid to the United States, they will ask that, in con sideling the amount so to be awarded, the losses of individuals in the destruction of their vessels and cargoes by the Nashville, and also the expenses to which the United States were put in the pursuit of that vessel, may be taken into account.

[332] *The Florida, and her tenders, the Clarence, the Tacony, and the Archer.

The Florida, originally known as the Oreto, was an iron-screw gunboat, of about seven hundred tons burden, bark-rigged, and had two smoke-stacks and three masts.⁸ The contract for her construction was made with Fawcett, Preston & Co., of Liverpool, by Bulloch, soon after he came to England in the summer of 1861. He was introduced to them by Prioleau, of the firm of Fraser, Trenholm & Co., in order that he might make the contract.¹

The Florida and her tenders.

It was pretended, for form’s sake, that she was constructed for the Italian Government; but it was a shallow pretense, and deceived only those who wished to be deceived. The Italian Consul at Liverpool disclaimed all knowledge of her,² and people at that port who were familiar with ship-building understood from the first that she was being built for the Southern insurgents.³

[333] The precise date of the making of the contract cannot be given by the United States. The *range of time within which it must have been made can be determined. Bullock left England in the autumn of 1861, at or about the time that the Bermuda sailed with Huse’s first shipment of stores; and returned in March on the Annie Childs, which ran the blockade from Wilmington.⁴ The contract was made before lie left, and the Florida was constructed during his absence.

The contract for the construction of the hull was sub let by Fawcett, Preston & Co., to Miller & Sons, of Liverpool.⁵ The payments to Miller & Sons were made by Fawcett, Preston & Co.; the payments to Fawcett, Preston & Co. were made by Fraser, Trenholm & Co.

[334] By the 4th of February the Florida was taking in her coal, and appearances indicated that she would soon leave “without her armament.⁶ She made her trial trip on the 17th of February. By the 1st of March she had taken in her provisions, “a very large quantity, enough for a long cruise,” and was “getting as many Southern sailors”⁷ as possible. She was registered as an English vessel.⁸ Although apparently ready to sail, she lingered about Liverpool, which gave rise to some speculations in the minds of the people of that town. It*was said that she had “injured herself and was undergoing repairs.”⁹ The mystery was solved by the arrival, on the 11th of March, in the Mersey, of the Annie Childs from Wilmington, bringing as passengers Captain Bullock¹⁰ and four other insurgent naval officers, who came on board of her some twenty miles down the river from Wilmington,”¹¹ and who were to take commands on the vessels which were contracted for in Liverpool. As soon as they arrived they went on board the Florida, and were entertained there that evening.¹² On the 22d of March the Florida took her final departure from the Mersey,¹³ with “a crew of fifty-two men, all British, with the exception of three or four, one of whom only was an American.”¹⁴ She was consigned by Bullock to Heyliger. Another account says that she was consigned to Adderly &Co.

Simultaneously with these proceedings, shipments were being made at Hartlepool, on the eastern coast of England, of cannon, rifles, shot, shells, &c, intended for the Florida. They were sent from Liverpool to Hartlepool by rail, and there put on board the steamer Bahama for Nassau.

[335] [336] It was a matter of public notoriety that this was *going on.¹ All the facts about the Florida, and about the hostile expedition it was proposed to make against the United States, were open and notorious at Liverpool. Mr. Dudley’s correspondence, already cited, was full of it. The means of intelligence were as accessible to British authorities as to the consular officers of the United States. Nevertheless, it was esteemed to be the duty of the officers of the United States to lay what had come to their knowledge before Her Majesty’s Government. Mr. Dudley, the Consul at Liverpool, wrote to Mr. Adams that he had information from many different sources as to the Oreto, “all of which goes to show that she is intended for the Southern Confederacy.”² Mr. Adams transmitted the intelligence to Earl Russell, and said that he “entertained little doubt that the intention was precisely that indicated in the letter of the Consul, the carrying on war against the United States.” * * * He added, “Should further evidence to sustain the allegations respecting the Oreto be held necessary to effect the object of securing the interposition of Her Majesty’s Government, I will make an effort to procure it in a more formal manner.”³

[337] The United States ask the Tribunal to observe*that, notwithstanding this offer, no objection was taken as to the form of the information submitted by Mr. Adams, nor was he asked by Earl Russell for further particulars. Lord Russell, however, in reply, transmitted to Mr. Adams a report of the British Commssioners of Customs, in which it was stated that the Oreto was a vessel of war, “pierced for four guns;” that she was “built by Miller & Sons for Fawcett, Preston & Co.,” and was “intended for the use of Messrs. Thomas Brothers, of Palermo;” that she “had been handed over to Messrs. Fawcett & Preston: that Miller & Son stated their belief that the destination was Palermo;” and that “the examiners had every reason to believe that the vessel was destined for the Italian Government.”⁴ Further representations being made by Mr. Adams, the same officers subsequently reported that, having received directions “to inquire into the further allegations made in regard to the Oreto,” they found “that the vessel in question was registered on the 3d of March in the name of John Henry Thomas, of Liverpool, as sole owner; that she cleared on the following day for Palermo and Jamaica, in ballast, but did not sail until the 22d, * * * having a crew of fifty-two men, all British, with the exception of *three or four, one of whom only was an American.”⁵

The Tribunal of Arbitration will observe that even from the reports of these British officers it is established that the Florida was a vessel of war, “pierced for four guns;” and also that notwithstanding their alleged belief that she was intended for the King of Italy, she was allowed to clear for Jamaica in ballast. Attention is also invited to the easy credulity of these officials, who, to the first charges of Mr. Adams, replied by putting forward the “belief” of the builders as to the destination of the vessel, arid who met his subsequent complaints by extracting from the custom house records the false clearance which Bullock, and Frazer, Trenholm & Co., had caused to be entered there. Such an examination and such a report can scarcely be regarded as the exercise of the “due diligence” called for by the rules of the Treaty of Washington.

[338] The Florida arrived at Nassau on the 28th of April, and was taken in charge by Heyliger, who was then a well-known and recognized insurgent agent. The Bahama arrived a few days later at the same port by preconcerted arrangement. The two branches of the hostile expedition, which had left Great Britain in detachments, were thus united in British waters. They were united in their conception in the contracts with Fawcett, Preston & Co. They were temporarily separated by the shipment of a portion of the ammunition and stores by rail to Hartlepool, and thence by the Bahama. They were now again united, and the vessels went’ together to Cochrane’s Anchorage, a place about nine miles from the harbor of Nassau, not included in the port limits.

[339] While there Captain Hickley, of Her Majesty’s ship Greyhound, thought it his duty to make a careful examination of the vessel, and he reported her condition to the Governor. In a remarkable certificate, signed by himself, and by the officers of the Greyhound, dated June 13, 1862, it is stated that he “asked the Captain of the Oreto whether the Oreto had left Liverpool in all respects as she was then; his answer was yes; in all respects.”¹ As, therefore, no changes had been made in her after leaving Liverpool, Captain Hickley’s report may be taken to be the official evidence of a British expert as to her character, at the time of Mr. Adams’s complaints, and of the customs examinations. He says, “I then proceeded to examine the vessel, and found her in every respect fitted as a war vessel, precisely the same as vessels of a similar class in Her Majesty’s Navy. She *has a, magazine and light-rooms forward, handing-rooms and handing-scuttles for powder as in war vessels; shell-rooms aft, fitted as in men-of-war; a regular lower deck with hammock-hooks, mess-shelves, &c., &c., as in our own war vessels, her cabin accommodations and fittings generally being those as fitted in vessels of her own class in the Navy. * * * She is a vessel capable of carrying guns; she could carry four broadside-guns forward, four broadside-guns aft, and two pivot-guns amidships. Her ports are fitted to ship and unship; port-bars cut through on the upper part to unship also. The construction of her ports, I consider, are peculiar to vessels of war. I saw shot-boxes all round her upper deck, calculated to receive Armstrong shot, or shot similar. She had breeching bolts and shackles, and side-tackle bolts. Magazine, shell-rooms, and light-rooms are entirely at variance with the fittings of a merchant-ship. She had no accommodation whatever for the stowage of cargo; only stowage for provisions and stores. She was in all respects fitted as a vessel of war of her class in Her Majesty’s Navy.* * * The Oreto, as she now stands, could, in my professional opinion, with her crew, guns, arms, and ammunition, going out with another vessel alongside of her, he equipped in twenty four hours for battle.” ²

[340] *The judge before whom the case was tried, commenting on this evidence, said: “Captain Hickley’s evidence as to the construction and fittings of the vessel I should, consider conclusive even had there been no other; but that construction and those fittings were made, not here, but in England.” ³

[341] This was, therefore, the condition of the Florida when she left Liverpool. That she was then “intended to cruise and carry on war” against the United States there can be no reasonable doubt; that she was “fitted out” and “equipped” within the jurisdiction of Great Britain, with all the fittings and equipments necessary to enable her to carry on such war, is equally clear from Captain Hickley’s professional statement. “Arming” alone was necessary to make her ready for battle. By the rules of the Treaty of Washington either the “fitting out” or the “equipping.” constitute an offense without the “arming.” That Great Britain had reasonable ground to believe that the fitting out and the equipping had been done within its jurisdiction, with intent that she should carry on such a war, the United States claim to have substantiated. That she had been specially adapted within British jurisdiction, to wit, at Liverpool, to warlike use, will scarcely be questioned after the positive testimony of Captain Hickley. That her *departure from the jurisdiction of Great Britain might have been prevented after the information furnished by Mr. Adams would seem to be beyond doubt. And that a neglect to prevent such departure was a failure to use the “due diligence” called for by the second clause of the first rule of the Treaty obviously follows the last conclusion. If these several statements are well founded, Great Britain, by permitting the construction of the Florida, at Liverpool, under the circumstances, and by consenting to her departure from that port, violated its duty as a neutral Government toward the United States.

[342] The United States Consul, soon after the arrival of the Oreto at Nassau, called the attention of the Governor to her well-known character.¹ The Governor declined to interfere, and with an easy credulity accepted the statements of the insurgent agents that the vessel was not and would not be armed,² and he made no further inquiries. She was then permitted to remain at Cochrane’s Anchorage. A second request to inquire into her character was made on the 4th of June, and refused.³ On the 7th of June both the Oreto and the Bahama were arrested and brought up from*Cochrane’s Anchorage into the harbor of Nassau. On the 8th the mail steamer Melita arrived from England, with Captain Raphael Semmes and his officers from the Sumter as passengers. They “became lions at once.”⁴ The Oreto was immediately released. The Consul reported this fact to his Government, and said that “the character of the vessel had become the theme of general conversation and remark among all classes of the citizens of Nassau for weeks.”⁵ On the same day Captain Hickley, whose professional eye had detected the purpose of the vessel from the beginning, signed with his officers the certificate quoted above.

The Consul, finding that reenwed representations to the Governor⁶ were met by an answer that the agents of the Oreto assured him of their intention to clear in ballast for Havana, and that he had given his assent to it,⁷ applied to Captain Hickley, of the Greyhound, and laid before him the evidence which had already been laid before the civil authorities. He answered by sending a file of marines on board the Oreto and taking her into custody.⁸

[343] The civil authorities at Nassau were all actively *friendly to the insurgents. With the Consul of the United States they had only the formal relations made necessary by his official position, With the insurgents it was quite different. We have already seen how Heyliger thought they regarded him. Maffitt, Semmes, and many other insurgent officers were there, and were often thrown in contact with the Government officials. Adderley, the correspondent of Fraser, Trenholm & Co., and the mercantile agent of the insurgents, was one of the leading merchants of the colony. Harris, his partner, was a member of the Council, and was in intimate social relations with all the authorities. The principal law officer of the colony, who would have charge of any prosecution that might be instituted against the Oreto and the cross-examination of the witnesses summoned in her favor, was the counsel of Adderley. All these circumstances, combined with the open partiality of the colonial authorities for the cause of the South, threw the insurgent agents and officers at that critical moment into intimate relations with those local authorities.¹

[344] [345] If it had been predetermined that the Oreto should be released by going through the form of a trial under the Foreign Enlistment Act,² the steps could not have been better directed tor that pur*pose. The trial commenced on the 4th of July, 1862.³ The prosecution was conducted by a gentleman who was at once Crown Counsel; Advocate General, and confidential counsel of Adderley & Co. and who, in a speech made in a trial in another court, which took place after the Oreto was libeled and before the decree was rendered, said that the Union of the United States was “a myth, a Yankee fiction of the past, now fully exploded.”⁴ The temper with which he would manage the prosecution of the Oreto may be imagined from this speech. He hurried on the trial before evidence could be obtained from Liverpool. He conducted his cross-examinations so as to suppress evidence unfavorable to the Oreto, when it could be done. He neglected to summon witnesses who must have been within his control, who could have shown conclusively that the Oreto was built for the insurgents, and was to be converted into a man-of-war.⁵ Maffitt knew it, but was not called.⁶ Heyliger knew it, but was not called. Adderley *knew it, but he was not called. Evans and Chapman were both there—officers in the insurgents’ navy, under the direction or Maffitt, drawing pay from him as an officer in that navy, and giving receipts as such.⁷ They knew all about it, but were not called. Harris,⁸ a member of the firm of Adderley & Co., was called, but his cross-examination was so conducted as to bring out nothing damaging to the vessel.⁹ He said, for instance, that the Oreto was consigned to him by Fraser, Trenholm & Co., and was to clear for St. John’s, New Brunswick. It might have been supposed that counsel desirous of ascertaining the truth would have followed up these clews, and would have shown from this witness the origin and the real purposes of the vessel; but that was not done.

[346] The direct examination of Captain Hickley, of the Greyhound, disclosed that officer’s opinion of the character and destination of the Oreto. His cross-examination was conducted by a gentleman who was represented to be the Solicitor General of the Colony, but who, in this case, appeared against the Crown. The testimony of sailors was also received to show that the vessel carried Con*federate flags, and that Semmes and the other insurgent officers were in the habit of visiting her.

The judge, in deciding the case, disregarded the positive proof of the character, intent, and ownership of the vessel. He said that he did not believe the evidence as to the insurgent flags, coming from common sailors, and he added, “Had there been a Confederate flag on board the Oreto, I should not consider it as very powerful evidence.” The overwhelming testimony of Captain Hickley and his officers was summarily disposed of. To this he said, “I have no right whatever to take it into consideration; the case depends upon what has been done since the vessel came within this jurisdiction.” While thus ruling out either as false or as irrelevant evidence against the vessel which events proved to be true and relevant, he gave the willing ear of credence to the misstatements of the persons connected with the Oreto. He could see no evidence of illegal intent in the acts of those who had charge of the Oreto. It is no wonder that the trial ended on the 2d of August with a judgment that, “Under all these circumstances I do not feel that I should be justified in condemning the Oreto. She will therefore be restored.”¹

[347] The United States call the attention of the Arbitrators to the important fact that the princi*pal ground on which this vessel was released, namely, the irrelevancy of the evidence of Captain Hickley and his associates, was believed by Her Majesty’s Government not to be in accordance with British law. When the news of the seizure of the Oreto arrived at London, Earl Russell directed inquiries to be made, “in order that a competent officer should be sent to Nassau in order to give evidence as to what occurred at Liverpool in the case of that vessel.”² Her Majesty’s Government evidently considered that it would be relevant and proper to show the condition of the vessel when she left Liverpool; and should it appear, as it did appear in Captain Hickley’s testimony, that at the time of her leaving she was fitted out as a man-of-war, with intent to cruise against the United States, then it would be entirely within the scope of the powers of the court in Nassau to condemn her for a violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819. Had the trial not been hurried on, such probably would have been the instructions from London.

[348] Both before and after the release of the Oreto, Maffitt was shipping a crew at Nassau. One witness deposes³ to shipping forty men. On the 8th of August she cleared for St. John’s, New *Brunswick. This was on its face a palpable fraud. On the 9th the schooner Prince Alfred went to the wharf of Adderley & Co., the Nassau correspondents of Fraser, Trenholm & Co., and there took on board eight cannon and a cargo of shot, shells, and provisions, and then went over the bar and laid her course for Green Cay, one of the British Bahama Islands, about sixty miles distant from Nassau. The Oreto, having been thoroughly supplied with coal while at the island of New Providence, lay outside with a hawser attached to one of Her Majesty’s ships of war. When the Prince Alfred appeared she cast off the hawser and followed and overtook the Prince Alfred, and gave her a tow. It was a bright moonlight night, with a smooth sea, and the voyage was soon made. The arms and ammunition, and so much of the supplies as she had room for, were then transferred to the Oreto; the rest were taken back to Nassau, where the Prince Alfred went unmolested for her violation of the law. The two vessels parted company, and the Oreto, now called the Florida, made for the coast of Cuba.

The United States ask the Tribunal of Arbitration to find that in these proceedings which took place at Nassau and in the Bahamas, Great Britain was once more guilty of a violation of its duty, as a neutral, toward the United States, in regard to this vessel.

[349] *The Oreto had been, within the jurisdiction of Great Britain at Liverpool, specially adapted to warlike use, with intent that she should cruise or carry on war against the United States. She had come again at Nassau within the jurisdiction of Her Majesty, and no steps were taken to prevent her departure from that jurisdiction. This alone was a violation of the duties prescribed by the second clause of the first rule of the Treaty; but it was not the only failure of Her Majesty’s officials to perform their duties at that time as the representative of a neutral Government.

The Oreto was armed within British jurisdiction; namely, at Green Cay. The arrangements for arming, however, were made in the harbor of Nassau; and the two vessels left that port almost simultaneously, and proceeded to Green Cay together. The purpose for which they went was notorious in Nassau. This was so palpable an evasion that the act should be assumed as having taken place in the harbor of Nassau. In either event, however, the act was committed within British jurisdiction, and was therefore a violation of the first clause of the first rule of the Treaty.

In like manner, the same acts, and the enlistment of men at New Providence, were violations of the second rule of the Treaty. There was no diligence used to prevent any of these illegal acts.

[350] *From Green Cay the Florida went to Cardenas, in the island of Cuba, and attempted to ship’ a crew there. “The matter was brought to the notice of the Government, who sent an official to Lieutenant Stribling, commanding during Lieutenant Commanding J. N. Maffitt’s illness, with a copy of the [Spanish] Queen’s Proclamation, and notification to him that the Florida had become liable to seizure.”¹ This efficient conduct of the Spanish authorities made the officers of the Florida feel at once that they were no longer in British waters. She left Cuba, and on the 4th of September she ran through the blockading squadron of Mobile, pretending to be a British man-of-war, and flying British colors.

