Mr. Perry to Mr. Seward
Sir:, At a conference between the Spanish minister of State and myself, which took place to-day at my house, the subject of your instruction No, 45, of November 15, was fully discussed.
Every conceivable argument was employed to obtain the result proposed by me in view of your instruction, as stated in my last, of December 2d; but I am sorry not to be able to report success.
Mr. Llorente said that, with all deference to the opinion of Mr. Seward, and with a most grateful appreciation of the kind offices of the President, he could not himself feel any confidence in the result of negotiations to be commenced here at this time.
The government of Peru seemed to be in a very unsettled condition. A new cabinet appeared on the scene every few weeks.
From the state of public opinion and of political parties in Peru, as represented to him, it was evident that any settlement arranged with a Peruvian negotiator at Madrid would be greatly exposed to a rejection at Lima.
The treaty of peace and recognition negotiated here by Mr. Asma some years since had met that fate. They would not abide by it.
[Page 469]I said that the case now was very different, as any settlement arrived at here in pursuance of the President’s advice would undoubtedly be supported by the influence of the United States for its acceptance at Lima.
Mr. Llorente was afraid it would be useless. The military preparations of Peru were being urged forward with all the haste their resources permitted. They might oblige the Spanish admiral to take hostile action at any moment. We did not even know whether hostilities had not already commenced. We did know that Peru was making every effort to prepare an expedition to attack the Spanish ships at anchor at the Chincha islands before their consorts should arrive.
Mr. Llorente mentioned the names and descriptions of the Peruvian vessels, and appeared to be well informed.
That attack might be made, or the Spanish commander might find himself placed in such circumstances as to feel obliged to make an attempt to destroy those preparations before they should be completed.
Mr. Lorente had no doubt of the result in either case, but this state of things was not favorable to any negotiation here.
Even if the Spanish government were to countermand its instructions to Admiral Pareja, or suspend their execution in view of President Lincoln’s advice to Peru, the time necessary for communication between Washington and Lima, and afterwards for the arrival at Madrid of a negotiator with instructions prepared in accordance with the President’s advice, would carry forward the day for beginning such negotiations into the month of February, at least, and it was impossible to calculate how much time would be consumed before a definite result could be arrived at and made known in the Pacific states.
Meantime the present indefinite state of things was giving rise to troublesome complications with the other Spanish-American states. Spain was already almost at war with Chili, without object or profit of any description. Everything counselled her Majesty’s government to bring this state of things to a close promptly one way or the other, and know, at least, precisely where they stood.
On the other hand, said Mr. Llorente, there was really nothing more for us to say or do here than what had been done already.
I had already been informed that the Spanish admiral would not move in this business of his own accord before January, and that then his first steps would not be hostile, but the reverse. This would certainly give time for the good counsel of the United States to be heard at Lima.
He regretted that the President had not thought it better to advise the government of Peru to negotiate on the spot with the plenipotentiary sent out by Spain for that purpose.
Perhaps that might yet be the result, if Mr. Seward, as was quite probable, should have again reflected upon the actual situation of this business.
Admiral Pareja had been furnished with full powers to negotiate with the government of Peru and bring this business to a settlement.
In reply to a remark of my own, tending to draw from him the precise character of the instructions finally given to Admiral Pareja, Mr. Llorente said, (and this statement, you will notice, amounts to a considerable modification of the communication made to me on the 13th of October,) that I might write to my government that the instructions of the Spanish admiral and plenipotentiary gave him discretionary power, and were exceedingly moderate and conciliatory, so much so that they could not fail to recommend themselves to Mr. Seward’s approbation.
With sentiments of the highest respect, sir, I remain your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.