Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams.
Sir: I fear that the press, speaking as it does under the influence of a hundred various forms of excitement arising out of the incidents of the last ten days, will bewilder, if it does not for the moment confound, our representatives abroad.
The military situation is, however, clearly intelligible, and ought to be satisfactory to the cool and candid judgment of the country.
From the Mississippi we learn that after a long and vigorous bombardment of Vicksburg, Commodore Farragut passed the batteries at that place from below, and joined himself to the fleet which lay above it. Thus the last obstacle of the navigation of the Mississippi has been overcome, and it is open to trade once more under the flag of the Union from the headwaters of its tributaries near the lakes and Prince Rupert’s Land to the Gulf of Mexico.
White river and the Yazoo have been cleared of all hostile armaments. We have a rumor that Vicksburg has actually been taken. But the report is premature, although we have no doubt but the capture has, before this time, occurred.
The fleet under Commodore Goldsborough has been efficient in seizing and bringing into port many British vessels carrying contraband, and insured at Lloyd’s against the perils of the blockade. So that it may be expected risks of this kind will sensibly diminish. On the coast all is safe and well.
In the west General Halleck is pushing a force from Corinth eastward without any show of organized resistance to capture Chattanooga, and close the only remaining railroad communication between Richmond and the valley of [Page 125] the Mississippi. This achievement will effect deliverance of Eastern Tennessee, distinguished for its loyalty, and so crown the pacification of the whole region west of the Alleghany mountains, north of Georgia and Alabama, and south of the Ohio river. But it is the vicinity of Richmond that has been the scene of military events of the intensest interest during the last two weeks, and it is that quarter that now chiefly engages the attention of the government.
General McClellan’s original design for the capture of Richmond embraced a march up the peninsula from Fortress Monroe and Yorktown, supported by naval forces on both the York and the James river. The sudden appearance of the Merrimack, with her terrible power of mischief, obliged him to confine his march to the bank of the York river, with the aid of a fleet in that river alone. He had, then, the Chickahominy, with its variable flow, and its almost impassable swamps, between him and Richmond. The Pamunkey, the chief tributary of the York, afforded him navigation only to the White House, where he held his forces, twenty miles from Richmond, without any other co-operation from our naval force on both rivers there than protection they afforded to his rear. A large force that was intended to be auxiliary to the army of the Potomac was retained in front of Washington, necessarily, as it was thought, with a view to the safety of the capital against forces sent to menace it from Richmond. While General McClellan was thus obtaining a foothold on the peninsula north of the Chickahominy, the insurgents succeeded in obstructing the James river a distance of seven miles below Richmond, and in constructing fortifications at Fort Darling, up a precipitous elevation on the south bank of the James river, which rendered it impossible for the fleet on that river to remove the obstructions without the aid of a land force to carry that fort. General McClellan was steadily, and, as it seemed, successfully, moving his army across the Chickahominy to change his base to the James river, below Fort Darling, on Wednesday last, when the insurgents concentrated large forces upon what was yet the front of the moving column, and a series of battles began which filled up seven successive days, at the end of which the general, with his army, and substantially all his material, had reached and established himself at Harrison’s Bar, upon the bank of the James river, in full co-operation with the fleet of seventeen gunboats, while the insurgents have not one man-of-war. This movement, which was a meditated, prepared one, undoubtedly became a retreat when the enemy pressed upon the withdrawing forces. The change of base involved a loss of communication for a time between the army and the government and the country. During this suspense, which lasted seven days, extravagant reports of disasters and losses, and the wildest alarm for even the safety of the army itself, obtained currency, and oppressed the public mind. At length we have the results so far as they affect the military situation. There have been immense losses, but more severe on the part of the insurgents than on that of the Union. The efficiency of the army of the latter is improved. That of the former, it is believed, is even more reduced. Every one of the battles was a repulse of the insurgents, and the two last, which closed the series, were decided victories. The army of the Potomac is rapidly receiving reinforcements from several sources, while the fleet is thought already equal in effect to an additional army. General Pope, having taken command of all the troops in Virginia, is pushing them forward from the north to cut off the railroad communication beyond the Rappahannock, and threatens them on the approach from the northwest. Within the next thirty days our navy, already large, will receive an augmentation of ten new iron-clad vessels, each equal to the Monitor. At the same time, the President, upon the invitation of the [Page 126] governors of twenty of the thirty-four States, has called out three hundred thousand men, a force amply sufficient to save all that has been gained, and speedily close the civil strife.
You will read with interest and admiration General McClellan’s modest conduct; his firm and decisive despatches and proclamation. The government and popular bodies who have heretofore been so efficient in filling up the armies are already in activity, and the prompt success of the call is deemed assured. The destruction of human life which has occurred is a sad and painful theme. But it brings its compensation in a military and in a political view—aspects in which it is now our stern duty to contemplate it. The delusion that the soldiers of the Union would not fight for it with as much courage and resolution as its enemies will fight against it, has been one of the chief elements of the insurrection. It has now been effectually dispelled.
Secondly. If, as fatalists argue, a certain quantity of human blood must flow to appease the dreadful spirit of faction, and enable a discontented people to recover its calmness and its reason, it may be hoped that the needful sacrifice has now been made.
Thirdly. If the representative parties had now to choose whether they would have the national army where it is and as it is, or back again where it was and as it was, it is not to be doubted that the insurgents would prefer to it the position and condition on the Pamunkey, and the friends of the Union the one now attained on the bank of the James.
Fourthly. The insurgents and the world abroad will see that the virtue of the people is adequate to the responsibilities which Providence has cast upon them.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.