[351] During the night of the 16th of January, 1863, the Florida left Mobile. On the morning of the 26th of the same month she re-entered the harbor of Nassau. Between Mobile and Nassau she had destroyed three small vessels, the Corris Ann, the Estelle, and the Windward. At Nassau she was received with more than honor. She “entered the port without any restrictions,”² and “the officers landed in the garrison boat, escorted by the post adjutant, Lieutenant Williams, of the Second West India Regiment.”¹ The Governor made a feint of finding fault with the mode in which she had entered, but*ended by giving her all the hospitality which her commander desired. She was at Nassau for thirty-six hours,² and while there-she took in coal and provisions to last for three months.³ This coal was taken on board by “permission of the authorities.”⁴

The attention of the Tribunal of Arbitration is also invited to the excess of these and all similar hospitalities, as violations of the instructions issued on the 31st of January, 1862.⁵

[352] “These orders required every ship of war or privateer of either belligerent, which should enter British waters, to depart within twenty-four hours afterward, except in case of stress of weather, or of her requiring provisions or things necessary for the subsistence of her crew, or repairs. In either of these cases she was to put to sea as soon after the expiration of the twenty-four hours as possible, taking in no supplies beyond what might be necessary for immediate use, and no more coal than would carry her to the nearest port of *her own country, or some nearer destination, nor after coaling once in British waters was she to be suffered to coal again within three months, unless by special permission.”⁶

These rules were rigidly enforced against the United States, They were not only relaxed, but they were oftentimes utterly disregarded in the treatment of the insurgent vessels.

The Florida when at Nassau, in the months of May, June, and July, 1862, and again in the month of January, 1863, was distant from Wilmington, Charleston, or Savannah, only two, or at most three, days’ steaming. She ordinarily sailed under canvas. Even when using steam in the pursuit and capture of vessels her consumption of coal, as shown by her log-book, did not average four tons a day. Thirty tons, (more than the amount taken by the United States Steamer Dacotah September, 1862,) was all that she should have been allowed to take on board under the instructions, even had she been an honest vessel, and one that Great Britain was not bound to arrest and detain. Yet in July, 1862, she received all the coal she wanted, and in January, 1863, she took on board a three months’ supply.

[353] The Tribunal also will note that in January, 1863, the entry into the harbor, though made * without permission, was condoned; that the visit lasted thirty-six hours instead of twenty-four; and that the “supplies” exceeded largely what was immediately necessary for the subsistence of the crew.

[354] The excessive hospitality was in striking contrast with the receptions given to vessels of the United States at that port. It has already been shown that in December, 1861, the United States had been forbidden to land coals at Nassau or Bermuda, except on condition that it should not be used for their vessels of war. It has also been shown that in September, 1862, the United States war-steamer Dacotah was forbidden to take more than twenty tons of coal, and that only upon condition that for ten days she would not re-appear in British waters. On the 20th of the previous November the commander of the Wachusett was informed that he could not be allowed even to anchor, or to come within three miles of the shore, without permission of the Governor. In fact, the indignities to which the vessels of the United States were subjected were so great that the Rear-Admiral in command of the fleet, on the 2d of January, 1863, wrote to the Secretary of the Navy, “I have not entered any British port except Bermuda, nor do I intend to enter, or permit any of the vessels of the squadron to ask permission to *enter, or subject myself and those under my command to the discourtesies those who had entered heretofore had received.”¹

The United States insist that these excessive hospitalities to the Florida and these discourtesies to the vessels of war of the United States constituted a further violation of the duties of Great Britain as a neutral. By furnishing a full supply of coal to the Florida, after a similar hospitality had been refused to the vessels of the United States, the British officials permitted Nassau to be made a base of hostile operations against the United States; and for this, as well as for other violations of duty as to that vessel, which have been already noticed, Great Britain became liable to the United States for the injuries resulting from her acts.

[355] The Florida left the port of Nassau on the afternoon of the 27th of January, 1863. By the middle of the following month her coal was getting low. On the 26th day of February Admiral Wilkes, in command of the United States Squadron in the West Indies, wrote to his Government thus: “The fact of the Florida having but a few days’ coal makes me anxious to have our vessels off the Martinique, which is the only island at which they can hope to get any coal supplies, the English islands being*cut off under the rules of her Majesty’s Government for some sixty days yet, which precludes the possibility, unless by chicanery or fraud, of the hope of any coal or comfort there.”² Admiral Wilkes’s hopes were destined to disappointment. On the 24th of February, two days before the date of his dispatch, the Florida had been in the harbor of Barbadoes, and had taken on board about one hundred tons³ of coal in violation of the instructions of January 31, 1862.

[356] Rear-Admiral Wilkes, hearing of this new breach of neutrality, visited Barbadoes ten days later to inquire into the circumstance. He addressed a letter to the Governor, in which he said, “I have to request your Excellency will afford me the opportunity of laying before my Government the circumstances under which the Florida was permitted to take in a supply of coal and provisions to continue her cruise and operations, after having so recently coaled and provisioned at Nassau, one of Her Majesty’s colonies in the West Indies, ample time having been afforded, some thirty days, for the information to have reached this island and Government; and if any cause existed why an investigation was not instituted after the letter to your Excellency was received from*the United States Consul.”⁴ The Governor evaded the question. He “doubted very much whether it would be desirable to enter into correspondence upon the points adverted to,” and said that “in sanctioning the coaling of the Florida, he did no more than what he had sanctioned in the case of the United States steamer of war San Jacinto.”¹ There was no parallel or even resemblance between the treatment of the San Jacinto and that of the Florida. On the 13th of November, 1863, the San Jacinto received seventy-five tons of coal and some wood at Barbadoes. With that exception she received no coal or other fuel from a British port during that cruise.²

Under these circumstances the United States must ask the Tribunal to declare that the burden is upon Great Britain to establish, that this express violation of Her Majesty’s Proclamation was innocently done. Whether done innocently or designedly, they insist, for the reasons already set forth, that the act was a new violation of the duties of a neutral, and furnished to the United States fresh cause of complaint against Great Britain.

[357] [358] Before completing the history of this vessel, the United States desire to show to the Tribunal how the vessels of the United States were received at *Barbadoes, the port at which the Florida received the last-mentioned supply of coal. They have already referred to the treatment of their vessels at Nassau and Bermuda. Captain Charles Boggs arrived at Barbadoes in April, 1865, in the United States war-steamer Connecticut, and made application for permission to remain there “a few days for the purpose of overhauling the piston and feed-pump of the engine.”³ The Governor replied, “It will be necessary for you, before I can give my sanction to your staying here longer than twenty-four hours, to give a definite assurance of your inability to proceed to sea at the expiration of that time, and as to the period within which it would be possible for you to execute the necessary repairs.”⁴ Captain Boggs replied, “Your letter virtually refuses the permission requested, inasmuch as it requires me to give a definite assurance of my inability to proceed to sea at the termination of twenty four hours. This I cannot do, as an American man-of-war can always go to sea in some manner. I shall do this, although with risk to my vessel and machinery. Regretting that the national hospitality of remaining at anchor for the purposes named in my letter of this morning is refused, I have the honor to inform you that *I shall depart from this port to-morrow at 10 a.m.”⁵

Barbadoes as well as Nassau having been thus made a base of hostile operations against the United States, the Florida again sailed out on her work of destruction on the evening of the 26th of February, 1863, and in a short time captured or destroyed the following vessels of the commercial marine of the United States, viz: the Aldebaran, the Clarence, the Commonwealth, the Crown Point, the General Berry, the Henrietta, the M. J. Colcord, the Lapwing, the Oneida, the Rienzi, the Southern Cross, the Star of Peace, the William B. Nash, and the Bed Gauntlet. An intercepted letter from her commander to Bullock, dated April 25, 1863, says, “The Florida has thus far done her duty. Six million dollars will not make good the devastation this steamer has committed.”⁶

[359] On the 16th of July, 1863, the Florida arrived at Bermuda. She remained nine days in that port, and was thoroughly repaired both in her hull and machinery. She also took on board a full supply of the best Cardiff coal, which had been brought to her from Halifax by the transport Harriet Pinckney.¹ This was permitted notwithstanding the general order that neither belligerent was to *be permitted to make coal depots in British colonial ports.

Here, again, were fresh-recurring violations of the duties of Great Britain as a neutral, to be added to the accumulated charges that have already been made as to this vessel.

With the improvements, repairs, and supplies obtained at Bermuda the Florida started for Brest. In crossing the Atlantic she destroyed the Francis B. Cutting on the 6th of August, and the Avon on the 20th; On the 3d of September Maffitt reports from Brest to Bullock, at Liverpool, “a list of men discharged from the Florida, with their accounts and discharges,” and he asks him “to provide them situations in the service.”² We have already seen that when Bullock received this letter he was low in funds.³ He was however, able to send from Liverpool to Brest for the Florida some new machinery and armament,⁴ and also a, crew.⁵

[360] The Florida left Brest in January, 1864, and entered the port of Bermuda in the following May, remaining, however, only long enough to land a sick officer. In June she returned to that port and made application for permission to repair. The Governor directed an examination to be made by experts, who reported:⁶ “1. She can proceed to sea with such repairs as can be made good here, which, as far as we can judge, will require five days for one man, viz, a diver for two days and a fitter for three days; or three complete days in all. 2. She can proceed to sea with safety in her present state under steam, but under sail is unmanageable with her screw up in bad weather, and her defects aloft (cross-trees) render maintop-mast unsafe. This could be made good in two days.” On this report, the Florida received permission to remain there five days; she actually remained nine days. While there she took on board one hundred and thirty-five tons of coal, half a ton of beef, half a ton of vegetables, a large supply of bread, provisions, and medicines, a large supply of clothing and other stores, and twenty days of carpenter’s work were done upon the vessel.⁷ Morris, the new commander, then drew upon Bullock, in Liverpool, in order to pay these bills, and provide himself with means for a cruise; and on the 27th of June, 1864, the Florida, being thus completely fitted out, left the port of Bermuda, and cruised off the harbor, boarding all vessels approaching the island.⁸

[361] *The breach of neutrality and violation of the instructions issued for the observance of British officials involved in these transactions were brought to Earl Russell’s notice by Mr. Adams.⁹ Earl Russell replied that “although some disposition was manifested by the commander of the Florida to evade the stringency of Her Majesty’s regulations, the most commendable diligence and strictness in enforcing those regulations was observed on the part of the authorities, and no substantial deviation, either from the letter or from the spirit of those regulations, was permitted to or did take place.”¹

[362] With the evidence now submitted to the Tribunal, which are the original vouchers for the purchases made at Bermuda by the Florida, it is evident that Earl Russell must have been misinformed when he stated that there had been no deviation from the regulations. The five days’ stay which was granted was extended to nine. Twenty days’ carpenter-work were done instead of five; supplies for a cruise were taken instead of sullies for immediate use; clothing, rum, medicines, and general supplies were taken, as well as supplies for the subsistence of the crew; one hundred and thirty-five tons of coal were *taken instead of twenty. In all this the United States find fresh and cumulative cause of complaint on account of this vessel. They also call the particular attention of the Tribunal to the fact that at that time there was no necessity of making any repairs to the Florida. The experts employed by the Governor to make the examination reported, “She can proceed to sea with safety in her present state under steam.” The repairs, therefore, were only necessary to enable her to use her sails, banking her fires,² and laying to for the purpose of watching and destroying the commerce of the United States. Permitting any repairs to be made at that time was another violation of the duties of Great Britain as a neutral toward the United States.

The Florida left Bermuda on the 27th of June, 1864. On the 1st of July she destroyed the Harriet Stevens; the Golconda on the 8th; the Margaret Y. Davis on the 9th; the Electric Spark on the 10th; and the Mondamin on the 26th of September, all being vessels belonging to the commercial marine of the United States. On the 7th of October, 1864, her career as an insurgent cruiser terminated at Bahia.

[363] During her cruise, three tenders were fitted out and manned from her officers and crew. The * Clarence was captured by her off the coast of Brazil on the 6th of May, 1863. She was then fitted out with guns, officers, and men, and during the first part of the month of June, 1863, captured and destroyed the Kate Stewart, the Mary Alvina, the Mary Schindler, and the Whistling Wind. On the 10th of that month she captured the Tacony. The Clarence was then destroyed, and the Tacony was converted into a tender, and, in the same month, destroyed the Ada, the Byzantian, the Elizabeth Ann, the Goodspeed the L. A. Macomber, the Marengo, the Ripple, the Rufus Choate, and the Umpire.³ On the 25th she captured the Archer. The crew and armament were transferred to that vessel, and the Tacony burned. On the 27th the United States revenue-cutter Caleb Cashing’ was destroyed by the Archer.

[364] The amount of the injury which the United States and its citizens suffered from the acts of this vessel and of its tenders will be hereafter stated. The United States with confidence assert that they have demonstrated that Great Britain, by reason of the general principles’ above stated, and in consequence of the particular acts or omissions hereinbefore recited, failed to fulfill all of the duties set forth in the three rules of the sixth article of the Treaty, or recognized by the *principles of International Law not inconsistent with such rules, and they ask the Tribunal to certify that fact as to the Florida and as to its tenders. Should the Tribunal exercise the power conferred upon it by Article VII of the Treaty to award a sum in gross to be paid to the United States, they ask that in considering the amount so to be awarded, the losses of individuals in the destruction of their vessels and cargoes, by the Florida, or by its tenders, and also the expenses to which the United States were put in the pursuit of either of those vessels, may be taken into account.

The Alabama, and her tender, the Tuscaloosa.

The Alabama, and her tender, the Tuscaloosa. [365] The Alabama, a vessel which has given the generic name to the claims before this Tribunal, is thus described by Semmes, her commander: “She was of about 900 tons burden, 230 feet in length, 32 feet in breadth, 20 feet in depth, and drew, when provisioned and coaled for cruise, 15 feet of water. She was barkentinerigged, with long lower masts, which enabled her to carry large fore and aft sails, as jibs and try-sails. The scantling of the vessel was light compared with vessels of her class in the Federal Navy, but this was scarcely a disadvantage, as she was designed *as a scourge of the enemy’s commerce rather than for battle. Her engine was of 300 horse-power, and she had attached an apparatus for condensing from the vapor of sea-water all the fresh water that her crew might require. * * * Her armament consisted of eight guns; six 32-pounders in broadside, and two pivot-guns amid-ship, one on the forecastle, and the other abaft the mainmast, the former a 100-pounder rifled Blakeley, and the latter a smooth-bore 8-inch.”¹

The Alabama was built and, from the outset, was “intended for a Confederate vessel of war.”² The contract for her construction was “signed by Captain Bullock on the one part and Messrs. Laird on the other.” The date of the signature cannot be given exactly. The drawings were signed October 9, 1861, and it is supposed that the contract was signed at or about the same time. “The ship cost in United States money about $255,000.” The payments were made by the agents of the insurgents. Bullock “went almost daily on board the gun-boat, and seemed to be recognized in authority;” in fact, “he superintended the building of the Alabama.”³

[366] On the 15th of May she was launched under the *name of the 290.⁴ Her officers were in England awaiting her completion, and were paid their salaries “monthly, about the first of the month, at Fraser, Trenholm & Co.’s office in Liverpool.”⁵

The purpose for which this vessel was being constructed was notorious in Liverpool. Before she was launched she became an object of suspicion with the Consul of the United States at that port, and she was the subject of constant correspondence on his part with his Government and with Mr. Adams.⁶

[367] The failure of Mr. Adams to secure in the previous March the interference of Her Majesty’s Government to prevent the departure of the Florida, appears to have induced him to think that it would be necessary to obtain strictly technical proof of a violation of the municipal law of England before he could hope to secure the detention of the then nameless Alabama. That he had good reason to think so is not open to reasonable doubt. On the 23d of June be thought he bad such proof. He wrote to Earl Russell that day,¹ recalling to his recollection the fact that notwithstanding the favorable reports from the Liverpool customs in regard to the Florida, there was the strongest reason for *believing that she had gone to Nassau, and was there “engaged in completing her armament, provisioning, and crew,” for the purpose of carrying on war against the United States.² He continued, “I am now under the painful necessity of apprising your Lordship that a new and still more powerful war-steamer is nearly ready for departure from the port of Liverpool on the same errand.” “The parties engaged in the enterprise are persons well known at Liverpool to be agents and officers of the insurgents of the United States.” “This vessel has been built and launched from the dock-yard of persons, one of whom is now sitting as a member of the House of Commons, and is fitting out for the especial and manifest object of carrying on hostilities by sea.” He closed by soliciting such action as might “tend either to stop the projected expedition, or to establish the fact that its purpose is not inimical to the people of the United States.”

[368] [369] Earl Russell replied that he had referred “this matter to the proper department of Her Majesty’s Government,”³ and on the 4th of July, 1862, he inclosed the customs report on the subject, in which it is stated that “the officers have at all *times free access to the building yards of the Messrs. Laird, at Birkenhead, where the vessel is lying, and that there has been no attempt, on the part of her builders, to disguise, what is most apparent, that she is intended for a ship of war.” It was further said that “the description of her in the communication of the United States Consul is most correct, with the exception that her engines are not constructed on the oscillatory principle. “With reference to the statement of the United States Consul that the evidence he has in regard to this vessel being intended for the so-called Confederate Government in the Southern States is entirely satisfactory to his mind,” it was said that “the proper course would be for the Consul to submit such evidence as he possesses to the collector at that port, who would thereupon take such measures as the Foreign Enlistment Act would require;” and the report closed by saying “that the officers at Liverpool will keep a strict watch on the vessel.”⁴ The point that the vessel was intended for a vessel of war being thus conceded, Mr. Adams thereupon, at once, relying upon the promise to keep watch of the vessel, instructed the Consul to comply with the directions indicated in the report of the Commissioners and furnish all the evidence in his possession to the Collector of Customs at Liverpool.⁵

Mr. Dudley did so on the 9th of July, in a letter to the Collector of Liverpool,⁶ and the attention of the Tribunal of Arbitration is called to the fact that every material allegation in that letter has been more than borne out by subsequent proof. The Collector replied that he was “respectfully of opinion that the statement made was not such as could be acted upon by the officers of the revenue unless legally substantiated by evidence.”¹ And again, a few days later, be said to Mr. Dudley, “The details given by you in regard to the said vessel are not sufficient, in a legal point of view, to justify me in taking upon myself the responsibility of the detention of this ship.”²

Thus early in the history of this cruiser the point was taken by the British authorities—a point maintained throughout the struggle—that I they would originate nothing themselves for the maintenance and performance of their international duties, and that they would listen to no representations from the officials of the United States which did not furnish technical evidence for a criminal prosecution under the Foreign Enlistment Act.

[371] * The energetic Consul of the United States at Liverpool was not disheartened. He caused a copy of his letter to be laid before R. P. Collier, Esq., one of the most eminent barristers of England, who, a few months later, became Solicitor General of the Crown, under Lord Palmerston’s administration, and who is now understood to be the principal law adviser of the Crown.

Mr. Collier advised that “the principal officer of the customs at Liverpool * * be applied to to seize the vessel, with a view to her condemnation,” and, “at the same time, to lay a statement of the fact before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, coupled with the request that Her Majesty’s Government would direct the vessel to be seized, or ratify the seizure if it has been made.”³

[371] It was useless to attempt to induce the collector to seize the vessel. Mr. Dudley thereupon set about to get the direct proof required by the authorities as to the character of the Alabama or 290. “There were men enough,” he said, “who knew about her, and who understood her character, but they were not willing to testify, and, in a preliminary proceeding like this, it was impossible to obtain process to compel them. Indeed, no one in a hostile community like Liverpool, *where the feeling and sentiment are against us, would be a willing witness, especially if he resided there, and was any way dependent upon the people of that place for a livelihood.”⁴ At last Mr. Dudley succeeded in finding the desired proof. On the 21st day of July, he laid it in the form of affidavits before the Collector at Liverpool in compliance with the intimations which Mr. Adams had received from Earl Bus-sell.⁵ These affidavits were on the same day transmitted by the Collector to the Board of Customs at London, with a request for instructions by telegraph, as the ship appeared to be ready for sea and might leave any hour.⁶ Mr. Dudley then went to London, and on the 23d of July laid the affidavits before Mr. Collier for his opinion.⁷ Copies of the affidavits will be found in Vol. HI, page 21 to 28, and Vol. VI, page 391,et. seq.

[372] It is not necessary to dwell upon the character of this proof, since it was conclusively soon passed upon by both Mr. Collier and by Her Majesty’s Government. It is sufficient to say that it showed affirmatively that the 290 was a “fighting vessel;” that she was “going out to the Government of the Confederate States of America to *cruise and commit hostilities against the Government and people of the United States of America;” “that the enlisted men were to join the ship in Messrs. Laird & Co.’s yard;” that they were enlisting men “who had previously served on fighting-ships;” that the enlistments had then been going on for over a month, and that there was need of immediate action by the British Government, if action was to be of any service in protecting its neutrality against violation.

Mr. Collier said immediately, “It appears difficult to make out a stronger case of infringement of the Foreign Enlistment Act, which, if not enforced on this occasion, is little better than a dead letter. It well deserves consideration whether, if the vessel be allowed to escape, the Federal Government would not have serious grounds of remonstrance.”¹

[373] The 290 was at this time nearly ready for sea, and time was important. Mr. Dudley, through his counsel, in order that no time might be lost, on the same day laid Mr. Collier’s new opinion before the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and before the Secretary of the Board of Customs. The Under Secretary “was not disposed to discuss the matter, nor did he read Mr. Collier’s opinion.”² The Secretary of the Board of Customs said that the Board could not act without orders from the Treasury Lords.³ The last of these answers was not communicated until the 28th of July.

The additional proof and the new opinion of Mr. Collier were also officially communicated to Her Majesty’s Government through the regular diplomatic channels. On the 22d of July copies of the depositions of Dudley, Maguire, DaCosta, Wilding, and Passmore were sent to Lord Russell by Mr. Adams;⁴ and on the 24th of July copies of the depositions of Roberts and Taylor were in like manner sent to Lord Russell These were acknowledged by Lord Russell on the 28th.

On that day “these papers were considered by the Law Officers of the Crown; on the same evening their report was agreed upon, and it was in Lord Russell’s hands early on the 29th. Orders were then immediately sent to Liverpool to stop the vessel.”⁵

[374] Thus it appears that this intelligence, which Great Britain regarded as sufficient to require the detention of the 290, was communicated to Her Majesty’s Government in three ways: first, on the 21st of July, through the channel at Liverpool, * which had been indicated by Earl Russell; second, on the 22d by the solicitor of Mr. Dudley in person to the Customs and to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Office; and thirdly, on the 23d and on the 24th by Mr. Adams officially. It also appears that the information communicated on the 21st was transmitted to London by the Collector, with the statement that the vessel might sail at any hour, and that it was important to give the instructions for detention by telegraph; and it still further appears that notwithstanding this official information from the Collector, the papers were not considered by the law advisers until the 28th, and that the case appeared to them to be so clear that they gave their advice upon it that evening. Under these circumstances, the delay of eight days after the 21st in the order for the detention of the vessel was, in the opinion of the United States, gross negligence on the part of Her Majesty’s Government. On the 29th the Secretary of the Commission of the Customs received a telegram from Liverpool saying that “the vessel 290 came out of dock last night, and left the port this morning.”¹ Mr. Adams was justly indignant at the failure of the customs authorities to redeem their voluntary promise to watch the vessel.²

[375] *On the 31st of July Mr. Adams had a” conference with Lord Russell at the Foreign Office,” at which “his Lordship first took up the case of the 290, and remarked that a delay in determining upon it bad most unexpectedly been caused by the sudden development of a malady of the Queen’s Advocate, Sir John D. Harding, totally incapacitating him for the transaction of business. This had made it necessary to call in other parties, whose opinion had been at last given for the retention of the gun-boat, but before the order got down to Liverpool the vessel was gone. He should, however, send directions to have her stopped if she went, as was probable, to Nassau.”³ The judgment of Her Majesty’s Government upon the character of the Alabama and upon the duty of Great Britain toward her was, therefore, identical with that of Mr. Collier.

The departure of the 290 from Birkenhead was probably, it may be said certainly, hastened by the illicit receipt of the intelligence of the decision of the Government to detain her.⁴

[376] After leaving the dock she “proceeded slowly *down the Mersey.” Both the Lairds were on board, and also Bullock. On the way down the river Laird settled with the paymaster for some purchases for the vessel, and paid into his hands a small sum of money.⁵

At the bell-buoy the Lairds and the ladies left by a tug, and returned to Liverpool. The 290 slowly steamed oh to Moelfra Bay, on the coast of Anglesey, where she remained “all that night, all the next day, and the next night.” No effort was made to seize her.

[377] During this time the tug Hercules, which had returned from the bell-buoy with the Lairds and the ladies, took on board at Liverpool a number of new hands for the 290. One account says there were as many as forty.⁶ The master of the Hercules admits that there might have been thirty.⁷ This was done publicly—so publicly that the United States Consul knew of it, and notified the Collector. The Collector had his orders to seize the 290, and had only to follow the Hercules to get the information which would enable him to obey those orders. He did cause the Hercules to be examined. The Surveyor who did that work reported to him that there were a number of persons on board, who admitted “that they were a portion of the crew, and were going to join the gun-boat,”⁸ and yet he neither stopped the Hercules, nor followed it. In an emergency when, if ever, the telegraph ought to have been employed, he wrote a letter by mail to the Commissioners of Customs at London,⁹ which could not be received until the following day. When this letter was received the Commissioners took no notice of the admitted recruitment of men, but ordered inquiries to be made as to powder and guns.¹ Before these inquiries could be commenced, the offender was at sea.² Under the circumstances this hesitation and delay, and the permitting the Alabama to lie unmolested in British waters for over two days, is little short of criminal in the officials who were or should have been cognizant of it.

[378] When the Alabama left Moelfra Bay her crew numbered about ninety men.³ She ran part way down the Irish Channel, then round the north coast of Ireland, only stopping near the Giant’s Causeway. She then made for Terceira, one of *the Azores, which she reached on the 10th of August.⁴

On the 18th of August, while she was at Terceira, a sail was observed making for the anchorage. It proved to be the Agrippina of London, Captain McQueen, having on board six guns, with ammunition, coals, stores, &c, for the Alabama.” Preparations were immediately made to transfer this important cargo. On the afternoon of the 20th, while employed discharging the bark, the screw-steamer Bahama Captain Tessier, (the same that had taken the armament to the Florida, whose insurgent ownership and character were well known in Liverpool,) arrived, “having on board Commander Raphael Semmes and officers of the Confederate States steamer Sumter.”⁵ There were also taken from this steamer two 32-pounders and some stores,⁶ which occupied all the remainder of that day and a part of the next.

[379] The 22d and 23d of August were taken up in transferring coal from the Agrippina to the Alabama. It was not until Sunday (the 24th) that the insurgents’ flag was hoisted. Bullock and * those who were not going in the 290 went back to the Bahama, and the Alabama, now first known under that name, went off with “twenty-six officers and eighty-five men.”

If it be necessary for the Tribunal to ascertain and determine what was the condition of the Alabama when she left Liverpool on the 29th of July, 1862, the affidavits of various witnesses, printed in the accompanying Volume, (III,) will enable them to do so with accuracy.⁷ If any details are wanting, they can easily be supplied from the account which her commander has given of his Adventures Afloat.⁸

[380] It is clear from all these statements that when she left Liverpool she was even more completely fitted out as a man-of-war than the Florida, at the time of her departure. The Tribunal will recall what Captain Hickley, a competent expert, said of that vessel: “She was in all respects fitted out as a vessel of war of her class in Her Majesty’s Navy.” “As she now stands she could, in my professional opinion, be equipped in twenty-four hours for * battle.” This is not too strong language to be used concerning the Alabama. She was, in fact equipped for battle in little more than twenty-four hours after the Bahama joined her.

It is not necessary, however, to consider this question; for her guilty status at that time is conclusively established against Great Britain.

1st. By the opinion of Mr. Collier, who, soon after giving it, became a member of Her Majesty’s Government, under the lead of Lord Palmers-ton, and with Earl Russell as a colleague. They must, therefore, be held to have adopted his views on one of the most important questions, half legal and half political, that came before Lord Palinerston’s Government for determination.

2d. Her Majesty’s Government, by ordering the detention of the 290, admitted her illegal character. Earl Russell himself hints that it is not impossible that “the officers of the customs were misled or blinded by the general partiality to the cause of the South known to prevail at Liverpool, and that a prima facie case of negligence could be made out.¹

3d. [381] Earl Russell stated to Mr. Adams in an official note that “it is undoubtedly true that the Alabama was partly fitted out in a British port.”² *This is all that is necessary to be said in order to bring it within the operation of the rules of the Treaty of Washington.

Thus constructed, equipped, fitted out, and manned as a ship of war in Liverpool, and armed under the original contract made at the same place with arms and munitions there collected by the contractors of the vessel, but sent out from Great Britain by a separate vessel in order to comply with the official construction of British municipal law, the Alabama commenced a career of destruction which proved highly disastrous to the commerce of the United States.

She was found to be a “fine sailer under canvass,” “a quality of inestimable advantage,” as it enabled Captain Semmes “to do most of his work under sail.”³ “She carried but an eighteen days’ supply of fuel,” which induced her commander “to adopt the plan of working under sail in the very beginning,” and “to practice it unto the end.” “With the exception of a half a dozen prizes, all captures were made with the screw hoisted and ship under sail.”⁴

[382] The United States will confine their comments to the official treatment which this vessel received within British jurisdiction. Her history for a *large part of her career may be found in Vol. IV, between pages 181 and 201. It has also been made the subject of an elaborate volume, from which some short extracts have been quoted above.

[383] From Terceira she crossed to the West Indies, taking at Martinique coal again from the bark Agrippina, which had been sent from England for the purpose;⁵ and she passed up thence into the Gulf of Mexico, marking her course by the destruction of vessels of the merchant marine of the United States, and of their war-steamer Hatteras. On the 18th of January, 1862, she arrived at Jamaica. Three British men-of-war were in the harbor, but the promised orders of Earl Russell to detain her for a violation of British sovereignty were not there. In lieu of that, “the most cordial relations were at once established between the officers of all these ships and of the Alabama,”¹ and the Governor of the island promptly granted Semtnes’s request to be permitted to repair his ship.² On the 25th of January, having been refitted and furnished with supplies, she left Jamaica,*” bound to the coast of Brazil, and thence to the Cape of Good Hope.”³

[384] On the 30th of the previous November, after Captain Semmes’s mode of carrying on war was known in England, Mr. Adams made to Lord Bus-sell the first of a long series of representations concerning this vessel. This communication contains a summary of all that the United States deem it necessary to say about the Alabama in this place. “It now appears,” Mr. Adams says, “from a survey of all the evidence, First. That this vessel was built in a dock-yard belonging to a commercial house in Liverpool, of which the chief member, down to October of last year, is a member of the House of Commons. Secondly. That from the manner of her construction, and her peculiar adaptation to war purpose, there could have been no doubt by those engaged in the work, and familiar with such details, that she was intended for other purposes than those of legitimate trade; and, Thirdly. That during the whole process and outfit in the port of Liverpool, the direction of the details, and the engagement of persons to be employed in her, were more or less in hands known to be connected with the insurgents in the United States. It further appears that since her departure from Liverpool, which she was suffered to leave* without any of the customary evidence at the custom-house to designate her ownership, she has been supplied with her armament, with coals, and stores, and men, by vessels known to be fitted out and dispatched for the purpose from the same port, and that although commanded by Americans in her navigation of the ocean, she is manned almost entirely by English seamen, engaged and forwarded from that port by persons in league with her commander. Furthermore it is shown that this commander, claiming to be an officer acting under legitimate authority, yet is in the constant practice of raising the flag of Great Britain, in order the better to execute his system of ravage and depredation on the high seas; And lastly, it is made clear that he pays no regard whatever to the recognized law of capture of merchant-vessels on the high seas, which requires the action of some judicial tribunal to confirm the rightfulness of the proceedings, but, on the contrary, that he resorts to the piratical system of taking, plundering, and burning private property, without regard to consequences, or responsibility to any legitimate authority whatever.”⁴

The course of conduct so forcibly sketched by Mr. Adams was continued by the officers of the Alabama until that vessel was sunk by the Kearsarge off Cherbourg.

[385] [386] *The Alabama went from the West Indies to Bahia, where she met the Georgia. She then crossed to the Cape of Good Hope, and entered Table Bay, as has already been seen.⁵ It is not necessary to say again what took place as to the Tuscaloosa; to speak of the evident character of the vessel with the captured cargo on board; of the honest indignation of Rear-Admiral Sir Baldwin Walker at the flimsy attempt to convert the prize into a cruiser; of the partiality of the Governor and the Attorney General; of the decision of Her Majesty’s Government that she must be regarded as a prize and not as a cruiser; Of the reluctant enforcement of the decision of the Government by the Colonial Authorities; or of the reversal of that decision by Her Majesty’s Government, when they found that it had been enforced. These facts have all been sufficiently set forth. It only remains to add, that, when Her Majesty’s Government had determined to send the instructions to disregard in similar cases such attempts to change the character of a prize, Earl Russell informed Mr. Adams of the fact, and added, “Her Majesty’s Government hope that under these instructions nothing will for the future happen to admit of a question being praised as to Her Majesty’s orders having been strictly carried out.”¹ Earl Russell could *not have anticipated that the first and only attempt of the authorities at Cape Town to carry out those instructions would be disavowed by Her Majesty’s Government, and that restoration would be ordered to the insurgents of the only vessel ever seized under them.

From Cape Town the Alabama pushed into the Indian Ocean, and, “within a day or two of six months,”³ returned again to Cape Town on the 20th of March, 1864. During her absence she had coaled at Singapore, with the consent of the authorities, at the wharf of the Peninsular and Oriental Steamship Company.³

On the 21st of March the Alabama began taking on board fresh supplies of coal in Cape Town.⁴ The last coal from a British port (and, in fact, the last supply) had been taken on board at Singapore on the 23d day of the previous December.⁵ The new supply was allowed to be put on board within three months from the time when the last supply was received in a British port. This was a fresh violation of the duties of Great Britain as a neutral.

[387] On the 25th of March the Alabama “got up steam and moved out of Table Bay for the last *time, amidst lusty cheers and the waving of handkerchiefs from the boats by which they were surrounded.”⁶ “Military and naval officers, governors, judges, superintendents of boards of trade, attorneys-general, all on their way to their missions in the far East, came to see her.”⁷

She now made her way to northern waters, and on the 11th of June, 1864, cast anchor in the harbor of Cherbourg. Her career was now finished. The United States war-steamer Kearsarge was in those waters, and on the 19th of the same June, within sight of Cherbourg, this British-built, British-armed, and British-manned cruiser went down under the fire of American guns.

[388] During her career the Alabama fitted out one tender, the Tuscaloosa. The “Conrad of Philadelphia, from Buenos Ayres to New York, with part of a cargo of wool,” was captured on the 20th of June, 1863, in latitude 25° 48′ south.⁸ It has already been seen that this prize was taken into the port of Cape Town, under the name of the Tuscaloosa, and under pretense of a commission; and that the pretense was recognized as valid. When the Alabama left to cruise in the Indian Ocean, Semmes “dispatched this vessel from Angra Pequeña back to the coast of Brazil, to *make a cruise on that coast.”¹ It has also been seen how, on her return to Cape Town, she was seized by the Governor of Cape Town, and held until the close of the struggle.

The United States ask the Tribunal of Arbitration, as to the Alabama and as to her tender, to determine and to certify that Great Britain has, by its acts and by its omissions, failed to fulfill its duties set forth in the three rules of the Treaty of Washington, or recognized by the principles of law not inconsistent with such rules. Should the Tribunal exercise the power conferred upon it by Article VII of the Treaty, award a sum in gross to be paid to the United States, they ask that, in considering the amount to be awarded, the losses of the United States, or of individuals, in the destruction of their vessels or their cargoes by the Alabama, or by its tender, and also the expense to which the United States were put in the pursuit of either of those vessels, or in the capture and destruction of the Alabama, may be taken into account.

In addition to the general reasons already stated, they ask this for the following reasons:

1. [389] That the Alabama was constructed, was fitted out, and was equipped within the jurisdiction of Great Britain, with intent to cruise and carry *on war against the United States, with whom Great Britain was then at peace; that Great Britain had reasonable ground to believe that such was the intent of that vessel, and did not use due diligence to prevent such construction, fitting out, or equipping.

2. That the Alabama was constructed and armed within British jurisdiction. The construction of the vessel and the construction of the arms; the dispatch of the vessel and the dispatch of the arms—all took place at one British port; and the British authorities had such ample notice that they must be assumed to have known all these facts, The whole should be regarded, therefore, as one armed hostile expedition, from a British port, against the United States.

3. That the Alabama, having been specially adapted to warlike use at Liverpool, and being thus intended to cruise and carry on war against the United States, Great Britain did not use due diligence to prevent her departure from its jurisdiction at Liverpool; nor, subsequently, from its jurisdiction at Kingston; nor, subsequently, from its jurisdiction at the Cape of Good Hope; nor, subsequently, from its jurisdiction at Singapore; nor, lastly, from its jurisdiction again at the Cape of Good Hope, as required by the rules of the Treaty of Washington.

*4. [390] That Great Britain did not, as Earl Russell had promised, send out orders for her detention.

5. That the Alabama received excessive hospitalities at Cape Town on her last visit, in being allowed to coal before three months had expired after her coaling at Singapore, a British port.

6. That the responsibility for the acts of the Alabama carries with it responsibility for the acts of her tender.

The Retribution.

The Retribution. [391] The steam-propeller Uncle Ben, built at Buffalo, in New York, in 1856, was sent to the southern coast of the United States just prior to the attack on Fort Sumter. Entering Cape Fear River in stress of weather, she was seized by the insurgents. Her machinery was taken out, and she was converted into a schooner, and cruised, under the name of the Retribution, about the Bahama Banks. On the 19th day of December, 1862, she captured, near the island of San Domingo, the United States schooner Hanover, and took the prize to Long Cay, (Fortune Island,) Bahamas, and there sold the cargo, “without previous judicial process.”¹ Representations being made of these facts, an answer was made by the Colonial Authorities, claiming that they were deceived, and that they supposed that the person making the sale was the master of the vessel.² Mr. Seward replied that this answer was not “deemed altogether conclusive.” Subsequently one Vernon Locke was represented as the person who had, “by fraudulent personations and representations, procured the admission of that vessel [the Hanover] to entry at the Revenue Office and effected the sale of her cargo there.”³ Locke was indicted, and bail accepted in the sum of £200. The United States are not aware that he was ever brought to trial. Mr. Seward thought the bail “surprisingly small and insignificant.”³ On the 19th of February, 1863, when off Castle Island, one of the Bahamas, she captured the American brig Emily Fisher, freighted with sugar and molasses. This prize also “was taken to Long Cay, one of the Bahama Islands, and notwithstanding the protest of Captain Staples, [the master,] and in the presence of a British magistrate, was despoiled of her cargo; a portion of which was landed, and the balance willfully destroyed.”⁴ The Retribution then went to the harbor of Nassau, where she was sold, assuming the name of the Etta.⁴

[392] *The United States, with confidence, ask the Tribunal to find and certify as to this vessel, that Great Britain failed to fulfill the duties set forth in the three rules of Article YI of the Treaty, or recognized by the principles of International Law not inconsistent with such rules. They ask this, not only for the general reasons heretofore mentioned as to this class of vessels, but because, in the case of each of the captured vessels above named, the acts complained of were done within Her Majesty’s jurisdiction.

The Georgia.

The Georgia. [393] The Georgia was built for the insurgents at Dumbarton, below Clyde, on the Glasgow. She was launched on the 10th day of January, 1863, at which time, as has already been said, “a Miss North, daughter of a Captain North, of one of the Confederate States, officiated as priestess, and christened the craft Virginia.”⁵ It was notorious that she was being constructed for this service.¹ When finished she was a “screw-steamer of about five hundred tons register, clipper-built; figure-head, fiddle-bow; short thick funnel; with *a number of compartments forward on both sides, from eight to ten feet square, and stronger than a jail, strong doors to them, with hinges about three inches thick, and brass padlocks accordingly, and a strong magazine forward in the bow.” On Friday, the 27th of March, she left for Greenock.² By this time she had parted with her name Virginia, and had the name Japan, “written in small letters on her bow;” and it was pretended that her voyage was to be to China.

[394] On the evening of Monday, the 30th of March, some seventy or eighty men who had been snipped at Liverpool for this vessel were sent to Greenock. The agreements with this crew were made by the house of Jones & Co., of Liverpool,³ who advanced money to them.”⁴ The vessel was registered in the name of Thomas Bold, of Liverpool, a member of the house of Jones & Co., and a near connection of Maury, who afterward commanded her. It remained registered in his name until the 23d day of the following June.⁵ When the men arrived in the Clyde from Liverpool, the Japan was “lying in the river opposite Greenock, and they were taken on board in a tug. On the *morning of the 2d of April they ran out toward the sea, but returned in the afternoon, and remained near the light-house down the Clyde, taking on board more men and provision from Greenock. They started again, and next morning they were off Castleton, Isle of Man.⁶ Here they changed their course, and went into the Atlantic, through the northern passage, between Ireland, and Scotland. On the 6th of April they reached the coast of France. Ushant light was the first place they sighted. Here they turned their steps toward St. Malo, proceeding under slow steam, and in the morning they sighted, off Morleaux.⁷ the steamer Alar, with arms, ammunition, and supplies for the Georgia, under charge of Jones, a partner in the Liverpool house of Jones & Co.⁸

[395] [396] It happened that these proceedings were afterward made the subject of judicial investigation before Sir Alexander Cockburn, Lord Chief Justice of England. Highatt and Jones, two of the members of the firm of Jones & Co., were indicted at Liverpool, for a violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819, in causing these men to be enlisted to serve in a war against the United States. The case came on for trial at the Liverpool Assizes, in * August, 1804. In his address to the jury, after the evidence was in, the Lord Chief Justice said: “There was no doubt that Matthews, Stanley, and Glassbrook did enter themselves and enlist on board the steamer, which was immediately afterward employed as a war-steamer in the Confederate service, for the purpose of waging war against the Northern States of America; and there seemed to be very little doubt that both the defendants had to do with the men’s leaving the port of Liverpool, for the purpose of joining the Japan, afterward called the Georgia. * * * Now came the question, whether the defendants had procured the men to be engaged in war against a country toward which this country was hound to maintain a strict neutrality. No doubt it was possible that the defendants might have been under a delusion that the ship was engaged for a voyage to China. It was for the jury to say whether they believed that to have been the case. If they believed the witnesses Conolly and Glassbrook, the defendant Jones could not have been of that opinion, because he was on board the small steamer which was an important agent in the transaction; and when he found out what the vessel really was, he manifested no surprise or horror. It was true that the jury had to rely on the evidence of men who had turned *traitors to the people they had sworn to serve, and who had since played the spy upon the persons who, as they alleged, had engaged them. But, on the other hand, there was no attempt to show them that, on the day when these men signed articles at Brest, Mr. Jones was not on board, and if he was on board it was difficult to suppose he could have got there with the innocent intention described by the defense. It seems strange that if they were acting as agents for Mr. Bold, they did not now call upon him to come into court, and state that they were innocently employed, and perfectly unconscious that the vessel was intended to go on a warlike expedition. Although sometimes it was an inconvenience and a hardship that a man, charged as the defendants were, could not be called to give his own evidence, sometimes it was a vast convenience to persons accused that they could not be called, because if they were, they would be constrained to admit, unless they committed perjury, that the truth was on the other side.”¹

[397] The Alar, with her cargo, had cleared at Newhaven for St. Malo. When the two vessels met, the Georgia took the Alar in tow, and they floated about on those waters during the whole day. At night they came to anchor, probably off the island *of Ushant, and the Georgia commenced taking in arms and ammunition and supplies. Three days passed in this way. There were nine breech-loading guns to be mounted on decks, and “guns, shot, shells, rockets, ammunition, rifles, cutlasses, and all sorts of implements of war.”²

All were put on board before Friday, the 10th of April’ the insurgents’ flag was then hoisted; Maury, the insurgent officer destined for the command, produced his commission; the Japan was changed into the Georgia; fifteen sailors who refused to cruise in her were transferred to the Alar, and the Georgia continued her cruise.

[398] On the 8th of April Mr. Adams called Earl Russell’s attention to the departure from the Clyde and Newhaven of this hostile expedition, “with intent to depredate on the commerce of the United States,”³ and he stated his belief that the destination of the vessel was the island of Alderney. Earl Russell replied, on the same day, that copies of his letter “were sent, without loss of time, to the Home Department and to the Board of Treasury, with a request that an immediate inquiry might be made into the circumstances stated in it, and that if the result should prove the suspicions to be well founded, the most effective measures might be * taken which the law admits of for defeating any such attempts to fit out a belligerent vessel from a British port.” ⁴

[399] Had Her Majesty’s Government taken the measures which Earl Russell suggested, it is probable that the complaints of the United States, as to this vessel, might not have been necessary. The sailing and the destination of the Japan were so notorious as to be the subject of newspaper comment.¹ No time, therefore, was required for that investigation. It could have been very little trouble to ascertain the facts as to the Alar. The answer to a telegram could have been obtained in a few minutes. Men-of-war might have been dispatched on the 8th from Portsmouth and Plymouth, to seize both these violators of British sovereignty. In doing this Her Majesty’s Government need only have exercised the same powers which were used against General Saldanha’s expedition, arrested at Terceira in 1827, and whose use in that case was sustained by a vote of both Houses of Parliament.² The island of Alderney and the other Channel islands were on the route to St. Malo and Brest, and it is not at all probable, scarcely possible, that the Alar and the Georgia *would not have been discovered. The purposes of the latter vessel, thus taken flagrante delicto, would then have been exposed.

This was not done. Instead of directing action to be taken by the Navy, Lord Russell caused inquiries to be made by the Home Office and the Treasury, and the Georgia escaped.

[400] On the 1st of December, 1863, Mr. Adams called Lord Russell’s attention to the fact of “the existence of a regular office in the port of Liverpool for the enlistment and payment of British subjects, for the purpose of carrying on war against the Government and people of the United States;” and he expressed the hope that “the extraordinary character of these proceedings, as well as the hazardous consequence to the future peace of all nations of permitting them to gain any authority under the international law, will not fail to fix the attention of Her Majesty’s Government.”³ The depositions inclosed in this communication furnished conclusive proof that the members of the firm of Jones & Co. were still engaged at Liverpool in procuring and shipping men for the Georgia, and that the payments of the wages of the crew of that vessel were regularly made through the same firm.⁴ It was also proved that Jones had *superintended the shipping of the armament of the Georgia off Brest; that he had been standing by the side of Maury when he assumed command, and that he had told the men, as an inducement to them to remain, that “of course they would get the prize money.”⁵

On the 11th of January, 1864, Mr. Adams inclosed to Lord Russell copies of papers which he maintained went “most clearly to establish the proof of the agency of Messrs. Jones & Co. in enlisting and paying British subjects in this Kingdom to carry on war against the United States.”⁶ Proceedings were taked against Jones & Highatt, as has already been shown. They were convicted, and were fined but fifty pounds each—manifestly a punishment not calculated to deter them from a repetition of the offense.⁷

[401] [402] [403] After all this information was before Lord Rus*sell, the Georgia, on the 1st day of May, 1864, reappeared in the port of Liverpool. During her absence she had been busy in destroying such of the commerce of the United States in the Atlantic as had escaped the depredations of the Florida and the Alabama. She had been to the Western Islands, and from thence to the Brazilian port of Bahia. From thence she went to the Cape of Good Hope. On the way she fell in with the Constitution, a merchant-vessel of the United States, laden with coal. “We filled our vessel with coal from her,” says one of the witnesses. In a few days after that she entered Simon’s Bay, Cape of Good Hope There she staid a fortnight, having repairs done and getting more coal. She left Simon’s Bay on the 29th of August. It is not probable that the supply from the Constitution was exhausted at that time.¹ She then worked her way to Cherbourg, and in a short time after came again into the port of Liverpool. Her career and character were rapidly but forcibly sketched by Thomas Baring, Esq., in a speech in the House of Commons on the 13th of May, 1864. He said: “At the time of her departure the Georgia was registered as the property of a Liverpool merchant, a partner of the firm which shipped the crew. She remained the property of *this person until the 23d of June, when the register was canceled, he notifying the Collector of her sale to foreign owners. During this period, namely, from the 1st of April to the 23d of June, the Georgia being still registered in the name of a Liverpool merchant, and thus his property, was carrying on war against the United States, with whom we were in alliance. It was while still a British vessel that she captured and burned the Dictator, and captured and released, under bond, the Griswold, the same vessel which had brought corn to the Lancashire sufferers. The crew of the Georgia were paid through the same Liverpool firm. A copy of an advance note used is to be found in the Diplomatic Correspondence. The same firm continued to act in this capacity throughout the cruise of the Georgia. After cruising in the Atlantic, and burning and bonding a number of vessels, the Georgia made for Cherbourg, where she arrived on the 28th of October. There was, at the time, much discontent among the crew; many deserted, leave of absence was given to others, and their wages were paid all along by the same Liverpool firm. In order to get the Georgia to sea again, the Liverpool firm enlisted in Liverpool some twenty sea-men, and sent them to Brest. The Georgia left Cherbourg on a second cruise, but having no success she returned to that *port, and thence to Liverpool, where her crew have been paid off without any concealment, and the vessel is now laid up. Here, then, is the case of a vessel, clandestinely built, fraudulently leaving the port of her construction, taking Englishmen on board as her crew, and waging war against the United States, an ally of ours, without once having entered a port of the power the commission of which she bears, but being, for some time, the property of an English subject. She has now returned to Liverpool—and has returned, I am told, with a British crew on board, who, having enlisted in war against an ally of ours, have committed a misdemeanor in the sight of the law.”²

[404] The Attorney General, Sir Boundell Palmer, replied on behalf of the Government to this speech. He did not seriously dispute the facts as stated by Mr. Baring. “The whole of the honorable gentleman’s argument,” he said, “assumes that the facts, and the law applicable to the facts, are substantiated, that we are in a position, as between ourselves and the Confederates, to treat the matter as beyond controversy, and to assume that the Georgia was, in fact, fitted out in violation of our neutrality. Now we may have very strong reason to suspect this, and may even believe it to be true; but to say *that we are to act upon strong suspicion or belief against another state, upon certain facts which have never been judicially established, and which it is not easy to bring to the test as between Government and Government, that is a proposition which is not without grave consideration to be accepted.”¹ He found a defense for the irresolution and inactivity of the Government, in the fact that the United States were unwilling to abandon their claims for compensation for the losses by the acts of the Alabama. “I have no hesitation,” he said, “in saying that the United States by advancing such demands, and by seeking to make our Government responsible for pecuniary compensation for prizes taken by the Alabama upon the high seas, and never brought within our ports or in any way whatever under our control, are making demands directly contrary to the principles of International Law laid down by their own jurists, and thereby they render it infinitely more difficult for us at their request to do anything resting on our own discretion.”²

[405] When it was apparent that the Georgia was to be allowed to remain in Liverpool, and that she was not to be made subject to the rules of January 31, 1862, Mr. Adams addressed a note to Lord Russell in which he said: “I learn that she is *about to remain for an indefinite period, the men having been discharged. I scarcely need to suggest to your Lordship that it has become a matter of interest to my Government to learn whether this vessel assumes the right to remain in virtue of her former character, or, if received in a later one, why she is permitted to overstay the period of time specified by the terms of Her Majesty’s Proclamation. * * I cannot but infer, from the course previously adopted toward the armed vessels of the United States, that any such proceeding, if taken by one of them, would have been attended by an early request from your Lordship to myself for an explanation.”³

Having received no answer to these questions, Mr. Adams, on the 7th of June, 1864, informed Lord Russell that he had received from the Consul of the United States, at Liverpool, information that a transfer purporting to be a sale had been made of the Georgia by the insure gents or their agents at Liverpool, and on behalf of the Government of the United States he “declined to recognize the validity of the sale.”⁴

[406] While Mr. Adams was vainly endeavoring to ascertain from Lord Russell whether the Georgia entered the port of Liverpool as a merchant-ship *or as a man-of-war, that vessel went into dock at Birkenhead and had her bottom cleaned and her engines overhauled.⁵ The insurgent agents went through the form of selling her to a person who was supposed to be in collusion with them. All this was communicated to Earl Russell by Mr. Adams.⁶ Lord Russell, in his reply to these notes, took no notice of Mr. Adams’s protest against the validity of the sale, or of his inquiries as to the character the vessel enjoyed in the port of Liverpool. He said’ that the evidence failed to satisfy him that the steamer Georgia would be again used for belligerent purposes; and he added that, “with, a view to prevent the recurrence of any question such as that which has arisen in the case of the Georgia, Her Majesty’s Government have given directions that in future no ship of war, of either belligerent, shall be allowed to be brought into any of Her Majesty’s ports for the purpose of being dismantled or sold.”¹

This terminated the discussion on the questions raised by Mr. Adams. A few days later, the career of the Georgia itself was terminated by its capture by the United States vessel of war Niagara.

[407] The United States ask the Tribunal of Arbitration to also certify as to this vessel, that Great Brit*ain has, by its acts and omissions, failed to fulfill the duties set forth in the three rules of the sixth article of the Treaty, or recognized by the principles of International Law not inconsistent with such rules. Should the Tribunal exercise the power conferred upon it by Article VII of the Treaty, to I award a sum in gross to be paid to the United. States, they ask that, in: considering the, amount to be awarded, the losses of the United: States and of individuals, and the expense to which the United States were put in the pursuit and capture of the Georgia, may be taken into account.

They ask this, in addition to the general reasons already assigned, for the following reasons applicable to this particular vessel:

1. [408] That, though nominally cruising under the insurgent flag, and under the direction of an insurgent officer, the Georgia was essentially a British vessel. The evidence on this point cannot be better stated than in the words to which Mr. Thomas Baring gave the great weight of his name in the House of Commons. When she returned to Liverpool, in May, 1864, she was received as & British vessel. Mr. Adams’s inquiries of Earl Russell failed to elicit a response that she was not. No steps were taken against her or against the parties concerned in fitting her out, equipping and arming her, or against any one concerned in the destruction of the *commerce of the United States, with the exception of the proceedings as to enlistments. The United States insist that by reason of the origin and history of the vessel, and by reason of this negligence of Her Majesty’s Government, Great Britain became justly liable to the United States for the injuries done by this vessel.

2. Great Britain did not use due diligence to prevent the fitting out and equipping of the Georgia within its jurisdiction. It was notorious that she was being constructed for use under the insurgent flag. (See the extract from the News, and Underwood’s dispatch.) Her fittings were of such a nature and character as to have afforded of themselves a reasonable ground to believe that she was intended to cruise or to carry, on war; and her destination rendered it certain that that war was to be carried; on against the United States. It was therefore the duty of Great Britain to prevent her departure from, the Clyde.

3. [409] It was the duty of Her Majesty’s Government, on the receipt of Mr. Adams’s note of the 8th of April, to take the most effectual measures which the law admitted of for defeating the attempt to fit out the Georgia from a British port. Lord Russell admitted * this measure of duty in his reply to Mr. Adams’s note. The most effectual, and in fact the only effectual remedy, was not* taken, so far as known to the United States.

Vessels of war dispatched from Plymouth and Portsmouth, immediately on the receipt of Mr. Adams’s note, into the waters about Brest and the Channel Islands, would have afforded a complete remedy. This was a measure sanctioned by British precedent and by British law. [See the Terceira case, above cited.] The failure to adopt that “effectual measure,” taken in connection with the original fitting out and equipping of the Georgia, in the Clyde, and with the arming her through the Alar, at Newhaven, constitute a violation of the duties of Great Britain as a neutral toward the United States, which entails upon it the obligation to make full compensation for the injuries caused by the acts of the Georgia.

4. When the Georgia arrived at Cape Town, Great Britain failed to detain her. This was a violation of the duties of a neutral as set forth in the second, clause of the first rule of the Treaty of Washington.

The Tallahassee, or the Olustee.

The Tallahassee or Olustee. [410] [411] The Tallahassee was “a British steamer fitted out from London to play the part of a privateer out of Wilmington.”¹ She was originally called the * Atlanta.² Under that name she arrived in Bermuda from England on the 18th day of April, 1864. She made two trips as a blockade-runner between there and Wilmington, and then went out for a cruise as a vessel of war. Her captures were principally made under the name of the Tallahassee. Some were made under the name of the Olustee. It is not quite clear, whether she made two trips, one under each name, or whether the name was changed in one trip, in order to blind the pursuers.³ On the 19th of August, 1864, she arrived in Halifax, after destroying several vessels near Cape Sable. The Consul of the United States at Halifax reported her as “about six hundred tons burden,” “an iron double-screw steamer,” having “about one hundred and twenty men.”⁴ He also said that the insurgents had established a coal depot there. On arrival, the officer in command called upon the Admiral and Lieutenant Governor. He gives the following account of what took place: “My reception by the first [the Admiral] was very cold and uncivil; that of the Governor less so. I stated that I was in want of coal, and that as soon as I could fill up I would go to sea; that it would take from two to three days. No objection was made at the *time—if there had been I was prepared to demand forty-eight hours for repairs. The Governor asked me to call next day, and let him know how I was progressing, and when I would leave. I did so, and then was told that he was surprised that. I was still in port; that we must leave at, once; that we could leave the harbor with only, one hundred, tons of coal on board. I protested against this, as being utterly insufficient. He replied that the Admiral had reported that quantity sufficient (and in such masters he must be governed by his statement) to run the ship to Wilmington. The Admiral had obtained this information by sending on board three of his officers, ostensibly to look at our machinery and the twin-screw, a new system, but really to ascertain the quantity of coal on board, that burned daily, &c. * * I am under many obligations to our agent, Mr. Weir, for transacting our business, and through his management about one hundred and twenty tons of coal were put aboard instead of half that quantity. * * Had I procured the coal needed I intended to have struck the coast at the capes of the Delaware, and followed it down to Cape Fear, but I had only coal enough to reach Wilmington on the night of the 25th.”¹

[412] Had the British authorities at Nassau, Bermuda, *Barbadoes, Cape Town, Melbourne, and other colonial ports, pursued the same course that the Lieutenant Governor at Halifax did, under the wise advice of the Admiral, the grievances of the United States would have been much less, and this case would have been shorter by many pages. The first time that the rule of January 31st, 1862, as to the supply of coal, was fairly carried out, the operations of the insurgent cruiser, to which it was applied, were arrested on the spot, and the vessel was obliged to run for a home port.

The Tallahassee apparently remained in Wilmington for some months. On the 13th of January, 1865, she arrived in Bermuda again, under the name of the Chameleon. On the 19th she sailed again, taking a cargo to Liverpool, where at the close of the war she was claimed by the United States.

From the fact that she was fitted out in London to be used as a privateer from Wilmington, and that she did go out from Wilmington with what purported to be a commission from the insurgent authorities, and did prey upon the commerce of the United States, and for the reasons already given, the United States ask the Tribunal to find and certify as to this vessel as they have been asked to find and certify as to the Sumter and the Nashville, the Florida and the Alabama, and the Georgia.

[413] *The Chickamauga.

The Chickamauga. Among the new British-built blockade-runners reported by the United States Consul at Liverpool on the 5th of March, 1861, was “the Edith, new double-screw; two pole-masts; forecastle raised one foot higher than bulwark; two funnels; marked to draw nine feet forward and ten aft; no figure-head.”² She arrived at Bermuda from England, on the 7th day of April, 1861. On the 23d of the following June she sailed for Wilmington, and on the 7th of the next July arrived from there with cotton. On the 23d of July she again went to Wilmington.

[414] The Edith was one of that class of blockade-runners, like the Tallahassee, which was owned by the insurgent authorities. In the year 1864 other parties as well as the insurgent authorities were largely engaged in the business of running cotton out of the blockaded ports. Thus, in the quarter in which the Edith left Liverpool, 34,754 bales of cotton were imported into Liverpool from the Southern States, via Bermuda, Nassau, Havana, and Matamoras, of which only 7,874 were consigned to Eraser, Trenholm & Co.”³ The Edith, however, was a vessel belonging to the *so-called government at Richmond, and, being found to be fast, and adapted for the sort of war that was carried on against the commerce of the United States, it was determined to put her in commission as a man-of-war.

The attention of the Tribunal of Arbitration is invited to the facile manner in which these vessels were permitted to adapt themselves to circumstances. The Sumter cruised as a man-of-war, and received hospitalities as such. She was allowed to change her character in a British port, and then to sail under the British flag as a blockade-runner, owned and operated by the insurgents. The same thing would undoubtedly have been done with the Georgia had she not been captured by the Niagara. The Atlanta started her career as a blockade-runner, owned by the insurgents; she was converted into a man-of-war under the name of the Tallahassee. When unable to pursue further her work of destruction, she became again a carrier for the benefit of the insurgents, and was accepted by Great Britain in her new character. The Edith was now to go through similar transformations.

[415] On the 17th of September she was in commission as a man-of-war. Between that date and the 28th of October she took on board large supplies of coal from blockade-runners. On the 28th *of October, having waited for a month for a night dark enough to run the blockade, she put to sea from Wilmington, and ran northward toward Long Island. On the 30th she destroyed the bark Mark L. Potter, of Bangor, Maine; on the 31st, the Emily L. Hall, the Shooting Star, the Goodspeed, and the Otter Roch, all vessels under the flag of the United States; on the 2d of November, the bark Speedwell, also a vessel of the United States; and on the 7th of November she reached Bermuda. On the 8th of November she was allowed to come into the harbor, and permission was given for a stay of five days for repairs, and also to take on board twenty-five tons of coal, although she had at that time one hundred tons in her bunkers. She actually staid seven days, and took on board eighty-two tons.¹ On the 15th of November she sailed from Bermuda, and on the 19th arrived at Wilmington.

For the reason already given the United States ask the Tribunal, as to this vessel, to find and certify as they have been asked to find and certify as to the Sumter, the Nashville, the Florida, the Alabama, the Georgia, and the Tallahassee.

[416] *The Shenandoah.

The Shenandoah. The British steamer Sea King, a merchant-vessel which had belonged to a Bombay Company, and had been employed in the East India trade,² was “a long rakish vessel of seven hundred and ninety tons register, with an auxiliary engine of two hundred and twenty nominal horse-power, with which she was capable of steaming, ten knots an hour. She was the handiwork of celebrated builders on the river Clyde, in Scotland, and had made one voyage to New Zealand as a transport for British troops, when she proved herself one of the fastest vessels afloat, her log showing at times over three hundred and twenty miles in twenty-four hours.”³

In the year 1863, before he voyage to New Zealand, Mr. Dudley had seen her at Glasgow, and had reported her as a most likely steamer for the purposes of a privateer.⁴

On the 20th September, in the year 1864, she was sold in London to Richard Wright, of Liverpool, a British subject, and the father-in-law of Mr. Prioleau, of South Carolina, the managing partner in the house of Eraser, Trenholm & Co.,¹ and the transfer was registered the same day.

[417] *The United States assert that the notorious connection of the firm of Eraser, Trenholm & Co. with the insurgents, end their repeated violations of the sovereignty of Great Britain in purchasing, constructing, equipping, arming, and contracting for vessels of war to be used in carrying on hostilities against the United States, ought by that time to have made them objects of suspicion to every British official, connected with the construction of the transfer of steamers capable of being adapted to warlike use. The acquisition, by a near connection of a member of their firm, of a fast-going steamer, capable of being so converted, and the proposition to send her to sea in ballast, with nothing on board but two mounted guns and a supply of provisions and coal, ought of itself to have attracted the attention of the British officials. The omission to take notice of the fact is a proof of want of the due diligence required by the Treaty. Under the circumstances, it would have been the exercise of but the most ordinary diligence to supervise the transfers of this class of vessels in the Government records, and to follow up so palpable a clew as was given in the case of the Sea King.

[418] On the 7th of October, Wright gave a power of attorney to one Corbett to “sell her at any time within six months for a sum not less than £45,000 *sterling.”² Corbett was an Englishman who had commanded the Douglas, afterward known as the Margaret and Jessie, one of the kaleidoscopic blockade-runners owned by the insurgents and carrying the British flag.

[419] The next day the Sea King cleared for Bombay, and sailed “with a crew of forty-seven men.”³ Before sailing, while she “lay in the basin,” she “took in coal and provisions sufficient for a twelve-months’ cruise.”⁴ She “had two 18-pounders mounted on the decks,” which were the guns generally used in bringing vessels to.⁵ “She was scarcely clear of the ground when a telegram was flashed to Liverpool, advising the Confederate agent at that port” that she had sailed;⁶ and about 8 or 9 o’clock that evening a screw-steamer, called the Laurel, “nearly new-built, very strong, and admirably adapted for a privateer,”⁷ left Liverpool, clearing for Matamoras, via Nassau, taking a “score or more of natives of the South, who had staked life and fortune on the hazard of a desperate game,” among whom were “several old Confederate States navy officers, who had served on board the Sumter, *Alabama, and Georgia.”⁸ The Laurel took out as cargo “cases marked as machinery, but in reality contained guns and gun-carriages, such as are used in war vessels.”⁹ Mr. Dudley, the Consul at Liverpool, from the number of guns and the number of men, drew the correct conclusion that they were shipped in order to be transferred to some other vessel.¹⁰ The officers in Her Majesty’s service, by the exercise of due diligence, might have arrived at the same conclusion, and might have detained both ships.

[420] The appointed place of meeting was the harbor of Funchal, in the island of Madeira. The Laurel arrived there two days in advance of the Sea King.¹ The latter vessel had enlisted its crew “for a voyage to Bombay or any port of the Indian Ocean, China Seas, or Japan, for a term not to exceed two years.”² She “went down the English Channel under steam and sail, and when off Land’s End she was put under reefed canvas,” and so continued to Madeira. She was fully rigged for sailing, and her steam was intended only as an auxiliary.

The Sea King arrived off Funchal the night of *the 19th.³ The Laurel, on the morning of the 20th, came out to meet her, “with a full head of steam on;” signaled her to round the Desertas, a barren rocky island lying near Madeira; and proceeded to the place of rendezvous, the Sea King following in the wake.⁴

“Tackles were at once got aloft on both, vessels, and they commenced operations by first transferring from the Laurel to the Sea King the heavy guns.” “At the expiration of thirty-six hours the transfer was effected, and the munitions of war, clothing, and stores, with which the Laurel had been laden, were piled in utter confusion on the decks and in the hold of the Sea King, which was to bear that name no more.”⁵ They “took in from the Laurel eight cannon, viz, six large and two small, with their carriages, (the guns were called 68-pounders;) a quantity of powder, muskets, pistols, shot and shell; clothing, and a quantity of other stores, and also a quantity of coals.”⁶

[421] Corbett then came forward and announced a pretended sale of the vessel, (the real sale having taken place in London,) and tried to induce the men who had enlisted to sail in the Sea King to continue their contract in the Shenandoah. The *conduct of this person was so palpably a violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act that the British Consul at Funchal sent him home as a prisoner, accompanied by depositions to prove his guilt.⁷ Captain Waddell, the new commander in the place of Corbett, made a speech, “which was received with but little enthusiasm from the majority of those who listened to him.”⁸ “Out of eighty twenty-three only cast in their lots with the new cruiser.”⁹ When the Shenandoah left the Laurel her “officers and crew only numbered forty-two souls, less than half her regular complement.”¹⁰ This obliged her “to depend upon her auxiliary engine.”

When the news of these proceedings was fully known in London, Mr. Adams brought the subject to the notice of Earl Russell.¹¹ In a subsequent note he referred to this fact in the following language:¹²

[422] “On the 18th of November, 1804, I had the honor to transmit to your Lordship certain evidence which went to show that on the 8th of October preceding a steamer had been dispatched, under the British flag, from London, called the *Sea King, with a view to meet another steamer, called the Laurel, likewise bearing that flag, dispatched from Liverpool on the 9th of the same month, at some point near the island of Madeira. These vessels were at the time of sailing equipped and manned by British subjects; yet they were sent out with arms, munitions of war, supplies, officers, and enlisted men,; for the purpose of initiating a hostile enterprise to the people of the United States, with whom Great Britain was at the time under solemn obligations to preserve the peace.

“It further appears that, on or about the 18th of the same month, these vessels met at the place agreed upon, and there the British commander of the Sea King made a private transfer of the vessel to a person of whom he then declared to the crew his knowledge that he was about to embark on an expedition of the kind described. Thus knowing its nature, he nevertheless went on to urge these seamen, being British subjects themselves, to enlist as members of it.

[423] “It is also clear that a transfer then took place from the British bark Laurel of the arms of every kind with which she was laden, for this same object; and lastly, of a number of persons, some calling themselves officers, who had been brought from Liverpool expressly to take part in the enterprise. Of these last a considerable portion consisted of the very same persons, many of them British subjects, who had been rescued from the waves by British intervention at the moment when they had surrendered from the sinking Alabama, the previous history of which is but too well known to your Lordship.

“Thus equipped, fitted out, and armed from Great Britain, the successor to the destroyed corsair, now assuming the name of the Shenandoah, though in no other respects changing its, British character, addressed itself at once to the work for which it had been intended. At no time in her later career has she ever reached a port of the country which her commander has pretended to represent. At no instance has she earned any national characteristic other than that with which she started from Great Britain. She has thus far roamed over the ocean, receiving her sole protection against the consequences of the most piratical acts from the gift of a nominal title which Great Britain first bestowed upon her contrivers, and then recognized as legitimating their successful fraud.”

[424] It is not necessary to follow in detail the cruise of the Shenandoah from Madeira to Melbourne. It is enough to say that it lasted ninety days,¹ *during which time several vessels of the merchant marine of the United States were destroyed, with valuable cargoes. On the 25th of January, 1865, she “dropped anchor off Sandridge, a small town about two miles from Melbourne.”²

“The November mail from Europe, which arrived at Melbourne about the middle of January, had brought the news that the Sea King had left England with the intention of being converted into a war vessel to cruise against the commerce of the United States.”³ Suspicions were at once aroused that the newly-arrived man-of-war under the insurgent flag was no other than the Sea King; suspicions which were confirmed by the statements of the prisoners from the captured vessels, and by others.⁴

[425] [426] The Consul of the United States appears to have acted with both courtesy and vigor. He placed before the authorities all the information in his possession, tending to show the illegal origin of the vessel, and the liabilities which she was imposing upon Great Britain by her depredations on the commerce of the United States.¹ He told the Governor that the “Shenandoah, alias Sea *King,” had never entered a port of the so-styled Confederate States for the purposes of naturalization, and consequently was not entitled to belligerent rights;”² and that the table-service, plate, &c., on the vessel all bore the mark of “Sea King.” He earnestly urged that “after the severest scrutiny it should be determined if this vessel and crew are entitled to the rights of belligerency, or whether the vessel should not be detained until the facts can be duly investigated.”³ When he found that, in spite of his remonstrances and of the proof of her character, it had been decided that the Shenandoah should be repaired, and should be allowed to take in supplies and coals, he protested “in behalf of his Government against the aid, comfort, and refuge” extended to her.⁴ When he was informed that the Governor had come to the decision “that whatever may be the previous history of the Shenandoah, the Government of the Colony is bound to treat her as a ship of war belonging to a belligerent Power,” he protested afresh, and notified the Governor “that the United States will claim indemnity for the damages already done to its shipping by said vessel, and also which may hereafter be committed if allowed to depart from *this port.”⁵ He placed in the hands of the Attorney General, conclusive “evidence to establish that the Shenandoah is in fact the Sea King.”⁶ When it came to his knowledge that Wadded was enlisting a crew in Melbourne for the Shenandoah, he put the proof of it at once into the hands of the Governor.⁷ When he heard that she was taking coal on board he communicated that fact also.⁸ From the beginning of the visit of the Shenandoah at Melbourne to the hour of her departure, this officer was constant in his vigilance, and in his efforts to aid the British authorities in the performance of their duties,* as the representatives of a neutral nation.

As soon as she arrived, almost before her anchor was dropped, her commander wrote to the Governor for permission to “make the necessary repairs and obtain a supply of coals.”⁹

[427] This letter was officially answered the next day, after the twenty-four hours allowed by the instructions of January, 1862, for his stay had expired. He was told that directions had been given to enable him to make the necessary repairs and to coal his vessel, and he was asked, at his earliest convenience, to intimate the nature and extent of *his requirements as regards repairs and supplies.¹⁰ This was the official answer. The real answer had been given the previous night to Waddell’s messenger, who was dispatched on shore “as soon as practicable the afternoon of arrival, to confer with the authorities and obtain permission for the ship to remain and procure some necessary repairs.” “He returned before midnight, having succeeded in his mission.” ¹

Two days were taken to reply to the question as to the nature and extent of the needed repairs and supplies. Waddell then stated, as a reason why he could not yet report, that the mechanics had not reported to him. He spoke generally about the condition of his propeller shaft, and the bearings under water, and, he added, “the other repairs are progressing rapidly.” ² It thus appears that he had been at that time three days in port, had made no official statement of the supplies or the necessary repairs, and that he had a force at work upon his vessel, without any report to the Governor showing the necessity.

[428] The next day he was asked to furnish a list of supplies required for the immediate use of his vessel.³ He appears to have furnished such a state*ment, but it has not been printed in any document within the control of the United States. As the list is in the possession of Great Britain, it will doubtless be produced, if it tends to release that Government from responsibility.

On the following day, being the fifth day after he arrived in port, the fourth day after be received permission to make his repairs, and the third or fourth day after the repairs were commenced, he reported to the Governor that the lining of the outer stern back (probably meaning the outer stern bush) was entirely gone, and that in order to replace it the Shenandoah must go into the Government slip for about ten days.⁴

On the 1st of February the Governor assented to the making of these repairs⁵ and the time named for them.

On the 7th of February, through his Secretary he called upon Captain Waddell “to name the day when he would be prepared to proceed to sea.”⁶ Waddell said that he could not name a day; and he gives excuses why his vessel was not yet on the slip; a fact which furnishes the evident reason for the letter of the Governor’s Secretary.⁷

[429] *On the 14th of February, a week later, inquiry is again made whether he is “in a position to state more definitely when the Shenandoah will be in a position to proceed to sea.”⁸

The reply shows that the Shenandoah was then on the slip, and was to be launched the next day. He thought he could proceed to sea by the 19th, though he had yet to take in all his stores and coals.⁹

The next correspondence between Waddell and the Governors Secretary furnishes the solution of the delay in the original report upon the repairs, the delay in the getting the vessel into the slip, the delay in getting her out of it, and the unreasonable time required “to take in stores, coals, and to swing the ship.” During all this time Waddell had been enlisting men for the Shenandoah out of the streets of Melbourne, and had protracted his repairs as an excuse for delay, while he filled up the thin ranks of his crew.

[430] The arrival of this vessel at Melbourne had produced a profound sensation. An inquiry was made of the Government in the Legislature to know if Her Majesty’s Proclamation had not been violated by the Shenandoah. The member making the inquiry called attention to the news of the de*parture of the Sea King from London for the purpose of being converted into a cruiser and he showed that the Sea King and the Shenandoah were the same vessel. The House was opposed to him, and he was called to order as he did this. The Chief Secretary replied, not so much calling in question the identity of the Sea King with the Shenandoah, as doubting the propriety of accepting the fact on the evidence quoted by the former speaker; and he added that, “in dealing with this vessel, they had not only to consider the terms of the proclamation referred to, but also the confidential instructions from the Home Government.” ¹

Here the United States learned for the first time that, in addition to the published instructions which were made known to the world, there were private and confidential and perhaps conflicting instructions on this subject. It is beyond their power to furnish to this Tribunal copies of these confidential instructions. Should their production be deemed important by Her Majesty’s Government, or should they tend to relieve Great Britain from liability to the United States, they will, undoubtedly be furnished to the Tribunal.

[431] The Consul of the United States at Melbourne penetrated the reasons for Waddell’s delay, and supplied the Colonial Authorities with evidence that men were being enlisted at Melbourne for the Shenandoah. His first letter to the Governor on this subject was dated the 10th of February. In it he called attention “to the shipment of men on board said Shenandoah in this port.”² Again, on the 14th of February, he transmitted to the Governor further proof on the same subject.³

The affidavits furnished by the Consul showed that an enlistment on a large scale was going on. The affidavit of Wicke, for instance, spoke of a cook named “Charley,” and ten men;⁴ the affidavit of Behucke, of “about ten men concealed in said Shenandoah.”⁵

[432] The authorities proceeded against “Charley” only. They carefully let alone Captain Waddell and his officers, who had been violating Her Majesty’s Proclamation and the laws of the Empire,⁶ and they aimed the thunders of the law *against an assistant cook. When the officer arrived at the vessel to serve the warrant for Charley’s arrest, he was informed that no such person was on board. On expressing a wish to ascertain this fact for himself, his request was refused.⁷ The next day he went again, and Captain Waddell “stated, on his honor and faith as a gentleman and an officer, that there was no such person as Charley on board.”⁸ On the evening of the same day Charley and three other men who had been enlisted in Melbourne were arrested as they left the Shenandoah by the water police,¹ thus showing that they must have been there all the while.

In consequence of this the permission to make repairs was suspended; but it was soon restored. The reason given for the restoration was that, Charley being taken, Waddell was “in a position to say, as commanding officer of the ship, that there were no persons on board except those whose names are on the shipping articles, and that no one has been enlisted in the service of the Confederate States since arrival in this port.”² It does not appear that Waddell made any such commitment; on the contrary, he said that he considered “the tone of the letter remarkably disrespectful and insulting.”

[433] *The Melbourne authorities did not insist upon having such an assurance. The Secretary of the Governor had said that Waddell was in a position to give the assurance; that was enough. The Chief Secretary said in the Assembly, speaking of the enlistment of “Charley,” “it appears to me and to the Government that if anything can be a violation of strict neutrality, this is it;”³ but he added, in a; few moments, (his attention being called to the fact that there were still persons on board who had joined the ship at Melbourne,) “The particular warrant that was issued for this particular individual (Charley) was satisfied; and if further warrants are issued for other persons who may be on board, the position of the Government to ill be altered. It may be that there are other persons on board.”⁴

There were other persons on board whose presence was a violation of British neutrality, and whose exposure would “alter the position of the Government”—some fifty in all; but no warrant was issued, and “the position of the Government” was not “altered.” The Shenandoah took on board her coal (three hundred tons in all) and her supplies, the character of which is not known to the United States, for the reasons already given.

[434] *The United States Consul to the last did his duty. On the 17th, the day before she sailed, he informed the Governor that “the Shenandoah was taking in three hundred tons of coal, in addition to the quantity she had on board when she came into this port—about four hundred tons;” and added, “The Shenandoah is a full-rigged sailing-vessel; steam is only auxiliary with her; and I cannot believe Your Excellency is aware of the large amount of coal now being furnished said vessel.”⁵ This coal was dispatched from Liverpool in a vessel called the John Fraser. The ear-marks were on the transaction in the very name of the transport.

[435] On the same day the Consul also lodged with the Governor the affidavit of one Andrew Forbes, to show that six persons, residents of Melbourne, whom he named, were to join the Shenandoah outside, she being then ready to sail. As time was of importance, and a day’s delay might be too late, the Consul went with his witnesses to the office of the Crown Solicitor, to whom the Attorney General had previously directed him to communicate such information. He found that officer leaving for his dinner. He told him “his business was urgent,” and that he had “come as *the representative of the United States to lay before him, as Crown Solicitor, the evidence that a large number of men were about violating the neutrality laws.”¹ The Solicitor said be must go to his dinner, and passed on. The Consul then went to several other officers in order to secure immediate action on his complaint. Among others, he went to the Attorney General, who sent him to another Solicitor; but he could get no one to attend to it, and the Shenandoah left early in the morning of the 18th without further British interference.

[436] The attention of the Tribunal of Arbitration is invited to the fact that a sworn list of the crew of the Shenandoah is attached to an affidavit made in Liverpool by one Temple ten months after the vessel left Melbourne.² Forbes in his affidavit, which was submitted to the Governor and laid before the Attorney General, gave the names of five persons who he had reason to believe were about to join the vessel from Melbourne. Temple’s affidavit shows that at least three of those persons did join and did serve, viz, “Robert Dunning, an Englishman, captain of the foretop;³ Thomas Evans, Welchman; and William Green,⁴ *an Englishman.”⁵ This corroborative, independent piece of testimony establishes the truthfulness of Forbes’s affidavit. This affidavit, so summarily rejected by the Crown Solicitor, was the specific evidence of the commission of a crime which Her Majesty’s Government required to be furnished by the United States. When produced the British authorities declined to act upon it.

[437] The United States assert, without fear of contradiction, that there was no time during the stay of the Shenandoah in Melbourne, when it was not notorious that she was procuring recruits. She went there for that purpose. Her effective power as a man-of-war depended entirely upon her success of obtaining a new crew. When she left the Laurel she had but twenty-three men besides her officers. With every capture between there and Melbourne great efforts were made to induce the captured seamen to en list; and those who would not enlist were compelled to work as sailors in order to avoid being put in Irons. The author of the “Cruise of the Shenandoah” says that fourteen were enlisted in this way—ten from the Alina and the Godfrey,⁶, two from the Susan,⁷ and two from the Stacey.⁸ Temple in his affidavit gives the names of three from the Alina, five from the Godfrey, one from the Susan, two from the Stacey, and one from the Edward.⁹ It is probable that Temple’s statement is correet. Of the twelve whom he names, two appear to have left the vessel at Melbourne, viz: Bruce, of the Alina; and Williams, of the Godfrey. It would therefore appear that, had the Shenandoah received no recruitment of men at Melbourne, her force on leaving would have been thirty-three marines, firemen, and ordinary seamen. One officer and two petty officers were discharged there, which reduced the number of officers to twenty, and her whole force to fifty-three. She was a full-rigged ship, 220 feet in length and 35 feet beam, and carried royal studding-sails, and required double or treble that number of men to make her effective as a man-of-war.¹⁰. The Tribunal will see how important it was to recruit men at Melbourne.

[438] [439] She took in there, according to the account given by the author of the Cruise of the Shenandoah, forty-five men.¹ Temple, in his affidavit, gives the names of forty-three, divided as follows: one officer, twelve petty officers, twenty seamen, seven firemen, and three marines. The United *States complain of this act, not alone as a technical violation of the duties of a neutral, as laid down in the second rule of the Treaty, but as a great injury to them, from which flowed the subsequent damages to their commerce from the Shenandoah. This recruitment might have been stopped by the exercise of the most ordinary diligence. It ought to have been stopped after the Consul’s letter of the 10th of February. It ought to have been stopped after his letter of the 14th. The authorities should have detained the Shenandoah on the information he communicated on the 17th. Most of the men went on board that night. It was a great negligence’ not to have prevented this. When the Shenandoah sailed on the morning of the 18th, the whole community knew that she had more than doubled her force in Melbourne. The newspapers of the next day were full of it. The Herald said: “Rumors are afloat that the Shenandoah shipped or received on board somewhere about eighty men.”² The Argus said: “It is not to be denied that during Friday night a large number of men found their way on board the Shenandoah, and did not return on shore again.”³ And the Age said: “It is currently reported that she shipped some eighty men.”⁴ It *is not probable—it may indeed be said to be most improbable—that a shipment of half that number of men could have been made without complicity of the authorities. Mr. Mountague Bernard intimates that they could not have come there without the knowledge of Captain Waddell.⁵ A similar train of reasoning will convince the Tribunal of Arbitration that the least measure of “diligence” would have discovered the fact to the local authorities.

[440] The permitting a shipment of three hundred tons of coal at Melbourne was also a violation of the duties of a neutral. The Shenandoah was a sailing vessel. Her steam power was auxiliary. From early in December until two days before her arrival at Melbourne, some seven weeks in all,⁶ she was under sail, without using her steam; she went from Land’s End to Madeira in the same way.⁷ She took on board, when she left London, a supply of coal for twelve months. Four hundred tons of it remained when she reached Melbourne. She required no fresh supply to, enable her to return to an insurgent port, and she sought it only for the purpose of cruising against the commerce of the United States, thus making Melbourne a base of the insurgent naval operations. *The United States are of the opinion that it was a breach of the duties of an impartial neutral to permit unlimited supplies of coal to be furnished to the Shenandoah in a British port, under circumstances similar to those in which like, supplies had been refused to the vessels of the United States; and that it was a still greater violation to permit the supply to be furnished from the insurgent transport, John Fraser, dispatched from Liverpool for that purpose, while the United States were forbidden to supply their vessels in like manner.

When the Shenandoah left London she took general supplies for a year; yet she was allowed to replenish at Melbourne within less than six months from the time of leaving London. It must be concluded from the declarations of the author of the Cruise of the Shenandoah, that when this was done she had enough supplies on board for the subsistence of the crew to the nearest insurgent port. The addition obtained at Melbourne enabled her to continue her hostile cruise and to light up the icy seas of the north with the fires of American vessels, long after the military resistance to the United States had ceased.

The United States further insist that when the authorities at Melbourne permitted the Shenandoah to make repairs to her machinery in that port, a still greater violation of the duties of Great Britain as a neutral was committed.

It has just been shown that this vessel was under no necessity of using her steam; that she had gone to Madeira under sail; that she had come from the Cape of Good Hope to Melbourne under sail. For many days before arriving at Melbourne “a heavy and continuous gale” prevailed.¹ At its height it was “sublime beyond description,” and the Shenandoah “drove before it at the rate of eleven knots an hour, under close-reefed topsails and reefed foresail.”² Yet the author of the Cruise of the Shenandoah makes no mention of any injury to the vessel, or of any leak, and there is nothing to show that the hull needed repairs, or that anything was done to it except that “a gang of calkers were procured and went to work upon the decks with pitch and oakum.”³ The United States are convinced that no other repairs were necessary for the hull, and that if the departure of the vessel was delayed for the ostensible purpose of further repairs to the vessel itself, the pretense was made solely for the purpose of delay.

[442] The repairs to the machinery, as distinguished from the hull, were made with the object of enabling the Shenandoah to go to the Arctic Ocean, there to destroy the whalers of the United States, *in accordance with Bullock’s instructions to Waddell before he left Liverpool.⁴ It is evident, not only from the absence of any mention of injury to the hull by the author of the Cruise of the Shenandoah, but also from the statement of experts of the repairs which the machinery required, that the hull was sound and seaworthy, and that the Shenandoah as a sailing-vessel, without steam, could at once have proceeded to sea, and have made her way to the insurgent ports.⁵ When Captain Boggs, of the United States Navy, two months later, (after the surrender of Lee,) asked permission to remain at Barbadoes “a few days, for the purpose of overhauling the piston and engine,” he was required, as a preliminary to the permission, to “give a definite assurance of his inability to proceed to sea.”⁶ As a man of honor and truth he could not do this, and he went to sea without his repairs. The same rule applied to the Shenandoah would have produced the same result, supposing Captain Waddell to have been as honorable and as truthful a man as Captain Boggs.

[413] *Twenty-four hours elapsed before any questions were put to Captain Waddell by the local authorities. Then he was told to state what repairs be wanted, in order that the Governor might know how long he was to enjoy the hospitalities of the port. He delayed, for two (lays to answer this question, going on, however, in the meanwhile with some of his repairs. He then reported the repairs already begun as “progressing rapidly,” and added that Langland Brothers & Co. were to examine the propeller and bracings (probably a misprint for “bearings”) under water; that a diver had that day examined them; and that “so soon as Messrs. Langland Brothers & Co. should hand in their report” he would inclose it.

Two days later, on the 30th, Langland Brothers & Co. made their report, “after inspection by the diver,” saying that “the lining of the outer sternback” (probably a misprint for “sternbush”) is entirely gone, and will have to be replaced; that “three days will elapse before she is slipped,” and that they “will not be able to accomplish the repairs within ten days from date.”¹

The Tribunal will observe that it was proposed that two kinds of repairs should be made.

[444] The first class did not require the vessel to go into the slip. These included the calking referred *to by the author of the Cruise of the Shenandoah,² and perhaps also repairs of a general character, which all steam machinery requires after having been run for any length of time, such as refitting of brasses, packing stuffing-boxes, examining and readjusting of working parts, &c., &c. All these repairs could have gone on simultaneously. Such coal as might be allowed within the construction of the instructions of January 31, 1862, as those instructions were applied to the vessels of the United States, and such supplies as were legally permitted, could also be taken on, and the vessel could be ready to go to sea again in from two to four days after her arrival in port. Or, should it be necessary for the vessel to go into a slip for the purpose of repairing the propeller, this class of repairs might also be going on in the slip, at the same time with the others.

[445] The other class of repairs were those which Langland Brothers & Co. were to report upon—repairs to the propeller. It appears from the report made by these mechanics on the 30th of January, that they founded their estimate upon the report of a diver. Mechanics ordinarily have to depend upon such a report, and to found their estimates upon it. The examination of the propeller of a screw-steamer, and of its bearings * below the water-line, is a simple matter, and takes but a short time. It is confined to the stern of the vessel. A practical expert can go down, satisfy himself of the extent of the injury, and return and report in a few minutes. Had the Governor treated Captain Waddell as Captain Boggs was treated, the examination could easily have been made on the morning of the 26th, and the whole extent of the injury could have been reported to the Governor on the afternoon of the same day within twenty-four hours after the arrival of the vessel in port. Captain Waddell, however, was not required to move so rapidly. He did not send his diver down until the 28th; he did not get the official report of his mechanics until the 30th. Thus he spent five days in doing what could have been done in five hours. There must have been a motive for that delay; the United States find that motive in his necessity to enlist a crew.

[446] The Tribunal will also observe that his own report on the 28th of the extent of his injuries differs from that made by his mechanics on the 30th. He reported that “the composition castings of the propeller shaft were entirely gone, and the bracings (probably a misprint for “bearings”) under water were in the same condition.” This was a more serious injury than the one reported by his mechanics two days later, namely, the necessity of giving the shaft a new outer sternbush. The latter would, it is true, require the docking of the ship to admit of the removal of the shaft. But when the ship was once in the slip, the propeller could be easily hoisted, being a movable one;¹ and then the renewal of the lignum-vitæ lining, technically known as the sternbush, the only repairs which the experts reported to be necessary, could be completed two or three days after the ship should be on the slip. If the vessel was necessarily longer on the slip she must have received more repairs than are described in the official report of the Lang-lands, which embraced all for which the permission was granted.

[447] It therefore appears that, on the supposition that the authorities at Melbourne could, under the circumstances, without violating the duty of Great Britain as a neutral, permit the repairs reported by Langland Brothers & Co. to be made, the Shenandoah should have gone to sea in ten days after her arrival. This estimate gives the extreme time for every requisite step, viz: one calendar day for the examination of the diver, excluding the day of arrival; three days (the estimate of the Langlands) for putting the vessel in the slip; three days for the repairs by the Langlands; one day for getting her out of the slip; and two days for reloading and getting to sea, which was the time actually taken; but as, during this time she unwarrantably took on board three hundred tons of coal, this is probably too large an estimate. Instead of requiring these repairs to be completed in ten days, the Melbourne authorities allowed the Shenandoah to stay there twenty-four days. The extra fourteen days were occupied in the recruitment of the forty-three men whom she carried away with her. It is difficult, under the circumstances, to resist the conclusion that the repairs were dawdled along for the purpose of securing the recruits, and that the authorities, to say the least, shut their eyes while this was going on; especially if it be true, as said by Temple, that the Government engineer was on board three or four times a day while they were undergoing repairs, and assisted them with his opinion and advice.² It is fair to say that this fact is doubted by the Governor of the Colony.³ If the Government engineer was not there, however, he should have been, in order to see that Waddell was not violating British neutrality.

[448] Leaving Melbourne, the Shenandoah went through the Pacific Ocean to the Arctic Seas, via Behring’s Straits, under the instructions issued by Bullock, in Liverpool, for the purpose of destroying the whalers of the United States. How successful she was in her attacks upon these intrepid and daring navigators is shown by the long list of captured vessels, for whose destruction the United States claim compensation.

[449] On the cruise to those seas she used her sails only. After arrival there she commenced steaming on the 25th of June, and “from that time till she left the Arctic Seas she made comparatively little use of her sails.”⁴ Many of the most valuable vessels were destroyed after that time. Temple names, in his affidavit, fifteen that were destroyed after Waddell knew of the suppression of the insurrection.¹ Bullock wrote him a letter, instructing him “to desist from any further destruction of United States property,”² and Earl Russell undertook to send the letter “through the British Consuls at the ports where the, ship may be expected.”. It was not until the 17th day of October, 1865, that she ceased to be officially registered as a British vessel. Waddell arrived at Liverpool with the Shenandoah on the 6th of the following November, and wrote Earl Russell that the destructions committed on the 28th of June—when Temple said that he knew of the surrender of Lee—were committed “in ignorance of the obliteration of the Government.” He said that he received his first intelligence on the 2d of August. The author of the Cruise of the Shenandoah says that they received, on the 28th of June, while burning the whalers, the news of the assassination of Mr. Lincoln.³ This event took place a week after the surrender of Lee. The affidavits of Temple and Nye in Vol. VII indicate still earlier knowledge. It would seem, therefore,’ that Waddell’s statements to Earl Russell could not have been correct.

[450] “The re-appearance of the Shenandoah in British waters” was regarded as “an untoward and unwelcome event.” The Times reminded the public that “in a certain sense it was doubtless true that the Shenandoah was built and manned in fraud of British neutrality.”⁴ Great Britain dealt with the “untoward” question as it had dealt with others during the contest—by evading it. The vessel was delivered to the United States. The men who had been preying upon the commerce of the United States for months without a semblance of authority behind them, most of whom were British subjects, with unmistakable British bearing and speech, were called before an officer of the British Navy *to be examined as to their nationality, they understanding in advance that it was a crime for British subjects to have served on the Shenandoah. “Each one stated that he belonged to one or the other of the States of America,”⁵ and they were discharged without further inquiry.

On the 28th of December, 1865, Mr. Adams, commenting upon these proceedings, wrote to Earl Clarendon as follows:⁶ “I trust it may be made to appear—

• “1. That the Sea King did depart from a British port armed with all the means she ever had occasion to use in the course of her cruise againts the commerce of the United States; and that no inconsiderable portion of her hostile career was passed while she was still registered as a British vessel, with a British owner, on the official records of the Kingdom.
• “2. That the commander had been made fully aware of the suppression of the rebellion the very day before he committed a series of outrages on innocent, industrious, and unarmed citizens of the United States, in the Sea of Okhotsk.
• “3. [451] The list of the crew, with all the particulars attending the sources from which the persons were drawn, is believed to be so far substantially correct as to set at rest the pretense of the officer sent on board that there were no British subjects belonging to the vessel.”
• The United States confidently insist that they have incontestable established the points there claimed by Mr. Adams; and further,
• “4. That the Shenandoah was fitted out and armed within British jurisdiction, namely, at London, for the purpose of cruising against the United States; that Great Britain had reasonable ground to believe that such was the case, and did not use due diligence to prevent it.
• “5. That she came again within British jurisdiction, where all these facts were open and notorious, and the British authorities exercised no diligence to prevent her departure, but claimed the right to treat her as a commissioned man-of-war, and to permit her to depart as such.
• “6. That twice within British jurisdiction she received large recruitments of men, without due diligence being used to prevent it: 1st. At Liverpool, from whence the men were forwarded by the Laurel; and, 2d, at Melbourne.
• “7. That she was allowed to make repairs and to receive coal and supplies which were denied to vessels of the United States in similar circumstances.”

[452] The subsequent career of the steamer Laurel, *which, with the Shenandoah, formed the, hostile expedition against the United States, throws additional light on the sincerity of the British neutrality in the case of the Shenandoah. On the 7th of March, 1865, Mr. Adams wrote as follows to Earl Russell:

“I am pained to be obliged once more to call your attention to the proceedings of the vessel called the steamer Laurel:

“This is the vessel concerning which I had the honor to make a representation, in a note dated the 10th November last, which appears to have proved, in substance, correct.

“Her departure from Liverpool on the 9th October, laden with men and arms destined to be placed on board of the steamer Sea King, her meeting with that vessel at Porto Santo, in the Madeira Islands, her subsequent transfer of her freight to that steamer, which thereupon assumed the name of the Shenandoah, and proceeded to capture and destroy vessels belonging to the people of the United States, are all facts now established by incontestable evidence.

[453] “It now appears that this steamer Laurel, having accomplished her object under British colors, instead of immediately returning to this Kingdom, made her way through the blockade to the port of Charleston, where she changed her register and *her name, and assumed to be a so-called Confederate vessel. In this shape she next made her appearance at the port of Nassau as the ‘Confederate States.’ From that place she cleared, not long since, to go, via Madeira, to the same port of Liverpool, from whence she had originally started.

“It further appears that, notwithstanding the assumption of this new character, this vessel carried out from Nassau a ship mail, made up at the post-office of that port, and transported the same to Liverpool. I have the honor to transmit a copy of a letter from the postmaster at that place establishing that fact.

“Under these circumstances, I have the honor to inform your Lordship that I am instructed by my Government to remonstrate against the receipt and clearance with mails of this vessel from Nassau, and to request that such measures may be adopted in regard to her as may prevent her from thus abusing the neutrality of Her Majesty’s territory, for the purpose of facilitating the operations of the enemies of the United States.”¹

[454] To this Earl Russell replied “that Her Majesty’s Government are advised, that although the proceedings of the steamer Confederate States, formerly Laurel, may have rendered her liable to *capture on the high seas by the cruisers of the United States, she has not, so far as is Known, committed any offense punishable by British law.” ²

From all these various facts, the United States ask the Tribunal of Arbitration to find and certify as to the Shenandoah, that Great Britain has, by its acts and by its omissions, failed to fulfill its duties set forth in the three rules of the Treaty of Washington, or recognized by the principles of law not inconsistent with such rules. Should the Tribunal exercise the power conferred upon it by the seventh article of the Treaty, to award a sum in gross to be paid to the United States, they ask that, in considering the amount to be awarded, the losses in the destruction of vessels and their cargoes by the Shenandoah, and the expense to which the United States were put in the pursuit of it, may be taken into account.

In the course of the long discussions between the two Governments, which followed the close of the insurrection, it became the duty of Mr. Adams to make a summary of the points which he maintained bad been established by the United States. This he did in the following language, addressed to Earl Russell:³

Summary.

[455] *“It was my wish to maintain—

• “1. That the act of recognition by Her Majesty’s Government of insurgents as belligerents on the high seas before they had a single vessel afloat was precipitate and unprecedented.
• “2. That it had the effect of creating these parties belligerents after the recognition, instead of merely acknowledging an existing fact.
• “3. That this creation has been since effected exclusively from the ports of Her Majesty’s Kingdom and its dependencies, with the aid and co-operation of Her Majesty’s subjects.
• “4. That during the whole course of the struggle in America, of nearly four years in duration, there has been no appearance of the insurgents as a belligerent on the ocean excepting in the shape of British vessels, constructed, equipped, supplied, manned, and armed in British ports.
• “5. That during the same period it has been the constant and persistent endeavor of my Government to remonstrate in every possible form against this abuse of the neutrality of this Kingdom, and to call upon Her Majesty’s Government to exercise the necessary powers to put an effective stop to it.
• “6. [456] That although the desire of Her Majesty’s Ministers to exert themselves in the suppression of these abuses is freely acknowledged, the efforts *which they made proved in a great degree powerless, from the inefficiency of the law on which they relied and from their absolute refusal, when solicited, to procure additional powers to attain the objects.
• “7. That, by reason of the failure to check this flagrant abuse of neutrality, the issue from British ports of a number of British vessels, with the aid of the recognition of their belligerent character in all the ports of Her Majesty’s dependencies around the globe, has resulted in the burning and destroying on; the ocean of a large number of merchant-vessels, and a very large amount of property belonging to the people of the United States.
• “8. That, in addition to this direct injury, the action of these British-built, manned, and armed vessels has had the indirect effect of driving from the sea a large portion of the commercial marine of the United States, and to a corresponding extent enlarging that of Great Britain, thus enabling one portion of the British people to derive an unjust advantage from the wrong committed on a friendly nation by another portion.
• “9. [457] That the injuries thus received by a country which has meanwhile sedulously endeavored to perform all its obligations owing to the imperfection of the legal means at hand to prevent them, as well as the unwillingness to seek for more *stringent powers, are of so grave a nature as in reason and justice to constitute a valid claim for reparation and indemnification.”

The United States, with confidence, maintain that every point thus asserted by Mr. Adams has been established by the proof hereinbefore referred to. In leaving in the hands of the Tribunal this part of their Case, they think it no impropriety earnestly to call attention to the magnitude of the issues to be decided.

[458] Many a vindictive and bloody war has grown out of less provocation than the United States thus suffered from a nation with which they supposed that they were holding friendly relations. On the 4th of July, 1777, during the war of the American Revolution, Lord Stormont was instructed to say to the French Ministers that “the shelter given to the armed vessels of the rebels, the facility they have of disposing of their prizes by the connivance of the Government, and the conveniences allowed them to refit, are such irrefragable proofs of support, that scarcely more could be done if there was an avowed alliance between France and them, and that we were in a state of war with that Kingdom.” He was also directed to say that however desirous of maintaining the peace, His Britannic Majesty could not, “from his respect-to his honor and his regard to the interest of his trading *subjects, submit to such strong and public instances of support and protection shown to the rebels by a nation that at the same time professes in the strongest terms its desire to maintain the present harmony subsisting between the two Crowns.”¹

The injuries inflicted upon the United States during the insurrection, under the cover of professions of friendship, are well described in this language of the Ministers of George III, except that the insurgents were allowed to burn, instead of assisted to dispose of their prizes. But the United States, although just emerging from a successful war, with all the appliances of destruction in their grasp, preferred to await a better state of feeling in Great Britain, rather than follow the example of that Government in resorting to war. The time came when Her Majesty’s Government felt that it would not be derogatory to the elevated position of their Sovereign to express regret for the escape of the cruisers and for the depredations which they committed. The United States, receiving this expression of regret in the spirit in which it was made, stand before this Tribunal of Arbitration to abide its judgment.

[459] If the facts which they bring here constitute, in the opinion of the Tribunal, no just cause for claim against Great Britain, they must bow to the * decision. But if, on the other hand, Great Britain shall not be able to explain to their complete satisfaction the charges and the proof which they present, the United States will count upon an award to the full extent of their demand. They feel that it is their duty to insist before this August Body, not only in their own interest, but for the sake of the future peace of the world, that it is not a just performance of the duties of a neutral to permit a belligerent to carry on organized war from its territories against a Bower with which the neutral is at peace.

If this Tribunal shall hold that combined operations like those of Bullock, Fraser, Trenholm & Co., Huse, Heyliger, and others, (which in the judgment of the United States constituted an organized war,) are legitimate, their decision will, in the opinion of the United States, lay the foundation for endless dissensions and wars.

If wrongs like those which the United States suffered are held by this Tribunal to be no violation of the duties which one nation owes to another, the rules of the Treaty of Washington can have little effective force, and there will be little inducement for nations in future to adopt the peaceful method of arbitration for the settlement of their differences.

[460] If it was right to furnish the Nashville at Ber*muda with a full supply of coal, sufficient to carry her to Southampton, instead of what might be necessary for her return to Charleston, the United States and the other maritime nations must accept the doctrine in the future.

If there was no violation of international duty in receiving the Sumter at Trinidad, and in supplying her with the fuel necessary to enable her to continue her career of destruction, instead of giving her what was requisite, with her sailing power, to enable her to return to New Orleans or Galveston, it is important that the maritime Bowers should know it.

If recognized vessels of war, like the Sumter and the Georgia, may be lawfully sold in a neutral port during time of war, the United States, as a nation whose normal condition is one of neutrality, accept the doctrine.

[461] If the duties of a neutral in preventing, within its territory, the construction, arming, equipping, or fitting out of vessels by one belligerent, which may be intended to cruise against the other belligerent, or the furnishing of arms or military supplies to such vessel, or the recruitment of men for such belligerent, are to be limited to the exercise of the powers conferred upon the neutral Government by municipal law, the United States, with their extended frontier on both oceans, have more * interest than any other maritime Bower in recognizing that fact.

If the recognition of belligerency by a neutral, in favor of an organized insurrection, authorizes a so-called. Government of insurrectionists to issue commissions, which are to protect vessels that may have violated the sovereignty of the neutral from examination, inquiry, or punishment by the neutral authorities when again within their jurisdiction, the United States, and other nations here represented, must hold themselves at liberty in future to conform to such measure of duty, in that respect, as may be indicated by this Tribunal.

If Georgias, Alabamas, Floridas, and Shenandoahs may be allowed to go out from neutral ports without violations of international duty, to prey upon the commerce of friendly nations; if it be no offense to recruit men for them and to send the recruits to join them in Alars, Bermudas, Bahamas, and Laurels, the United States as a neutral will be relieved, when other States are at war, from a great part of the difficulties they encounter in watching a long line of coast.

[462] If Tallahassees and Chickamaugas may be constructed in neutral territory, without violation of international duty, to serve as it may suit the pleasure of a belligerent, alternately either as blockade-runners or as men-of-war, those maritime nations whose normal, condition is one of neutrality need not regret such a doctrine, when viewed, not in the light of principle, but as affecting their pecuniary interests.

And if it be no offense, as in the case of the Retribution, to take a captured cargo into a neutral port, and there to dispose of it with the knowledge and without the interference of the local magistracy, the maritime Powers, knowing that such buccaneering customs are to be permitted, will be the better able to guard against them.

It will depend upon this Tribunal to say whether any or all of these precedents are to be sanctioned and are to stand for future guidance.

The conduct of other nations contrasted with that of Great Britain. The United States, in closing this branch of the Case, desire to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that they came out from this long and bloody contest without serious cause of complaint against any nation except Great Britain.

The Executives of other nations issued notices to their citizens or subjects, enjoining upon them to remain neutral in the contest.

[463] Belgium issued a notice on the 25th of June, 1861, warning Belgians against engaging as priva*teers.¹ The United States had never any cause of complaint in this respect against Belgium. The Emperor of the French, on the 10th of June, 1861, issued a proclamation commanding his subjects to “maintain a strict neutrality in the struggle entered upon between the Government of the Union and the States which pretended to form a separate confederation.”² The United States refer to the foregoing recital of the proceedings against Mr. Arman’s vessels, as a proof of the fidelity with which the Imperial Government maintained the neutrality which it imposed upon its subjects.

The Government of the Netherlands forbade privateers to enter its ports, and warned the inhabitants of the Netherlands and the King’s subjects abroad not to accept letters of marque.³ The United States have no knowledge that these directions were disobeyed.

[464] The Government of Portugal shut the harbors of the Portuguese dominions against privateers and their prizes.⁴ Of this the United States had no complaint to make. At a later period that Government went so far “as to forbid the coaling of any steamer designing to violate the blockade,” and to “require a bond to be given, before allowing *coals to be furnished at all, that the ship receiving the supply will not run the blockade.”⁵ When the insurgent iron-clad Stonewall came into Lisbon Harbor in March, 1865, it was ordered to leave in twenty-four hours.⁶ The United States bear willing testimony to this honorable conduct of Portugal.

The Prussian Government announced that it would not protect its shipping or its subjects who might take letters of marque, share in privateering enterprises, carry merchandise of war, or forward dispatches.¹ The United States have no reason to suppose that the subjects of the King of Prussia departed from the line of duty thus indicated.

The Russian Government ordered that even “the flag of men-of-war belonging to the seceded States must not be saluted.”²

[465] Spain followed France in the track of England,³ but care was taken to avoid, in the Royal Proclamation, the use of the word “belligerents.”⁴ It has been seen with what fidelity and impartiality the authorities at Cardenas carried out the letter and the spirit of this proclamation, when the *Florida arrived there from Nassau, in the summer of 1862.

[466] The Emperor of Brazil required his subjects to observe a strict neutrality; and his Government informed them what acts of the belligerents would forfeit the right of hospitality. It was ordered that “a belligerent who has once violated neutrality shall not be admitted into the ports of the Empire;” and that “vessels which may attempt to violate neutrality shall be compelled to leave the maritime territory immediately, and they shall be allowed to procure no supplies.” These rules were enforced. The Alabama was refused the hospitality of Brazilian ports in consequence of violations of the neutrality which *the Emperor had determined to maintain. When the Tuscaloosa came to St. Catharine’s from Simon’s Bay, in November, 1863, she was refused supplies and ordered to leave, because she was a tender and prize of the Alabama, and was tainted by the acts of that vessel. The commander of the Shenandoah boarded a vessel between Cardiff and Bahia, opened the manifest, and broke the seal of the Brazilian Consul; for this act his vessel, and any vessel which he might command, were excluded from Brazilian ports.⁵ The Imperial Government, in all these proceedings, appeared desirous *of asserting its sovereignty, and of maintaining an honest neutrality.

Mr. Fish, in one of his first utterances after he became Secretary of State, expressed the sense which the United States entertained of this difference between the conduct of Great Britain and that of other nations. “There were other Powers,” he said, “that were contemporaneous with England in similar concessions; but it was in England only that that concession was supplemented by acts causing direct damage to the United States. The President is careful to make this discrimination, because he is anxious, as much as possible, to simplify the case, and to bring into view these subsequent acts, which are so important in determining the question between the two countries.”⁶

1. Vol. III, page 461.
1. Vol. VI, page. 4.
2. Lord Russell to Mr. Adams, Vol. I, page 578.
3. Vol. V, pages 486 to 91.
1. Ante, page 251.
2. Duke of Newcastle to Governor Ord, Vol. II, page 558.
3. Earl Russell to Lord Lyons, Vol. II, page 591.
1. Earl Russell to Mr. Adams, Vol. I, page 578.
1. Bernard to Seward, Vol. II, page 485.
2. Adams to Russell, Vol. II, page 484.
3. Russell to Adams, Vol. II, page 486.
4. Sprague to Seward, Vol. II, page 502.
5. Sprague to Adams, Vol. II, page 507.
1. Sprague to Codrington, Vol. II, page 509.
2. Sprague to Adams, Vol. II, page 515.
3. Adams to Russell, Vol. II, page 522.
4. Adams to Russell, Vol. II, page 523.
5. Adams to Russell, Vol. II, page 522.
6. Russell to Adams, Vol. II, page 526.
7. Adams to Russell, Vol. II, page 520.
8. Russell to Adams, Vol. II, page 521.
9. The nominal purchasers were M. G. Klingerder & Co., (Vol. II, page 529.) Thi house was connected with Fraser, Trenholm & Co., and paid regularly a portion of th wages of the men on the Alabama to their faimlies in Liverpool. (See Dudley to Adams, Vol. III, page 210.)
10. Vol. II, pages 521–538.
11. Ord to Allen, Vol. II, page 590. See also the reports of the officers of the Keystone and the Quaker City, who, in December, 1861, were refused supplies of coal at this port. Vol. VI, pages 52 and 53. See also the case of the Florida, post, where this subject is more fully discussed.
1. Vol. IV, pp. 486–491.
2. The President’s Proclamation of October 8, 1870, issued during the Franco-German war, limited the supply of coal to the war vessels or privateers of the belligerents to so much as might be sufficient, if without sail-power, to carry the vessel to the nearest European port of its own country: if with sail-power, to half that quantity.
3. Vol. II, pages 502, 503.
4. Sprague to Adams, Vol. II, pages 502, 503, 506, 507.
1. Bernard to Seward, Vol. II, page 485.
2. Bernard’s Neutrality of Great Britain, page 287.
3. Wells to Seward, Vol. II, page 538.
4. Governor Ord to the Duke of Newcastle, Vol. II, page 557.
5. Duke of Newcastle to Governor Ord, Vol. II, page 558.
6. Wells to Ord, Vol. II, page 539.
1. Wells’to Seward, vol. II, page 540.
2. Captain Patey to the Secretary of the Admiralty, Vol. II, pages 543, 544.
3. Russell to Adams, Vol. II, page 555.
4. Vol. II, page 587.
5. Ord to Allen, Vol. II, page 590.
6. Adams to Seward, Vol. II, page 542.
7. Allen to Seward, Vol. II, page 591.
8. Dudley to Adams, Vol. II, page 594.
1. Prioleau’s evidence, Vol. VI, page 181.
2. Dudley to Seward, Vol. II, page 592.
3. See Mr. Dudley’s dispatches of January 24 and 31, and of February 4, 12, 17, 19, 21, 22, 26, and 27, and of March 1, 5, 12, 15, 19, and 22, in the year 1862, Vol. VI, page 214, et seq.
4. Dudley to Seward, March 12, 1862, Vol. VI, page 223.
5. Same to same, February 12, 1862, Vol. VI, page 215.
6. Dudley to Seward, Vol. II, page 592; Vol. VI, page 215.
7. Same to same, Vol. II, page 596; Vol. VI, page 220.
8. Same to same, Vol. II, page 597; Vol. VI, page 221.
9. Dudley to Seward, March 7, 1862, Vol. VI, page 222.
10. Same to same, March 22, 1862, Vol. VI, page 224.
11. Dudley to Adams, Vol. II, page 601.
12. Vol. II, page 601.
13. Vol. II, page 604.
14. Customs Report, Vol. II, page 605; Vol. VI, page 231.
1. See Mr. Dudley’s dispatches of March 7, 12, and 15, Vols. II and VI.
2. Dudley to Adams, Vol. II, page 594; Vol. VI, page 216.
3. Adams to Russell, Vol. II, page 593; Vol. VI, page 216.
4. Vol. II, pages 595, 96; Vol. VI, page 218.
5. Vol. II, page 605; Vol. VI, page 231.
1. Vol. VI, page 246.
2. Vol. VI, pages 264 and 266.
3. Vol. V, page 513.
1. Consul Whiting to Governor Bayloy, Mav 9, 1862, Vol. VI, page 235.
2. Nesbitt to Whiting, May 13, 1852, Vol. VI, page 236.
3. Vol. VI, pages 238, 239.
4. Whiting to Seward, June 19, 1862, Vol. VI, page 241.
5. Whiting to Seward, June 13, 1862, Vol. VI, page 242.
6. Whiting to Bayley, June 12, 1862, Vol. VI, page 243.
7. Nesbitt to Whiting, June 13, 1862, Vol. VI, page 244.
8. Whiting to Seward, June 18, 1862, Vol. VI, page 250.
1. Kirkpatrick to Seward, Vol. VI, page 327.
2. This seemingly harsh statement is fully borne out by the report of the trial. See Vol. V, page 509.
3. Governor Bayley to Captain Hickley, June, 1862.
4. Whiting to Seward, August 1, 1862, Vol. VI, page 261.
5. If the Tribunal will read the summary of this case in the opinion of the court, Which may be found at page 509 of Vol. V, it will be found that this statement is not too strong.
6. The Oreto had in fact been ordered by Bullock, as agent of the Confederate Government, from one ship-building firm, as the Alabama had been ordered by him from another; and Captain Maffitt, the officer appointed to command her, was all this while at Nassau, waiting the result of the trial.—Bernard’s Neutrality of Great Britain, page 351.
7. See Evans and Chapman’s vouchers, Nassau, July 28, Vol. VI, page 330.
8. See Consul Kirkpatrick’s dispatch to Mr. Seward, July 7, 1865, as to the standing of these men, Vol. VI, page 327.
9. Vol. V, page 517.
1. Vol. V, page 521; Vol. VI, page 285.
2. Vol. II, pages 610, 611.
3. Solomon’s deposition, Vol. VI, page 310.
1. Copy of voucher of Manuel Corany, Vol. VI, page 331.
2. Whiting to Seward, January 26, 1863, Vol. VI, page 333.
1. Whiting to Seward, 26th January, 1863, Vol. III, page 333.
2. Whiting to Seward, January 27, 1863, Vol. VI, page 333.
3. Journal quoted ante, page —. See also Vol. If, page 617. See also Vol. VI, page 335, the deposition of John Demerith, who says, “We filled her hunkers with coal, and placed some on deck, and in every place that could hold it. I suppose that she had on board over one hundred and eighty tons that we put there. She did not have less than that quantity. The coal was taken from the wharves and from vessels in the harbor. The money for coaling her was paid from Mr. Henry Adderley’s store.”
4. Whiting to Wells, Vol. II, page 616.
5. Vol. IV, page 175.
6. Bernard’s Neutrality of Great Britain, pages 265 and 266.
1. Rear-Admiral Wilkes to the Secretary of the Navy January 2, 1873.
2. Admiral Wilkes to Mr. Welles, Vol. VI, page 338.
3. Trowbridge to Seward, Vol. II, page 619; Vol. VI, page 339.
4. Wilkes to Walker, Vol. II, page 628, Vol. VI, page 343.
1. Walker to Wilkes, Vol. II, page 629; Vol. VI, page 344.
2. Robeson to Fish, Vol. VI, page 345.
3. Captain Boggs to Governor Walker, Vol. VI, page 178.
4. Governor Walker to Captain Boggs, Vol. VI, page 178.
5. Captain Boggs to Governor Walker, Vol. VI, page 179.
6. Vol. II, page 629; Vol. VI, page 346.
1. Consul’s report to Mr. Seward.
2. Vol. II, page 639; Vol. VI, page 349.
3. Ante, page —.
4. Dudley to Seward, January 21, 1864. Eraser, Trenholm & Co. to Barney, September 22, 1863, Vol. VI, page 352.
5. Morse to Seward, January 8, 1864, Vol. VI, page 353.
6. Vol. VI, page 357.
7. See the vouchers for their payments, Vol. VI, page 358, et seq.
8. Welles to Seward, Vol. II, page 652.
9. Adams to Russell, Vol. II, page 651.
1. Russell to Adams, Vol. II, page 653.
2. Maffitt to Barney, Vol. VI, pages 351, 352.
3. Vol. VI, page 370.
1. Semmes’s Adventures Afloat, pages 402, 403.
2. Journal of an officer of the Alabama. See Vol. IV, page 181.
3. Dudley to Edwards, Vol. III, page 17; Vol. VI, page 383.
4. Dudley to Seward, Vol. III, page 1; Vol. VI, page 371.
5. Vol. III, page 146; Vol. VI, page 465.
6. See Vol. III, passim.
1. Adams to Russell, Vol. III, page 5; Vol. VI, page 375.
2. The Florida arrived at Nassau April 28, and the Bahama with her armament a few days later. These facts were undoubtedly known to Lord Russell and to Mr. Adams when this letter was written.
3. Russell to Adams, Vol. III, page 6; Vol. VI, page 376.
4. Vol. III, page 7; Vol. VI, page 379.
5. Adams to Wilding, Vol. III, page 8; Vol. VI, page 381.
6. Dudley to Edwards, Vol. III, page 17; Vol. VI, page 383.
1. Edwards to Dudley, Vol. III, page 19; Vol. VI, page 385.
2. Vol. VI, page 389.
3. Vol. III, page 16; Vol. VI, page 388.
4. Dudley to Seward, Vol. III, page 13.
5. Dudley to Seward, Vol. III, page 13; Vol. VI, page 390.
6. Collector to Commissioners, Vol. III, page 20; Vol. VI, page 395.
7. Vol. III, page 29; Vol. VI, page 398.
1. Vol. III, page 29; Vol. IV, page 398.
2. Squary to Adams, Vol. III, page 29; Vol. VI, page 397.
3. Vol. III, page 31; Vol. VI, page 406.
4. Vol. III, page 21; Vol. VI, page 397.
5. A speech delivered in the House of Commons on Friday, August 4, 1871, by Sir Roundell Palmer, M. P. for Richmond, page 16.
1. Vol. III, page 36.
2. Adams to Russell, Vol. III, page 536.
3. Vol. III, pages 35,36; Vol. VI, page 414.
4. Semmes says in his Adventures, “Fortunately for the Confederate vessel, tidings of the projected seizure were conveyed to Birkenhead.” “Our unceremonious departure was owing to the fact of news being received to the effect that the customs authorities had orders to hoard and detain us that morning.” Vol. IV, page 181.
5. Vol. III, page 147; Vol. VI, page 437.
6. Vol. VI, page 408.
7. Vol. VI, page 411.
8. Vol. VI, page 409.
9. Vol. VI, page 410.
1. Vol. IV, page 410.
2. Vol. IV, page 413.
3. Vol. III, page 46. Two crew-lists are in the accompanying volumes. One will be found in Vol. III, page 150; the other, in Vol. III, page 213.
4. Vol. IV, page 182.
5. Journal of an Officer of the Alabama. See Vol. IV, page 182.
6. The Bahama cleared from Liverpool on the 12th of August. Fawcett, Preston & Co. shipped on board of her “nineteen cases containing guns, gun-carriages, shot, rammers, &c., weighing in all 158 cwt. 1 qr. 27 lbs. There was no other cargo on board, except five hundred and fifty-two tons of coal for the use of the ship.” Vol. III, page 54; see also Vol. III, page 141, for further details.
7. See particularly Younge’s deposition, Vol. III, page 145; Passmore’s deposition, Vol. III, page 25; and Latham’s deposition, Vol. III, page 211. See also Vol. VI, pages 435 and 472
8. I had arrived on Wednesday, [at Terceira,] and on Saturday night we had, by dint of great labor and perseverance, drawn order out of chaos. * * * The ship having been properly prepared, we steamed out on this bright Sunday morning; the flag of the Confederate States was unfurled for the first time from the peak of the, Alabama.—Semmes’s Adventures Afloat, pages 408, 409.
1. Speeches and dispatches of Earl Russell, Vol. II, pages 259, 260.
2. Earl Russell to Mr. Adams, Vol. III, page 299.
3. Semmes’s Adventures Afloat, page 419.
4. Semmes’s Adventures Afloat, page 420.
5. Same, page 514. The Agrippina is the same vessel that took coal and supplies to her at Terceira.
1. Semmes’s Adventures Afloat, page 555.
2. Ibid. “By the act of consenting to receive the Alabama in Kingston, and permitting her to refit and supply herself at that, we had considered the British Government as having given her a positive recognition, and having assumed the responsibility for the consequences of that sanction.”—Mr. Adams’s statement to Lord Russell, described in a dispatch to Mr. Seward, Vol. III, page 247.
3. Semmes’s Adventures Afloat, page 563.
4. Vol. III, pages 70, 71.
5. Ante, page 110.
1. Vol. III, page 203.
3. Semmes’s Adventures Afloat, page 737.
3. Semmes’s Adventures Afloat, page 715.
4. Semmes’s Adventures Afloat, page 744.
5. This is evident from Semmes’s account of his voyage on leaving Singapore, page 715, et sea.
6. Semmes’s Adventures Afloat, page 744.
7. Semmes’s Adventures Afloat, page 745.
8. Semmes’s Adventures Afloat, page 627.
1. Semmes’s Adventures Afloat, page 738.
1. Mr. Seward to Lord Lyons, Vol. I, page 701.
2. Burnside to Nesbitt, Vol. 1, page 702.
3. Governor Bayley to Duke of Newcastle, Vol. I, page 706.
3. Governor Bayley to Duke of Newcastle, Vol. I, page 706.
4. Affidavit of Thomas Sampson, Vol. VI, page 736.
4. Affidavit of Thomas Sampson, Vol. VI, page 736.
5. Underwood to Seward, January 16, 1863, Vol. VI, page 593.
1. Extracts from London Daily News, February 12 and 17, 1883, Vol. VI, page 503, et seq.
2. Dudley to Seward, Vol. II, page 685; Vol. VI, page 509.
3. Vol. II, page 681; Vol. VI, page 516; Vol. VII, page 88.
4. Vol. II, page 672; Vol. VI, page 512; Vol. VII, page 88.
5. Mr. Adams to Earl Russell, Vol. II, pages 677,678; Vol. VII, page 88.
6. Mahou’s affidavit, Vol. II, page 672; Vol. VI, page 513.
7. Thompson’s affidavit, Vol. II, page 671; Vol. VI, page 511.
8. Speech of Thomas Baring, Esq., M. P., Haosard, 3d series, Vol. 175, page 467.
1. Vol. VI, page 567.
2. Vol. II, page 671; Vol. VI, page 511.
3. Vol. II, page 666; Vol. VI, page 509.
4. Vol. II, page 667; Vol. VI, page 510.
1. Vol. II, page 688.
2. Hansard, new series, Vols. XXIII and XXIV; Annual Register, History, &c., A. D. 1829, Vol. LXXII, page 187.
3. Vol. II, page 682; Vol. VI, page 519.
4. Vol. II, pages 683, 684, 686, 689, &c.
5. Stanley’s affidavit, Vol. II, page 684; Vol. VI, page 522. See also Charles Thompson’s affidavit, Vol. III, page 87.
6. Vol. II, page 698; Vol. VI, page 534.
7. “Five prosecutions were instituted at different times against persons charged with having enlisted or engaged men for the naval service of the Confederate States. Of these, three were successful. Five of the accused were convicted or pleaded guilty. * * * No prosecution appears to have been instituted against Bullock himself.” (Bernard’s Neutrality, pages 361–2.). This is a terribly small record, considering the magnitude of the offenses committed, and considering the zeal shown in repressing enlistments for the service of the United States. (See Vol. IV, page 547, and Vol. IV, page 540.) It is to be observed, too, that Mr. Adams furnished Lord Russell with evidence to sustain a prosecution against Bullock. (Mr. Adams to Earl Russell, March 30, 1863, Vol, III, page 130.)
1. See the affidavits in Vol. II, page 684, et seq.
2. Hansard, third series, Vol. 175, page 467; Vol. V, page 577.
1. Hansard, 3d series, Vol. CLXXV, pages 484–5.
2. Same, page 488.
3. Vol. II, page 703; Vol. VI, page 538.
4. Vol. II, page 710; Vol. VI, page 543.
5. Wilding to Seward, Vol. II, page 711; Vol. VI, page 543.
6. Vol. II, page 713; Vol. VI, page 545.
1. Earl Russell to Mr. Adams, Vol. II, page 719; Vol. VI, page 550.
1. Mr. Adams to Earl Russell, Vol. I, page 709: See Vol. VI, page 728.
2. Morse to Seward, Vol. VI, page 727.
3. Boreham’s affidavit, Vol. VI, page 732.
4. Mr. Jackson to Mr. Seward, 19th August, 1864, Vol. VI, page 728.
1. Wood to Mallory, 31st August, 1864, Vol. VI, page 729.
2. Manuscripts in Department of State; see Vol. VI, pages 723–4–5.
3. Dudley to Seward, 1st April, 1864. Only 697 bales came by way of Havana.
1. Manuscript dairy in the Department of State.
2. Bernard’s British Neutralty, page 359.
3. Cruise of the Shenandoah,” page 9.
4. Dudley to Seward and Morse to Seward, Vol. VI, page 555.
1. Dudley to Seward, Vol. III, page 319; Vol. VI, page 660.
2. Dudley to Seward, Vol. III, page 319.
3. Dudley to Seward, Vol. III, page 319; Vol. VI, page 560.
4. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 10.
5. Temple’s affidavit, Vol. III, page 478; Vol. VI, page 709.
6. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 11.
7. Dudley to Adams, Vol. III, page 316; Vol. VI, page 556.
8. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 16. See also Vol. III, page 318.
9. Dudley to Seward, Vol. III, page 317; Vol. VI, page 556.
10. Dudley to Seward, Vol. III, page 318; Vol. VI, page 557.
1. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 19.
2. Ellison’s affidavit, Vol. III, page 359; Vol. VI, page 580.
3. Harris’s affidavit, Vol. III, page 363; Vol. VI, page 584.
4. Cruise of the Shenandoah, pages 19, 20.
5. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 21.
6. Vol. III, page 363; Vol. VI, page 580. See also the other affidavits which follow this.
7. Vol. VI, page 572.
8. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 22.
9. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 23.
10. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 24.
11. Adams to Russell, Vol. III, page 323
12. Same to same, Vol. III, page 377.
1. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 93.
2. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 94.
3. Blanchard to Seward, Vol. III, page 384; Vol. VI, page 588.
4. See depositions in Vol. III, on pages 399, 401, 402, 405, 407, and 417. The same depositions may he found in Vol. VI. This point appears to have been settled beyond doubt. See extract from Melbourne Herald, Vol. VI, page 650.
1. See Mr. Blanchard’s dispatch to Mr. Seward, Vol. III, page 384.
2. Vol. III, page 394; Vol. VI, page 598.
3. Blanchard to Darling. Vol. VI, page 395; Vol. VI, page 598.
4. Blanchard to Darling, Vol. III, page 397; Vol. VI, page 609.
5. Blanchard to Darling, Vol. III, page 398; Vol. VI, page 602.
6. Vol. III, pages 403 and 404, 405 and 407. See also Vol. VI.
7. Vol. III, pages 414, 420, 423, 427, 428. See also Vol. VI.
8. Vol. III, page 425; Vol. VI, page 630.
9. Waddell to Darling Vol. V, page 599.
10. Francis to Waddell, Vol. V, page 599; Vol. VI, page 639.
1. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 97.
2. Vol. V, page 600; Vol. VI, page 640.
3. Francis to Waddell, Vol. V, page 600; Vol. VI, page 641.
4. Waddell to the Commissioner of Trade, Vol. V, page 600; Vol. VI, page 641.
5. Francis to Waddell, Vol. V, page 602; Vol. VI, page 644.
6. Francis to Waddell, Vol. V, page 602; Vol. VI, page 643.
7. Waddell to Francis, Vol. V, page 602; Vol. VI, page 644.
8. Francis to Waddell, Vol. V, page 602; Vol. VI, page 644.
9. Waddell to Francis, Vol. V, page 602; Vol. VI, page 644.
1. Vol. V, page 611; Vol. VI, page 680; et seq. It was in consequence of these doubts expressed by the Chief Secretary that the Consul furnished the evidence of the identity of the two vessels. Vol. III, page 386; Vol. VI, page 590.
2. Blanchard to Darling, Vol. III, page 420; Vol. VI, page 625.
3. Blanchard to Darling, Vol. III, page 414; Vol. VI, page 619.
4. Vol. III, page 421; Vol. VI, page 625.
5. Vol. III, page 422; Vol. VI, page 626.
6. The second section of the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819 made it illegal to procure any person to engage to enlist as a sailor in sea service under any person assuming to exercise any powers of government, or to agree to go from any part of Her Majesty’s dominions for the purpose of being so enlisted; and persons committing that offense were to be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and to be punished, on conviction, by fine or imprisonment, or both. It would be difficult to describe what Captain Waddell actually did at Melbourne in more accurate language than this.
7. Vol. V, page 618; Vol. VI, page 665.
8. Vol. V, page 618; Vol. VI, page 665.
1. Francis to Waddell, Vol. V., page 605; Vol. VI, page 647.
2. Ibid., Vol. V, page 605.
3. Vol. V, page 619; Vol. VI, page 666.
4. Vol. V, pages 620 and 667.
5. Blanchard to Darling, Vol. III, pages 425, 426; Vol. VI, page 630.
1. Lord to Blanchard, Vol. III, page 429; Vol. VI, page 635.
2. Vol. III, page 477: Vol. VI, page 709.
3. Vol. III, page 488: Vol. VI, page 719.
4. Vol. III, page 489; Vol. VI, page 727.
5. Vol. III, pages 489, 490; Vol. VI, page 721.
6. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 42.
7. Ibid., page 43.
8. Ibid., page 47.
9. Vol. III, pages 487–491; Vol. VI, page 718, et seq.
10. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 23.
1. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 113.
2. Vol. III, page 435; Vol. VI, page 683.
3. Vol. III, page 436; Vol. VI, page 684.
4. Vol. III, page 436; Vol. VI, page 685.
5. Bernard’s Neutrality, page 434.
6. Cruise of the Shenandoah, pages 63–94.
7. Schutcher’s affidavit, Vol. III, page 365; Vol. VI, page 586.
1. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 66.
2. Ibid., page 67.
3. Ibid., page 104.
4. Vol. III, page 401; Vol. VI, page 705.
5. It is true that the insurgents had no ports at that time which the Shenandoah could enter. Wilmington, the last of their ports, was closed by the capture of Fort Fisher. This, however, was an additional reason why the Shenandoah should not have been allowed to leave Melbourne, carrying a flag that had no port to receive it. See the correspondence between the United States and Portugal referred to ante, page 59.
6. Walker to Boggs; Vol. VI, pages 178–9.
1. Waddell to Francis, Vol. V, page 600; Vol. VI, page 640.
2. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 77.
1. Wilson’s affidavit, Vol. III, page 325; Vol. VI, page 566.
2. Temple’s affidavit, Vol. III, page 481; Vol. V, page 712.
3. Darling to Cardwell, Vol. III, page 506.
4. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 187.
1. Vol. III, pages 482, 483; Vol. VI, page 709, et seq. This statement by Temple is confirmed by Hathaway’s affidavit, Vol. VII, page 95.
2. Vol. III, page 458; Vol. VI, page 698.
3. Cruise of the Shenandoah, page 206.
4. London Times, November 8, 1865; Vol. III, page 449.
5. Cheek to Paynter, Vol. III, page 505.
6. Vol. III, page 475.
1. Vol. III, page 339.
2. Vol. III, page 341.
3. Vol. III, page 533.
1. Vol. III, page 599.
1. Vol. IV. page 3.
2. Vol. IV, page 4.
3. Vol. IV, page 6.
4. Vol. IV, page 7.
5. Mr. Harvey to Mr. Seward, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864, part 4, page 296.
6. Same to same, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865, part 3, page 109.
1. Vol. IV, page 8.
2. Vol. IV, page 9.
3. Vol. IV, page 10.
4. Vol. IV, page 9.
5. Vol. VI, page 538.
6. Mr. Fish to Mr. Motley, May 15, 1869, Vol. VI, page 4.